Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) / Transport Layer Security (TLS)

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Creating agency: NSA National Security Agency (US)
Document date: -
Pages: 42
Genre: slides
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Classification: TOP SECRET COMINT
Dissemination: REL TO USA, FVEY

A classified NSA Network Security Products training presentation providing a comprehensive technical overview of SSL/TLS protocol mechanics and NSA's exploitation approaches, including observed usage statistics from intercepted traffic, RSA key exchange decryption methodology, exploitation of the Debian OpenSSL RNG weakness, and the practical challenges of decrypting millions of SSL sessions per day at scale.

Long Description:
This is an NSA training presentation from the Network Security Products division (S31213), published by Der Spiegel as part of their documentation of SCARLETFEVER — NSA's programme for attacking SSL/TLS connections. The document covers both the technical fundamentals of SSL/TLS and NSA's operational approaches to exploiting it, mixing unclassified protocol education with classified operational intelligence and exploitation methodology, ranging from UNCLASSIFIED to TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY at different points. SCARLETFEVER does not appear by name in the document itself — the attribution comes from Der Spiegel's sourcing and labelling, consistent with other SCARLETFEVER documents they published separately which explicitly name the programme in the context of SSL/TLS exploitation within LONGHAUL/TURMOIL. The classified sections reveal several operationally significant details about NSA's SSL exploitation capabilities and the landscape of encrypted traffic they were seeing. SSL version usage statistics drawn from actual intercepted traffic showed SSL 3.0 at 49% and TLS 1.0 at 48%, with TLS 1.1 and 1.2 essentially absent despite having been standardised years earlier — a finding with direct cryptanalytic implications since older protocol versions carry known weaknesses. Key exchange usage data showed RSA at 65% and Anonymous Diffie-Hellman at 20%, with ephemeral DHE at only 1% — meaning the vast majority of sessions used RSA key exchange, which NSA describes as "easy" to exploit given a known private key, rather than the forward-secret ephemeral Diffie-Hellman that the document explicitly flags as "not exploitable by the easy way." The exploitation methodology section describes a straightforward decision tree for RSA decryption: if the cipher suite uses RSA key exchange and the server certificate's modulus matches a known private key in NSA's database, and both sides of the conversation are collected, then the client key exchange message can be decrypted to recover the pre-master secret, from which all session keys derive. The document also describes exploitation of the well-known Debian OpenSSL random number generator vulnerability — which created a finite set of only (2^15) × 6 = 196,608 possible RSA keys per key size — noting that observing a Debian-generated modulus allows private key lookup from a precomputed table and full traffic decryption. The resumed sessions section reveals that approximately 90% of decrypted traffic came from resumed sessions rather than initial handshakes — nine resumed sessions for every initial session — meaning that capturing a single initial session's master key could unlock a large volume of subsequent traffic. Processing challenges noted include millions of sessions per day requiring efficient filtering, the need for two-sided collection, and USSID 18 compliance issues around American communications.
Programs:
SCARLETFEVER

People mentioned:
-

Countries:
-

Tags:
SSL, TLS, cryptanalysis, RSA exploitation, Diffie-Hellman, ephemeral DHE, Debian OpenSSL, RNG vulnerability, session key recovery, master secret, pre-master secret, certificates, resumed sessions, network security, S31213, internet security, Tor

Identifier:
spiegel_-_media-35511

PDF SHA-256:
6f7a9bfc997bfe65aa59fa3989149bfb14cb389592bc2a9768ebbef6cae0d460

Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) / Transport Layer Security (TLS)

[REDACTED]
Network Security Products
S31213


UNCLASSIFIED

Example

  • http://www.greatstuff.com
  • Wants credit card number
  • Look at lock on browser
  • Use https instead of http

UNCLASSIFIED


UNCLASSIFIED

History

A protocol designed by Netscape in late
1994 to provide communications
security over the Internet

GOALS:

  • message privacy
  • message integrity
  • mutual authentication

UNCLASSIFIED


UNCLASSIFIED

SSL Versions

  • 1.0: July 1994 – not released publicly
  • 2.0: Dec 1994
  • 3.0: Nov 1995
  • 3.1: Jan 1999: RFC 2246 (TLS 1.0)
  • 3.2: Apr 2006: RFC 4346 (TLS 1.1)
  • 3.3: Aug 2008: RFC 5246 (TLS 1.2)

UNCLASSIFIED


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

SSL Version Usage

SSL 3.0: 49%
SSL 3.1: (TLS 1.0) 48%
SSL 2.0: 3%
other: < 0.0001 %

  • Even though SSL 3.2 (TLS 1.1) and SSL 3.3 (TLS 1.2) have been out for a while, they are not seen!

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY


UNCLASSIFIED

Location of SSL Protocols

Ethernet
IP
TCP
SSL Header
Encrypted SSL data =
HTTP

  • Independent of packet boundaries
  • Multiple SSL records can be sent per packet
  • SSL records can span packets

UNCLASSIFIED


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

TCP ports used by SSL

  • IANA has over 60 ports specified for SSL/TLS use!
  • Some ports seen more than others
    • https 443 ~63% of SSL/TLS traffic
    • pop3s 995 ~1% of traffic

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

NON IANA TCP ports

  • SSL/TLS can use ANY port!
    • tor 9001 10%
    • ? 4090 4% (mobile ip server)
    • tor 11375 2%
    • p2p 16613 1% (limewire)
    • p2p 44348 1% (limewire)
    • p2p ? 18% (limewire or other)

Note: all statistics ignore SSL sent under protocols other than IP

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY


UNCLASSIFIED

SSL Operation

  • Application calls SSL connect routines to set up channel
  • Public Key cryptography is used during handshake to authenticate parties and exchange session key
  • Symmetric Key cryptography (using session key) is used to encrypt the data

UNCLASSIFIED


UNCLASSIFIED

Public Key Algorithms

  • Key Exchange used to derive session keys for encryption:
    • RSA
    • Diffie-Hellman (DH / EDH / ADH)
    • Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH / ECDHE)
    • Pre-Shared Key (PSK)
    • Secure Remote Password (SRP)
    • Fortezza
    • Kerberos
  • Authentication mechanisms
    • RSA
    • DSA
    • None (Anonymous)

UNCLASSIFIED


UNCLASSIFIED

Symmetric Key Algorithms

  • Work horse of algorithms
  • Can offer near perfect secrecy
  • Block - encrypt data block
    • RC2 – 128 bit key
    • DES - 56 bit key or Triple DES
    • IDEA - 128 bit key, PGP
    • AES – 128 or 256 bit key
    • SEED – 128 bit key
    • CAMELLIA – 128 or 256 bit key
  • Stream - encrypt byte by byte
    • RC4 - 128 bit key

UNCLASSIFIED


UNCLASSIFIED

Message Digests

  • Hash functions
    • All output is influenced by all input
    • If an input bit is changed, every output bit has 50% chance of changing
    • Improbable for different inputs to have the same hash
    • MD5(128 bit), SHA-1(160 bit)

UNCLASSIFIED


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

Key Exchange Usage

  • 65% RSA
  • 20% ADH
  • 1% DHE / RSA
  • 0.7% RSA Export

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY


UNCLASSIFIED

The SSL Handshake

  • Handshake determines:
    • SSL version (2 or 3.x)
    • Cipher suite
      • public key scheme (Diffie-Hellman, RSA)
      • symmetric key scheme (DES, RC4)
      • key length
      • hashing routine (SHA1, MD5)
    • Compression Scheme

UNCLASSIFIED


UNCLASSIFIED

Client Messages              Server Messages

Client Hello ------------>
                   <-------- Server Hello
                   <-------- Certificate *
                   <-------- Server Key Exchange *
                   <-------- Certificate Request *
                   <-------- Server Hello Done
Certificate  ------------>
Client Key Exchange ----->
Certificate Verify ------>
Change Cipher Spec ------>
Finished ---------------->
                   <-------- Change Cipher Spec
                   <-------- Finished
Application Data <---------> Application Data

UNCLASSIFIED


SECRET//COMINT//20320108

Client Hello - Version 2

SSL 2.0 handshake message <1 byte>
Message length            <1 byte>
Client hello message      <1 byte = 01>
Preferred SSL Version     <2 bytes>

Cipher suite length       <2 bytes>
Session ID length         <2 bytes>
Client Hello Random length<2 bytes - usually 0x10>

Cipher suites             <Set of 3 byte cipher suites>
Session ID                If present, resumed session
Client Hello Random

SECRET//COMINT//20320108


SECRET//COMINT//20320108

Client Hello - Version 3/TLS

SSL 3/TLS handshake     <1 byte>
Version                 <2 bytes>
Message length          <2 bytes>
Client hello message    <1 byte = 01>
Length                  <3 bytes>
Version                 <2 bytes

Client Hello Random     <32 bytes>

Session ID length       <1 byte - usually 0x20 or 0>
Session ID              If present, resumed session

Cipher suite length     <2 bytes>
Cipher suites           <Set of 2 byte cipher suites>

Compression length      <1 byte>
Compression methods

SECRET//COMINT//20320108


SECRET//COMINT//20320108

Server Hello - Version3/TLS

SSL 3/TLS message       <1 byte - 0x16>
Version                 <2 bytes>
Length                  <2 bytes>
Server hello message    <1 byte - 0x02>
Length                  <3 bytes>
Version                 <2 bytes>

Server hello random     <32 bytes>

Session ID length       <1 byte - usually 0x20>
Session ID

Cipher selected         <2 byte cipher suite>
Compression             <1 byte>

SECRET//COMINT//20320108


UNCLASSIFIED

SSL Certificates

  • X.509 version number
  • name of entity the certificate is validating
  • public key of entity
  • issuer name, the Certificate Authority
  • unique serial number
  • validity period
  • digital signature

UNCLASSIFIED


SECRET//COMINT//20320108

Sample Parsed Certificate

Certificate:

Data:
    Version: 1 (0x0)
    Serial Number:
      f4:bf:15:eb:73:ef:e2:16
    Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
    Issuer: C=CA, ST=server-ca-state, L=server-ca-city, O=server-ca-company, OU=server-ca-section,
   CN=server-ca-name/emailAddress=server-ca@server.ca.com
    Validity
      Not Before: Apr 24 21:07:13 2008 GMT
      Not After: May 24 21:07:13 2008 GMT
    Subject: C=SE, ST=server-state, L=server-city, O=server-company, OU=server-section, CN=server-
   name/emailAddress=server@server.com

SECRET//COMINT//20320108


SECRET//COMINT//20320108

Certificate (con't)

Subject Public Key Info:

Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
  RSA Public Key: (1024 bit)
    Modulus (1024 bit):
         00:ad:e3:64:3f:45:75:44:be:b8:5f:ab:74:35:e0:12:ef:2f:41:23:ca:10:96:2e:e3:1a:48:da:c4:ef:
         8d:ca:67:d9:11:8a:9f:45:6c:f2:7c:e9:cb:fd:51:9b:5d:0b:02:1b:9d:fa:9c:28:ae:8c:ef:43:eb:cc:
         7e:50:27:52:2d:af:28:7c:89:c5:37:43:01:f8:e5:98:03:9d:fe:dc:d2:ba:74:84:86:be:6f:f6:93:c6:
         5a:15:36:85:11:9e:24:f1:c0:c7:e8:05:d1:91:86:7f:0d:58:be:f8:80:8b:1a:f0:0b:f5:0d:28:10:1e:
         b1:fe:9f:61:9b:27:15:06:b7
       Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption

  05:5e:a6:5a:eb:9c:ab:f6:2e:67:b2:7e:91:45:40:47:56:3d:76:5b:9a:d2:82:63:16:9a:d1:5a:4d:a0:
  87:ed:2e:98:2a1a:4e:d9:04:bb:b0:b6:28:f6:a3:0b:f9:74:6f:c2:e1:dd:98:08:63:ff:2d:53:c5:b7:7c:
  a8:c7:66:ea:6a:1a:cc:f9:4b:52:b1:bd:60:5e:d7:8c:aa:82:01:09:ef:15:d9:3a:98:45:0d:f1:9a:2c:be:
  07:db:72:4c:b9:a2:90:c1:d1:06:fd:81:76:19:c5:4d:bf:30:df:81:c5:22:6b:5e:09:3f:9e:bc:b8:67:d5:
  12:bb:24:da:7d

SECRET//COMINT//20320108


UNCLASSIFIED

Certificate Authority

  • Someone both parties trust
  • Issuer of Certificates
  • Many standard ones listed in browser options
    • VeriSign
    • GTE CyberTrust Root CA
    • Thawte Server

UNCLASSIFIED


UNCLASSIFIED

Certificate

Server Info
CA priv
(hash)

UNCLASSIFIED


UNCLASSIFIED

X.509 Certificates

Certificate
Separate
Plaintext portion
Digital signature
Hash function
Decipher with
public key
Hash value
=?
Y
N
Message authenticated
Hash value
Message invalid

UNCLASSIFIED


UNCLASSIFIED

Key Generation

  • Uses three random numbers to create session key
    • Client Random
    • Server Random
    • Pre-Master Secret
  • Series of hash functions and bit selections

UNCLASSIFIED


UNCLASSIFIED

Pre-Master Secret

  • 48 random bytes
  • Either:
    • RSA: Sent in Client Key Exchange message encrypted with the public key of the server
    • Diffie-Hellman: Parameters are sent so that both sides can agree on a pre-master secret (either in the client key exchange message or the client certificate)
  • THE security behind SSL/TLS

UNCLASSIFIED


SECRET//COMINT//20320108

Master Secret

  • Master secret is same across a session/resumed session.
  • Used for generating encryption keys, MAC secrets and IVs.
  • Formed differently for SSL and TLS, but both use a combination of:
    • SHA1
    • MD5
    • Client Random
    • Server Random
    • Pre-Master Secret
    • Fixed Constant (eg, "A" "client write key")

SECRET//COMINT//20320108


UNCLASSIFIED

Client
Random

Pre-Master
Secret

Server
Random

Master
Secret

Key Block

Export

Final
Client
Write

Final
Server
Write

UNCLASSIFIED


SECRET//COMINT//20320108

Key Block

  • Generated per session. Generated differently for SSL/TLS, but both use:
    • SHA1
    • MD5
    • Client Random
    • Server Random
    • Master Secret
    • Fixed Constant (eg, “A” “client write key")
  • The length of the key block generated depends upon the cipher suite used.

SECRET//COMINT//20320108


SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY//20320108

Session Keys

From the Key Block, pull out the keys as follows:

  • Client Write MAC Secret (Hash size bytes)
  • Server Write MAC Secret (Hash size bytes)
  • Client Write Key (Key Material Length)
  • Server Write Key (Key Material Length)
  • Client Write IV (IV Size)
  • Server Write IV (IV Size)

Example: 3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA

2 x 24 byte keys, 2 x 20 byte MAC secrets,2 x 8 byte IVs
= 104 bytes of key

SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY//20320108


UNCLASSIFIED

Resumed Session

Client Messages               Server Messages

Client Hello --------->
                      <------ Server Hello
                      <------ Change Cipher Spec
                      <------ Finished
Change Cipher Spec -->
Finished ------------>

Application Data <----------> Application Data

UNCLASSIFIED


UNCLASSIFIED

Resumed Sessions

  • Client sends session ID
  • If stored in server cache, may use previous session information (Master key). Sends the same session ID back to client.
  • Client does not send a Key Exchange, Server does not send a certificate
  • Both use stored Master Key and skip first part of key generation

UNCLASSIFIED


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

SSL Exploitation

  • Not impossible!
  • RSA key exchange "easy” to do because of fixed key.
  • EDH key exchange not exploitable by the "easy” way. :(

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY


UNCLASSIFIED

RSA Keys (Stating the Obvious)

If the Key Exchange type is RSA:

  • If we can get a hold of the server's RSA private key, we can decrypt the Client Key Exchange message and read the pre-master secret key. No other heavy work need be done.
  • Valid for life of certificate

UNCLASSIFIED


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

Debain SSL

  • Publically known weakness in the RNG for specific version of Debian openssl
  • Creates finite set of RSA keys
  • If Debian modulus is observed, lookup the private key in table (2 ^ 15) * 6 for each key size.
  • Decrypt the traffic!

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

RSA Exploitation Steps

  • Is it the key exchange RSA? (server hello)
    • If so, is the modulus match a known private key? (server certificate)
      • If so, is there 2-sided collect?
        • If so, do we have:
          • Client Hello
          • Server Hello
          • Client Key Exchange
            DECRYPTION!

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

RSA Resumed Sessions

  • Most traffic decrypted is resumed sessions (about 9 resumed sessions for every initial session).
  • To decrypt a resumed session, you need:
    • Master key (initial session)
    • Client random (resumed session)
    • Server random (resumed session)

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY


CONFIDENTIAL//COMINT

Problems in processing

  • Literally millions of sessions per day
  • Need to have good filtering and selection
  • Need both sides of conversation
  • USSID 18 issues

CONFIDENTIAL//COMINT


CONFIDENTIAL//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

Network Traffic Problems

  • Correctly reconstructing SSL session
    • Port reuse
    • Match client and server using time stamp
    • Match resumed sessions to initial sessions, using SSL session id or SSL session ticket

CONFIDENTIAL//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

State Needed to Decrypt

  • Cipher Suite
  • Master Key
  • Client Random
  • Server Random
  • Session ID / Session Ticket
  • Index for finished message
  • Index for application data

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY


UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Contact Information

[REDACTED]

Network Security Products
S31213

[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY


UNCLASSIFIED

Questions?

UNCLASSIFIED