Sensitive Targeting Authorisation
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A GCHQ internal form template for Sensitive Targeting Authorisation (STA), used to obtain approval for surveillance targeting of individuals or organisations with sensitive nationalities or in sensitive locations, covering both real-time tasking and historical database datamining, with separate authorisation tracks for overseas targets and UK-based targets.
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People mentioned:
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Countries:
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Tags:
targeting procedures, data mining, tasking, proportionality, SCS authorisation, domestic surveillance, overseas collection, British Islands, content database, selectors, compliance, legal framework, surveillance oversight, audit, COP5377, Snowden, The Intercept 2015, Ryan Gallagher, KARMA POLICE
Identifier:
sensitive-targeting-authorisation
PDF SHA-256:
05a3295edb17ecc5de6ab412543e891c1f5e9b3ab49c57bc7f8290795754fac0
My notes
Sensitive Targeting Authorisation (STA) Reference COP5377
STA: AUTHORITY TO TARGET AN INDIVIDUAL/ORGANISATION WITH A
SENSITIVE NATIONALITY OR IN A SENSITIVE LOCATION
* Mandatory fields for applicant
# Mandatory fields for authorising officer
* To (Enter the name of the authorising officer):
* From (Analyst name)
* Business Unit
* Quality checked by (name)
* Business Unit
(SDO signing out of hours – please enter analyst name and BU owning targeting)
* Today's date
* Tasking or Datamining (see notes below)
Notes:
- For tasking requests: this form is not to be used for addresses in the British Islands (ie: the UK, Channel Islands and the Isle of Man) except with OPP-LEG agreement.
- For content database searches only (datamining): this form may be used for addresses in the British Islands, and must then be sent to an authorised SCS officer for approval. In these cases one historical search only can be conducted within two working days of the approval and these STAs cannot be renewed. For datamining overseas: permitted for a one-week period only and cannot be renewed.
- SDO can only authorise OOH. Appropriate authorisation should be sought at earliest opportunity on the next working day.
- All STAs (new and renewal) must be quality checked – this is a mandatory requirement. Any application not quality checked will be returned.
- If a target enters a sensitive location, revaluate your tasking and detask or seek appropriate authorisation.
- It is not necessary have a COP ref number to submit a new application – you will be advised of the COP number upon receipt of email authorisation.
- Once you have completed the form for either a new application or renewal, email it to the appropriate authorising officer who will then ‘email authorise' and send a copy to you and STAUPDATE-GCHQ.
- As of 1 June 2007 STAs will only be accepted in soft copy form.
TASKING and DATAMINING overseas – Grade 6 authorisation
Ignore this section if not required
Target
Aliases
Current Location MUST NOT BE British Islands
Nationality
Number/term Add date of inclusion of new selectors on STA (for renewals only)
UK EYES ONLY
DATAMINING UK-based targets – SCS authorisation – RENEWAL NOT PERMITTED
Ignore this section if not required
Target
Aliases
Current Location
Nationality
Number/term Add date of inclusion of new selectors on STA (for renewals only)
UK EYES ONLY
<PROTECTIVE MARKING>
INTELLIGENCE CASE
The intelligence case must include sufficient information to allow a senior member of GCHQ to make an informed judgement as to the reasonableness and proportionality of the request, as described in the GCHQ Compliance Document.
Please indicate how long this authorisation is required for and ensure that proportionality issues are taken into account.
JIC Requirement
MIRANDA number
Duration - Max. 6 months (see note above)
* Primary customer(s) for intelligence:
\ * Enter intelligence case and expand as required here:
Authorising officer details:
Name:
Position:
Date:
Expiry Date
Comments (in box below)
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This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
<PROTECTIVE MARKING>
<PROTECTIVE MARKING>
RENEWAL CASE – Tasking only
The renewal case must include sufficient information to allow a senior member of GCHQ to make an informed judgement as to the reasonableness and proportionality of the request, as described in the GCHQ Compliance Document.
* Renewal requestor (Analyst name)
* Business Unit
* Quality checked by (name)
* Business Unit
- Any form not quality checked will be returned
- Renewals are only available for tasking requests
- Application for renewal – Please create a new page for each renewal and include any comments made by previous authorising officer
- Please indicate clearly the required expiry date and the name of the appropriate authorising officer – a maximum of 6 months from the date of expiry, not the date of signing
- Ensure that all active selectors for this target are recorded on the form (including any new ones)
- The renewal case should include full details of what the targeting has produced to date. If no intelligence has been produced details of why should be included
- Enter renewal case and expand as required here:
4 of 4
This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
<PROTECTIVE MARKING>
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