Internet Anonymity 2011

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Creating agency: NSA National Security Agency (US)
Document date: 2011
Pages: 51
Genre: slides
Banner:
Classification: TOP SECRET COMINT
Dissemination: REL TO USA, FVEY

A TOP SECRET NSA presentation from 2011 providing a comprehensive survey of Internet Anonymity Technologies (IAT) — covering HTTP proxies, VPN anonymity providers, multi-hop networks including Tor and JAP, anonymous remailers and circumvention tools — alongside NSA's capabilities and limitations against each, including XKEYSCORE fingerprints for VPN identification, the PARTNERSNIPPET Tor deanonymisation team, GOLDENFORTIN Netflow data, and a candid assessment that Tor offers "no passive exploitation."

Long Description:
This is a TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY presentation from NSA S31323, delivered at the 2011 SIGDEV Conference. The document surveys the full landscape of Internet Anonymity Technology (IAT) from an NSA targeting and collection perspective, covering capabilities and limitations against each type. The presentation frames anonymity as distinct from encryption — encryption hides content while anonymity masks metadata and endpoint associations — and notes that the importance of metadata to SIGINT post-2001 "cannot be overstated." It categorises IAT into six types: single-hop HTTP proxies and aggregators, VPN anonymity providers, proprietary multi-hop circumvention networks, anonymous remailers, miscellaneous single-hop tools and open-source multi-hop networks including Tor and JAP. For HTTP proxy analysis, NSA uses the Proxy Discoverer tool (originally developed by S31323) to scrape aggregator sites, check exit IP addresses and enumerate proxy software including Glype, PHProxy, CGIProxy, ASP.NET, cURLProxy, Surrogafier and Zelune. Results are operationalised by NACIRONIN with NTOC support under project PONTENTPOTABLES. The FOXTRAIL and NKB tools are mentioned for obtaining IP address information internally. The RONIN system tracks discovered proxies and proxy aggregators. The VPN anonymity provider section lists approximately 200 named providers and describes NSA's server enumeration methodology — combining manual covered internet access, DNS pattern exhaustion scripting, and XKEYSCORE X.509 certificate fingerprinting. Three specific XKEYSCORE fingerprints are provided in full for Hotspot Shield, Easy-Hide-IP and Comodo TrustConnect. The SIGINT Forensics Lab holdings are searched via the SNAPE Portal for OpenVPN references. For defeating user-to-VPN traffic NSA's approach is described as case-by-case depending on coverage, protocol vulnerabilities, implementation settings, and "collateral" from NCSC, TAO and FISA, with important cases sent to CES. The Tor section is the most substantial. NSA's PARTNERSNIPPET team is named as responsible for attempting to solve the client IP address problem for CT targets using Tor to access terrorist web forums including al-Faloja, CEMF, al-Hisbah, shumukh and TRSC, with specific personas DLW, Song of Terror and Time of Terror identified. Over 80 CT email selectors had used Tor. Passive traffic analysis uses TLS certificate features — specific Diffie-Hellman modulus, random CN/Subject name patterns and two-hour certificate lifetimes — for fingerprinting via XKEYSCORE, with new signatures developed after Tor changed its TLS handshake in February 2011 to mimic Apache web server traffic. The NAC data source GOLDENFORTIN provides Cisco Netflow records with heavy representation of Tor relays for circuit reconstruction attempts. The backup slides contain a frank assessment: "Tor is very good — No passive exploitation." Active techniques include traffic shaping to block Tor relays or TLS handshakes at choke points. For CNE implants, TorButton is described as "a thorn in the side of SIGINT" with no current bypass methods — the only hope being implanting web servers with poisoned content documents intended for targets. Bridge node discovery exploits Tor's own bridge distribution mechanism by collecting bridge requests from exit nodes. A WikiInfo page called "The Onion Realm" maintained by CES/CTSO (S314) documents Tor hidden service URLs. JAP (JonDo Anonymous Proxy) is assessed as offering "much better chance for a Global Adversary (SIGINT)" given its smaller, more centralised network, though sessionisation of DNI would still be a problem. Circumvention tools Freegate, Ultrasurf, Gpass and Garden are noted. Tails is flagged as a complete bootable OS for anonymity with Tor as a crucial component — consistent with Tails appearing as a Quadrant 1 priority threat in the 2012 SIGDEV Conference risk matrix. PSIPHON, GHOSTSURF, Mixmaster, Mixminion, ORBOT and bot-based proxy networks using XSOX are also covered.
Programs:
FOXTRAIL, NKB, NACIRONIN, PONTENTPOTABLES, RONIN, XKEYSCORE, PARTNERSNIPPET, GOLDENFORTIN, SNAPE

People mentioned:
Heap, Austin

Countries:
United Arab Emirates, Antigua and Barbuda, Anguilla, Armenia, Netherlands Antilles, Austria, Australia, Aruba, Barbados, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Bermuda, Brazil, Bahamas, Belize, Canada, Switzerland, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Estonia, Egypt, Fiji, United Kingdom, Grenada, Gibraltar, Germany, Greenland, Greece, Guatemala, Hong Kong, Hungary, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, India, Iran, Iceland, Jamaica, Jordan, Japan, Saint Kitts and Nevis, North Korea, South Korea, Kuwait, Cayman Islands, Saint Lucia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Morocco, Monaco, Marshall Islands, North Macedonia, Mongolia, Malta, Mexico, Malaysia, Nicaragua, Norway, Nepal, New Zealand, Oman, Panama, Peru, French Polynesia, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Pakistan, Puerto Rico, Palestine, Paraguay, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Solomon Islands, Seychelles, Sweden, Singapore, Slovenia, Slovakia, Senegal, Turks and Caicos Islands, Thailand, Turkey, Tuvalu, Taiwan, Ukraine, United States, Uzbekistan, Vatican City, Venezuela, British Virgin Islands, United States Virgin Islands, Vanuatu, South Africa, Czech Republic, France, Italy

Tags:
traffic analysis, traffic shaping, Computer Network Exploitation, IAT, anonymity, JAP, JonDo, proxy detection, proxies, VPNs, OpenVPN, PPTP, SSH, L2TP, SSTP, IPSec, Hotspot Shield, AnchorFree, Easy-Hide-IP, Comodo TrustConnect, GHOSTSURF, PSIPHON, Freegate, UltraSurf, Gpass, Garden, Mixmaster, Mixminion, ORBOT, XSOX, Tails, TorButton, Tor Browser, hidden services, traffic fingerprinting, server mapping, DNS, al-Faloja, CEMF, al-Hisbah, shumukh, TRSC, DLW, Song of Terror, Time of Terror

Identifier:
spiegel_-_media-35540

PDF SHA-256:
0b027be1646548ed2b1046052068a79b87175f5e49b7e66111cab655dbcd5c44

(C//REL) Internet Anonymity 2011

  • NSA (S31323)
  • [REDACTED]
  • [REDACTED]
  • [REDACTED] NSTS

TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA, FVEY
1


(C//REL) What is Internet Anonymity?

  • (U) Many Possible Meanings/Interpretations
    • (S//REL) Simply Not Using Real Name for Email
    • (S//REL) Private Forum with Unadvertised Existence
    • (S//REL) Unlocatable Endpoint on Internet
  • (S//REL) This Talk Concerns Endpoint Location
    • (S//REL) The Network Address (IP Address) is Crucial
    • (S//REL) It is Not Always Sufficient, However
      • (S//REL) Dynamic IP Address
      • (S//REL) Mobile Device

TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY
2


(C//REL) What is Internet Anonymity?

  • (S//REL) Anonymity Is Not Simply Encryption
    • (S//REL) Encryption Can Simply Hide Content
    • (S//REL) Anonymity Masks the MetaData and hence association with user
    • (S//SI//REL) Importance of MetaData to SIGINT post-2001 can not be overstated
    • (S//REL) There is also anonymity specifically for publishing information
      • (S//REL) Beyond the Scope of this Talk!
  • (U) Anonymity is the antithesis of most business transactions (but encryption may be crucial)
    • (U) Authentication for monetary exchange
    • (U) Marketing wants to know customer well
    • (U) The same goes for Taxing Authorities :-)

TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY
3


(C//REL) Who Wants Internet Anonymity?

  • (U) All Technology is Dual-Use
    • (U) Nuclear Weapon to Plug Oil Well
    • (U) Homicide by Hammer
  • (U) Internet Anonymity for Good
    • (U) Anonymous Surveys (Ex: Diseases)
    • (U) Human Rights Bloggers
    • (U) HUMINT Sources

TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY
4


(C//REL) Who Wants Internet Anonymity?

  • (U) Internet Anonymity for Bad (Semi to Really)
    • (U) Copyright Violators (File Sharing)
    • (U) Internet Scam Artists
    • (U) Pedophiles
    • (C//REL) Foreign Intelligence Agents
    • (S//REL) Terrorist Actors (Our Concern)
  • (U) Both Cases Use Internet Anonymity Technology (IAT)

TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY
5


(S//REL) Internet Censorship: A "Dual"

  • (U) Different Scenario
    • (U//FOUO) User IP Address known
    • (U//FOUO) User Blocked from accessing certain site IP Addresses
    • (U//FOUO) Users get around it with Circumvention Technology - Mostly the same as Internet Anonymity Technology (IAT)

TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY
6


(C//REL) Types Of IAT

  • (S//REL) Single Hop Proxies
    • (S//REL) Web Site Proxies
    • (S//REL) HTTP/SOCKS Proxies
      • (S//REL) Browser Configured to Access
    • (S//REL) Proxy Aggregator Sites for Both
    • (S//REL) May support SSL/TLS
      • (S//REL) HTTP Sites: Only User → Proxy
      • (S//REL) SSL Sites (HTTPS)
        • (S//REL) Transparent (Just Pass the Bits)
        • (S//REL) Man-in-the-Middle (MITM)

TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA, FVEY
7


(C//REL) Types Of IAT: HTTP Proxies/Aggregators

  • (S//REL) Web-Site Proxy Aggregator sites
    • (S//REL) May list thousands of proxies
      • (S//REL) Taxonomy may be country where hosted
      • (S//REL) Taxonomy may be ego/business related
      • (S//REL) Taxonomy may be proxy software related
      • (S//REL) Taxonomy may be provider related
    • (S//REL) Proxy Information IS Temporal
      • (S//REL) Requires active confirmation
      • (S//REL) Requires revisits

TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY
8


(C//REL) Types Of IAT: HTTP Proxies/Aggregators

  • (S//REL) Web Proxy Sites (and Aggregator sites) – Info We Want
    • (S//REL) Domain Name (obvious :-) )
    • (S//REL) Associated IP address(es)
      • (S//REL) Can get live (nslookup, host, dig, etc)
      • (S//REL) Can maybe get internally (Foxtrail, NKB, etc.)
    • (S//REL) "Exit" IP address (where does user appear?)
      • (S//REL) Obtaining manually easy (http://checkip.dyndns.org)
      • (S//REL) How to Automate?
        • (S//REL) Proxy Discoverer (Originally S31323)
    • (S//REL) Other miscellaneous (cookie modification, SSL support, etc.)

TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY
9


(C//REL) Types Of IAT: HTTP Proxies/Aggregators

  • (S//REL) Web Proxy Aggregator sites Analysis
    • (S//REL) Proxy Discoverer
      • (S//REL) Scrapes Aggregator (ie www.proxy.org)
      • (S//REL) For each proxy, GET www.checkin.dyndns.org
        • (S//REL) Iterate over software, variations
        • (S//REL) Glype, PHProxy, CGIProxy, ASP.NET, cURLProxy, Surrogafier, Zelune
        • (S//REL) Try multiple times
        • (S//REL) Aggregator may give software hints
        • (S//REL) Failure may indicate site down, or proxy SW modification
    • (S//REL) Results from Proxy Discoverer must bridge low->high
    • (S//REL) Operationalized by NAC/RONIN with NTOC support (project PONTENTPOTABLES)
      • (S//REL) See SDC2011: [REDACTED]

TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA, FVEY
10


(C//REL) Types Of IAT

  • (S//REL) VPN Anonymity Providers
    • (S//REL) Provider may offer multiple servers
      • (S//REL) Different Sovereign Nations
      • (S//REL) Different Bandwidths
      • (S//REL) Most fee based: Can vary on time/number of servers
    • (S//REL) May offer multiple VPN protocols
      • (S//REL) PPTP (No client software)
      • (S//REL) SSH
      • (S//REL) OpenVPN
      • (S//REL) L2TP/IPSEC
      • (S//REL) SSTP
    • (S//REL) Communications User ↔ Server Encrypted

TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY
11


(C//REL) Types Of IAT

  • (S//REL) VPN Anonymity Providers
    • (S//REL) Plethora of providers (I found about 200)
      • (S//REL) 12VPN, Ace VPN, Air VPN, AlwaysVPN, Ananoos, AnoCentral, Anonine, Anonyproz, AnonymityNetwork, Anonymizer, Anti-Hadopi, Arethusa, ArtofPing, Astrill, BananaVPN, BeeVPN, BlackLogic, BlackVPN, BolchVPN, BuyProxyService, Change-Mon-IP, Cienen, ClearVPN, ConnectInPrivate, ConnectionVPN, CrackIP, Cryptline, Cryptocloud, CyberGhostVPN, DarknetVPN, DrakkerVPN, DoubleVPN, ExpressVPN, Eztun, FBVPN, FlashVPN, FQVPN, Freedur, FreeVPN, GateVPN, GoldenFrogVyprVPN, GoTrusted, HappyVPN, HideIPVPN, HideMyAss, Hideway, High-Speed-VPN, HostSpotVPN, HotspotShield, IAPSSecurityStore, ibVPN, IdealVPN, InvisibleBrowsing, iOpusiPig, IPJET, Ipredator, ItsHidden, Ivacy, IVPN, Ksecure, KeyVPN, Kryptnet, LamniaVPN, LeVPN, LibertyVPN, LifeVPN, Linkideo, Loki, MadVPN, MetroPipe, MicroVPN, MonkeyVPN, Mullvad, MyOpenGateway, MyVPN, Overplay, oVPN, PacketIX, PC-Streaming, PerfectPrivacy, Privacy.io, Privacy.li, PrivacyTunnel, PrivateInternetAccess, PrivateVPN, PRQtunnel, PublicVPN, PureVPN, Relakks, RemoteVPN, RoadWarriorVPN, RootPanama, RoxNetworks, SaferSurf, SecretsLine, SecureNetics, SecureSwiss, SecureTunnel, SecureVPN, SlickyProxy, SmallVPN, SofanetSofaLINK, SteganosInternetAnonymVPN, StrongVPN, SuperVPN, SurfBouncer, SurfoNym, SurfRescue, SwissPVN, SwitchVPN, TheSafety, Tiggerswelt, tonVPN, Trackbuster, trilightzone, TorrentFreedeom, Tunnelr, TUVPN, UkiVPN, UltraVPN, UnblockVPN, USAIP, VIPAccounts, VIPVPN, VPN4ALL, VPNDeutschland, VPNDog, VPNGates, VPNMaster, VPNonline.ru, VPNPrivacy, VPNProNet, VPNSeek, VPNSteel, VPNSwiss, VPNtraffic, VPNTunnel, vpntunnel.se, VPNSecure, VPNod, VPNout, VPNWorld, VyprVPN, Witopia, WorldVPN, WOWVPN, XeroBank, xtra-vpn, YourFreedom, YourPrivateVPN

TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA, FVEY
12


(C//REL) Types Of IAT

  • (S//REL) VPN Anonymity Providers
    • (S//REL) Range of Sovereign Nations/Localities in this set huge!
      • (S//REL) Multiple Cities in more popular countries
      • (S//REL) Most fee based: Can vary on time/number of servers
        • (S//REL) Most notable exception: Hotspot Shield (Provider AnchorFree)
          • » (S//REL) Advertising supported
          • » (S//REL) Multiple OSINT reports of "most popular"
        • (S//REL) About a half dozen others claim they are free
      • (S//REL) Package deals (Europe, any 3 servers, etc.) sometimes available
      • (S//REL) Poster child for location selection: IAPS (www.intl-alliance.com)
        • (S//REL) AE, AG, AI, AM, AN, AQ, AT, AU, AW, BB, BD, BG, BM, BR, BS, BZ, CA, CH, CL, CN, CO, CR, CU, CY, DK, DO, EE, EG, FJ, GB, GD, GI, GL, GR, GT, HK, HU, ID, IE, IL, IN, IR, IS, JM, JO, JP, KN, KP, KR, KW, KY, LC, LI, LU, MA, MC, MH, MK, MN, MT, MX, MY, NI, NO, NP, NZ, OM, PA, PE, PF, PG, PH, PK, PR, PS, PY, QA, RO, RU, SA, SB, SC, SE, SG, SI, SK, SN, TC, TH, TR, TV, TW, UA, US, UZ, VA, VE, VG, VI, VU, ZA,

TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA, FVEY
13


(C//REL) Types Of IAT

  • (S//REL) VPN Anonymity Providers
    • (S//REL) Search of SIGINT Forensics Lab Holdings for OpenVPN
      • (S//REL) Using SNAPE Portal
      • (S//REL) OpenVPN specifically because a client is required
      • (S//REL) Listing is just name of IAT provider
        • (S//REL) HotSpot Shield
        • (S//REL) Steganos Anonymous VPN
        • (S//REL) Securenetics
        • (S//REL) General references to using OpenVPN products
        • (S//REL) Several references to IP address only: Need more products in RONIN!

TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY
14


(C//REL) Types Of IAT

  • (S//REL) VPN Anonymity Providers
    • (S//REL) What “we” want
      • (S//REL) Server enumeration
        • (S//SI//REL) SIGINT: Obvious – target using such a service
          • » (S//SI//REL) One hop, so enough coverage means success!
        • (S//SI//REL) Compliance: FAA – Is target in US is important!
      • (S//REL) Exploiting User ↔ VPN traffic
        • (S//SI//REL) Very case by case
          • » (S//SI//REL) Coverage (may need 2 sided collection)
          • » (S//SI//REL) Protocol (may or may not have vulnerabilities)
          • » (S//SI//REL) Settings (implementation important)
          • » (TS//SI//REL) “Collateral” - NCSC, TAO, FISA, etc.
          • » (S//SI//REL) Request sent to CES if important

TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA, FVEY
15


(C//REL) Types Of IAT

  • (S//REL) VPN Anonymity Providers
    • (S//REL) Server enumeration
      • (S//SI//REL) Manual work with Covered Internet (Linux/Windows)
        • » (S//SI//REL) Sometimes info derived from documentation
        • » (S//SI//REL) Sometimes need to access service
        • » (S//SI//REL) May be a trial version to get "seed"
        • » (S//SI//REL) Even if paid may only get some servers
        • » (S//SI//REL) Some providers give you the works, YMMV
        • » (S//SI//REL) Try to minimize work!
        • » (S//SI//REL) Try to extend seed(S//REL)
        • » (S//SI//REL) DNS “Pattern”, ex. vpn01.hidegood.net
        • » (S//SI//REL) Use scripting/free Linux tools to exhaust space (try nslookup on vpn01.hidegood.net, vpn02.hidegood.net, etc.)
        • » (S//SI//REL) Open source DNS enumeration scripts (brief look)
        • » (S//REL) Where do results go? (Again, See NAC/RONIN talk)

TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY
16


(C//REL) Types Of IAT

  • (S//REL) VPN Anonymity Providers
    • (S//REL) Server enumeration
      • (S//SI//REL) Use the XKEYSCORE, Luke – AKA Fun with X.509
        • (S//SI//REL) Prompted by Hotspot Shield (HSS), the free service for which server lists are NOT readily available (Software Reverse Engineering required)
        • (S//SI//REL) OpenVPN, as well as SSL/SSTP, send a server x.509 certificate to client as part of setup
        • (S//SI//REL) XKEYSCORE sees a LOT of traffic worldwide
        • (S//SI//REL) XKEYSCORE fingerprints aren't too hard
          • » (S//SI//REL) Need unique string, usually CN and/or DN
          • » (S//SI//REL) Check for valid X.509 certificate
        • (S//SI//REL) Query safe: Traffic encrypted (still do 1-side defeat)

TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA, FVEY
17


(C//REL) Types Of IAT

  • (S//REL) VPN Anonymity Providers
    • (S//REL) Server enumeration
      • (S//SI//REL) Use the XKEYSCORE, Luke – AKA Fun with X.509
        • (S//SI//REL) Prompted by Hotspot Shield (HSS), the free service for which server lists are NOT readily available (Software Reverse Engineering required)
        • (S//SI//REL) fingerprint('encryption/hotspot_shield/x509') = $pkcs and $udp and 'metrofreefivpn';
        • (S//SI//REL) fingerprint('encryption/easy_hide_ip/x509') = $tcp and from_port(8881) and ('\x06\x09\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x0d\x01\x01\x01'c) /RSA/ and'www.easy-hide-ip.com';
        • (S//SI//REL) fingerprint('encryption/comodo_trustconnect/x509') = $tcp and from_port(443) and ('\x06\x09\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x0d\x01\x01\x01'c) /RSA/ and 'ComodoVPNS-';

TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY
18


(C//REL) Types Of IAT

  • (S//REL) Proprietary Multi-Hop Networks (Usually Circumventor Motivated)
    • (S//REL) Freegate
    • (S//REL) Ultrasurf
    • (S//REL) Gpass
    • (S//REL) Garden
    • (S//REL) Haystack (by Austin Heap – ruled bogus by community)
  • (S//REL) Movement to Secure US Government Support to Providers (Congress)
    • (S//REL) US Dept of State
    • (S//REL) Broadcasting Board of Governors (Independent USG Agency)
      • (S//REL) Has instructions for "Getting around Internet Blockage" on Radio Free Asia (RFA) and VOA Persian news sites

TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA, FVEY
20


(C//REL) Types Of IAT

  • (S//REL) Anonymous Remailers (Multi-Hop)
    • (S//REL) Most Secure
    • (S//REL) Main examples: Mixmaster and Mixminion
    • (S//REL) Extremely High Latency (Random Delays)
      • (S//REL) Only useful for email, other store and forward communications
      • (S//REL) Not much use
      • (S//REL) NOTE 1: Usability and Anonymity are Foes!

TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY
21


(C//REL) Types Of IAT

(S//REL) Miscellaneous IAT Technologies (Single Hop)

  • (S//REL) PSIPHON
    • (S//REL) Discussed in Censorship Circumvention Circles
    • (S//REL) Technology for known associate to setup in appropriate place
    • (S//REL) Access via knowing obscure URL and Username/Password w/HTTPS
  • (S//REL) Miscellaneous Multi-Selectors
    • (S//REL) Some are just "HTTP and/or Socks Proxy Aggregators"
      • (S//REL) EasyHideIP.com
      • (S//REL) Real-Hide-IP.com
        • (S//REL) Found researching this presentation!
      • (S//REL) Both of these yield list with HTTP GET!
      • (S//REL) Postprocessing: Shell/PERL/etc. script to extract another to check w/Covered Internet (simple proxy option to wget)
      • (S//REL) NAC/RONIN will track these

TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY
22


(C//REL) Types Of IAT

(S//REL) Miscellaneous IAT Technologies (Single Hop)

  • (S//REL) Miscellaneous Multi-Selectors
    • (S//REL) Proprietary Proxy Provider/Chooser
      • (S//REL) Paid product, Client Software
      • (S//REL) Usually involves obfuscation and/or encryption
      • (S//REL) GHOSTSURF
        • » (S//REL) First analyzed 2006 – uses obfuscaton
        • » (S//REL) Server list has changed but all else same
      • (S//REL) Easy-Hide-IP
        • » (S//REL) Analyzed in 2011 – uses TLS on port 8881
        • » (S//REL) Over 400 servers in 7 countries
      • (S//REL) Hide-IP
        • » (S//REL) Analyzed in 2006 – New product now
        • » (S//REL) Need to re-analyze

TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY
23


(C//REL) Types Of IAT

(S//REL) Miscellaneous IAT Technologies (Single Hop)

  • (S//REL) Bot-Based Proxy Networks
    • (U//FOUO) Kudos to [REDACTED], NGA, for pointing this out in her Intelink-TS blog, Sphinx1121 (Pointer to krebsonsecurity.com)
    • (S//REL) Bot owners drop socks proxies on compromised computers
    • (S//REL) Said proxies are then rented out to "customers" for anonymity
    • (S//REL) OSINT indicates a "product" called XSOX available on underground forums as a C&C for such a network
  • (S//REL) General Note for IAT analysts: Details IMPORTANT
    • (S//REL) Proof by example: EasyHideIp.com NOT the same as Easy-Hide-IP.com (Of course domains are not case sensitive)

TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY
24


(C//REL) Types of IAT

  • (S//REL) Open Source Multi-Hop Networks
    • (S//REL) Jondo Anonymous Proxy (JAP)
    • (S//REL) Championed by German University (Dresden)
    • (S//REL) (Mostly?) Open source software – some Docs in German
    • (S//REL) Uses a technology known as Cascades
      • (S//REL) Each cascade is set of 2 or 3 Mixes
      • (S//REL) All internal traffic encrypted
      • (S//REL) Free service AN.ON: 5 Cascades
      • (S//REL) Premium service JonDoNym: 10 Cascades
        • (S//REL) Countries: BG, CA, CH, CZ, DE, DK, FR, GB, IT, LU, US,
        • (S//REL) Less than 50 mixes total

TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY
25


(C//REL) Types of IAT

  • (S//REL) Open Source Multi-Hop Networks
    • (S//REL) Jondo Anonymous Proxy (JAP)
    • (S//REL) Comparison with Tor
      • (S//REL) Not nearly as well studied
      • (S//REL) Much smaller contained development community
      • (S//REL) More centralized structure (all mixes centrally approved)
      • (S//REL) Not as diverse geographically or scalable
      • (S//REL) Not as well used or publicized
    • (S//REL) Not analyzed in great detail here at NSA (or FVEY?)
    • (TS//SI//REL) Much better chance for Global Adversary (SIGINT :-) )
      • (TS//SI//REL) Sessionization of DNI still would be a problem

TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY
26


(C//REL) Types of IAT

  • (S//REL) Open Source Multi-Hop Networks
    • (S//REL) JonDo Anonymous Proxy (JAP)
Browser User A
JAP

Browser User B
JAP

Browser User XYZ
JAP

InfoService

Mix 1 (First Mix)
Mix 2 (Middle Mix)
Mix 3 (Last Mix)

Cache-Proxy
Cache-Proxy
Cache-Proxy
Cache-Proxy

Internet

bidirectional TCP/IP connection

TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY
27


(C//REL) Types of IAT

  • (S//REL) Open Source Multi-Hop Networks
    • (S//REL) Tor
    • (S//REL) Very widely used worldwide
    • (S//REL) Open Source
      • (S//REL) Active Development
      • (S//REL) Mitigates Threats
    • (S//REL) Very Secure
    • (S//REL) Low enough latency for most TCP uses
    • (S//REL) Still the King of high secure, low latency Internet Anonymity
      • (S//REL) There are no contenders for the throne in waiting

TOP SECRET//COMINT REL TO USA,FVEY
28


(S//REL) Tor Operation (1)

EFF How Tor Works: 1

Alice
Step 1: Alice's Tor client obtains a list of Tor nodes from a directory server.

Dave
Jane
Bob

Tor node
unencrypted link
encrypted link

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(S//REL) Tor Operation (2)

EFF How Tor Works: 2

Alice
Step 2: Alice's Tor client picks a random path to destination server. Green links are encrypted, red links are in the clear.

Dave

Guard
Middle
Exit

Jane
Bob

Tor node
unencrypted link
encrypted link

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(S//REL) Mom: Where Do Tor Relays Come From?

  • (S//REL) Recall there is (well actually more than 1) Tor Directory server?
    • (S//REL) This is the pool
    • (S//REL) Choices made in terms of advertised capabilities:
      • (S//REL) Bandwidth
      • (S//REL) Uptime
      • (S//REL) Supported Protocols
    • (S//REL) Tor client has total final say

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(S//REL) Mom: Where Do Tor Relays Come From?

  • (S//REL) Pool is still currently about 1500
    • (S//REL) Many countries represented
      • (S//REL) Most in DE
      • (S//REL) Second most in US
    • (S//REL) Anyone can set one up and register it
    • (S//REL) Exit nodes are scary (Kiddie Porn)
  • (S//REL) How about a private pool? (heh-heh)
    • (S//REL) Note 2: Private Resources and Anonymity are foes!

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(S//REL) Bridges: Special Tor Relays

  • (S//REL) Having the set of relays public makes it easy for government censors
    • (S//REL) Just block access to all relays from that country
  • (S//REL) Tor Project staffed with smart people!
    • (S//REL) Introduce new concept: Bridge Nodes
      • (S//REL) Unadvertised Entry Nodes distributed "out-of-band"
      • (S//REL) Project will hand out three at a time (weekly)
        • (S//REL) Email or surf bridges.torproject.org
    • (S//SI//REL) SIGINT: Use Tor Against Itself! (Bridge requests from exit nodes)
    • (S//REL) Circa April 2011: Tor Project claims around 600 Bridges

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(S//SI//REL) Tor and NSA Targets

  • (TS//SI//REL) Sophisticated CT Targets use TOR to access Terrorist Web Forums
    • (TS//SI//REL) Web Forums: al-Faloja, CEMF, al-Hisbah, shumukh, TRSC
    • (TS//SI//REL) Persona: DLW, Song of Terror, Time of Terror
  • (TS//SI//REL) Visible exit traffic allows for "All except the Client IP" SIGDEV
  • (TS//SI//REL) Solving (attempting to solve :-( ) this IP address problem was the work of NSA PARTNERSNIPPET team
  • (S//SI//REL) Also 80+ CT email selectors who have used Tor

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(S//SI//REL) Passive Traffic Analysis

  • (S//SI//REL) For Normal SIGINT flow, need to identify Tor traffic!
    • (S//SI//REL) Only outer TLS layer visible → How to Distinguish?
    • (S//SI//REL) Tor developers attempt to remain anonymous by blending in with myriad other TLS traffic
    • (S//SI//REL) Tor TLS has changed over the years
    • (S//SI//REL) There ARE some server → client features which are recognizable NOW

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(S//SI//REL) Passive Traffic Analysis (2)

  • (S//SI//REL) Tor TLS (server → client) startup features
    • (S//SI//REL) Certificate: Specific Diffie-Hellman (DH) Modulus (just string match)
    • (S//SI//REL) Certificate: Issuer and Subject random names of same form – ex: CN=www.ofzgkdjxvjrss.net (regex match)
    • (S//SI//REL) Certificate: Always 2-hour lifetime (ASN.1 format → more intensive computation)
  • (S//SI//REL) Several XKS fingerprints and a plugin implemented

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(S//REL) Tor Project Recent Activity

  • (S//REL) Driven by Censorship Circumvention, Hide Signature
    • (S//REL) New bridge nodes blocked in China
    • (S//REL) Researching better bridge distribution strategies
      • (S//REL) Claim by Tor Project is 8000 requests/day for <1000 total
    • (S//REL) Around Feb 2011, changed the TLS handshake
      • (S//REL) Signature more like Apache web-server
        • (S//REL) Different DH Modulus
        • (S//SI//REL) New XKS Signatures address this
    • (TS//SI//REL) Proposed eventual change will kill identification!
      • (S//REL) Each Tor node will generate randomish signatures in a volatile way specifically designed to look like normal website TLS traffic!

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(S//REL) Tor Project Recent Activity

  • (S//REL) Tor on non-traditional platforms
    • (S//REL) ORBOT, Tor for Android smartphones
    • (S//REL) Tor Router Project
      • (S//REL) Modified Linksys Router – everything over Tor
    • (S//REL) Hide-My-IP-Address
      • (S//REL) Proprietary replacement for Tor Browser Bundle
      • (S//REL) From "WCCL Network" not part of Tor Project
      • (S//SI//REL) Looked at based on reference by CT target
    • (S//REL) Tor Project working on better strategies to distribute bridges
    • (S//REL) Tails: Complete Bootable OS on CD for anonymity
      • (S//REL) Tor is a crucial component

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(S//REL) Tor Hidden Service URLs

  • (S//REL) Tor Hidden Services (HS) for anonymous publishing
    • (S//REL) Not real reliable, but Tor Project research continues
    • (U//FOUO) I said outside scope, sorry
    • (S//REL) Tor HS accessed via Tor only by http://xxxxxx.onion
    • (S//REL) There is the tor2web.com site which is a HTTP to Tor proxy
      • (S//REL) Loses some anonymity but easy to use
      • (S//REL) Good tool for Covered Internet research
    • (S//REL) Site on WikiInfo to document Tor HS URLs
      • (S//REL) "The Onion Realm" - [REDACTED]
      • (U//FOUO) Kudos to CES/CTSO (S314) for populating this

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(S//REL) Public IAT Resources Inside

  • (U//FOUO) General IAT
    • (S//REL) [REDACTED]
  • (S//REL) Tor
    • (S//REL) [REDACTED]
    • (S//REL) [REDACTED]

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(S//REL) References to IAT in SIGINT

  • (S//REL) “Grep” in SIGINT reports for relevant phrases (ex anonymity)
    • (S//REL) Most is FVEY (cited here) Majority US, also UK, CAN
    • (S//SI//REL) Format is TOPI / Type of Info
      • (TS//SI//REL) CT / Discuss Tor (6 reports)
      • (TS//SI//REL) CT / Use Tor or another proxy
      • (TS//SI//REL) CT / Create modified Tor
      • (TS//SI//REL) CT / Mandate use of Tor
      • (TS//SI//REL) CT / Tor for Censorship Circumvention
      • (TS//SI//REL) CT / Use Tor and a VPN (UltraVPN)
      • (TS//SI//REL) CT / Instructions for using Tor and other US Proxy
      • (TS//SI//REL) CT / Discuss us of (non-specified but non-US) VPN
      • (TS//SI//REL) CT / Discuss Tor and HTTP Proxies for anonymity
      • (TS//SI//REL) CT / Discuss Tor and RealHideIp (previously unknown IAT)
      • (TS//SI//REL) CT / Discuss use of Kproxy.com (HTTP Proxy)

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(S//REL) References to IAT in SIGINT

  • (S//REL) “Grep” in SIGINT reports for relevant phrases (ex anonymity)
    • (S//SI//REL) Format is TOPI / Type of Info
      • (TS//SI//REL) CT / Use of PimpMyIp (HTTP Proxy)
      • (TS//SI//REL) CT / Use of (masked US Company) VPN (L2TP protocol) for anonymity
      • (TS//SI//REL) CT / Instructions for use of VPNs for anonymity
      • (TS//SI//REL) CT / Use of VPN (HotSpotShield) and SSH tunnels
      • (TS//SI//REL) CT / Use of Tor and an unspecified VPN
      • (TS//SI//REL) CT / Use of Easy-Hide-IP (Socks proxy chooser)
      • (TS//SI//REL) CT / Use of unspecified anonymizing proxy
      • (TS//SI//REL) CT / Instructions on use of Tor and name-masked US program
      • (TS//SI//REL) CT / Use of VPN (Cyberghost)
      • (TS//SI//REL) CT / Use of unspecified HTTP proxy
      • (TS//SI//REL) CT / Questions on whether Tor is compromised
      • (TS//SI//REL) CT / Questions on whether associated compromised by IAT non-use

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(S//REL) References to IAT in SIGINT

  • (S//REL) “Grep” in SIGINT reports for relevant phrases (ex anonymity)
    • (S//SI//REL) Format is TOPI / Type of Info
      • (TS//SI//REL) Iran / Use of Freegate and Ultrasurf
      • (TS//SI//REL) India / Use of unknown proxy for anonymity
      • (TS//SI//REL) India / Use of Tor to access a webmail account
      • (TS//SI//REL) India / Use of Tor for hacking (2 reports)
      • (TS//SI//REL) India / Provision of list of socks proxies to use
      • (TS//SI//REL) Iran / Provision of list of socks proxies to use
      • (TS//SI//REL) India / Use of unknown proxy for anonymity
      • (TS//SI//REL) Cuba / Use of unknown proxy for anonymous research
      • (TS//SI//REL) Turkey / Use of Tor

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(U) Backup Slides

  • (S//REL) From Last years SDC Tor Talk

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(S//REL) Tor (The onion router)

  • (S//REL) Development originally NRL funded
  • (S//REL) Original developers from Anonymous Remailer Research Community
  • (S//REL) Project now a US non-profit (www.torproject.org)
  • (S//REL) User to Internet site interaction uses 3 hops through Tor "Relays"
    • (S//REL) Entry
    • (S//REL) Middle
    • (S//REL) Exit

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(S//REL) Tor Security

  • (S//SI//REL) As you can see from the diagram, everything except for final hop is encrypted.
  • (S//SI//REL) The final hop may be also in the case of Bob being an SSL site.
  • (S//SI//REL) Two-layer TOR encryption: Pipe between any 2 nodes TLS encrypted (Only thing seen externally).
  • (S//SI//REL) Inside the TLS is the Onion Routing (see following diagram):

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(S//REL) Tor Security (2)

  • (S//SI//REL) So each node can only decrypt data between its predecessor and itself and only knows about its predecessor and successor.
  • (S//SI//REL) The exit node can read the final traffic if it is not SSL.
  • (S//SI//REL) The user Tor client is in control of everything
    • (S//SI//REL) Setting up keys for cryptography
    • (S//SI//REL) Choosing the Entry, Middle, and Exit
  • (TS//SI//REL) Tor is very good – No passive exploitation :-(

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(S//REL) Tor Onion Encryption

Layers of the onion

Router A Key
Router B Key
Router C Key
Message

Routing path
Source -> Router A -> Router B -> Router C

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(S//SI//REL) Passive Traffic Analysis (3)

  • (S//REL) NSA Network Analysis Center (NAC) data source GOLDENFORTIN
    • (S//REL) Cisco Netflow Records
      • (U) From IP Address
      • (U) To IP Address
      • (U) Time Up
      • (U) Time Down
      • (U) Number of Bytes
      • (U) Number of Packets
    • (S//REL) Heavy Representation of Tor Relays

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(S//SI//REL) Passive Traffic Analysis (4)

  • (S//SI//REL) How to use Tor network data?
    • (S//SI//REL) Attempt to work back from known exit traffic of interest all the way back to client user
      • (S//SI//REL) This is “Circuit Reconstruction”
      • (S//SI//REL) Requires great coverage
      • (S//SI//REL) Geography might be your friend sometimes
    • (S//SI//REL) Attempt to correlate known exit traffic to a small set of putative client traffic
      • (S//SI//REL) Client Geographical Assumption Required
    • (TS//SI//REL) No smoking gun yet :-( Optimism still lives!

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(TS//SI//REL) Active: Traffic Shaping

  • (S//SI//REL) This primarily means deny/degrade to date
    • (TS//SI//REL) If target is behind a choke point to Internet
      • (TS//SI//REL) Block all or a major subset of Tor Relays
      • (TS//SI//REL) Block all Tor TLS handshakes
    • (TS//SI//REL) Try to force target to use alternate communications means
  • (S//SI//REL) Always the (potential) Exploit vs Attack Tradeoff

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(TS//SI//REL) Active: Implants

  • (S//SI//REL) TorButton: A Thorn in the side of SIGINT
    • (S//REL) One of the components of The Tor Browser Bundle – AKA "Tor for Dummies"
    • (S//REL) Firefox browser plugin – on/off switch for Tor
    • (S//REL) Locks down browser REAL good (disables all active content things, sandboxes state, etc.)
  • (TS//SI//REL) No current bypass methods for CNE Exploits
  • (TS//SI//REL) Only hope is implanting web server with poisoned content document intended for target

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