GALLANTWAVE

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Creating agency: NSA National Security Agency (US)
Document date: -
Pages: 5
Genre: slides
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Classification: TOP SECRET COMINT
Dissemination: REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

NSA presentation describing GALLANTWAVE — a LONGHAUL capability for VPN decryption — specifically its scaling architecture to handle increased collection volumes and a peering mechanism allowing partner agencies to share single-sided VPN key exchange events so that LONGHAUL can complete decryption attempts that would otherwise fail due to one-sided collection.

Long Description:
This is a TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL presentation from NSA's Digital Network Crypt Applications (DNCA) division describing the scaling and volume requirements for GALLANTWAVE, a VPN decryption capability operating within the LONGHAUL attack orchestration framework. The document addresses two parallel development tracks. The @Scale track focuses on deploying GALLANTWAVE more widely through a peering mechanism between partner agencies — the architecture showing KPS (Key Processing System) communicating with LONGHAUL — allowing agencies to share copies of VPN key exchange events that have only been seen on one side of the connection. This is a direct response to one of the fundamental challenges of passive cable collection for VPN decryption: IPSec requires both sides of an IKE key exchange to recover the session key, but a given cable tap may only see traffic flowing in one direction. The peering architecture allows LONGHAUL to identify which events have not paired locally, request the missing side from a partner agency, and complete the key recovery process that would otherwise be impossible. The @Volume track addresses the hardware scaling challenge, with plans to increase system capacity from 10 gigabits to 40 and then 100 gigabits per second, and to increase target volumes under a programme called CORNERKICK. The architecture diagrams illustrate two scenarios. Single-sided collection shows how LONGHAUL requests a missing B-to-A event from a peer's Key Processing System when it has only seen the A-to-B direction, receiving the event and completing the attack via the GW (GALLANTWAVE) component and MVR. The filtered pairing diagram shows a more complex multi-site scenario with two GALLANTWAVE nodes (GW-1 and GW-2) exchanging need and event messages to complete pairings across geographically distributed collection points, with an SF component mediating between them — the nature of SF is not defined in the document.
Programs:
GALLANTWAVE, CORNERKICK, LONGHAUL, MVR

People mentioned:
-

Countries:
-

Tags:
VPN decryption, IPSec, IKE, key recovery, peering architecture, Digital Network Crypt Applications, DNCA, Key Processing System, single-sided collection, partner peering, encryption breaking, cable collection, passive collection, scaling

Identifier:
spiegel_-_media-35514

PDF SHA-256:
8a53be36db1d732ff63d29ac9fcff6e6952025ec74bcbe5bb1e96f445eb98cbf

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

GALLANTWAVE@scale

GALLANTWAVE @ volume

[REDACTED]

DIGITAL NETWORK CRYPT APPLICATIONS
DNCA
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
Dated: 20070108
Declassify On: 20351201

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Requirements

§ @Scale

  • Deploy more widely
  • Leverage peering with partner
    § @Volume
  • Increased system size: 10G -> 40G -> 100G
  • Increased target volumes: CORNERKICK ++

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

@Scale

Need
§ Peer to forward “ ‘missing' attack-events to LONGHAUL”, to LONGHAUL, so LONGHAUL can use them to complete single-sided processing.
§ LONGHAUL to reciprocate.

Approach
§ LONGHAUL to become aware of which ‘Events' are not pairing local to agency and to request peer to send (copy) of such events to LONGHAUL
§ Minimise bandwidth required to communicate requests
§ Peering is a back-end (KPS <-> LONGHAUL)
§ Peers process independently

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Single-sided A->B using peering

KPS
need[B'->A']

SF
event[B->A]

need[B'->A']
event[B->A]
request[A->B]
responseFound[A->B]
MVR
GW

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Filtered pairing

event[B->A]
event[E->F]
need[A'->B']
need[F'->E']
responseFound[B->A]
GW-2
request[B->A]
need[B'->A']
need[D'->C']
event[A->B]
event[C->D]
SF
responseFound[A->B]
request[A->B]
GW-1
responseFound[A->B]

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL