Automated NOC detection

Open PDF
Creating agency: GCHQ Government Communications Headquarters (UK)
Document date: 2011-01-01
Pages: 25
Genre: slides
Banner:
Classification: TOP SECRET STRAP 2
Dissemination: -

This slide deck lays out how GCHQ and Canada’s CSEC systematically identified and penetrated Network Operations Centers—most notably Belgacom—by automating NOC discovery and weaponizing that mapping for QUANTUM INSERT attacks. It reads like a blueprint for turning router configs, metadata, and bulk scans into cookie-based targeting against telecom engineers inside core networks.

Long Description:
The document details a multi‑phase effort to “find my NOC,” beginning with parsing router configuration files and ACLs to pinpoint privileged management ranges (NOCTURNAL SURGE), then modeling the tradecraft in Pentaho to scale across autonomous systems and countries with shared schemas (TIDAL SURGE, OLYMPIA). In parallel, GCHQ’s 5‑Alive and CSEC’s HYPERION harvest 5‑tuple metadata—especially SNMP and TELNET—to infer which IPs act as management terminals, distinguishing legitimate operator logins from scanning and password‑guessing. Where configs are missing, HACIENDA bulk port scanning fills gaps by enumerating hallmark NOC services. The result is a fused confidence‑ranked map of NOC IP ranges across ISPs and mobile operators. Once the ranges are locked in, the playbook pivots from discovery to exploitation: selectors are pulled from NOC traffic in MUTANT BROTH—Google PREFID, Yahoo cookies, LinkedIn IDs—feeding real‑time dashboards (NRTA) for QUANTUM INSERT against named staff. The slides repeatedly reference Belgacom, including GRX router banners and Brussels‑geolocated NOC IPs, making clear the program’s in‑country focus despite the warnings that such prefix queries are “more likely to retrieve the communications of innocent individuals.” The tone is clinical, but the stakes are unmistakable: a Five Eyes joint capability that turns the heart of a European telecom’s operations into an attack surface.
Programs:
SURGE, NOCTURNALSURGE, RT, NACSHACK, CHAINGUARD, TIDALSURGE, GLOBALSURGE, PENTAHO, OLYMPIA, HYPERION, TERMINALSURGE, HACIENDA, QUANTUMINSERT, MUTANTBROTH, OPSOCIALIST, SAMUEL PEPYS, GEOFUSION, FIVEALIVE, NRTA, RADIUS

People mentioned:
-

Countries:
Luxembourg, Belgium, Netherlands, United States

Tags:
signals intelligence, telecommunications, telecommunications infrastructure, mobile networks, carrier networks, roaming infrastructure, international interconnects, backbones, packet backbone, autonomous systems, BGP, peering relationships, transit providers, Operation Socialist, BELGACOM, Belgian telecom, GRX, GPRS, CSEC, Five Eyes, NAC, Network Analysis Centre, 5-Alive, ACL, access control, VTY, SSH, telnet, SNMP, SYSLOG, DNS, TACACS, router configuration, CIDR blocks, Global Database, IPv4, port scanning, Metadata fusion, 5-tuple, selectors, selector targeting, TDI, cookies, Google, Yahoo cookies, LinkedIn, User-Agent, NRTA, IP prefix search, HHFP, Presence events, NAT, proxies, network management, management plane, routers, TCP, UDP, NTP, TFTP, NetBIOS, Mobile OMCs, ISP NOCs, tradecraft automation, Computer Network Exploitation, Brussels, Mechelen, Internet Service Providers

Identifier:
gchq-automated-noc-detection

PDF SHA-256:
5776d07736307256c3d1b03bc6e9f274fae8aca6f3ac2d901e3f644bcf89dd4b

TOP SECRET STRAP 2

NAC
NETWORK ANALYSIS CENTRE

Automated NOC Detection

[REDACTED], Head of GCHQ NAC
[REDACTED], Senior Network Analyst, CSEC NAC

NAC
NETWORK ANALYSIS CENTRE

This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ o[REDACTED]


TOP SECRET STRAP 2

Challenge

  • SDC 2009 – Challenged the Network Analysis community to automate the detection of Network Operations Centres

NAC
NETWORK ANALYSIS CENTRE

This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ o[REDACTED]


TOP SECRET STRAP 2

Phase 1: Intelligent Router Configuration File Parsing

  • Routers have numerous services running on them that help identify the NOC IP ranges:
    • SSH
    • TELNET/VTY
    • SNMP
    • SYSLOG
    • DNS
    • TACACS
    • RADIUS
  • Access to these services tends to be locked down by the use of Access Control Lists (ACLs)
  • Configuration files provide details of how services are configured.

NAC
NETWORK ANALYSIS CENTRE
This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ o[REDACTED]


TOP SECRET STRAP 2

NOCTURNAL SURGE

  • GCHQ response to challenge.
  • Early Prototype that looks at only:
    • ACLs for SSH/TELNET
    • ACLs for VTY

NOCTURNAL SURGE
aka Find my NOC

NAC
NETWORK ANALYSIS CENTRE

This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ o[REDACTED]


NOCTURNAL SURGE::HomePage - Mozilla Firefox
File Edit View History Bookmarks Tools Help
[REDACTED] fkb
gchq-web research sigdev search task-tgting Analysis tools PROGRAMMES press Discover Gforge-UK Gforge GTAC Tasking DB OpsTracker RTC RT NacShack Investor NAC1011NSRCS 1112-FTE CHAIN GUARD
NOCTURNAL SURGE::HomePage FIVE ALIVE FIVE ALIVE FKB IPv4 AS Search

SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
NAC
NETWORK ANALYSIS CENTRE

Corp Directory "Change Password" Login

PO
We

Global Database
AS query
ACLs for TELNET/SSH (Ports 23/22)
ACLs applied to VTY Lines

Enter an AS: [REDACTED] kapow!

Project Database
Project Query
ACLs for TELNET/SSH (Ports 23/22)
ACLs applied to VTY Lines

Select Project: [REDACTED] kapow!

Recent Updates:

20110118 - v0.2
Added Server Information from TIDAL SURGE 'Services Used' Data for Projects and Global DB
Added collapsible sections for above where number of Servers > 5
Changed colour scheme to hi-light unrecognised ACL bitmasks that do not convert to CIDR in RED and CIDR blocks in YELLOW

20110105 - v0.1

Done

NOCTURNAL SURGE::A[REDACTED] - Mozilla Firefox
File Edit View History Bookmarks Tools Help
[REDACTED] fkb
gchq-web research sigdev search task-tgting Analysis tools PROGRAMMES press Discover Gforge-UK Gforge GTAC Tasking DB OpsTracker RTC RT NacShack Investor NAC1011NSRCS 1112-FTE CHAIN GUARD
NOCTURNAL SURGE::A[REDACTED] FIVE ALIVE FIVE ALIVE FKB IPv4 AS Search

SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
NAC
NETWORK ANALYSIS CENTRE

NOCTURNAL
SURGE

aka Find my NOC in AS[REDACTED]

<-- Back to Query Page

- Summary Results [416 available]
Occurrences Source Network Source Mask ACL Name Servers GLOBALSURGE IP Queries
89 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 11 [REDACTED] IP Query Range Query
89 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 11 [REDACTED] IP Query Range Query
86 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 11 [REDACTED] IP Query Range Query
86 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]5 (/32) [REDACTED] [REDACTED]YSLOG[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
83 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]5 (/32) [REDACTED] [REDACTED]NMPTR[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]YSLOG[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] 11
72 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 11 IP Query Range Query
62 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 11 SYSLOG [REDACTED] IP Query Range Query
62 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 11 IP Query Range Query
62 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 11 IP Query Range Query
61 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 11 IP Query Range Query
61 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 11 IP Query Range Query
60 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 11 IP Query Range Query
60 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 11 IP Query Range Query
59 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 11 IP Query Range Query

NOCTURNAL SURGE::HomePage - Mozilla Firefox
File Edit View History Bookmarks Tools Help
[REDACTED] fkb
gchq-web research sigdev search task-tgting Analysis tools PROGRAMMES press Discover Gforge-UK Gforge GTAC Tasking DB OpsTracker RTC RT NacShack Investor NAC1011NSRCS 1112-FTE CHAIN GUARD
NOCTURNAL SURGE::HomePage FIVE ALIVE FIVE ALIVE FKB IPv4 AS Search

SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
NAC
NETWORK ANALYSIS CENTRE

Corp Directory "Change Password" Login

NOCTURNAL SURGE
aka Find my NOC

POC [REDACTED] (OPD-NAC)
Welcome[REDACTED]Business U[REDACTED]

Global Database
AS query
ACLs for TELNET/SSH (Ports 23/22)
ACLs applied to VTY Lines
Enter an AS: [REDACTED] kapow!

atabase
ry
LNET/SSH (Ports 23/22)
to VTY Lines
[REDACTED] kapow!

Recent Updates:

20110118-v0.2
* Added Server Information from TIDAL SURGE 'Services Used' Data for Projects and Global DB
* Added collapsible sections for above where number of Servers > 5
* Changed colour scheme to hi-light unrecognised ACL bitmasks that do not convert to CIDR in RED and CIDR blocks in YELLOW
20110105-v0.1
Done

NOCTURNAL SURGE::A[REDACTED] - Mozilla Firefox
File Edit View History Bookmarks Tools Help
[REDACTED] fkb
gchq-web research sigdev search task-tgting Analysis tools PROGRAMMES press Discover Gforge-UK Gforge GTAC Tasking DB OpsTracker RTC RT NacShack Investor NAC1011NSRCS 1112-FTE CHAIN GUARD
NOCTURNAL SURGE::A[REDACTED] FIVE ALIVE FIVE ALIVE FKB IPv4 AS Search

SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
NAC
NETWORK ANALYSIS CENTRE

NOCTURNAL
SURGE

aka Find my NOC in AS[REDACTED]

<-- Back to Query Page

Summary Results [6 available]
Occurrences Source Network Source Mask ACL Name Servers GLOBALSURCE IP Queries
2 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 172 IP Query Range Query
1 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 138 IP Query Range Query
1 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 138 IP Query Range Query
1 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 171 IP Query Range Query
1 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 138 IP Query Range Query
1 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 138 SYSLOG [REDACTED] IP Query Range Query
+ Full Results [7 available]

SECRET STRAP1 COMINT

Done

TOP SECRET STRAP 2

GCHQ / CSEC NAC Joint tradecraft development

  • During March 2011 GCHQ Analysts visited CSEC to look at the using PENTAHO for tradecraft modelling working with CSEC NAC and CSEC/H3 software developers to see if could model NOCTURNAL SURGE in PENTAHO and then implement in OLYMPIA.
  • Only possible to attempt because:
    • GCHQ NAC use PENTAHO
    • CSEC NAC/H3 use PENTAHO
    • CSEC NAC have implemented GCHQ NAC TIDAL SURGE Database Schema (DSD also have this..)
  • GCHQ approach based on AS
  • CSEC approach based on Country

NAC
NETWORK ANALYSIS CENTRE

This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GC[REDACTED]


TOP SECRET STRAP 2

Pentaho - NOC Auto Detection

  • Input country digri
  • Remove private IP addresses
  • Dedupe exact range, method
  • Dummy (do nothing)
  • Trim whitespace from descriptions
  • Select values
  • Calculate number of IP addresses in range
  • Filter <= /16
  • Dummy (do nothing) 3
  • Filter on input country
  • Select values 4
  • Merge Join with geo data
  • Sort on 1st ip
  • Convert decimal IP to String
  • Dedupe on first ip
  • Dummy (do nothing) 4
  • Group intersecting IP ranges
  • Sort on 1st ip 2
  • Country digraph to lower case 2
  • Enrich with Geo
  • Output raw results
  • Count by groupid
  • Sort on group id
  • Merge Join groups with company info
  • Sort by group count
  • Merge Join group ids with count
  • Sort by first ip
  • Output NOC ranges for input country, sorted by confidence

ed to VTY lines
P + Subnet Mask

NAC
NETWORK ANALYSIS CENTRE

This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ or [REDACTED]


TOP SECRET STRAP 2

Phase 2: Intelligent use of Metadata

  • We do not always get full configuration files to parse.
  • Services between routers and NOCs run on IP/TCP/UDP
  • We do create 5-TUPLE metadata from our collection
    • GCHQ have prototype database – 5-Alive
    • CSEC have database - HYPERION

NETWORK ANALYSIS CENTRE
This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ o[REDACTED]


TOP SECRET STRAP 2

SNMP Protocol

SNMP Manager
SNMP Agent
get-request UDP 161
get-response UDP 161
get-next-request UDP 161
get-response UDP 161
Set-request UDP 161
get-response UDP 161
trap UDP 162

NETWORK ANALYSIS CENTRE
This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ [REDACTED]


TOP SECRET STRAP 2

SNMP Protocol in 5-Alive

Diarised Events | Activity Graphs

Options
? Help | Filter | Export to CSV

s [REDACTED] [REDACTED] |   |  --> | udp 161 |
s [REDACTED] [REDACTED] |   |  --> | udp 161 |

Resul
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED]   |   | [REDACTED]   |   |  -->  | udp | [REDACTED] | 161 |
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED]   |   | [REDACTED]  | [REDACTED]   |  -->  | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | 161 |
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED]   |   | [REDACTED]  | [REDACTED]   |  -->  | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | 161 |
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED]   |   | [REDACTED]  | [REDACTED]   |  -->  | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | 161 |
| 4 | 2011-05-13 | 09:59:37 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | --> | udp | 161 | [REDACTED] | US | Unknown
| 5 | 2011-05-13 | 09:59:36 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | --> | udp | 161 | [REDACTED] | US | Unknown
| 6 | 2011-05-12 | 07:22:32 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | --> | udp | 161 | [REDACTED] | LU | Unknown
| 7 | 2011-05-12 | 06:04:46 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | --> | udp | 161 | [REDACTED] | US | Unknown
| 8 | 2011-05-11 | 22:52:58 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | --> | udp | 161 | [REDACTED] | US | Unknown
| 9 | 2011-05-11 | 19:55:22 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | --> | udp | 161 | [REDACTED] | US | Unknown

NAC
NETWORK ANALYSIS CENTRE

This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ [REDACTED]


TOP SECRET STRAP 2

Further drill down on activity for identified IP

20 [REDACTED] 17 udp DNS (Domain Name System) 63226 53 2011-05-12 07:30:00 2011-05-12 08:00:00
21 [REDACTED] 17 udp Trivial File Transfer Protocol TFTP 52096 69 2011-05-13 10:00:00 2011-05-13 10:30:00
22 [REDACTED] 17 udp Trivial File Transfer Protocol TFTP 58912 69 2011-05-13 10:00:00 2011-05-13 10:30:00
23 [REDACTED] 17 udp Trivial File Transfer Protocol TFTP 53438 69 2011-05-13 10:00:00 2011-05-13 10:30:00
24 [REDACTED] 17 udp Network Time Protocol NTP 52096 123 2011-05-13 10:00:00 2011-05-13 10:30:00
25 [REDACTED] 17 udp Network Time Protocol NTP 58912 123 2011-05-13 10:00:00 2011-05-13 10:30:00
26 [REDACTED] 17 udp Network Time Protocol NTP 53438 123 2011-05-13 10:00:00 2011-05-13 10:30:00
27 [REDACTED] 17 udp NetBIOS NetBIOS Datagram Service 53438 138 2011-05-13 10:00:00 2011-05-13 10:30:00
28 [REDACTED] 17 udp NetBIOS NetBIOS Datagram Service 58912 138 2011-05-13 10:15:00 2011-05-13 10:45:00
29 [REDACTED] 17 udp NetBIOS NetBIOS Datagram Service 52096 138 2011-05-13 10:00:00 2011-05-13 10:30:00
30 [REDACTED] 17 udp Simple Network Management Protocol SNMP 52096 161 2011-05-13 10:00:00 2011-05-13 10:30:00

NAC
NETWORK ANALYSIS CENTRE

This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ o[REDACTED]


TOP SECRET STRAP 2

Phase 3: Intelligent use of TELNET traffic

  • Again we do not always get full configuration files. Phase 1 is based on full (or as near to full) configuration files
  • GCHQ NAC collect TELNET Sessions into TERMINAL SURGE
    • Collection based on TCP Port 23 (TELNET)
    • Other protocols use TCP Port 23 (YMSG)
  • Interaction with Routers over TCP Port 23 maybe nefarious:
    • Scanning
    • Password guessing
  • Need to separate legitimate use from nefarious activity
  • Look for signs of legitimate use.
    • Successful login
    • Follow on commands

NETWORK ANALYSIS CENTRE
This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ o[REDACTED]


TOP SECRET STRAP 2

From TCP Port 23 (Echo)

Untitled - Notepad
File Edit Format View Help

 *****************************************
 * GRX kgli-ipl-r1.belbone.grx           *
 *****************************************

 *******************************************************************************
 *  UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS TO THIS NETWORK DEVICE IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED.         *
 *  You must have explicit permission to access or configure this device.      *
 *  All activities performed on this device may be logged, and violations      *
 *  of this policy may result in disciplinary action, and may be reported      *
 *  to law enforcement...                                                      *
 *  There is no right to privacy on this device.                               *
 *  For more info mail to customer.care@belgacom-ics.com or tel +32 25475151   *
 *******************************************************************************

User Access Verification

Username: ......... ..!..!....."..'...rancid
Password:

kgli-ipl-r1>enable
Password:
kgli-ipl-r1#
kgli-ipl-r1#term length 0
kgli-ipl-r1#show version

NAC
NETWORK ANALYSIS CENTRE

This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ [REDACTED]


TOP SECRET STRAP 2

To TCP Port 23

Untitled - Notepad
File Edit Format View Help

........pu6TXXV
terminal width 512

show ip route isis
show controller E1 0/1/0 brief
show interfaces description
show ip route static
show interfaces | include Tunnel
show ipv6 route static
show controller E1 0/1/0 | inc Description:
show ipv6 route eigrp
show bfd neighbors
show ip route rip

show ipv6 neighbors
show ip arp
show ip route local
show interface FastEthernet0/1 | inc Description:
show ip route bgp

NAC
NETWORK ANALYSIS CENTRE

This information is exempt from disclosure und exemption under other UK information
legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ [REDACTED]


TOP SECRET STRAP 2

Intelligent analysis of TELNET traffic

  • The fact that login was successful for both examples means the following:
    • From TCP Port 23
      • To IP address is Network Management Terminal (in the NOC ?)
    • To TCP Port 23
      • From IP address is Network Management Terminal (in the NOC ?)

NAC
NETWORK ANALYSIS CENTRE

This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ [REDACTED]


TOP SECRET STRAP 2

Phase 4: Bulk Port Scanning

  • We know the key services/servers running in the NOC
  • Utilise HACIENDA, GCHQ's bulk port scanning capability to identify what IPs have these service ports open – additional logic to build up confidence required.

NAC
NETWORK ANALYSIS CENTRE

This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ [REDACTED]


TOP SECRET STRAP 2

Fusion of sources

  • Aim is to bring all sources that help identify NOC IP ranges together with associated confidence.
  • Different techniques provide different results due to the nature of passive access (international v's in-country for instance)
  • Different techniques have different levels of reliability – therefore looking to develop aggregation with overlay of smart intelligence.
  • Solution can work on not just ISP NOCs but also Mobile OMCs.

NAC
NETWORK ANALYSIS CENTRE

This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ [REDACTED]


TOP SECRET STRAP 2

And then....enabling CNE on NOCs

  • We now have IP ranges – need selectors of NOC Staff to enable QUANTUM INSERT attack against them.
  • Use of GCHQ TDI capability to identify selectors coming out of IP ranges and/or identification of proxy/NAT within NOC range.

NAC
NETWORK ANALYSIS CENTRE

This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ [REDACTED]


TOP SECRET STRAP 2

NOC IP range search in MUTANT BROTH

MUTANT BROTH
Identifier Search | IP Address Search | Password Search | IP Prefix Search

Legal Context
*   This is a powerful technique that allows you to pull back presence events for an IP network.
*   You must make sure that your HRA justification (Reason) clearly explains why you are querying on an IP network, as you are more likely to retrieve the communications of innocent individuals as well as tar
*   Your queries will be logged for audit.
*   You should use Traceroute or DNS look up first so that only IP prefixes registered or associated with the target networks are queried.
*   If you suspect that the IP prefix is dynamic, you must either combine this search with another filter eg an HHFP or limit the query length to 60 minutes.
*   If after running the query, it is clear that the IP prefix is dynamic, you should not look at the results as they are unlikely to relate to your target.

Search for IP address prefixes
*   Enter the set IP address prefixes.
*   The IP address range must be specified as: < dotted decimal IP >/< prefix length >
*   Example: 172.16.17.0/23
       192.168.4.5
       192.168.128.0/17
*   Prefix lengths of less than 16 bits will be ignored.
*   Absent lengths are assumed to be 32 bits.
*   Optionally enter the HHFP or the time period start and search length in minutes.

IP Ranges 80.84.19.0/24
HHFP
Time period start 17/05/2011
Search length (minutes) 20000

MIRANDA 20135
JIC 2
Purpose NS
Reason Belgacom reseach

Execute

NAC
NETWORK ANALYSIS CENTRE

This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCH[REDACTED]


TOP SECRET STRAP 2

NOC IP range – Target identifiers for QUANTUM INSERT

Source IP User-Agen
80.84.19.9 Mozilla/5.0 (X
80.84.19.9 Mozilla/5.0 (X
80.84.19.9 Mozilla/5.0 (X
80.84.19.9 Mozilla/5.0 (X
80.84.19.9 Mozilla/5.0 (c
80.84.19.9 Mozilla/5.0 (X
80.84.19.9 Mozilla/5.0 (W
80.84.19.9 Mozilla/5.0 (X
80.84.19.9 Mozilla/5.0
80.84.19.9 Mozilla/5.0 (X
80.84.19.9 Mozilla/5.0 (X
80.84.19.9 Mozilla/5.0 (W
Date Time Non Routine Source Source IP:HHFP Source IP Geo Identifier Type Identifier Value Event Count (%)
17/05/11 00:02:54 80.84.19.9:d23bad41 50.83; 4.33, BRUSSELS; BE; 7LLM Yahoo-B-Cookie [REDACTED] (4%)
17/05/11 00:02:59 80.84.19.9:d23bad41 50.83;4.33; BRUSSELS; BE; 7LLM Yahoo-B-Cookie [REDACTED] (4%)
17/05/11 00:02:59 80.84.19.9:d23bad41 50.83;4.33, BRUSSELS; BE; 7LHV Yahoo-B-Cookie [REDACTED] (2 %)
17/05/11 00:05:37 80.84.19.9:5eec974d 50.83; 4.33; BRUSSELS; BE; 7LHV Google-PREFID- [REDACTED] (0 %)
17/05/11 00:16:18 80.84.19.9:7d9134a5 50.83; 4.33; BRUSSELS; BE; 7LHV Google-PREFID- [REDACTED] (1 %)
17/05/11 00:17:58 80.84.19.9:77387b02 50.83;4.33; BRUSSELS; BE; 7LHV Google-PREFID- [REDACTED] 6 (16 %)
17/05/11 00:23:35 80.84.19.9:e4a90e3f 50.83;4.33; BRUSSELS; BE; 7LHV Google-PREFID- [REDACTED] (4 %)
17/05/11 00:28:05 80.84.19.9:7d9134a5 50.83; 4.33, BRUSSELS; BE; 7LHV Google-PREFID- [REDACTED] 2 (14 %)
17/05/11 00:37:34 80.84.19.9:b36815d3 50.83; 4.33; BRUSSELS; BE; 7LHV Google-PREFID- [REDACTED] (0 %)
17/05/11 00:39:55 80.84.19.9:f12897e0 50.83; 4.33; BRUSSELS; BE; 7LHV Google-PREFID- [REDACTED] 4 (28 %)
17/05/11 00:47:56 80.84.19.9:477c4721 50.83;4.33; BRUSSELS; BE; 7LHV Google-PREFID- [REDACTED] 2 (18 %)
17/05/11 00:54:38 80.84.19.9:d23bad41 50.83;4.33; BRUSSELS, BE; 7LHV Google-PREFID- [REDACTED] (3 %)

NAC
NETWORK ANALYSIS CENTRE

This information is exempt from disclosure und[REDACTED] exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ [REDACTED]


TOP SECRET STRAP 2

Real-time picture of QI

NRTA Dashboard - Mozilla Firefox
File Edit View History Bookmarks Tools Help
[REDACTED]
Most Visited SAMUEL PEPYS

NRTA Dashboard for INOC

up to TOP SECRET STRAP 2 UK EYES ONLY

Alerts for OPSOCIALIST

Oldest avail
Newest availa
Newest index
Target TDI Type Selector IP addresses Age From To OS
[REDACTED] Google-PREFID-Cookie [REDACTED] Route: 213.181.44.4
Src: 213.181.44.4; Dest: 209.85.143.99
0 minutes ago Chrome 6.0.472.63
[REDACTED] LinkedIn-Membenid [REDACTED] Route: 91.181.245.10
Src: 91.181.245.10; Dest: 216.52.242.80
14:28 hours ago Firefox 3.6.13
[REDACTED] LinkedIn-Membenid [REDACTED] Route: 93.184.208.50
Src: 93.184.208.50; Dest: 216.52.242.82
19:17 hours ago Safari 4.0
[REDACTED] LinkedIn-Membenid [REDACTED] Route: 178.144.30.204
Src: 178.144.30.204; Dest: 216.52.242.80
20:11 hours ago Safari 4.0
[REDACTED] Google-PREFID-Cookie [REDACTED] Route: 10.252.243.17
Src: 10.252.243.17; Dest: 10.225.65.132
22:56 hours ago [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Google-PREFID-Cookie [REDACTED] Route: 213.181.44.4
Src: 213.181.44.4; Dest: 209.85.143.104
23:40 hours ago Chrome 6.0.472.63
[REDACTED] Google-PREFID-Cookie [REDACTED] Route: 10.252.243.5
Src: 10.252.243.5; Dest: 10.225.31.68
24:24 hours ago [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Google-PREFID-Cookie [REDACTED] Route: 10.252.243.11
Src: 10.252.243.11; Dest: 10.225.31.199
24:56 hours ago [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Google-PREFID-Cookie [REDACTED] Route: 213.181.44.4
Src: 213.181.44.4; Dest: 209.85.143.104
25:03 hours ago Firefox 3.6.13
[REDACTED] LinkedIn-Membenid [REDACTED] Route: 213.181.44.4
Src: 213.181.44.4; Dest: 216.52.242.80
26:14 hours ago Chrome 6.0.472.63

GeoFusion reports IP address 213.181.44.4 as MECHELEN (low confidence), BE (high confidence).
No results returned.

Date Time (UTC) Source Destination Type Description
11/02/11 14:56:23 213.181.44.4:b7b2a59 195.125.115.181 HTTPFormPOST POST to widget.samsungmobile.com/NPSUpdateMagerService/service1.asmx/GetMatchNotify
11/02/11 14:56:14 213.181.44.4:9b0bf290 46.137.114.64 HTTP GET rainbow.mythings.com
11/02/11 14:56:14 213.181.44.4:9b0bf290 79.125.107.244 HTTP GET pixel.rubiconproject.com/tap.php?v=566011
11/02/11 14:56:03 213.181.44.4:b7b2a59 195.125.115.181 HTTPFormPOST POST to widget.samsungmobile.com/NPSUpdateMagerService/service1.asmx/GetMatchNotify
11/02/11 14:55:59 213.181.44.4:9b0bf290 46.137.114.64 HTTP GET rainbow.adswizz.com[REDACTED]
11/02/11 14:55:46 213.181.44.4:441e94e 46.137.114.64 HTTP GET synchrobox.adswizz.com[REDACTED]
11/02/11 14:55:42 213.181.44.4:4b7b2a59 195.125.115.181 HTTPFormPOST POST to widget.samsungmobile.com/NPSUpdateMagerService/service1.asmx/GetMatchNotify

Expand all | Collapse all | Export CSV | Export raw
3/3 | 60 Row(s)

This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Info [REDACTED] other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ or [REDACTED]

NAC
NETWORK ANALYSIS CENTRE

This information is exempt from disclosure und[REDACTED] exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]


TOP SECRET STRAP 2

Questions?

NAC
NETWORK ANALYSIS CENTRE
This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ or [REDACTED]