Types of IAT - Advanced Open Source Multi-hop
Open PDFDocument date: -
Pages: 9
Genre: slides
Banner: TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
Classification: TOP SECRET SI
Dissemination: REL TO USA, FVEY
This top-secret NSA/GCHQ document provides a detailed technical overview of the Tor network, including how it works, its strengths as the “king of high secure, low-latency Internet anonymity,” methods for identifying Tor traffic, censorship-driven protocol obfuscation, and ongoing intelligence efforts to analyze, fingerprint, and exploit Tor through passive SIGINT and active research, including collaboration between US and UK agencies.
My notes
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA,FVEY
(C//REL) Types of IAT - Advanced Open Source Multi-Hop
- (S//REL) Open Source Multi-Hop Networks
- (S//REL) Tor
- (S//REL) Very widely used worldwide
- (S//REL) Open Source
- (S//REL) Active Development
- (S//REL) Mitigates Threats
- (S//REL) Very Secure
- (S//REL) Low enough latency for most TCP uses
- (S//REL) Still the King of high secure, low latency Internet Anonymity
- (S//REL) There are no contenders for the throne in waiting
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(S//REL) Tor Operation (1)
EFF How Tor Works: 1
Alice
Step 1: Alice's Tor
client obtains a list
of Tor nodes from
a directory server.
Dave
Tor node
unencrypted link
encrypted link
Jane
Bob
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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA,FVEY
(S//REL) Tor Operation (2)
EFF How Tor Works: 2
Alice
Step 2: Alice's Tor client
picks a random path to
destination server. Green
links are encrypted, red
links are in the clear.
Dave
Guard
Middle
Exit
Jane
Bob
Tor node
unencrypted link
encrypted link
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(S//SI//REL) Passive Tor Traffic Analysis
- (S//SI//REL) For Normal SIGINT flow, need to identify Tor traffic!
- (S//SI//REL) Only outer TLS layer visible → How to Distinguish?
- (S//SI//REL) Tor developers attempt to remain anonymous by blending in
with myriad other TLS traffic - (S//SI//REL) Tor TLS has changed over the years
- (S//SI//REL) There ARE some server → client features which are
recognizable- (S//SI//REL) Certificate: Specific Diffie-Hellman (DH) Modulus - byte search
- (S//SI//REL) Certificate: Issuer and Subject random names of same form ex:
CN=www.ofzfkdjxvrss.net - regex match - (S//SI//REL) Certificate: always 2 hour lifetime - ASN.1 parsing, more computation
- (S//SI) Multiple XKS fingerprints from multiple parties deployed
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(S//REL) Tor Project Censorship Driven Activity
- (S//REL) Driven by Censorship Circumvention, Hide Signature
- (S//REL) China and Iran still main adversaries
- (S//REL) Researching better bridge distribution strategies
- (S//REL) Claim by Tor Project is 8000 requests/day for <1000 total
- (S//REL) Around Feb 2011, changed the TLS handshake
- (S//REL) Signature more like Apache web-server
- (S//REL) Different DH Modulus
- (S//SI//REL) New XKS Signatures address this
- (TS//SI//REL) Proposed eventual change will kill identification!
- (S//REL) Each Tor node will generate random-ish signatures in a volatile
way specifically designed to look like normal website TLS traffic!
- (S//REL) Each Tor node will generate random-ish signatures in a volatile
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(S//REL) Censorship Driven Protocol Obfuscation - Psiphon 3 / Tor
- (S//REL) Extreme Censorship blocking: Common encrypted protocols
- (S//REL) In the case of Psiphon 3: SSH
- (S//REL) In the case of Tor: TLS
- (S//REL) Make deep packet inspection (XKS :-) ) work harder
- (S//REL) Both use work of a open source project (brl/obfuscated-openssh)
- (S//REL) Idea is both sides transmit random seed and verifier information
- (S//REL) Verifier is hash of seed and other data
- (S//REL) If verifier passes data used from both side seeds to generate key
- (S//REL) Key used in symmetric cipher to encrypt native SSH or SSL protocol
- (S//REL) So for random stream, need to de-obfuscate and test for SSH / SSL
- (S//REL) Details for Psiphon 3
- (S//REL) Hash used for verifier, key generation: 6000 iterations SHA-1
- (S//REL) Symmetric cipher is RC-4
- (S//REL) Details for Tor Obsfproxy
- (S//REL) Hash used for verifier, key generation: 100K iterations SHA-256
- (S//REL) Symmetric cipher is AES-CTR-128
- (S//REL) Key uses seed from both sides!
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(S//REL) Tor Project and friends Recent Activity
- (S//REL) Tor on non-traditional platforms
- (S//REL) ORBOT, Tor for Android smartphones - Associated browser, easy to use!
- (S//REL) Tor Router Project - Modified Linksys Router (everything over Tor)
- (S//REL) Hide-My-IP-Address
- (S//REL) Proprietary replacement for Tor Browser Bundle
- (S//REL) From "WCCL Network" not part of Tor Project
- (S//SI//REL) Looked at based on reference by CT target
- (S//REL) Tor Project working on improving support for circumvention
- (S//REL) Handshake obfuscation (discussed)
- (S//REL) Better bridge proliferation / distribution
- (S//REL) Tails: Complete Bootable OS on CD for anonymity - includes Tor
- (S//REL) Adds Severe CNE misery to equation
- (S//SI//REL) Has been discussed by CT targets
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(S//REL) Tor Project and friends Recent Activity
- (S//REL) Advanced Tor "Obfuscation" Project: SkypeMorph
- (S//REL) Another option for pluggable transport
- (S//REL) More sophisticated concept than Obfsproxy
- (S//REL) Open connection to Skype server with "bridge Skype ID"
- (S//REL) Encapsulate Tor in encrypted data mimicking Skype Video Traffic
- (S//REL) Sort of traffic flow steganography vice content steganography
- (S//REL) True Public Key cryptography vice obfuscation with known key
- (S//REL) Product of University research - Non-trivial to deploy
- (TS//SI//REL) Most Recent SIGINT Work on Exploiting Tor
- (TS//SI//REL) REMATION II Workshop (US/UK) at MHS spring 2012
- (S//SI//REL) Unleashed Networking/CNE legions...
- (S//REL) See later talk by [REDACTED] for the scoop
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(S//REL) Tor Project and friends Recent Activity
- (S//REL) Online Feud between 2 IAT Products: Ultrasurf and Tor
- (S//REL) " Technical Analysis of the Ultrasurf proxying software" (Applebaum)
- (S//REL) Analysis (including some SRE) – highly critical
- (S//REL) Single hop, controlled by one authority
- (S//REL) Security by obscurity
- (S//REL) No perfect forward secrecy (forensic traces exploitable)
- (S//REL) Responsible Disclosure: Ultrasurf notified 12/2011, published 04/2012
- (S//REL) "Tor's critique of Ultrasurf: A reply from the Ultrasurf developers"
- (S//REL) Posted on Ultrasurf site days after Tor published critique
- (S//REL) All talk and no show
- (S//REL) Not fully analyzed
- (S//REL) One Approach to IAT: Tor - higher anonymity, smaller scale
- (S//REL) One Approach to IAT: Ultrasurf - focus on circumvention, massive scale
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