SPIN 15 VPN Story

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Creating agency: NSA National Security Agency (US)
Document date: -
Pages: 4
Genre: report
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Classification: TOP SECRET COMINT
Dissemination: REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

A TOP SECRET planning document describing two parallel workstreams in SPIN 15: the deployment of VPN decryption capabilities to SMOKYSINK (US-3237), a unilateral NSA RAMPART-T cable tap site operating without a third-party partner, and a risk reduction benchmarking activity measuring TURMOIL's VPN and SSL exploitation performance against the Net-Centric Capabilities (NCC) programme's Key Performance Parameters — which targeted 100,000 VPN decrypt requests per hour by the end of fiscal year 2011, and 10 million SSL sessions per day by the end of fiscal year 2012.

Long Description:
This is a TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY draft planning document describing two operational workstreams within SPIN 15, an NSA release cycle for VPN decryption capabilities under the VALIANTSURF programme. The document was published by Der Spiegel under the German title "Beschreibung bestehender Projekte von VPN Entschlüsselungen" ("Description of existing VPN decryption projects"). The first workstream concerns the deployment of VPN decryption capabilities to a site designated SMK — identifiable from other published Snowden documents as SMOKYSINK (SIGAD US-3237/KE), a RAMPART-T cable tap operating without a third-party partner, distinguished from the RAMPART-A sites which require foreign intelligence service cooperation. The document describes SMOKYSINK as "a VPN rich environment with targets of high value" whose SIGINT reporting reaches "high levels of government," and notes that NSA leadership has tasked CES (Cryptanalysis and Exploitation Services) to deploy decryption capabilities there. SPFs had to be signed to authorise the deployment of TS//SI equipment to what the document describes as an S//SI-cleared site. The deployment plan covers two TURMOIL hardware platforms: T-16 development and live servers followed by Dell LPT systems, with tasks distributed across TURMOIL, CES and AMF teams spanning March through June. The pipeline involves loading SPIN 13 software, configuring PIQ services on Blade 14, configuring ISLANDHIDEAWAY for POISONNUT VAO messaging traffic, adding IP tasking to KEYCARD for VPNs of interest, evaluating decrypted data in XKEYSCORE for strong selectors, and verifying that decrypted data hitting strong selectors is forwarded through TURMOIL to PRESSUREWAVE for analyst retrieval and reporting. A note flags that an MDC upgrade and Site Store deployment at SMOKYSINK scheduled for March 16-31 may cause the VPN decryption deployment to slip. The second workstream is a risk reduction benchmarking activity supporting Program B — the formal acquisition designation for the Net-Centric Capabilities (NCC) programme, which funded TURMOIL development under the broader TURBULENCE enterprise architecture. The document lists eight Key Performance Parameters with scaling targets across fiscal years 2009 through 2012. The most significant are: NCC decrypt requests per hour scaling from 1,000 (Q4 FY09) to 100,000 (Q4 FY11); full processing including decryption and re-injection of at least 20% of those requests; SSL session exploitation scaling from 10,000 sessions per day (Q4 FY09) to 10 million sessions per day (Q4 FY12); and password recovery detection scaling from 500 sessions per month to 20,000 sessions per month over the same period. These figures are directly cited in Der Spiegel's December 2014 encryption article, confirming this document as the source of those numbers. The benchmarking schedule covers April and May on T-16 Heavy and LPT platforms respectively, with review dates on April 16 and May 8 to guide architectural decisions needed to meet the September 30, 2009 KPP deadline. PIQ services referenced throughout the document operate under the PICARESQUE ECI compartment — the restricted access control covering NSA's cryptanalytic exploitation capabilities — and communicate with POISONNUT, the VPN Attack Orchestrator (VAO), via ITx (ISLANDTRANSPORT) and ISLANDHIDEAWAY. POISONNUT, also known as VAO, had existed since 2003 and was being redeveloped as the first component of the LONGHAUL programme at the time of this document. The document's "two thrusts" framing takes on additional significance when read alongside the APEX (Active/Passive Exfiltration) programme being developed in parallel within the same SPIN 15 release cycle. APEX was designed to solve a problem the passive VALIANTSURF deployment at SMOKYSINK could not: many target VPNs are simply not visible to passive cable taps because the traffic does not cross a monitored link. APEX addressed this by combining TAO active implants — specifically HAMMERSTEIN, which could select and exfiltrate targeted packets from inside compromised routers — with TURMOIL's passive processing pipeline, allowing IKE key exchange packets captured from inside target networks to be fed back into TURMOIL's VPN decryption components. The SPIN 15 VPN Story document's two workstreams — passive decryption at SMOKYSINK and NCC performance benchmarking — were therefore being developed alongside a third effort to extend VPN key recovery beyond what passive collection alone could reach. Taken together, the document is a project plan for two things happening in parallel in early 2009. First, NSA was deploying its VPN decryption capability to a specific cable tap site — SMOKYSINK — that was intercepting internet traffic at a major congestion point and needed special authorisation because the cryptanalytic tools being deployed were more sensitive than the site's standard clearance level. Second, NSA was benchmarking how fast its TURMOIL collection systems could intercept, decrypt and re-inject VPN and SSL traffic, working toward formal programme targets that called for processing 100,000 encrypted VPN connections per hour and exploiting 10 million SSL sessions per day by the end of fiscal year 2012. These targets — which Der Spiegel later cited in its 2014 encryption investigation — give concrete scale to what the broader VALIANTSURF and BULLRUN programmes were actually trying to achieve operationally: not just the ability to break encryption in principle, but the industrial-scale infrastructure to do it continuously, automatically, and fast enough to re-inject decrypted traffic back into the collection pipeline before it was too late to act on it.

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20320108
DRAFT

SPIN 15 VPN Story

VPN has two thrusts, one has high mission impacts and the other has high performance and functionality impacts for Program B.

Mission impact - Start generating SIGINT from VPNs at SMK.

SMK is a VPN rich environment with targets of high value. Mission impact is high. Consumers of the SIGINT reporting based on sources from SMK are at high levels of government. NSA leadership has tasked CES to deploy decryption capabilities to SMK. Security concerns have been addressed. SPFs have been signed to deploy TS//SI equities to the S//SI site. VPN transformation tests have passed and capabilities ready for deployment to the T-16 development server at SMK. To achieve a successful deployment to SMK on the T-16s (first) and LPTs, the following are high level steps:

Task Owner Date
Load Spin 13 on T-16 DEV (first) and then T-16 LIVE system Turmoil March
Configure Blade 14 for PIQ Services Spin 13. CES March
Configure AMF/IslandHideaway for PIQ blade and VAO messaging traffic AMF March
Add IP tasking to Keycard for VPNs of interest CES March
Evaluate decrypted data in Xkeyscore for Strong Selectors CES March/April
Update Keycard with Strong Selectors CES March/April
Verify decrypted data which hits on a strong selector is forwarded from Turmoil to Pressurewave CES April
Verify analysts can retrieve the data from Pressurewave for reporting CES April
Identify Dell for PIQ Blade at SMK for LPT DEV system CES April
Load Spin (13/14?) on LPT DEV (first) and then the LPT LIVE Systems Turmoil May
Configure Dell for PIQ Services Spin 13. CES May

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
Dated: 20070108
Declassify On: 20320108

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20320108

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20320108
DRAFT

Configure AMF/IslandHideaway for PIQ blade and VAO messaging traffic AMF May
Add IP tasking to Keycard for VPNs of interest CES May
Evaluate decrypted data in Xkeyscore for Strong Selectors CES May/June
Update Keycard with Strong Selectors CES May/June
Verify decrypted data which hits on a strong selector is forwarded from Turmoil to Pressurewave CES June
Verify analysts can retrieve the data from Pressurewave for reporting CES June

Note: MDC upgrade and Site Store deployment at SMK will impact the VPN decryption deployment. March 16-31 is the schedule for the upgrade and site store deployment. VPN decryption deployment may slip due to availability.

Risk Reduction Activity for Program B

Program B Capabilities Document has provided Key Performance Paramerters (KPPs) for VPN. In order to achieve the KPP identified for Sep 30, 2009, a risk reduction activity has been initiated. This activity will gather performance benchmarks early in SPIN 15 on the current architecture running on two 2.5G platforms, the T-16 Heavy and the Dell LPT. Information from the performance benchmarks will indicate the level of redesign (if any) needed to meet the KPPs. The following are the performance requirements in Program B.

  1. NCC CA Service Requests (Decrypt) per hour (aggregate for all VPN exploitation-enabled systems).
    Q4 FY09 (Risk 1,000 Reduction)
    Q4 FY10 10,000
    Q4 FY11 100,000
  1. NCC front end systems shall fully process (i.e. decrypt and re-inject) at least 20% of CA service requests (~20% Reinject Rate?)
  1. For tasked IP addresses, NCC front end systems shall identify relevant IPSec sessions and generate attack requests (Rates?)
  1. NCC front end systems shall buffer VPN data for up to 15 minutes (900 seconds) while waiting for response from Attack Orchestrater (AO)
  1. After successful key recovery and decryption PIQ services shall re-inject decrypted VPN for Stage1 & Stage2 processing
  1. Aggregate VPN buffering and processing rate per TML system (Assumptions – LPT? T16? U64?)

Q4 FY09 (Risk 4 VPN 25 Concurrent VPN 100 Mbps Aggregate VPN Data / System

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20320108

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20320108
DRAFT

Reduction Systems Flows / System
Q4 FY10 10 VPN Systems 100 Concurrent VPN 100 Mbps Aggregate VPN Data / System Flows / System
Q4 FY11 100 VPN Systems 100 Concurrent VPN 500 Mbps Aggregate VPN Data / System Flows / System

  1. Desired SSL Exploitation - Aggregate TURMOILs shall exploit all sessions associated with a given cryptovariable at the rates:

Q4 FY09 (Risk 10,000 Sessions / Day Reduction)
Q4 FY10 100,000 Sessions / Day
Q4 FY11 1,000,000 Sessions / Day
Q4 FY12 10,000,000 Sessions / Day

  1. Desired Password Recovery - Aggregate TURMOILS shall detect the presence of at least 100 password based encryption applications at the rates:

Q4 FY09 (Risk 500 Sessions / Month Reduction)
Q4 FY10 2,000 Sessions / Month
Q4 FY11 8,000 Sessions / Month
Q4 FY12 20,000 Sessions / Month

A schedule has been proposed to gather the performance benchmarks on current turmoil 2.5G systems (T-16 and LPT).

Benchmark functionality and performance testing on TBAR 2.5G T-16

Task Owner Date
Configure T-16 with SPIN 13. Configure Keycard Turmoil April 1-3
Configure Blade 14 in T-16 with PIQ services CES April 1-3
Configure ITx/IH for PIQ blade and VAO messaging traffic AMF April 1-3
Run PIQ to VAO interface test CES April 6
Provide data set that can be looped to meet performance requirements. Data set is characterized for outcome. Data needs to be loaded in streamer (?) CES and Turmoil April 6
Load Keycard with IPs and Strong Selectors CES April 6
Run test CES and Turmoil April 7-8
Identify issues CES and Turmoil April 9-10

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20320108

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20320108
DRAFT

Fix issues CES and Turmoil April 9-10
Rerun test CES and Turmoil April 9-10
Document Benchmarks CES and Turmoil April 13-15

April 16 will be a review date of the performance benchmarks gathered on a 2.5G T-16 Heavy system. This information will guide decisions to pursue architectural and design planning and implementation to meet the Sep 30, 2009 KPPs.

Benchmark functionality and performance testing on 2.5G LPT (T-16)

Task Owner Date
Configure LPT with SPIN 14. Configure Keycard Turmoil April 30
Configure Dell with PIQ services CES April 30
Configure ITx/IH for PIQ blade and VAO messaging traffic AMF April 30
Run PIQ to VAO interface test CES April 30
Provide data set that can be looped to meet performance requirements. Data set is characterized for outcome. Data needs to be loaded in streamer (?) CES and Turmoil April 31
Load Keycard with IPs and Strong Selectors CES April 31
Run test CES and Turmoil May 1
Identify issues CES and Turmoil May 1
Fix issues CES and Turmoil May 4-5
Rerun test CES and Turmoil May 6
Document Benchmarks CES and Turmoil May 7

May 8 is the second review date of the performance benchmarks. This will include the benchmarks from the 2.5G LPT system. This information will guide decisions to pursue architectural/design planning and implementation to meet the Sep 30, 2009 KPPs.

Turmoil technical discussion can be hosted in parallel to the benchmark testing. The purpose of the discussions is to ??????.

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20320108