What is HACIENDA?

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Creating agency: NSA, GCHQ, CSE National Security Agency (US), Government Communications Headquarters (UK), Communications Security Establishment (Canada)
Document date: -
Pages: 26
Genre: slides
Banner:
Classification: TOP SECRET STRAP 1 COMINT
Dissemination: REL FVEY

This document details HACIENDA, a large-scale reconnaissance tool used by GCHQ and the Five Eyes alliance to perform automated port scanning and vulnerability mapping across entire nations. It outlines the technical process of identifying and exploiting network infrastructure, specifically for the purpose of discovering Operational Relay Boxes (ORBs) to facilitate covert "Computer Network Exploitation" (CNE).

Long Description:
HACIENDA serves as a primary data reconnaissance engine for the Joint Threat Research Intelligence Group (JTRIG), utilizing industry-standard tools like nmap and GEOFUSION to scan every IP address within a targeted country. By retrieving hostnames, banners, and application data from common ports (such as HTTP, HTTPS, and FTP), the system builds a comprehensive "Network Knowledge Base." This automated approach allows intelligence agencies to move away from manual analysis, enabling them to identify vulnerable devices and potential entry points into foreign networks in under five minutes. The document also integrates the LANDMARK and MUGSHOT programs, which focus on the automated characterization of every machine on the internet. These systems use the data gathered by HACIENDA to create "Vulnerability Profiles," tracking everything from operating system versions to patch histories and browser usage. By sharing this intelligence via the MAILORDER transport system, GCHQ and its partners (CSEC, DSD and NSA NTOC) maintain a global infrastructure of hijacked "ORBs" that provide non-attribution for their own hacking operations, categorized under the "R.I.C.E." framework: Reconnaissance, Infection, Command and Control, and Exfiltration.

What is HACIENDA?

  • Data reconnaissance tool developed by the CITD team in JTRIG
  • Port Scans entire countries
    • Uses nmap as port scanning tool
    • Uses GEOFUSION for IP Geolocation
    • Randomly scans every IP identified for that country

UK TOP SECRET STRAP1
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY


Countries

  • Completed full scans of 27 countries including
    • [REDACTED]
    • [REDACTED]
    • [REDACTED]
    • [REDACTED]
    • [REDACTED]
    • [REDACTED]
  • Completed partial scans of 5 additional countries

UK TOP SECRET STRAP1
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY


Tasking & Access

  • To task HACIENDA with a Country or Subnet
    • [REDACTED]@gchq.gov.uk)
    • CITD alias [REDACTED]@gchq.gov.uk)
  • Access to the Data
    • At GCHQ, request a GLOBAL SURGE account from [REDACTED]@gchq.gov.uk)
    • At CSEC, contact [REDACTED]
    • At NSA, contact [REDACTED]
    • At DSD, contact [REDACTED]

UK TOP SECRET STRAP1
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY


Ports

  • Pulls back hostname, banners, application names and port status
  • Gathers additional information for...
    • 21 (ftp): directory listing
    • 80 (http): content of main page
    • 443 (https): content of main page
    • 111 (rpc): results of rpcinfo

UK TOP SECRET STRAP1
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY


Host 1 -> SYN (SEQ = x) -> Host 2
Host 2 -> SYN (SEQ = y, ACK = x + 1) -> Host 1
Host 1 -> (SEQ = x + 1, ACK = y + 1) -> Host 2


Host 1 -> SYN (SEQ = x) -> Host 2
Host 2 -> RST (SEQ = y, ACK = x + 1) -> Host 1


The Results...

  • All stored in JTRIG's internal database
  • Available in GLOBAL SURGE
    • NAC's Network Knowledge Base Prototype
  • Transferred by MAILORDER to
    • CSEC
    • DSD
    • NSA NTOC

UK TOP SECRET STRAP1
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY


How is it used?

  • CNE
    • ORB Detection
    • Vulnerability Assessments
  • SD
    • Network Analysis
    • Target Discovery

UK TOP SECRET STRAP1
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY


NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
SIGDEV
SIGINT DEVELOPMENT

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

The Hacking Process

  1. (R)econnaissance
  2. (I)nfection
  3. (C)ommand And Control
  4. (E)xfiltration

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
SIGDEV
SIGINT DEVELOPMENT

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Reconnaissance

Publicly Available Information
(Email Address, Location, Network Info, Passwords, etc.)

Research

Hacker

  • Enumerate (Network)
  • Scan (Services)
  • Operating Systems
  • Versions
  • Domain Names

Victim

Reconnaissance Infection Command and Control Exfiltration

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
SIGDEV
SIGINT DEVELOPMENT

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Infection

Hacker
Email with Attachment or Link
Victim
Special Packets to Exploit Services
Use Login Credentials
Bad Web Site

Reconnaissance Infection Command and Control Exfiltration

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
SIGDEV
SIGINT DEVELOPMENT

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Command and Control

Hacker
Push Tools and Send Commands (Tasking, Survey, etc.)
Victim
Beacons and Responses

Reconnaissance Infection Command and Control Exfiltration

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
SIGDEV
SIGINT DEVELOPMENT

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Exfiltration

Exfil using known and custom protocols (Known: HTTP, SMTP, ICMP, FTP, etc)
Victim
Hacker

Reconnaissance Infection Command and Control Exfiltration

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
SIGDEV
SIGINT DEVELOPMENT

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Reconnaissance

This system is audited for USSID 18 and Human Rights Act compliance
CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

X-KEYSCORE C2C Session Viewer

Datetime            Case Notation    From IP    To IP      From Port To Port Protocol
2012-05-16 13:03:20 2CBAB00000M0210  [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 01701     01701   icmp

Session | Header (3) | Meta (7) | GENESIS | Contexts (1)

Formatter: WIRESHARD | Send to: Download Session | Mode: Snippet | Options | Search Content: Enter text to search

Quick Clicks
* Session
* One-Click Searches
  * Find fingerprint
    * selector/cadence/task
    * udp/tunnel/ipv4
    * netmanagement/icmp/e
  * Find traffic on
  * Find application
    * netmanagement/icmp

Internet Protocol, Src: 8.8.8.8 (8.8.8.8), Dst: 192.168.0.83 (192.168.0.83)
Version: 4
Header length: 20 bytes
Differentiated Services Field: 0x00 (DSCP 0x00: Default; ECN: 0x00)
    0000 00.. = Differentiated Services Codepoint: Default (0x00)
    .... ..0. = ECN-Capable Transport (ECT): 0
    .... ...0 = ECN-CE: 0
Total Length: 60
Identification: 0x2d3c (11560)
Flags: 0x00
    0... = Reserved bit: Not set
    .0.. = Don't fragment: Not set
    ..0. = More fragments: Not set
Fragment offset: 0
Time to live: 51
Protocol: ICMP (0x01)
Header checksum: 0x897a [correct]
    [Good: True]
    [Bad: False]
Source: 8.8.8.8 (8.8.8.8)
Destination: 192.168.0.83 (192.168.0.83)
Internet Control Message Protocol
Type: 0 (Echo (ping) reply)
Code: 0
Checksum: 0x51ec [correct]
Identifier: 0x0001
Sequence number: 623 (0x026f)
Data (32 bytes)
    0000 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f 70      abcdefghijklmnop
    0010 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69      qrstuwwabcdefghi

Reconnaissance Infection Command and Control Exfiltration

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
SIGDEV
SIGINT DEVELOPMENT

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Password Guessing

USER Administrator
PASS #mafiavafute197532@%!?*
USER Administrator
PASS sh3l5l1k3p4rty3v3r
USER Administrator
PASS Sh3I5Lik3P4rtY@v3r
USER Administrator
PASS Sh5I8LiK6P8rtY6v5r
USER Administrator
PASS kalimero4cappy
USER Administrator
PASS P@ssword
USER Administrator
PASS P@sswOrd
USER Administrator
PASS P@ssw0rd

Iraqi Ministry of Finance

Reconnaissance Infection Command and Control Exfiltration

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
SIGDEV
SIGINT DEVELOPMENT

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Windows cmd.exe

C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe
Microsoft Windows XP [Version 5.1.2600]
(C) Copyright 1985-2001 Microsoft Corp.

U:\>_

Reconnaissance Infection Command and Control Exfiltration

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT

Communications Security Establishment
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications

Presentation Outline

  • LANDMARK – automated tradecraft to further expand CNE covert infrastructure
  • [REDACTED]

Canada
2


TOP SECRET//COMINT

Communications Security Establishment
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications

LANDMARK

  • CSEC's Operational Relay Box (ORB) covert infrastructure used to provide an additional level of non-attribution; subsequently used for exploits and exfiltration
  • 2-3 times/year, 1 day focused effort to acquire as many new ORBs as possible in as many non 5-Eyes countries as possible

Canada
3


TOP SECRET//COMINT

Communications Security Establishment
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications

LANDMARK – the recent past....

  • February 2010
  • Operation encompassing the whole of LONGRUN solely using OLYMPIA (CSEC's network knowledge engine with automated tradecraft)
  • 8 teams of 3 network exploitation analysts busy for 5-8 hours
  • A list of 3000+ potential ORBs

Canada
5


TOP SECRET//COMINT

Communications Security Establishment
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications

Olympia version 0.5.0
File Tools Window Help
Olympia | Gimme all you got
Gimme all you got | Gimme all you got by Country

Search
Continent: africa
Country: kenya
Date Range: Last 30 Days
Start Date:
End Date:

Commands
☐ Show VPNs
☐ Show Toygrippe Range Events
☐ Show CND Event Summaries
☐ Show User Online Events on IP
☐ Show router configuration information (TIDAL SURGE)
☐ Show IP Communications
☐ Show Geolocation Information
☐ Show Network Information
☐ Show SIGINT Observable Feature Information
☐ Show Survey Information
☐ Show Geolocation Map
☐ Reverse DNS Lookup
☑ Show Port Scans on IP

Africa View (JPA) (10000)
Showing page 1
Source System First Seen Last Seen Hostname IP Port Protocol Status TTL Product Version Banner Information
GCHQ Hacienda Tue May 26 08:11:03 GMT 2009 Tue May 26 08:11:03 GMT 2009 [REDACTED] 80 tcp filtered 0 unknown unknown unknown
GCHQ Hacienda Tue May 26 08:11:03 GMT 2009 Tue May 26 08:11:03 GMT 2009 [REDACTED] 110 tcp filtered 0 unknown unknown unknown
GCHQ Hacienda Tue May 26 08:11:03 GMT 2009 Tue May 26 08:11:03 GMT 2009 [REDACTED] 111 tcp filtered 0 unknown unknown unknown
GCHQ Hacienda Tue May 26 08:11:03 GMT 2009 Tue May 26 08:11:03 GMT 2009 [REDACTED] 161 tcp filtered 0 unknown unknown unknown
GCHQ Hacienda Tue May 26 08:11:03 GMT 2009 Tue May 26 08:11:03 GMT 2009 [REDACTED] 162 tcp filtered 0 unknown unknown unknown
GCHQ Hacienda Tue May 26 08:11:03 GMT 2009 Tue May 26 08:11:03 GMT 2009 [REDACTED] 443 tcp filtered 0 unknown unknown unknown
GCHQ Hacienda Tue May 26 08:11:03 GMT 2009 Tue May 26 08:11:03 GMT 2009 [REDACTED] 500 tcp filtered 0 unknown unknown unknown
GCHQ Hacienda Tue May 26 07:07:29 GMT 2009 Tue May 26 07:07:29 GMT 2009 [REDACTED] 0 unknown unreachable 0 unknown unknown unknown
GCHQ Hacienda Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 [REDACTED] 110 tcp open 0 Kerio MailServer POP3 Server 6.3.2 4152.1242730171@kcv_svr
GCHQ Hacienda Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 [REDACTED] 443 tcp open 0 Kerio MailServer Webmail 6.3.2 unknown
GCHQ Hacienda Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 [REDACTED] 25 tcp open 0 Microsoft ESMTP 6.0.3790.3959 unknown
GCHQ Hacienda Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 [REDACTED] 80 tcp open 0 Microsoft IIS webserver 6.0 unknown
GCHQ Hacienda Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 [REDACTED] 21 tcp open 0 Microsoft ftp unknown unknown
GCHQ Hacienda Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 [REDACTED] 22 tcp closed 0 unknown unknown unknown
GCHQ Hacienda Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 [REDACTED] 23 tcp closed 0 unknown unknown unknown
GCHQ Hacienda Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 [REDACTED] 111 tcp closed 0 unknown unknown unknown
GCHQ Hacienda Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 [REDACTED] 161 tcp closed 0 unknown unknown unknown
GCHQ Hacienda Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 [REDACTED] 162 tcp closed 0 unknown unknown unknown
GCHQ Hacienda Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 [REDACTED] 443 tcp closed 0 unknown unknown unknown
GCHQ Hacienda Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 [REDACTED] 21 tcp closed 0 unknown unknown unknown
GCHQ Hacienda Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 [REDACTED] 22 tcp closed 0 unknown unknown unknown
GCHQ Hacienda Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 [REDACTED] 23 tcp closed 0 unknown unknown unknown
GCHQ Hacienda Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 [REDACTED] 25 tcp open 0 unknown unknown unknown
GCHQ Hacienda Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 [REDACTED] 80 tcp open 0 unknown unknown unknown
GCHQ Hacienda Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 [REDACTED] 110 tcp closed 0 unknown unknown unknown
GCHQ Hacienda Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 [REDACTED] 111 tcp closed 0 unknown unknown unknown
GCHQ Hacienda Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 [REDACTED] 161 tcp closed 0 unknown unknown unknown
GCHQ Hacienda Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 [REDACTED] 162 tcp closed 0 unknown unknown unknown
GCHQ Hacienda Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 [REDACTED] 443 tcp open 0 unknown unknown unknown
GCHQ Hacienda Tue May 26 04:17:40 GMT 2009 Tue May 26 04:17:40 GMT 2009 [REDACTED] 21 tcp closed 0 unknown unknown unknown
GCHQ Hacienda Tue May 26 04:17:40 GMT 2009 Tue May 26 04:17:40 GMT 2009 [REDACTED] 22 tcp closed 0 unknown unknown unknown
GCHQ Hacienda Tue May 26 04:17:40 GMT 2009 Tue May 26 04:17:40 GMT 2009 [REDACTED] 23 tcp closed 0 unknown unknown unknown
GCHQ Hacienda Tue May 26 04:17:40 GMT 2009 Tue May 26 04:17:40 GMT 2009 [REDACTED] 25 tcp open 0 unknown unknown unknown
GCHQ Hacienda Tue May 26 04:17:40 GMT 2009 Tue May 26 04:17:40 GMT 2009 [REDACTED] 80 tcp open 0 unknown unknown unknown
GCHQ Hacienda Tue May 26 04:17:40 GMT 2009 Tue May 26 04:17:40 GMT 2009 [REDACTED] 110 tcp closed 0 unknown unknown unknown
GCHQ Hacienda Tue May 26 04:17:40 GMT 2009 Tue May 26 04:17:40 GMT 2009 [REDACTED] 111 tcp closed 0 unknown unknown unknown
GCHQ Hacienda Tue May 26 04:17:40 GMT 2009 Tue May 26 04:17:40 GMT 2009 [REDACTED] 161 tcp closed 0 unknown unknown unknown
GCHQ Hacienda Tue May 26 04:17:40 GMT 2009 Tue May 26 04:17:40 GMT 2009 [REDACTED] 162 tcp closed 0 unknown unknown unknown
GCHQ Hacienda Tue Jun 17 00:13:34 GMT 2008 Tue Jun 17 00:13:34 GMT 2008 [REDACTED] 0 unknown unreachable 0 unknown unknown unknown
GCHQ Hacienda Tue Jun 17 00:13:34 GMT 2008 Tue Jun 17 00:13:34 GMT 2008 [REDACTED] 0 unknown unreachable 0 unknown unknown unknown
GCHQ Hacienda Tue Jun 17 00:13:33 GMT 2008 Tue Jun 17 00:13:33 GMT 2008 [REDACTED] 0 unknown unreachable 0 unknown unknown unknown
GCHQ Hacienda Tue Jun 17 00:12:49 GMT 2008 Tue Jun 17 00:12:49 GMT 2008 [REDACTED] 0 unknown unreachable 0 unknown unknown unknown
GCHQ Hacienda Tue Jun 17 00:13:50 GMT 2008 Tue Jun 17 00:13:50 GMT 2008 [REDACTED] 0 unknown unreachable 0 unknown unknown unknown
GCHQ Hacienda Tue Jun 17 00:13:59 GMT 2008 Tue Jun 17 00:13:59 GMT 2008 [REDACTED] 0 unknown unreachable 0 unknown unknown unknown
GCHQ Hacienda Tue Jun 17 00:00:29 GMT 2008 Tue Jun 17 00:00:29 GMT 2008 [REDACTED] 0 unknown unreachable 0 unknown unknown unknown
GCHQ Hacienda Tue Jun 17 00:03:13 GMT 2008 Tue Jun 17 00:03:13 GMT 2008 [REDACTED] 0 unknown unreachable 0 unknown unknown unknown
GCHQ Hacienda Tue Jun 17 07:01:12 GMT 2008 Tue Jun 17 07:01:12 GMT 2008 [REDACTED] 0 unknown unreachable 0 unknown unknown unknown
GCHQ Hacienda Tue Jul 07 07:30:40 GMT 2009 Wed Feb 03 11:13:34 GMT 2010 80-247-147-41.reverse.newskies.net [REDACTED] 0 unknown unreachable 0 unknown unknown unknown
GCHQ Hacienda Tue Jul 07 07:32:20 GMT 2009 Wed Feb 03 11:14:55 GMT 2010 80-247-147-42.reverse.newskies.net [REDACTED] 0 unknown unreachable 0 unknown unknown unknown
GCHQ Hacienda Tue Jul 07 07:31:23 GMT 2009 Wed Feb 03 11:15:34 GMT 2010 80-247-147-43.reverse.newskies.net [REDACTED] 0 unknown unreachable 0 unknown unknown unknown
GCHQ Hacienda Tue Jul 07 07:32:11 GMT 2009 Wed Feb 03 11:12:30 GMT 2010 80-247-147-42.reverse.newskies.net [REDACTED] 0 unknown unreachable 0 unknown unknown unknown
GCHQ Hacienda Tue Jul 07 07:30:20 GMT 2009 Wed Feb 03 11:15:11 GMT 2010 80-247-147-44.reverse.newskies.net [REDACTED] 0 unknown unreachable 0 unknown unknown unknown
GCHQ Hacienda Tue Jul 07 07:32:14 GMT 2009 Wed Feb 03 11:13:15 GMT 2010 80-247-147-45.reverse.newskies.net [REDACTED] 0 unknown unreachable 0 unknown unknown unknown
GCHQ Hacienda Tue Jul 07 07:32:13 GMT 2009 Wed Feb 03 11:13:15 GMT 2010 80-247-147-46.reverse.newskies.net [REDACTED] 0 unknown unreachable 0 unknown unknown unknown
GCHQ Hacienda Tue Jul 07 06:49:57 GMT 2009 Wed Feb 03 11:14:00 GMT 2010 80-247-147-46.reverse.newskies.net [REDACTED] 0 unknown unreachable 0 unknown unknown unknown
GCHQ Hacienda Tue Jul 07 07:47:17 GMT 2009 Wed Feb 03 11:14:06 GMT 2010 80-247-147-47.reverse.newskies.net [REDACTED] 0 unknown unreachable 0 unknown unknown unknown
GCHQ Hacienda Tue Jul 07 07:06:18 GMT 2009 Wed Feb 03 12:02:07 GMT 2010 [REDACTED] 0 unknown unreachable 0 unknown unknown unknown
GCHQ Hacienda Tue Jun 17 00:30:20 GMT 2008 Tue Jun 17 00:30:20 GMT 2008 pool2-gw.emperion.net [REDACTED] 23 tcp open 0 Cisco router unknown unknown
GCHQ Hacienda Tue Jun 17 00:06:36 GMT 2008 Tue Jun 17 00:06:36 GMT 2008 [REDACTED] 0 unknown unreachable 0 unknown unknown unknown

BUT, network analysis still manual!

Canada
6


TOP SECRET//COMINT

Communications Security Establishment
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications

LANDMARK today...

  • Network analysis tradecraft to determine vulnerable devices has been encoded within OLYMPIA

[REDACTED]

Canada
7


TOP SECRET//COMINT

Communications Security Establishment
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications

  • [REDACTED] GSM provider
  • NSA TAO requested assistance gaining access to the network
  • Network analysis using OLYMPIA:
    • DNS query to determine IP address
    • IP address to network range
    • Network range to port scan
    • Are there any vulnerable devices in that range?
  • Duration: < 5 minutes

Canada
8


UK TOP SECRET STRAP I

Use Case 1: Finding Orbs

  • Combine Harvester
  • Mugshot QFD
  • Etc..
  • Hacienda
  • DNS
  • Geo Fusion
  • CNE Orbs
  • Mugshot Control

MUGSHOT CORE – Q/A Framework

  • Vulnerability Profile
  • Potential Orbs
    • Highnote
      • Orbs
        GCHQ
        © Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.

UK TOP SECRET STRAP I

Benefits

  • Automated Vulnerability Assessment
    • Using Vulnerability Profiles for Remote and Content Delivery vectors
  • Automated Target Development and Monitoring**
    • Identify and characterise target machines
  • Profiles machines, including:
    • Browser, OS, PSP, Patch History
    • Activity
    • Download
  • Automated Target Technology Tracking (Stats & Trends)
    • Browsers, OS, PSP etc
  • ORB Identification
    • Initial ten fold increase in Orb Identification rate over manual process

GCHQ
© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.


UK TOP SECRET STRAP I

Defining Attributes

Attribute Definition

  • Name
  • Description
  • Type
  • Data sources

Machine Attributes

  • Open port (25, 80, 443)
  • Server banner (Server: Apache)
  • PSP fingerprint (Kaspersky v7.01)
  • XFF (192.168.2.1)
  • Web Request (test.exe, file.pdf)
  • DNS Name (webhost.com)
  • SNMP sysname

Machine Communication Attributes

  • FTP login
  • DNS Request
  • HTTPS connection

GCHQ
© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.


UK TOP SECRET STRAP I

MUGSHOT GOALS

  • Automated Target Characterisation and Monitoring
    • Automatically understand everything important about CNE target networks from passive and active sources.
  • Automated Un-Targeted Characterisation
    • Automatically understand everything important about all machines on the Internet from passive and active sources.

GCHQ
© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.