TURBULENCE - Fielded Capability: End-to-End VPN, SPIN 9 Design Review

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Creating agency: NSA National Security Agency (US)
Document date: -
Pages: 47
Genre: slides
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Classification: TOP SECRET COMINT
Dissemination: REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

An NSA SPIN 9 design review presentation describing the transition of TURMOIL's VPN decryption capability from the legacy Red Architecture to the new Blue Architecture — covering the full end-to-end dataflow, component interfaces, test scenarios and detailed processing specifications for each system in the VPN decryption pipeline.

Long Description:
This is a TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY TURBULENCE design review presentation. The document covers the SPIN 9 objectives, capabilities, dataflows, interfaces, test scenarios and detailed component specifications for TURMOIL's VPN decryption capability. At the time of writing, all deployed VPN capabilities were running as SPIN 6 Red Architecture software on Red Architecture hardware at TEC and MHS Live only — YRS, SSO, MHS Dev had no VPN capability at all. SPIN 9's primary objective was to transition the entire capability to the Blue Architecture while redesigning the decryption flow to reallocate functionality between TURMOIL, the VPN Attack Orchestrator (VAO) and the VPN Metrics service. A key constraint is noted: SPIN 9 VPN identification and decryption capability would not deploy to Third Party TURMOIL sites, though metadata capability would deploy to all sites. The document contains several notable features. First, it captures a transitional moment in the architecture — multiple references to WEALTHYCLUSTER 2.0 are struck through, indicating that the bundled decrypt path to WC2.0 was deprecated during SPIN 9 in favour of the sessionized decrypt path to XKEYSCORE. The TRANSFORM+FORWARD tasking option that previously sent decrypted traffic to WC2.0 was eliminated. However the interface table (VPN14) still lists a "Bundled Decrypt" path from TML Home to "TEC WC2.0" via MAILORDER, suggesting the TEC retained WC2.0 connectivity even as it was being phased out elsewhere. Second, this document provides the explicit expansion of TGIF as "The Grand Input Format" — the format in which IKE metadata is delivered to TOYGRIPPE. The TOYGRIPPE section confirms it accepts TGIF files sent by MAILORDER as bundled tar files, with TOYGRIPPE 3.2 storing PPTP and IPSec VPN metadata for analyst access via a web browser interface. Third, the component descriptions provide rare functional detail on each system in the pipeline. TUBE defragments sessions, examines BME tags to determine PWV routing, and wraps multiple objects into single MAILORDER files to reduce file count. EXOPUMP extracts metadata from SOTF records and converts them to PWV XML metadata objects. PRESSUREWAVE hosts a persistent standing query from the VPN Analytic — when new metadata arrives matching the query, the analytic is notified and pulls IKE packets for TGIF conversion. The VAO generates ESP Security Association cryptovariables from IKE packets, matches CV requests with generated CVs, and notes that it requests multiple ESP packets per session. XKEYSCORE receives sessionized decrypted traffic in SOTF format, archives content, databases metadata for analyst query, performs keyword scanning, optionally forwards selected data to PINWALE, and sends presence tips to TRAFFICTHIEF. The full interface table lists 14 numbered VPN interfaces (VPN1 through VPN14) with source, destination, content type, format, schema reference and transport mechanism for each, providing the most complete published specification of how data flows between TURMOIL, KEYCARD, PIQ Blade, VAO, TUBE, EXOPUMP, PRESSUREWAVE, XKEYSCORE, TOYGRIPPE and WC2.0. The VPN-specific BME tag table documents ten metadata tags used to track decrypted VPN sessions through the processing pipeline, including the vpnID UUID, protocol namespace, ESP SPI, IKE cookie, IKE payload and survey flag — the fields that allow analysts and downstream systems to identify, query and route VPN-derived intelligence. The test scenario section documents both sunny day and failure scenarios including VAO timeout, key response after TDS hold time expiry, ESP collected without IKE, IKE collected without ESP, and concurrent VPN sessions — providing insight into the operational failure modes engineers had to design around. Taken together this is the most comprehensive single-document description of the TURMOIL VPN decryption pipeline published in the Snowden archive, covering architecture, interfaces, component behaviour, metadata schema and test requirements in a single presentation.
Programs:
TURBULENCE, TURMOIL, KEYCARD, WEALTHYCLUSTER, TUBE, XKEYSCORE, PRESSUREWAVE, EXOPUMP, PWV, TOYGRIPPE, PICARESQUE, AGILITY, MAILORDER, ISLANDTRANSPORT, PIQBLADE, PINWALE, TRAFFICTHIEF, IBRIDGE, PPF, METROTUBE, FIP, SSO

People mentioned:
-

Countries:
-

Tags:
VPN exploitation, VPN decryption, contact chaining, TLS, SSL, Blue Architecture, Red Architecture, IPSec, IKE, ISAKMP, ESP, VPN Attack Orchestrator, SIGDEV, strong selectors

Identifier:
spiegel_-_media-35529

PDF SHA-256:
3b73f559d5bce1088c27633ff0b1cab3a3eb0f1abce8fd8bbaecad7978a24dae

TURBULENCE

Fielded Capability: End-to-End VPN

SPIN 9 Design Review

[REDACTED]

The overall classification for this brief is:
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VPN Spin 9 Fielded Capability Upgrade

(U) Current Fielded Capability

  • (TS//SI//REL) All current TURMOIL Virtual Private Network (VPN) capabilities are fielded as Spin 6 Red Architecture software running on Red Architecture hardware.
VPN Metadata VPN Decryption
TEC Red
No capability after Blue transition on 17-Sep
Red
No capability after Blue transition on 17-Sep
YRS No capability No capability
SSO No capability No capability
MHS Live Red Red
MHS Dev No capability No capability

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VPN Spin 9 Fielded Capability Upgrade

(U) Spin 9 Objectives

  • (S//SI//REL) The Spin 9 Objective for the TURBULENCE (TU) VPN Private capability is to transition to the Blue Architecture.
  • (S//SI//REL) Spin 9 VPN will implement a redesign of the decryption flow that reallocates some functionality between TURMOIL, the VPN Attack Orchestrator (VAO), and the VPN Metrics service.
  • (U) Deliver all capabilities as deployable at the end of Spin 9.

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(U) Capabilities

  • (TS//SI//REL) The TU VPN capability will implement an operational capability to detect and decrypt selected communications that are encrypted using IP security (IPsec) algorithms and protocols. It will forward the unencrypted content to follow-on processing systems.
  • (TS//SI//REL) The TU VPN capability will collect metadata about IPsec Internet Key Exchange (IKE) events and forward the metadata to follow-on SIGINT Development (SIGDEV) systems.

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(U//FOUO) Exploited Protocols

(TS//SI//REL) IPsec automatic key management protocols establish security associations between communicants. A security association (SA) is a relationship between a source and a destination that includes a session key and other parameters. The VPN capability exploits the following key management protocols:

  • (U) ISAKMP – Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (RFC2407, RFC2408) provides the authentication and key exchange framework.
  • (U) IKE – Internet Key Exchange (RFC2409) provides the authentication and key exchange mechanisms.

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(U//FOUO) Exploited Protocols (continued)

(TS//SI//REL) IPsec security protocols provide integrity, confidentiality, and authentication for higher layer IP protocols. IPsec security protocols use security associations previously established either manually or by automatic key management protocols (IKE). The VPN capability targets SA's that are established by IKE. The VPN capability exploits the following security protocol:

  • (U) ESP - Encapsulating Security Payload (RFC2406) provides traffic confidentiality (via encryption) and optionally provides authentication and integrity protection.

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(U) IPsec Operation (Alice⇨ Bob)

ISAKMP/IKE Phase1
ISAKMP SA
Security Association Database
ISAKMP/IKE Phase2
ESP SA
ESP
Cleartext
Alice @ IP Source
Unencrypted Handshake
Encrypted Handshake
Encrypted Data
ISAKMP/IKE Phase1
ISAKMP SA
Security Association Database
ISAKMP/IKE Phase2
ESP SA
ESP
Cleartext
Bob @ IP Destination
  • (U) An SA is identified by a 4-tuple <SrcIP, DstIP, SPI, SecurityProtocol>, where the SPI (Security Parameter Index) is chosen by DstIP for SA uniqueness.
  • (U) The Bi-directional ISAKMP SA is negotiated in Phase1 and protects the ESP key negotiations in Phase2.
  • (U) A Uni-directional ESP SA is negotiated in Phase2 and is used to protect the user's cleartext.
  • (U) Reverse communication (Bob⇨ Alice) requires a separate ESP SA and is negotiated using the same ISAKMP SA as used for (Alice⇨ Bob).

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(U) IPsec Modes

Alice IP=A
Internet
Bob IP=B

| IP Hdr: Src=A, Dst=B │ ESP Header │ Encrypted Data │ ESP Trailer |

(U) Transport Mode

  • (U) Original IP Header is preserved
  • (U) ESP Header and Trailer encapsulate and encrypt remaining IP Packet
Alice IP=A
Security Gateway IP=Fa
Internet
Security Gateway IP=Fa
Bob IP=B
| IP Hdr: Src=Fa1 Dst=Fb | ESP Header | Encrypted IP Hdr: Src=A, Dst=B | Encrypted Data | ESP Trailer |

(U) Tunnel Mode

  • (U) Security Gateway at source encapsulates, encrypts, and adds new IP Header to original packet.
  • (U) Security Gateway at destination recovers and forwards original packet.
  • (U) Identities of traffic source and destination is concealed
  • (U) Extra padding also may be added to hide packet size

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(S//SI//REL) TU VPN Products

  • (TS//SI//REL) Bundled decrypt are the decrypted packets from an ESP Security Association prior to any session or application processing.
  • (TS//SI//REL) Sessionized decrypted packets are the decrypted packets that have been recursively processed by the TURMOIL Stage 1 sessionizer for SIGDEV.
  • (S//SI//REL) Selected application sessions are the recursed TURMOIL sessions that have been selected by KEYCARD strong selection and subsequently processed by TURMOIL Stage 2 application processing.
  • (S//SI//REL) IPsec metadata are derived from IKE events for VPN SIGDEV.
  • (S//SI//REL) VPN metrics are produced by CES CA components for internal use.

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(S//SI//REL) TU VPN Product Dataflows

  • (TS//SI//REL) Bundled decrypt are delivered directly to WEALTHYCLUSTER 2.0 (WC2.0) via TUBE from TURMOIL as packets for application processing that is not available in TURMOIL.
  • (TS//SI//REL) Sessionized decrypted packets are delivered without selection (full-take) to XKEYSCORE from TURMOIL for target SIGDEV.
  • (S//SI//REL) Selected application sessions are delivered to PRESSUREWAVE via TUBE format conversion and EXOPUMP where data and metadata object are created and inserted into PWV for legacy analytics and analysis tools.
  • (S//SI//REL) IPsec metadata are delivered to TOYGRIPPE via PWV where an analytic converts IPsec metadata to TGIF format and pushes it to TOYGRIPPE.
  • (S//SI//REL) VPN metrics are delivered to CA Resources by the TURMOIL PIQ blade via CES firewall.

Reference: VPN Spin 9 Dataflows

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(S//SI//REL) TU VPN Product Retrieval Mechanisms

  • (S//SI//REL) WC2.0
    • An analyst uses the AGILITY interface on WC2.0 to view selected traffic as the intended recipient would see it.
  • (S//SI//REL) PRESSUREWAVE
    • The PRESSUREWAVE analytic and standing query pulls, reformats, and pushes metadata objects to TOYGRIPPE.
  • (S//SI//REL) TOYGRIPPE
    • A SIGDEV analyst uses the TOYGRIPPE query interface to pull VPN metadata.

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(U//FOUO) Selection Mechanisms

  • (S//SI//REL) Protocol Selection - Identify VPN traffic in IP traffic
    • IKE: version=4, 0x05≤hdrLen≤0xff, nxtProtocol=17, srcPort=500, dstPort=500
    • ESP: version=4, hdrLen=5, nxtProtocol=50
  • (S//SI//REL) Session Selection - Identify session packets in VPN traffic
    • IKE: srcIP, dstIP, srcPort, desPort, nxtProtocol (5-tuple)
    • ESP: srcIP, dstIP, SPI
  • (TS//SI//REL) Target Selection – Identify, select, and task target in VPN sessions
    • KEYCARD performs target selection lookup with IP selectors
    • KEYCARD lookup result determines tasking disposition:
      • Not TRANSFORM (no action)
      • TRANSFORM (decrypt)
      • TRANSFORM+SURVEY (decrypt and send to XKEYSCORE)
      • TRANSFORM+FORWARD (decrypt and send to WC2.0) no action
      • TRANSFORM+SURVEY+FORWARD (decrypt and send to XKEY & WC2.0)

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(U) Design Constraints

(TS//SI//REL) Spin 9 VPN will use the following components:

Capability Component Function Developer
PIQ-Blade Extends the CES enclave to TURMOIL for decryption and other CA processing CES/ESO
VPN Identification and Decryption WC2.0 Receive bundled decrypt for application processing TU
VPN Attack Orchestrator (VAO) Provides IKE / ESP matching functionality. It communicates with the PIQ-Blade and is located behind the CES Firewall. CES/SAO/ Txx
VPN Metadata TOYGRIPPE Receives VPN SOTF Metadata via PRESSUREWAVE CES/ESO

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(U) Delivery Constraints

(TS//SI//REL) Spin 9 VPN will use the following delivery mechanisms:

Capability Product Format Mechanism
VPN Identification and Decryption Bundled decrypt for WC2.0 SOTF MAILORDER
Sessionized decrypted packets from TURMOIL Data Store to XKEYSCORE SOTF Socket
VPN Metadata VPN IKE setup metadata for PRESSUREWAVE SOTF Socket via TUBE and EXOPUMP
VPN IKE setup metadata for TOYGRIPPE TGIF MAILORDER via VPN Analytic

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(U) Management Constraints

  • (S//SI//REL) All VPN deployments must be approved by Chief CES.

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(U) Second and Third Party Constraints

  • (TS//SI//REL) Spin 9 VPN identification and decryption capability will not deploy to Third Party TU Sites.
  • (U//FOUO) Spin 9 VPN metadata capability will deploy to all TU sites.

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VPN Spin 9 Fielded Capability Upgrade

(U) What Spin 9 VPN will do

  • (S//SI//REL) Packet Detection
    • Detect IKE exchanges
    • Detect ESP packets
  • (S//SI//REL) IPsec Metadata Flow
    • Bundle all detected IKE with SRI and send to PWV

Reference: VPN Spin 9 Sequence Diagram

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(U) What Spin 9 VPN will do (continued)

  • (TS//SI//REL) ESP Decryption Flow
    • When IKE exchange is observed, lookup IP addresses in KEYCARD. If tasked for collection, forward to VAO.
    • When ESP is observed, lookup IP addresses in KEYCARD. If tasked for collection, request key from VAO.
    • If decrypt key is provided by VAO, decrypt ESP packet.
    • Send VPN decrypt metrics to CES VPN Metrics Service in CA Enclave.
    • Recurse decrypted packets to find identifiers tasked for TURMOL processing.
    • Send selected sessions to PWV via TUBE and EXOPUMP.
    • Sessionize all decrypted packets and pass to XKEYSCORE for SIGDEV.
    • Forward all decrypted packets to WC2.0 for application processing.
    • Process only Tunnel mode ESP packets.

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(U) What Spin 9 VPN will not do

  • (S//SI//REL) Will not process IPsec in other protocol implementations
    • Will not perform pattern-based IKE / ESP detection.
    • Will not process TCP/500, UDP/4500, or TCP/4500 implementations.
    • Will not process IKEv2 (RFC4306).
  • (S//SI//REL) Will not process non-IPsec based VPNs
    • TU VPN capability will only process IPsec based VPNs.

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(U) End-to-end test

  • (TS//SI//REL) IKE and ESP test packets must use coordinated security associations
  • (S//SI//REL) Use both synthetic (lab generated) and live collect test data
  • (S//SI//REL) Live test data may only be processed through PIQ blade
  • (TS//SI//REL) Test data characterization must include:
    • 5-tuples (sourceIP, destinationIP, protocol, sourcePort, destinationPort)
    • Number of IKE packets
    • Number of ESP packets
    • Unencrypted ESP payload content

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(U) Test Scenarios

  • (S//SI//REL) "Sunny Day" Scenarios. Single VPN with all IKE/ESP packets available and VPN Match. Exercise KEYCARD tasking option combinations.
    • (TS//SI//REL) Transform – Decrypt to PRESSUREWAVE; IKE to TOYGRIPPE
    • (TS//SI//REL) Transform & Survey – Decrypt to PRESSUREWAVE & XKEYSCORE; IKE to TOYGRIPPE
    • (TS//SI//REL) Transform & Forward – Decrypt to PRESSUREWAVE & WEALTHYCLUSTER 2.0; IKE to TOYGRIPPE
    • (TS//SI//REL) Transform & Survey & Forward - Decrypt to PRESSUREWAVE, XKEYSCORE, WEALTHYCLUSTER 2.0; IKE to TOYGRIPPE
    • (S//SI//REL) Not Transform – IKE to TOYGRIPPE

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(U) Test Scenarios (continued)

  • (U) Failure Scenarios.
    • (TS//SI//REL) ESP Decryption fails because bad key is returned by VAO.
    • (S//SI//REL) VAO responds with no key recovered.
    • (S//SI//REL) VAO key response timeout.
    • (S//SI//REL) VAO key response received after response timeout.
    • (S//SI//REL) VAO response received after TDS hold time expires and ESP is not available.
    • (S//SI//REL) Phase 1 and Phase 2 IKE is complete, but no ESP is collected.
    • (S//SI//REL) ESP is collected, but no IKE is collected.

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(U) Test Scenarios (continued)

  • (S//SI//REL) Miscellaneous Scenarios.
    • (S//SI//REL) Multiple, rapid (< 30 second) Phase 2 re-keys for same initiator / responder pair.
    • (S//SI//REL) Two VPN sessions collected concurrently for same IP source.
    • (TS//SI//REL) Decryption flow can be disabled.
    • (S//SI//REL) IKE Metadata flow can be disabled.

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VPN Spin 9 Development & Integration Activities

Metadata Flow
Decryption Flow
Decryption Subflow: IKE & ESP Sessions to TDS
Decryption Subflow: PIQ Blade processing
Metadata Flow (APP) ~ 21 Sep
TML I&T (TML + APP)
TU I&T
Decryption Subflow: process and recurse decrypted packets
Legend
TML I&T (TML + APP
VPN Analytic (CES/SAO)
PIQ Blade (X342)
Decrypt (APP) ~ 19 Oct
VAO (CES/SAO)
TML I&T: PPF App (APP) & Sessionizer for IKE/ESP (TML)
VPN Metrics (CES)
TDS (TML)
iBridge (TML)
TML I&T (TML + APP)

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VPN SPIN 9 Dataflows

 <==============================================================o======================= Internet Key Exchange (IKE) ============================>
 <==============================================================c===========o=========== Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) ===================>
                                                                |           |
 +-----------+                                                  v           v        +---------+                +---------------+   +-------------------------------+
 | XKEYSCORE |                                               +-----------------+     | KEYCARD |                | Interface Key |   |         Dataflow Key          |
 +-----------+                                               |     TURMOIL     |     +---------+                | T = Transport |   | Selector Lookup               |
       ^                                                     |                 |          ^                     | C = Content   |   | VPN Metrics                   |
       |        VPN7                                         |                 |          |                     | F = Format    |   | PIQ Blade Monitoring          |
       ------------------------------------------------------|                 |       VPN1                     +---------------+   | ESP Key Request/Response      |
                T: Socket Connection                         |                 |       T: Socket Connection                         | IKE Messages                  |
                C: Sessionized Decrypted Packets             |                 |       C: Selector Hit Query/Response               | Selected Application Sessions |
                F: SOTF                                      |                 |       F: Binary                                    | IKE Records                   |
                                                             |                 |          |                                         | Sessionized Decrypted Packets |
                                                             |                 |          |                                         +-------------------------------+
                                                             |                 |-----------         
 +----------------+                                          |                 |         
 |      TUBE      |                                          |                 |         
 |                |       VPN5                               |                 |         
 |                |<-----------------------------------------|                 |         
 |                |       T: Socket Connection               |                 |         
 |                |       C: IKE Records                     |                 |         
 |                |       F: SOTF                            |                 |                                       +-----------------+  +--------------+
 |                |                                          |         +-------+                                       |                 |  |              |
 |                |                                          |         |       |       VPN2                            |                 |  |              |     +-------------+
 |                |       VPN6                               |         |       |---------------------------------------|-----------------|--|--------------|---->| VPN Metrics |
 |                |<-----------------------------------------|         |       |       T: Secure Socket (SSL)          |                 |  |              |     +-------------+
 |                |       T: Socket Connection               |         |       |       C: VPN Metrics                  |                 |  |              |
 |                |       C: Selected Application Sessions*  |         |       |       F: SOAP                         |                 |  |              |
 |                |       F: SOTF                            |         |       |                                       |                 |  |              |
 +----------------+                                          |         |       |       VPN18                           |                 |  |              |     +-----------+
   |            |                                            |         |       |---------------------------------------|-----------------|--|--------------|---->| CES Watch |
   |            |                                            |         | PIQ   |       T: Secure Socket (SSL)          |                 |  |              |     +-----------+
   |           VPN9                                          |         | Blade |       C: PIQ Blade Monitoring         | CES XML Gateway |  | CES Firewall |
   |           T: MAILORDER                                  |         |       |       F: WebSA                        |                 |  |              |
   |           C: Selected Application Sessons*              |         |       |                                       |                 |  |              |
   |           F: SOTF                                       |         |       |       VPN3                            |                 |  |              |     +-----+
   |            |                                            |         |       |---------------------------------------|-----------------|--|--------------|---->|     |
   |            |                                            |         |       |       T: Secure Socket (SSL)          |                 |  |              |     |     |
 VPN8           |                                            |         |       |       C: ESP Key Request/Response     |                 |  |              |     |     |
 T: MAILORDER   |   Note                                     |         |       |       F: SOAP                         |                 |  |              |     | VAO |
 C: IKE Records |   * Selected Application Sessions          |         |       |                                       |                 |  |              |     |     |
 F: SOTF        |   are identified and selected from         |         |       |       VPN4                            |                 |  |              |     |     |
   |            |   the decrypted packets extracted          |         |       |---------------------------------------|-----------------|--|--------------|---->|     | 
   |            |   from the VPN tunnel and inserted         |         +-------+       T: Secure Socket (SSL)          |                 |  |              |     |     |
   |            |   into the TURMOIL input stream.           |                 |       C: IKE Messages                 |                 |  |              |     +-----+
   |            |                                            |                 |       F: SOAP                         +-----------------+  +--------------+
   v            v                                            +-----------------+
   +------------+
   |   EXOPUMP  | 
   +------------+                                                                                                                             +-----------+
   |            |                                           +------------------+                                                              | TOYGRIPPE |
   |            |     VPN11                                 |                  |                       +--------------------+                 +-----------+
   |            ------------------------------------------->|                  |                       |     METROTUBE      |                       ^
   |                  T: ITx (JMS)                          |                  |                       |                    |                       |
   |                  C: Selected Appl Sessions*            |     PRESSURE-    | VPN12                 |   +--------------+ |    VPN13              |
   |                  F: XML/SOTF                           |       WAVE       |-----------------------|-->| VPN Analytic |-|------------------------
   | VPN10                                                  |                  | T: ITx (JMS)          |   +--------------+ |    T: MAILORDER
   -------------------------------------------------------->|                  | C: IKE Records        |                    |    C: IKE Records
     T: ITx (JMS)                                           |                  | F: SOTF               +--------------------+    T: TGIF
     C: IKE Records                                         +------------------+

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VPN SPIN 9 Metadata Dataflows

 <==============================================================o======================= Internet Key Exchange (IKE) ============================>
                                                                |                                                                                 
                                                                |            
                                                                v                                               +---------------+   +-------------------------------+
                                                             +-----------------+                                | Interface Key |   |         Dataflow Key          |
                                                             |     TURMOIL     |                                | T = Transport |   |                               |
                                                             |                 |                                | C = Content   |   |                               |
                                                             |                 |                                | F = Format    |   |                               |
                                                             |                 |                                +---------------+   |                               |
                                                             |                 |                                                    |                               |
                                                             |                 |                                                    | IKE Records                   |
                                                             |                 |                                                    |                               |
                                                             |                 |                                                    +-------------------------------+
                                                             |                 |                    
 +----------------+                                          |                 |         
 |      TUBE      |                                          |                 |         
 |                |       VPN5                               |                 |         
 |                |<-----------------------------------------|                 |         
 |                |       T: Socket Connection               |                 |         
 |                |       C: IKE Records                     |                 |         
 |                |       F: SOTF                            |                 |
 |                |                                          |                 |
 |                |                                          |                 |
 |                |                                          |                 |
 |                |                                          |                 |
 |                |                                          |                 |
 |                |                                          |                 |
 |                |                                          |                 |
 +----------------+                                          |                 |
   |                                                         |                 |
   |                                                         |                 |
   |                                                         |                 |
   |                                                         |                 |
   |                                                         |                 |
   |                                                         |                 |
   |                                                         |                 |
   |                                                         |                 |
 VPN8                                                        |                 |
 T: MAILORDER                                                |                 |
 C: IKE Records                                              |                 |
 F: SOTF                                                     |                 |
   |                                                         |                 |
   |                                                         |                 |
   |                                                         |                 |
   |                                                         |                 |
   v                                                         +-----------------+
   +------------+
   |   EXOPUMP  | 
   +------------+                                                                                                                             +-----------+
   |                                                        +------------------+                                                              | TOYGRIPPE |
   |                                                        |                  |                       +--------------------+                 +-----------+
   |                                                        |                  |                       |     METROTUBE      |                       ^
   |                                                        |                  |                       |                    |                       |
   |                                                        |     PRESSURE-    | VPN12                 |   +--------------+ |    VPN13              |
   |                                                        |       WAVE       |-----------------------|-->| VPN Analytic |-|------------------------
   | VPN10                                                  |                  | T: ITx (JMS)          |   +--------------+ |    T: MAILORDER
   -------------------------------------------------------->|                  | C: IKE Records        |                    |    C: IKE Records
     T: ITx (JMS)                                           |                  | F: SOTF               +--------------------+    T: TGIF
     C: IKE Records                                         +------------------+
     F: XML/SOTF

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VPN SPIN 9 Decrypt Dataflows

 <==============================================================o======================= Internet Key Exchange (IKE) ============================>
 <==============================================================c===========o=========== Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) ===================>
                                                                |           |
 +-----------+                                                  v           v        +---------+                +---------------+   +-------------------------------+
 | XKEYSCORE |                                               +-----------------+     | KEYCARD |                | Interface Key |   |         Dataflow Key          |
 +-----------+                                               |     TURMOIL     |     +---------+                | T = Transport |   | Selector Lookup               |
       ^                                                     |                 |          ^                     | C = Content   |   | VPN Metrics                   |
       |        VPN7                                         |                 |          |                     | F = Format    |   | PIQ Blade Monitoring          |
       ------------------------------------------------------|                 |       VPN1                     +---------------+   | ESP Key Request/Response      |
                T: Socket Connection                         |                 |       T: Socket Connection                         | IKE Messages                  |
                C: Sessionized Decrypted Packets             |                 |       C: Selector Hit Query/Response               | Selected Application Sessions |
                F: SOTF                                      |                 |       F: Binary                                    | Sessionized Decrypted Packets |
                                                             |                 |          |                                         +-------------------------------+
                                                             |                 |-----------         
 +----------------+                                          |                 |         
 |      TUBE      |                                          |                 |         
 |                |                                          |                 |         
 |                |                                          |                 |         
 |                |                                          |                 |         
 |                |                                          |                 |         
 |                |                                          |                 |                                       +-----------------+  +--------------+
 |                |                                          |         +-------+                                       |                 |  |              |
 |                |                                          |         |       |       VPN2                            |                 |  |              |     +-------------+
 |                |       VPN6                               |         |       |---------------------------------------|-----------------|--|--------------|---->| VPN Metrics |
 |                |<-----------------------------------------|         |       |       T: Secure Socket (SSL)          |                 |  |              |     +-------------+
 |                |       T: Socket Connection               |         |       |       C: VPN Metrics                  |                 |  |              |
 |                |       C: Selected Application Sessions*  |         |       |       F: SOAP                         |                 |  |              |
 |                |       F: SOTF                            |         |       |                                       |                 |  |              |
 +----------------+                                          |         |       |       VPN18                           |                 |  |              |     +-----------+
   |            |                                            |         |       |---------------------------------------|-----------------|--|--------------|---->| CES Watch |
   |            |                                            |         | PIQ   |       T: Secure Socket (SSL)          |                 |  |              |     +-----------+
   |           VPN9                                          |         | Blade |       C: PIQ Blade Monitoring         | CES XML Gateway |  | CES Firewall |
   |           T: MAILORDER                                  |         |       |       F: WebSA                        |                 |  |              |
   |           C: Selected Application Sessons*              |         |       |                                       |                 |  |              |
   |           F: SOTF                                       |         |       |       VPN3                            |                 |  |              |     +-----+
   |            |                                            |         |       |---------------------------------------|-----------------|--|--------------|---->|     |
   |            |                                            |         |       |       T: Secure Socket (SSL)          |                 |  |              |     |     |
   |            |                                            |         |       |       C: ESP Key Request/Response     |                 |  |              |     |     |
   |            |   Note                                     |         |       |       F: SOAP                         |                 |  |              |     | VAO |
   |            |   * Selected Application Sessions          |         |       |                                       |                 |  |              |     |     |
   |            |   are identified and selected from         |         |       |       VPN4                            |                 |  |              |     |     |
   |            |   the decrypted packets extracted          |         |       |---------------------------------------|-----------------|--|--------------|---->|     | 
   |            |   from the VPN tunnel and inserted         |         +-------+       T: Secure Socket (SSL)          |                 |  |              |     |     |
   |            |   into the TURMOIL input stream.           |                 |       C: IKE Messages                 |                 |  |              |     +-----+
   |            |                                            |                 |       F: SOAP                         +-----------------+  +--------------+
   v            v                                            +-----------------+
   +------------+
   |   EXOPUMP  | 
   +------------+                                                               
                |                                           +------------------+
                |     VPN11                                 |                  |
                ------------------------------------------->|                  |
                      T: ITx (JMS)                          |                  |
                      C: Selected Appl Sessions*            |     PRESSURE-    |
                      F: XML/SOTF                           |       WAVE       |
                                                            |                  |
                                                            |                  |
                                                            |                  |
                                                            +------------------+

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| Stage 0 | TURMOIL | KEYCARD | TUBE | XKEYSCORE | EXOPUMP | VAO | PWv | VPN Metrics | VPN Analytic | CES Watch | TOYGRIPPE |
1 IKE Packet
Aggregate/Sessionize
S IKE Metadata
M IKE Metadata
J IKE Metadata
J IKE Metadata
M IKE Metadata
S IKE Select Query
TRANSFORM or (TRANSFORM and SURVEY)
IKE Select Response S
Aggregate
H IKE Messages
H VPN Metrics (SOAP)
2 ESP Packet
S ESP Select Query
TRANSFORM or (TRANSFORM and SURVEY)
ESP Select Response S
Aggregate
H ESP Key Request
H VPN Metrics (SOAP)
Key Recovered
ESP Key Response H
Decryption
H VPN Metrics (SOAP)
3 if (TRANSFORM and SURVEY) Recursion for Sessionization
S Sessionized Decrypted Packets
4 if (TRANSFORM) Recursion for Tunnel Selection and Application Processing
S Selected Application Sessions
M Selected Application Sessions
J Selected Application Sessions
H PIQ Blade Monitoring

S Socket
M MAILORDER
J ISLANDTRANSPORT (JMS)
H Secure Socket Layer (HTTPS)

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VPN Spin 9 Metadata Design Details

Packet Processing Framework
  Packet Router
  Keyword Manager
  Atomic Event Generator
  PPF EV
  Stateful Event Generator
  PPF EV
  Event Filter

PPF Events w/IKE

EventToBME VPN-Specific
sri
Stage 0 DFID Allocator
<sotf> (via socket)
HOME
<sotf>
TUBE
PWV

Key
TDK Component
PPF Component
External Service
Mission Application Component
Packet Data
Keyword Management
Session Data
PPF Messaging

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VPN Spin 9 Decryption Design Details

PreProc
1st Stage Packet Filter
Packet Processing Framework
Packet Router
Keyword Manager
Atomic Event Generator
Stateful Event Generator
PPF EV
PPF EV
Event Filter
PPF EV
Metadata EventGenerator
PPF EV <ndds>
PPF EV <ndds>
DFCE <tbus>
Sessionizer
S1G
FIP
App Demux
AppID
M/D Inject
IKE <sotf>
ESP <sotf>
IPNormalizer
Reinject
Decomp
<sotf>
IOPort Router
<sotf>
<sotf> (socket)
Mailorder Router Service
Mailorder
WC2
TDS
IKE n
<sotf>
ESP M/D
<sotf>
ESP Data
<sotf>
In
KE <sotf>
iBridge
decrypt
SIGDEV sessions
XKS
Stage 0 DFID Allocator
Selection Validation/Normalization
VAO
IKEMessage w/ SidPKts (P1)
IKEMessage w/ SidPKts (P2)
ESPKeyRequest w/ SRT_ESP(0..n)
ESPKeyResponse
Key
Packet Data
Keyword Management
Session Data
PPF Messaging
PPF Component
External Service
TDK Component
Mission Application Component

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VPN Spin 9 Interfaces

I/F Source Destination Content Format Schema / ICD Changes Transport
VPN1 TURMOIL KEYCARD Selector Query/Response Binary cns.xsd No Socket
VPN2 PIQ Blade CES VPN Metrics SOAP/HTTPS VPNMetrics.xsd Yes Socket (SSL)
VPN3 PIQ Blade CES VAO ESP Crypto-variable Request/Response SOAP/HTTPS VAOESP.xsd Yes Socket (SSL)
VPN4 PIQ Blade CES VAO IKE Message SOAP/HTTPS VAOIKE.xsd Yes Socket (SSL)
VPN5 TML Home TUBE IKE Data/Metadata SOTF DataBundleOutput.xsd VPNDataBundle.xsd Yes Socket
VPN6 TML Home TUBE Selected Session, Decrypted & Recursively Processed SOTF TURMOIL/core VPNDecrypt.xsd Yes Socket
VPN7 TML Home XKEYSCORE Decrypted Session SOTF TURMOIL/core VPNDecrypt.xsd Yes Socket
VPN8 TUBE EXOPUMP IKE Data/Metadata SOTF DataBundleOutput.xsd VPNDataBundle.xsd Yes MAILORDER
VPN9 TUBE EXOPUMP Selected Session, Decrypted & Recursively Processed SOTF TURMOIL/core VPNDecrypt.xsd Yes MAILORDER
VPN10 EXOPUMP PWV IKE Data/Metadata SOTF DataBundleOutput.xsd VPNDataBundle.xsd PWV Schema Yes ITx
VPN11 EXOPUMP PWV Selected Session, Decrypted & Recursively Processed SOTF TURMOIL/core VPNDecrypt.xsd PWV Schema Yes ITx
VPN12 PWV VPN Analytic IKE Data/Metadata SOTF DataBundleOutput.xsd VPNDataBundle.xsd PWV Schema Yes ITx
VPN13 VPN Analytic TOYGRIPPE IKE Data/Metadata TGIF TGIF ICD No MAILORDER
VPN14 TML Home TEC WC2.0 Bundled Decrypt SOTF TURMOIL/core VPNDecrypt.xsd Yes MAILORDER

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VPN Specific BME

Tag ID Type Value Context Description
vpnID 900791 string xxxxxxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxxxxxxxxxx • Recursed packets
• XKEYSCORE session
• WC2.0 decrypt
16-byte Universally Unique ID that associates IPsec packets in processing history
protocolNamespace 900667 string 'ipsec/ike' • PWV Metadata Identify IPsec as transport protocol layer
keyExchange 600533 string 'IKE' • PWV Metadata Flags IPsec IKE event
espspi 55002 uint32 xxxxxxxx • XKEYSCORE session
• WC2.0 decrypt
4-byte SPI from ESP packet
nextProtocol 37007 uint8 IPTUNNEL=4 • XKEYSCORE session
• WC2.0 decrypt
Identifies IP Tunnel in processing history
appID 114000 string 'vpn/esp' • XKEYSCORE session
• WC2.0 decrypt
Identifies VPN/ESP in XKEYSCORE Session
ikeCookie 900683 string 8 chars • PWV Metadata Destination cookie from IKE packet
ikePayload 900682 string 68 chars • PWV Metadata Raw payload extracted from IKE packet
survey 900790 string 'vpn/esp' • XKEYSCORE session Identifies VPN/ESP in protocol history as weakly selected indicating session should not be forwarded to PRESSUREWAVE.
protocol 2001 String 'vpn/esp' • Recursed packets
• XKEYSCORE session
• WC2.0 decrypt
Identifies VPN in processing history

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Questions?

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Background

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KEYCARD

(U) Inputs

  • (U) Application ID: VPN
  • (U//FOUO) Raw Selectors: IP addresses of sessions carrying the IKE exchange
  • (U) Context: Packet IP addresses both source and destination (properly identified) with realm derived from network universe

(U) Processing

  • (S//SI//REL) Lookup raw selectors and report hit/no-hit results.
  • (S//SI//REL) Return tasking for hits.

(U) Outputs

  • (U//FOUO) Evaluated Selectors:
    • Hit or No-Hit indicators
    • Target match data if necessary

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TURMOIL VPN Metadata Processing

(U) Inputs

  • (U) Raw packets

(U) Processing

  • (S//SI//REL) Detect IKE exchanges at UDP source and destination ports 500
  • (S//SI//REL) Extract IP addresses, responder cookie, message ID, ISAKMP payload
  • (S//SI//REL) Bundle all IKE detect messages with SRI

(U) Outputs

  • (S//SI//REL) SOTF object containing metadata and IKE packets

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TURMOIL VPN Decrypt Processing

(U) Inputs

  • (U) Raw packets
  • (U) Selection results from KEYCARD

(U) Processing

  • (S//SI//REL) Detect ESP packets and extract IP addresses and SPI
  • (S//SI//REL) Match tasked IKE exchange packets with an ESP packet stream
  • (S//SI//REL) Generate UUID and assign to VPNID for unique exchange ID
  • (S//SI//REL) Send Crypto-variable Request to the CES VAO
  • (TS//SI//REL) If the key is returned, decrypt the ESP packets
  • (TS//SI//REL) Send decrypt metrics to the CES VPN Metrics service
  • (TS//SI//REL) Recurse all decrypted packets from the VPN.
  • (TS//SI//REL) Sessionize all decrypted packets, pass sessions to XKEYSCORE
  • (TS//SI//REL) Forward all decrypted packets to a WC2.0 for additional application processing.

(U) Outputs

  • (TS//SI//REL) Decrypted packets to a WC2.0
  • (TS//SI//REL) Decrypt metrics to VAO
  • (TS//SI//REL) Sessionized decrypted packets to XKEYSCORE
  • (S//SI//REL) Selected application SOTF

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XKEYSCORE

(U) Inputs

  • (S//SI//REL) Sessionized collect in SOTF format.

(U) Processing

  • (S//SI//REL) Recovers and archives session content. Databases metadata for query by analysts. XKEYSCORE can also perform keyword scanning and optionally forward selected data back to PINWALE. Presence tips can also be sent to TRAFFICTHIEF.

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TUBE (ID and Decryption)

(U) Inputs

  • (U) SOTF objects.

(U) Processing

  • (C//SI//REL) Defragments fragmented sessions, creating an SOTF object with the complete session.
  • (C//SI//REL) Examines the BME to determine if the session should go to PWV.
  • (C//SI//REL) Creates a new SOTF object, placing the received or defragged SOTF object into the data section. The BME of the newly created object contains classification metadata*, as well as certain fields such as sessionID and signalUpTime replicated from the BME of the original received SOTF object.
    • NOTE: Classification metadata needs more discussion to determine appropriate origination. TURMOIL may assume some responsibilities.
  • (U) Determines appropriate routing (MAILORDER FDI) and forwards the new SOTF object to EXOPUMP via MAILORDER.
  • (U) Optionally (configurable) wrap multiple objects destined for EXOPUMP/PWV into one MAILORDER file to reduce the number of individual files transmitted.

(U) Outputs

  • (U) SOTF objects.

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TUBE (Metadata)

(U) Inputs

  • (U) SOTF objects.

(U) Processing

  • (C//SI//REL) Examines the BME to determine if the session should go to PWV.
  • (U) Determines appropriate routing (MAILORDER FDI) and forwards the new SOTF object to EXOPUMP via MAILORDER.
  • (U) Optionally (configurable) wrap multiple objects destined for EXOPUMP/PWV into one MAILORDER file to reduce the number of individual files transmitted.

(U) Outputs

  • (U) SOTF objects.

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EXOPUMP

(U) Inputs

  • (U) SOTF object from TUBE via MAILORDER.

(U) Processing

  • (U) Extracts metadata from SOTF records for PWV XML metadata.
  • (U) Inserts SOTF objects and XML metadata into PWV.

(U) Outputs

  • (U) PRESSUREWAVE metadata object.

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PRESSUREWAVE

(U) Inputs

  • (S//SI//REL) VPN metadata including IKE payload objects with associated metadata represented in XML.
  • (U//FOUO) Selected application data objects with associated metadata represented in xml.

(U) Processing

  • (S//SI//REL) PWV hosts a persistent (or standing) query created by the VPN analytic. When new metadata arrives that matches the query, the VPN analytic is notified and pulls the associated metadata and IKE packets for further processing.
  • (U//FOUO) PWV serves as data store for TU analytics

(U) Outputs

  • (S//SI//REL) The metadata and IKE packets are forwarded to VPN analytic via ITx (JMS messaging service).

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VPN Analytic

(U) Inputs

  • (S//SI//REL) Persistent query to detect VPN metadata/IKE packets in PRESSUREWAVE
  • (S//SI//REL) SOTF files containing IKE packets

(U) Processing

  • (U//FOUO) Convert SOTF to TGIF records

(U) Outputs

  • (S//SI//REL) MAILORDER files with TGIF records containing intercepted IKE packets

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TOYGRIPPE

(U) Inputs

  • (U//FOUO) TGIF ("The Grand Input Format") records based on TML collected metadata.

(U) Processing

  • (U//FOUO) TOYGRIPPE 3.2 system accepts TGIF files sent by MAILORDER as bundled "tar" files.
  • (TS//SI//REL) TOYGRIPPE unbundles, validates, and stores the VPN metadata from the TGIF files into a database for later access by Analysts primarily through a web browser interface. TOYGRIPPE supports data processing and storage for PPTP and IPSec VPN metadata records.

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VAO

(U) Inputs

  • (S//SI//REL) IKE packets
  • (S//SI//REL) ESP Crypto-variable (CV) Requests

(U) Processing

  • (S//SI//REL) Generates ESP SA CV's from IKE packets
  • (S//SI//REL) Matches ESP SA CV requests with generated CV's
  • (S//SI//REL) Responds to ESP SA CV requests

(U) Outputs*

  • (S//SI//REL) ESP Crypto-variable Response

* Note: VAO requests that multiple ESP packets also be sent for each session

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VPN Metrics

(U) Inputs

  • (S//SI//REL) PIQ Blade VPN Processing Metrics

(U) Processing

  • (S//SI//REL) Internal to CES/CA Enclave

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XWEALTHYCLUSTER 2.0

(U) Inputs

  • (S//SI//REL) Bundled decrypted packets in SOTF format via MAILORDER.

(U) Processing

  • (U) Signal identification
  • (S//SI//REL) Protocol recognition, processing and sessionization
  • (C//SI//REL) Application identification and processing
  • (C//SI//REL) Link characterization aggregation
  • (U//FOUO) Filtering, selection, and forwarding
  • (U//FOUO) Strong selection
  • (S//SI//REL) Persona session association
  • (S//SI//REL) Session association
  • (S//SI//REL) IP Decompression
  • (S//SI//REL) Contact chaining

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