Types of IAT - Advanced Open Source Multi-hop

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Creating agency: NSA, GCHQ National Security Agency (US), Government Communications Headquarters (UK)
Document date: -
Pages: 9
Genre: slides
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Classification: TOP SECRET SI
Dissemination: REL TO USA, FVEY

This top-secret NSA/GCHQ document provides a detailed technical overview of the Tor network, including how it works, its strengths as the “king of high secure, low-latency Internet anonymity,” methods for identifying Tor traffic, censorship-driven protocol obfuscation, and ongoing intelligence efforts to analyze, fingerprint, and exploit Tor through passive SIGINT and active research, including collaboration between US and UK agencies.

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(C//REL) Types of IAT - Advanced Open Source Multi-Hop

  • (S//REL) Open Source Multi-Hop Networks
    • (S//REL) Tor
    • (S//REL) Very widely used worldwide
    • (S//REL) Open Source
      • (S//REL) Active Development
      • (S//REL) Mitigates Threats
    • (S//REL) Very Secure
    • (S//REL) Low enough latency for most TCP uses
    • (S//REL) Still the King of high secure, low latency Internet Anonymity
      • (S//REL) There are no contenders for the throne in waiting

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(S//REL) Tor Operation (1)

EFF How Tor Works: 1

Alice

Step 1: Alice's Tor
client obtains a list
of Tor nodes from
a directory server.

Dave

Tor node
unencrypted link
encrypted link

Jane

Bob

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(S//REL) Tor Operation (2)

EFF How Tor Works: 2

Alice

Step 2: Alice's Tor client
picks a random path to
destination server. Green
links are encrypted, red
links are in the clear.

Dave

Guard

Middle

Exit

Jane

Bob

Tor node
unencrypted link
encrypted link

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(S//SI//REL) Passive Tor Traffic Analysis

  • (S//SI//REL) For Normal SIGINT flow, need to identify Tor traffic!
    • (S//SI//REL) Only outer TLS layer visible → How to Distinguish?
    • (S//SI//REL) Tor developers attempt to remain anonymous by blending in
      with myriad other TLS traffic
    • (S//SI//REL) Tor TLS has changed over the years
    • (S//SI//REL) There ARE some server → client features which are
      recognizable
      • (S//SI//REL) Certificate: Specific Diffie-Hellman (DH) Modulus - byte search
      • (S//SI//REL) Certificate: Issuer and Subject random names of same form ex:
        CN=www.ofzfkdjxvrss.net - regex match
      • (S//SI//REL) Certificate: always 2 hour lifetime - ASN.1 parsing, more computation
      • (S//SI) Multiple XKS fingerprints from multiple parties deployed

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(S//REL) Tor Project Censorship Driven Activity

  • (S//REL) Driven by Censorship Circumvention, Hide Signature
    • (S//REL) China and Iran still main adversaries
    • (S//REL) Researching better bridge distribution strategies
      • (S//REL) Claim by Tor Project is 8000 requests/day for <1000 total
    • (S//REL) Around Feb 2011, changed the TLS handshake
      • (S//REL) Signature more like Apache web-server
      • (S//REL) Different DH Modulus
      • (S//SI//REL) New XKS Signatures address this
    • (TS//SI//REL) Proposed eventual change will kill identification!
      • (S//REL) Each Tor node will generate random-ish signatures in a volatile
        way specifically designed to look like normal website TLS traffic!

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(S//REL) Censorship Driven Protocol Obfuscation - Psiphon 3 / Tor

  • (S//REL) Extreme Censorship blocking: Common encrypted protocols
    • (S//REL) In the case of Psiphon 3: SSH
    • (S//REL) In the case of Tor: TLS
    • (S//REL) Make deep packet inspection (XKS :-) ) work harder
    • (S//REL) Both use work of a open source project (brl/obfuscated-openssh)
  • (S//REL) Idea is both sides transmit random seed and verifier information
    • (S//REL) Verifier is hash of seed and other data
    • (S//REL) If verifier passes data used from both side seeds to generate key
    • (S//REL) Key used in symmetric cipher to encrypt native SSH or SSL protocol
    • (S//REL) So for random stream, need to de-obfuscate and test for SSH / SSL
  • (S//REL) Details for Psiphon 3
    • (S//REL) Hash used for verifier, key generation: 6000 iterations SHA-1
    • (S//REL) Symmetric cipher is RC-4
  • (S//REL) Details for Tor Obsfproxy
    • (S//REL) Hash used for verifier, key generation: 100K iterations SHA-256
    • (S//REL) Symmetric cipher is AES-CTR-128
    • (S//REL) Key uses seed from both sides!

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(S//REL) Tor Project and friends Recent Activity

  • (S//REL) Tor on non-traditional platforms
    • (S//REL) ORBOT, Tor for Android smartphones - Associated browser, easy to use!
    • (S//REL) Tor Router Project - Modified Linksys Router (everything over Tor)
    • (S//REL) Hide-My-IP-Address
      • (S//REL) Proprietary replacement for Tor Browser Bundle
      • (S//REL) From "WCCL Network" not part of Tor Project
      • (S//SI//REL) Looked at based on reference by CT target
    • (S//REL) Tor Project working on improving support for circumvention
      • (S//REL) Handshake obfuscation (discussed)
      • (S//REL) Better bridge proliferation / distribution
    • (S//REL) Tails: Complete Bootable OS on CD for anonymity - includes Tor
      • (S//REL) Adds Severe CNE misery to equation
      • (S//SI//REL) Has been discussed by CT targets

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(S//REL) Tor Project and friends Recent Activity

  • (S//REL) Advanced Tor "Obfuscation" Project: SkypeMorph
    • (S//REL) Another option for pluggable transport
    • (S//REL) More sophisticated concept than Obfsproxy
    • (S//REL) Open connection to Skype server with "bridge Skype ID"
    • (S//REL) Encapsulate Tor in encrypted data mimicking Skype Video Traffic
    • (S//REL) Sort of traffic flow steganography vice content steganography
    • (S//REL) True Public Key cryptography vice obfuscation with known key
    • (S//REL) Product of University research - Non-trivial to deploy
  • (TS//SI//REL) Most Recent SIGINT Work on Exploiting Tor
    • (TS//SI//REL) REMATION II Workshop (US/UK) at MHS spring 2012
    • (S//SI//REL) Unleashed Networking/CNE legions...
    • (S//REL) See later talk by [REDACTED] for the scoop

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(S//REL) Tor Project and friends Recent Activity

  • (S//REL) Online Feud between 2 IAT Products: Ultrasurf and Tor
    • (S//REL) " Technical Analysis of the Ultrasurf proxying software" (Applebaum)
    • (S//REL) Analysis (including some SRE) – highly critical
    • (S//REL) Single hop, controlled by one authority
    • (S//REL) Security by obscurity
    • (S//REL) No perfect forward secrecy (forensic traces exploitable)
    • (S//REL) Responsible Disclosure: Ultrasurf notified 12/2011, published 04/2012
    • (S//REL) "Tor's critique of Ultrasurf: A reply from the Ultrasurf developers"
      • (S//REL) Posted on Ultrasurf site days after Tor published critique
      • (S//REL) All talk and no show
      • (S//REL) Not fully analyzed
      • (S//REL) One Approach to IAT: Tor - higher anonymity, smaller scale
      • (S//REL) One Approach to IAT: Ultrasurf - focus on circumvention, massive scale

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