CLASSIFICATION GUIDE FOR CRYPTANALYSIS, 2-12
Open PDF +1 other copyDocument date: 2005-09-13
Pages: 3
Genre: guide
Banner: TOP SECRET//COMINT//20291123
Classification: TOP SECRET COMINT
Dissemination: -
An NSA/CSS classification guide for cryptanalysis establishing the precise classification level for each type of information about NSA's capabilities to exploit commercial and indigenous encryption systems — from the unclassified acknowledgement that NSA exploits cryptographic devices, through to the Top Secret protection of cryptographic modifications made to commercial products to render them exploitable and industry relationships used to obtain cryptographic details.
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People mentioned:
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Countries:
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Tags:
CES, classification guide, cryptanalysis, cryptography, industry relationships, ECI, commercial encryption, backdoors
Identifier:
nsa-cryptanalysis-2-12-guardian-13-0905
PDF SHA-256:
44651321fc24685dd08c9bb34fe5afc151199f3c7d96303f9450273dcd9dc406
My notes
TOP SECRET//COMINT//20291123
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
(U//FOUO) CLASSIFICATION GUIDE FOR
CRYPTANALYSIS, 2-12
Effective Date: 13 September 2005
CLASSIFIED BY: [REDACTED]
REASON FOR CLASSIFICATION: 1.4 (c)
DECLASSIFY ON: 20291123
ENDORSED BY: [REDACTED]
Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
Dated: 20041123
Declassify On: 20291123
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//20291123
(U//FOUO) CLASSIFICATION GUIDE TITLE/NUMBER: CRYPTANALYSIS Guide 02-12
(U) PUBLICATION DATE: 13 September 2005
(U) OFFICE OF ORIGIN: Cryptanalysis & Exploitation Services (S31)
(U//FOUO) POC: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
(U//FOUO) PHONE: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
(U//FOUO) ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY: [REDACTED]
| Description of Information | Classification/ Markings | Reason | Declass | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. (U) The fact that NSA/CSS exploits cryptographic information security devices and systems. | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | |
| 2. (C) The fact that NSA/CSS works with Second Party partners on exploiting cryptographic information security devices and systems. | CONFIDENTIAL | 1.4 (c) | 20291123 | . |
| 3. (S) The fact that NSA/CSS works with unspecified Third Party partners on exploiting cryptographic information security devices and systems. | SECRET | 1.4 (c) | 20291123 | |
| 4. (U) The fact that NSA/CSS exploits unintended cryptographic vulnerabilities in commercial or indigenous information security devices and systems, as long as neither the vulnerability nor the targeted device/ system is identified. | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | |
| 5. (TS//SI) The fact that NSA/CSS makes cryptographic modifications to commercial or indigenous cryptographic information security devices or systems in order to make them exploitable. | TOP SECRET// COMINT at a minimum | 1.4 (c) | 20291123 | (U) Specifying the specific system is protected by an ECI.. |
| 6. (U) The fact that NSA/CSS has cryptanalytic techniques to exploit cryptographic components of commercial or indigenous information security devices or systems. | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | (U) Additional details will raise the classification and may be protected by an ECI. |
| 7. (C) The fact that NSA/CSS has the ability to recover cryptovariables used to exploit commercial or indigenous cryptographic information security devices or systems. | CONFIDENTIAL | 1.4 (c) | 20291123 | (C) Details of CV recovery are protected by an ECI. (C) Specifying a specific system for which we can recovery CVs is protected by an ECI. |
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| Description of Information | Classification/ Markings | Reason | Declass | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 8. (U) The fact that NSA/CSS successfully exploits cryptographic components of commercial or indigenous cryptographic information security devices or systems without specifying the device or system. | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | (U) Additional details will require the classification and may be protected by an ECI. |
| 9. (U//FOUO) The fact that NSA/CSS successfully exploits cryptographic components of commercial or indigenous cryptographic information security devices or systems when the device or system is specified. | TOP SECRET// COMINT at a minimum | 1.4 (c) | 20291123 | (U) Additional details may be protected by an ECI. |
| 10. (TS) The fact that NSA/CSS obtains cryptographic details of commercial cryptographic information security systems through industry relationships. | TOP SECRET at a minimum | 1.4 (c) | 20291123 | (C) Identification of the system or company is protected as COMINT and ECI. |
(U) DEFINITIONS:
(U//FOUO) Information security device or system: A device or system that provides any of the following services for communications or information systems: confidentiality, data integrity, authentication and authorization.
(U//FOUO) Cryptanalytic vulnerability: A flaw in the design, implementation or system integration of cryptography used in an information security device, or a flaw in the way that a cryptographic information security device is used.
(U//FOUO) Unintended cryptographic vulnerability: Security is less than advertised by the manufacturer.
(U//FOUO) Indigenous: Non-commercial cryptographic information security system or device developed by a SIGINT target.
[REDACTED]
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BULLRUN CoI - Briefing Sheet [pdf]
A GCHQ briefing sheet introducing the BULLRUN Community of Interest — the access control framework protecting Five Eyes capabilities to defeat encryption across TLS/SSL, HTTPS, SSH, VPNs, IPSec, encrypted chat and encrypted VoIP — covering the classification structure, handling procedures and protective marking guidance for intelligence derived from cryptanalytic exploitation.
“N.S.A. Able to Foil Basic Safeguards of Privacy on Web” - The New York Times ↗ (2013-09-05) · “Revealed: The NSA's Secret Campaign to Crack, Undermine Internet Security” - ProPublica ↗ (2013-09-05) · “Prying Eyes: Inside the NSA's War on Internet Security” - Der Spiegel ↗ (2014-12-28) · Perlroth, Nicole · Larson, Jeff · Shane, Scott · Appelbaum, Jacob · Gibson, Aaron · Grothoff, Christian · Müller-Maguhn, Andy · Poitras, Laura · Sontheimer, Michael · Stöcker, Christian -
TLS Trends: A roundtable discussion on current usage and future directions [pdf]
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TURMOIL/APEX/APEX High Level Description Document [pdf]
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Intro to the VPN Exploitation Process [pdf]
NSA introduction to the VPN exploitation process from September 2010, presented by the OTP VPN Exploitation Team, covering the full workflow from initial collection through to sustained decryption of IPSec, PPTP, SSL and SSH traffic, with named exploitation successes including airlines, diplomatic missions, banks and intelligence services across Iran, Jordan, Russia, Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Somalia, Indonesia and Mexico.
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PROJECT BULLRUN Classification Guide [pdf]
This BULLRUN classification guide outlines the NSA’s highly secretive methods for undermining and exploiting encryption technologies through a combination of cryptanalysis, industry collaboration, covert implants, and network exploitation. It specifies strict classification protocols for capabilities against protocols like TLS/SSL, VPNs, VoIP, and webmail, emphasizing secrecy around sources, methods, and industry partnerships that make commercial encryption systems deliberately vulnerable.
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