CASCADE - Joint Cyber Sensor Architecture

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Creating agency: CSE Communications Security Establishment (Canada)
Document date: -
Pages: 66
Genre: slides
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Classification: TOP SECRET COMINT
Dissemination: REL FVEY

This presentation outlines the Communications Security Establishment’s (CSE) plans to unify and expand its cyber sensor networks (ITS and SIGINT) to create a comprehensive, multi-layered national cyber defense system, enabling threat detection, intelligence collection, and defensive operations across Canadian and foreign networks. It emphasizes standardizing sensor deployments, integrating analytic capabilities, and preparing for “Effects” operations to mitigate cyber threats by 2015. The presentation is duplicated from page 33 onwards - three slides of the duplicated slides have internal CSE comments.

Long Description:
This is a TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO FVEY CSEC Global Access Cyber Defence Operation presentation describing CASCADE — the Joint Cyber Sensor Architecture project — published by CBC News and The Intercept on 23 March 2015 as part of reporting on CSEC's cyberwarfare capabilities. The document appears twice in slightly different versions, the second including presenter notes, suggesting it was prepared as both a briefing document and an internal presentation template. CASCADE is defined as a project to align passive cyber sensor capabilities and architecture across CSEC's two parallel missions — SIGINT collection and IT Security (ITS) defence of Government of Canada networks. The problem it addresses is divergence: EONBLUE software was deployed in both missions but with incompatible architectures, non-standardised configurations and differing software versions, creating duplication of effort and preventing full exploitation of available capabilities. The project proposes a four-phase approach moving from tracking and metadata alignment through full-take strategy, sensor interoperability and ultimately a unified sensor environment. The sensor inventory section — titled "Shades of Blue" — provides the most detailed published description of CSEC's sensor family. EONBLUE is the primary sensor running at 10Gbps on Dell R610 1U hardware, performing Top Secret/SI processing for tracking and discovery and producing content metadata. INDUCTION is a distributed cloud-based processing system operating across multiple 10Gbps links, also performing TS/SI tracking and discovery with PXE boot infrastructure. THIRD-EYE is a cyber metadata processor operating at multiple 1Gbps links at unclassified processing level, producing metadata only. CRUCIBLE is a secure sensor operating at 10Gbps, derived from TS/SI signatures but operating in an unclassified environment for tracking — consistent with its earlier description in the CSEC Cyber Threat Detection document as a low-cost throwaway sensor deployable in non-SCIF environments. The current deployment status reveals the operational footprint at time of writing. Under Special Source, INDUCTION had 100% coverage of main SSO sites with metadata production, THIRD-EYE was deployed at select new sites, and CRUCIBLE was being deployed to newly emerging sites in pre-SCIF environments for survey collection. Under Warranted Collection, EONBLUE was deployed for full-take collection. Under FORNSAT, EONBLUE had recently been upgraded using GCHQ's code base, with a CHOKEPOINT solution providing virtualised integration with the FORNSAT environment. SUNWHEEL/SMO work was underway with CHOKEPOINT en route to CASSIOPEIA — confirming both SUNWHEEL and CASSIOPEIA as named CSEC collection programmes. Under IT Security, EONBLUE was deployed at three edge gateway Government of Canada departments with dynamic defence enabled at two, and at the main government backbone across dual 10Gbps links. The sensor interoperability section introduces two additional named capabilities. JAZZFLUTE is described as a system that should support ITS analysts in targeting SIGINT systems — enabling the IT Security mission to leverage SIGINT collection infrastructure. EBSH is described as a sensor with a custom CLI interface like a network switch that supports inline binary updates, enabling rapid deployment of new capability across all programmes and sites. The Canadian Cyber Sensor Grid diagram shows the full architectural vision: Government of Canada departments connected through secure channels with defensive monitoring; Canadian Internet Space with Special Source, Special Access and Warranted Access coverage; Systems of Importance monitored separately; and three separate foreign internet space monitoring zones — one associated with FORNSAT collection and two associated with GAZEBO Access. GAZEBO appears here as a named access programme not previously seen in the archive, providing CSEC access to foreign internet space in a third distinct monitoring zone. The Towards 2015 section describes CSEC's strategic ambition for the five-year planning horizon. Under "Expand Our Access Footprint" CSEC planned to increase Special Source access to include all international gateways accessible from Canada and deploy a protective sensor grid across all Government of Canada operations at all classification levels. Under "Enable Effects for Threat Mitigation" — the most politically sensitive section — CSEC stated it would "seek the authority to conduct a wide spectrum of Effects operations" and build the technical infrastructure, policy architecture and tradecraft necessary for such operations. The CBC article notes this language predates Bill C-51 and that experts believed the bill could legalise some of the 32 cyber tactics listed in a 2011 CSEC document. The "Network Is The Sensor" vision section frames CSEC's ultimate architectural goal: integrating EONBLUE directly into the core of the internet rather than deploying it at gateways, enabling detection of threats before they reach targets, identification of exfiltration and command-and-control communications anywhere in national networks, and — most significantly — the ability to insert payloads to disrupt adversaries and silently discard malicious traffic at the network core. The document explicitly states that in cooperation with telecommunications partners, CSEC could modify traffic routes, perform hygiene filtering and insert payloads upon detection. The SEEDSPHERE threat actor is cited as a motivating example, with the document noting that from the time a malicious PDF is opened to SEEDSPHERE having interactive control of a workstation takes less than three minutes. The document concludes with a reconceptualisation of tipping and cueing — arguing that in a Five Eyes context with full national infrastructure visibility, traditional T&C for defence purposes becomes unnecessary and should instead be repurposed to enable intelligence collection through cyber session collection, with analytic collaboration and knowledge transfer replacing second-party tasking requests.
Programs:
CASCADE, PHOTONICPRISM, EONBLUE, INDUCTION, THIRDEYE, CRUCIBLE, CHOKEPOINT, SUNWHEEL, CASSIOPEIA, SCNET, JAZZFLUTE, GAZEBO, SEEDSPHERE, TEXPRO, SSO

People mentioned:
-

Countries:
Canada

Tags:
CSE, cyber defense, cybersecurity, cyber warfare, network defense, ITS, full-take collection, metadata, sensor unification, sensor interoperability, joint operations, cryptology, defensive operations, Effects operations, threat mitigation, cyber threat, foreign intelligence, domestic defense, Canadian national infrastructure, internet surveillance, Special Source Access, distributed sensors, host-based capabilities, command and control, exfiltration detection, network monitoring, dynamic defense, analytic tradecraft, network situational awareness, cyber operations, scalable sensor architecture, network manipulation, international gateways, Government of Canada, malware detection, botnet monitoring, network hygiene filtering, cyber espionage, nation cybersecurity, mobile apps, mobile phones, smart phones, mobile security, DNS, HTTP, collection sites, exploitation, implants, payloads, Apple

Identifier:
20150323-CBC-Cascade_Joint_Cyber_Sensor_Architecture_Presentation

PDF SHA-256:
1ef804592b84f0df294b7f2b034c52be756addb1d89c5cf504bc206a430dc57c

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY

CASCADE

Joint Cyber Sensor Architecture

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation

Overview

  • Project Overview
  • Current Status
  • Proposed Architecture
  • Towards 2015

GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY


CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation

Project Overview

  • Alignment of passive cyber sensor capabilities and architecture in the SIGINT and ITS missions
  • Goals
    • Common sensor technology and architecture
    • Address scalability issues in sensor deployments
  • Scope
    • Passive sensors and supporting infrastructure are in scope
    • Analytic tools are out of scope
    • Host based capability is out of scope (caveat: passive messaging is in scope)

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY


CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY

Our Sensors

SIGINT / ITS

  • Photonic Prism
    • Monitoring of GC Networks
    • Includes:
      • Full-Take Packet Capture
      • Signature Based Detection
      • Anomaly Based Discovery
      • Analytic Environment
      • Oversight Compliance Tools
  • EONBLUE
    • Monitoring in Passive SIGINT
    • Includes:
      • Full-Take (on specific accesses)
      • Signature Based Detection
      • Anomaly Based Discovery
    • Additional Functions are offloaded and exist further downstream:
      • Analytic Environment
      • Dataflow / Targeting
      • Oversight and Compliance Tools

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CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation

Shades of Blue

=> 10Gbps
EONBLUE
*   DELL R610 1U Platform
*   TS//SI Processing
*   - Tracking / Discovery
*   => Content Metadata

=> Multiple 10Gbps
INDUCTION
*   Distributed Processing (Cloud)
*   TS//SI Processing
*   Tracking / Discovery
*   PXE Boot Infrastructure
*   => Content Metadata

=> Multiple 1Gbps
THIRD-EYE
*   Cyber Metadata Processor
*   UNCLASSIFIED Processing
*   Metadata Production
*   => Metadata

=> 10Gbps
CRUCIBLE
*   Secure Sensor
*   TS//SI Derived (in UNCLASS)
*   Tracking
*   => Metadata

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GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation

Current Status – SIGINT Deployments

  • Special Source
    • 100% INDUCTION coverage of main SSO sites + metadata production
    • THIRD-EYE metadata production at select new sites
    • CRUCIBLE deployments to newly emerging sites pre-SCIF environment (survey)
    • Increase in link speeds
  • Warranted Collection
    • EONBLUE sensor deployment – full take collection
  • FORNSAT
    • Recently upgraded to current EONBLUE code base, leveraging GCHQ
    • CHOKEPOINT solution to integrate with environment (Virtualized)
  • Working on SUNWHEEL / SMO
    • CHOKEPOINT system enroute to CASSIOPEIA
    • No SUNWHEEL presence as of yet, plans to leverage CHOKEPOINT capability

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CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation

Current Status – IT Security Deployments

  • Deployment at 3 edge gateway GC departments
    • Dynamic defence is enabled at two of these sites
  • Deployment at the main government backbone
    • Dual 10Gbps links (~3Gbps loading)
    • Data volumes continue to increase due to Internet Access Point aggregation
  • Currently performing full take and storage of all monitored traffic
    • System performance issues, overall analyst usability issues

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CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation

Divergence – Sensor Deployments

  • While both ITS/SIGINT currently leverage EONBLUE software:
    • The architectures are not aligned
    • Configuration differs greatly
    • Software versions are not standard across programs
    • The full capability of EONBLUE is not being leveraged equally across programs

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Proposal

CASCADE: A Way Forward

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GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation

Problem Statement

  • Divergence
    • Sensor architectures have diverged between ITS/SIGINT
    • Within each area, versions are not standardized
  • Management and Scalability
    • Some configurations will not scale
    • Difficult to manage current sensor environment
    • High cost to grow existing solution (people, HW/SW costs)
  • Duplication of Effort
    • Divergence creates duplication of effort
    • Limited resources are not focused on innovation and new challenges

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CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation

A Phased Approach

Tracking & Metadata Alignment Full-Take Strategy Sensor Interoperability Unified Sensor Environment
Address performance / stability issues with SCNET Improve Query Performance for Full-Take Data Extend Native Messaging Between Business Lines Shared Mission Space
Ensure that SIGINT / ITS approach to Tracking / Metadata Production are aligned Develop / Implement strategy to better do Full-Take Ensure Targeting is Unified Single Interconnected Sensor Grid
Simplify Version Management Host / Network Interoperability

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY


CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation

Tracking and Metadata

Ensure EONBLUE is deployed in a standard fashion across all environments

Upgrade SCNET to 10Gbps EONBLUE Update all SIGINT collection sites to latest code release

Produce Standard Metadata

DNS Response Harvesting HTTP Client / Server Headers IP-to-IP Flow Summarizations

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GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation

Full-Take Strategy

Address SCNET Scalability

Reconfiguration / Design of Storage Solution Improved / Enforced data indexing and quering

Leverage Third-Eye Architecture

Distributed Collection Grid (at multiple clients) Queries are Federated and Centrally Managed Enables unique data ingest at client department (i.e. Firewall Logs)

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CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation

Full-Take Strategy

  • Benefits
    • Improve Performance
      • Better data indexing techniques
      • Federated queries across multiple systems
    • Reduced Cost (Storage local to client departments)
      • 10,000$ -> 25,000$ per client
      • Re-use of back-end Storage
    • Enable departmental security officers / operators
      • Capability of Third-Eye exceeds what is commercially available
  • Cons
    • Requires network connections to each GC Department
    • Requires footprint within each departments datacenter
    • Complexity of distributed processing

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY


CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation

Sensor Interoperability

EONBLUE sensors exchange messages to enable more robust selection and filtering

Messages should be automatically exchanged between SIGINT and ITS/CTEC The sensor environment will be connected to enable seamless message flows

Targeting selectors for Cyber Threats will be unified

When updates are made to SIGINT sensors the selectors will be automatically replicated for ITS JAZZFLUTE should support ITS analysts targeting SIGINT systems

Simplify Sensor Version Management

Rapid deployment of new capability seamless across all programs / sites Distributed Induction (Across WAN) EBSH: Sensor has custom CLI like a switch and supports inline binary updates

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY


CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation

Interoperability enables Synchronization

  • ITS access to data collected by SIGINT sensors
    • Outputs should be common to enable a common analyst platform
    • Sensor environment should be seamlessly integrated
  • Capability remains at cutting-edge
    • Single release for all collection programs in SIGINT, all points of presence, and across both missions
    • Management is simplified for operators, focusing on sensor expansions
    • Standardized OS Versions and Optimizations

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY


CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation

Unified Sensor Environment

All Cyber Sensors form a complete eco-system

  • Access point is Mandate / Authority Agnostic
  • Sensors are Multi-Modal (Defence or Intelligence from any sensor, anytime)

Extend Messaging to Host Based Capabilities

  • IT Security Host Based Agents
  • CNE implants

Cyber Processing and analytic environments converge

Two-Tier Environment

  • Automated / GUI rich environment for operators
  • Command-Line Driven RAW access for Discovery

Shared Network Resources for Common Services

  • Wiki / Blog / Chat
  • NIS / NTP / DNS / Messaging / etc

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY


CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation

Synchronized Deployment Strategy

  • Where do you deploy sensors to maximize detection capabilities for Foreign Intelligence collection and Network Defence
  • Coverage-based deployment considerations – what are the gaps?
    • [REDACTED]
    • [REDACTED]
    • [REDACTED]
  • Threat-based deployment considerations – what are the gaps?
    • Based on EPRs
    • Threat trends and forecasting reports
    • Adversary TTPs

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY


CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation

Canadian Cyber Sensor Grid

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────┐┌─────────────────────────────┐
│                                             ││                             │
│                       ┌───────┐             ││                             │
│           ┌───────┐   │GC Dept│             ││                             │
│ ┌───────┐ │GC Dept│   └┬──────┘             ││    ┌────────────────┐       │
│ │GC Dept│ └────┬──┘    │         ┌───────┐  ││    │Foreign Internet│       │
│ └──┬────┘      │       │┌────────┼GC Dept│  ││    │Space           │       │
│    │           │       ││        └───────┘  ││    └──────────┬─────┘       │
│    │     ┌─────┴───────┴┤        ┌───────┐  ││               │             │
│    └─────┤Secure Channel┼────────┼GC Dept│  ││               │             │
│          └─────────────┬┘        └──┬────┘  ││               │             │
│                        │            │       ││               │             │
│                        │            │       ││               │             │
│                        │            │       ││               │             │
│  Defensive Monitoring  │            │       ││  FORNSAT      │             │
└────────────────────────┼────────────┼───────┘└───────────────┼─────────────┘
┌────────────────────────┼────────────┼───────┐                │              
│     ┌──────────────────┴────┐       │       │  ┌─────────────┴──┐           
│     │Canadian Internet Space├───────┘       │  │Foreign Internet│           
│     └──┬──────────────────┬┬┴───────────────┼──┤Space           │           
│        │                  ││                │  └────────────────┘           
│        │                  │└────────────────┼──┬────────────────┐           
│  ┌─────┴────┐          ┌──┴─────────────┐   │  │Foreign Internet│           
│  │System of │          │Foreign Internet│   │ ┌┼Space           ├──────────┐
│  │Importance│          │Space           │   │ │└────────────────┘          │
│  └──────────┘          └────────────────┘   │ │                 ┌────────┐ │
│                                             │ │                 │Foreign │ │
│                                             │ │                 │Internet│ │
│  Special Source / Special Access            │ │                 │Space   │ │
│  Warranted Access                           │ │  GAZEBO Access  └────────┘ │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────┘ └────────────────────────────┘

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY


CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY

Towards 2015

Beyond sensor unification

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GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation

CSEC 2015

  • Strategic Priorities for CSEC
    • Strengthen "Team CSEC" and Prepare for Our New Facility
    • Adopt Innovative and Agile Business Solutions
    • Expand Our Access Footprint
    • Improve Analytic Tradecraft
    • Automate Manual Processes
    • Synchronize the Cryptologic Enterprise for Cyber Security Mission
    • Enable "Effects" for Threat Mitigation

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY


CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation

Cyber Sensor in 2015

  • Expand Our Access Footprint
    • We will increase SPECIAL SOURCE access to include all international gateways accessible from Canada.
    • We will deploy a sensor system that creates a protective grid at multiple layers over Government operations in Canada, and at all classification levels.
  • Improve Analytic Tradecraft
    • We will equip SIGINT and cyber defence analysts with tools for flexible manipulation and customized analysis of large scale data sets.
    • We will build analytic tradecraft that understands, anticipates, and exploits the methodology of threat agents to provide comprehensive cyber- situational awareness based on multiple sources of cryptologic data.

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY


CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation

Cyber Sensor in 2015

  • Synchronize the Cryptologic Enterprise for the Cyber Security Mission
    • We will improve how we anticipate, identify, track and mitigate cyber threats on government systems through new concepts of joint operations.
    • We will design and develop joint SIGINT-ITS systems, including common data repositories, joint tasking and analytic systems.
    • We will increase operational capacity by ensuring SIGINT, ITS, and cryptologic partner sensors interoperate seamlessly.
    • We will synchronize and use ITS and SIGINT capabilities and complementary analyses to thwart cyber threats.
  • Enable "Effects" for Threat Mitigation
    • We will seek the authority to conduct a wide spectrum of Effects operations in support of our mandates.
    • We will build the technical infrastructure, policy architecture and tradecraft necessary to conduct Effects operations.
    • We will further integrate ITS and SIGINT authorities and operations to leverage common sensors, systems and capabilities necessary for active and expanded dynamic cyber defence measures.

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY


CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation

The Network Is The Sensor

Principles

Security needs to be transparent to the user in order to be effective

Security is a right for all Canadians

  • Federal Government
  • Municipal/Provincial Gov
  • Critical Infrastructure
  • Industry
  • The Citizen

End-Users should incur little cost for security

IT Assets should be distributed

Access is mandate / authority agnostic

Goals

Detect threats as they enter our national networks, not at the Gateway
Identify Exfiltration, Command and Control, anywhere in our national networks
The network is your defence for all infrastructure

Rationale

We can't keep pace with our adversary
Gateway / Device / End-Node protection is not sufficient (essential, yes)
Rather than plugging one hole at a time, build better layered defence

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY


CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation

Principles Explained

  • Security is Transparent
    • If security inhibits functionality, or interferes with user experience it will be bypassed
  • Security is a right
    • Attempting to protect everybody with end-node / gateway defenses is not feasible.
  • IT Assets should be distributed
    • We run an open market, network providers will compete to provide access
    • Consolidated gateways creates single points of failure
    • Cost / Redundancy considerations

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY


CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation

Goals

  • Detection before attack hits target
    • If we wish to enable defence we must have intelligence to know when attacks enter our national infrastructure
  • Identify Exfiltration / Command and Control
    • Some attacks will slip through or can't be seen (i.e. shaping)
    • Exploit our temporal advantage - aggressively pursue these implants as they will communicate 'home' for instruction
  • The Network IS your Defence
    • In some cases, in cooperation with our partners we can affect change at the CORE of the Internet on detection:
      • Modify traffic routes
      • Silently discard malicious traffic (hygiene filtering)
      • Insert payload to disrupt adversaries

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY


CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation

Rationale

  • Keeping pace with the Adversary
    • From the time a malicious PDF is opened, till SEEDSPHERE has interactive control of a workstation is <3 minutes
    • There are countless malicious actors (state, crime, generic malware)
  • Gateway / End-Node Defence by itself is insufficient
    • It is only one part of the problem
    • Over 600,000 Apps in the iTunes Appstore (How do you secure that?)
    • Defence in Depth includes network monitoring, and network interaction
  • Build better Defence
    • Our current MO is to resolve one incident at a time
    • Automate the defence through a robust network capable of not only detection, but manipulation of malicious traffic

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY


CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation

What does it Mean?

  • EONBLUE will be integrated into the Network
    • Monitoring Government of Canada
    • Monitoring Core Infrastructure (Special Source) extending the reach to view national infrastructure
    • Monitoring foreign Internet Space
  • EONBLUE will enable defensive operations
    • Through robust communication with host-based capabilities
    • Through direct manipulation of network communications
    • Through interaction with Teleco infrastructure to affect change

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Food for Thought

Changing the way we think

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GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation

Changing the way we think

  • Tipping and Cueing
    • If the purpose is to enable defence of national infrastructure it becomes unnecessary in a 5-eyes context
      • We have full visibility of our national infrastructure
      • The chance of 'beating' the internet for latency of an attack is minimal
      • The network will perform the filtering
    • What if instead T&C enables intelligence collection (Cyber Session Collection)?
  • Targeting and Tasking
    • We all share common targets and we will all target using our national capability the cyber threats we know about
    • No need for 2nd party tasking / targeting requests. Instead expose cyber information across the community
    • What if instead we focus on analytic collaboration and knowledge transfer
      • TEXPRO information, federated repositories (malware/traffic), etc

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CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation

Changing the way we think

  • Foreign SIGINT Intercept
    • Becomes the 'hunting ground' for discovery of new threats
    • Enables attribution and counter-intelligence reporting
    • Defence is taken care of by 'The Network'
    • Mobile Platforms are the next frontier, what is their implication on Cyber?
  • Domestic Defence
    • We will exhaust the treasury deploying network appliances to perform dynamic defence
    • The same capabilities will be integrated into the CORE of the Internet
    • Defence in Depth through complimentary capabilities on end-nodes, at the gateway, and in the core of the Internet.

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GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation

Conclusion

  • CASCADE
    • The harmonization of ITS/SIGINT Sensor capabilities
    • Lays the foundation for long-term integration of Cyber within the Cryptologic Enterprise
  • Towards 2015
    • The Network is the Sensor
      • Defence, Mitigation, Intelligence all formed from a single comprehensive network creating a perimeter around Canada
      • Extending our reach through 5-eyes partnerships to ensure mutual defence of national assets.

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CASCADE

Joint Cyber Sensor Architecture

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation

Overview

  • Project Overview
  • Current Status
  • Proposed Architecture
  • Towards 2015

GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY


CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation

Project Overview

  • Alignment of passive cyber sensor capabilities and architecture in the SIGINT and ITS missions
  • Goals
    • Common sensor technology and architecture
    • Address scalability issues in sensor deployments
  • Scope
    • Passive sensors and supporting infrastructure are in scope
    • Analytic tools are out of scope
    • Host based capability is out of scope (caveat: passive messaging is in scope)

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY

What is the project about?
Define the goal of this project
Is it similar to projects in the past or is it a new effort?
Define the scope of this project
Is it an independent project or is it related to other projects?

  • Note that this slide is not necessary for weekly status meetings

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Our Sensors

SIGINT / ITS

  • Photonic Prism
    • Monitoring of GC Networks
    • Includes:
      • Full-Take Packet Capture
      • Signature Based Detection
      • Anomaly Based Discovery
      • Analytic Environment
      • Oversight Compliance Tools
  • EONBLUE
    • Monitoring in Passive SIGINT
    • Includes:
      • Full-Take (on specific accesses)
      • Signature Based Detection
      • Anomaly Based Discovery
    • Additional Functions are offloaded and exist further downstream:
      • Analytic Environment
      • Dataflow / Targeting
      • Oversight and Compliance Tools

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY


CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation

Shades of Blue

=> 10Gbps
EONBLUE
*   DELL R610 1U Platform
*   TS//SI Processing
*   - Tracking / Discovery
*   => Content Metadata

=> Multiple 10Gbps
INDUCTION
*   Distributed Processing (Cloud)
*   TS//SI Processing
*   Tracking / Discovery
*   PXE Boot Infrastructure
*   => Content Metadata

=> Multiple 1Gbps
THIRD-EYE
*   Cyber Metadata Processor
*   UNCLASSIFIED Processing
*   Metadata Production
*   => Metadata

=> 10Gbps
CRUCIBLE
*   Secure Sensor
*   TS//SI Derived (in UNCLASS)
*   Tracking
*   => Metadata

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY


CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation

Current Status – SIGINT Deployments

  • Special Source
    • 100% INDUCTION coverage of main SSO sites + metadata production
    • THIRD-EYE metadata production at select new sites
    • CRUCIBLE deployments to newly emerging sites pre-SCIF environment (survey)
    • Increase in link speeds
  • Warranted Collection
    • EONBLUE sensor deployment – full take collection
  • FORNSAT
    • Recently upgraded to current EONBLUE code base, leveraging GCHQ
    • CHOKEPOINT solution to integrate with environment (Virtualized)
  • Working on SUNWHEEL / SMO
    • CHOKEPOINT system enroute to CASSIOPEIA
    • No SUNWHEEL presence as of yet, plans to leverage CHOKEPOINT capability

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY

  • If any of these issues caused a schedule delay or need to be discussed further, include details in the next slide.

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation

Current Status – IT Security Deployments

  • Deployment at 3 edge gateway GC departments
    • Dynamic defence is enabled at two of these sites
  • Deployment at the main government backbone
    • Dual 10Gbps links (~3Gbps loading)
    • Data volumes continue to increase due to Internet Access Point aggregation
  • Currently performing full take and storage of all monitored traffic
    • System performance issues, overall analyst usability issues

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY


CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation

Divergence – Sensor Deployments

  • While both ITS/SIGINT currently leverage EONBLUE software:
    • The architectures are not aligned
    • Configuration differs greatly
    • Software versions are not standard across programs
    • The full capability of EONBLUE is not being leveraged equally across programs

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY


CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY

Proposal

CASCADE: A Way Forward

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY


CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation

Problem Statement

  • Divergence
    • Sensor architectures have diverged between ITS/SIGINT
    • Within each area, versions are not standardized
  • Management and Scalability
    • Some configurations will not scale
    • Difficult to manage current sensor environment
    • High cost to grow existing solution (people, HW/SW costs)
  • Duplication of Effort
    • Divergence creates duplication of effort
    • Limited resources are not focused on innovation and new challenges

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY

Duplicate this slide as necessary if there is more than one issue.
This and related slides can be moved to the appendix or hidden if necessary.


CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation

A Phased Approach

Tracking & Metadata Alignment Full-Take Strategy Sensor Interoperability Unified Sensor Environment
Address performance / stability issues with SCNET Improve Query Performance for Full-Take Data Extend Native Messaging Between Business Lines Shared Mission Space
Ensure that SIGINT / ITS approach to Tracking / Metadata Production are aligned Develop / Implement strategy to better do Full-Take Ensure Targeting is Unified Single Interconnected Sensor Grid
Simplify Version Management Host / Network Interoperability

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY


CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation

Tracking and Metadata

Ensure EONBLUE is deployed in a standard fashion across all environments

Upgrade SCNET to 10Gbps EONBLUE Update all SIGINT collection sites to latest code release

Produce Standard Metadata

DNS Response Harvesting HTTP Client / Server Headers IP-to-IP Flow Summarizations

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY


CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation

Full-Take Strategy

Address SCNET Scalability

Reconfiguration / Design of Storage Solution Improved / Enforced data indexing and quering

Leverage Third-Eye Architecture

Distributed Collection Grid (at multiple clients) Queries are Federated and Centrally Managed Enables unique data ingest at client department (i.e. Firewall Logs)

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY


CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation

Full-Take Strategy

  • Benefits
    • Improve Performance
      • Better data indexing techniques
      • Federated queries across multiple systems
    • Reduced Cost (Storage local to client departments)
      • 10,000$ -> 25,000$ per client
      • Re-use of back-end Storage
    • Enable departmental security officers / operators
      • Capability of Third-Eye exceeds what is commercially available
  • Cons
    • Requires network connections to each GC Department
    • Requires footprint within each departments datacenter
    • Complexity of distributed processing

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY


CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation

Sensor Interoperability

EONBLUE sensors exchange messages to enable more robust selection and filtering

Messages should be automatically exchanged between SIGINT and ITS/CTEC The sensor environment will be connected to enable seamless message flows

Targeting selectors for Cyber Threats will be unified

When updates are made to SIGINT sensors the selectors will be automatically replicated for ITS JAZZFLUTE should support ITS analysts targeting SIGINT systems

Simplify Sensor Version Management

Rapid deployment of new capability seamless across all programs / sites Distributed Induction (Across WAN) EBSH: Sensor has custom CLI like a switch and supports inline binary updates

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY


CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation

Interoperability enables Synchronization

  • ITS access to data collected by SIGINT sensors
    • Outputs should be common to enable a common analyst platform
    • Sensor environment should be seamlessly integrated
  • Capability remains at cutting-edge
    • Single release for all collection programs in SIGINT, all points of presence, and across both missions
    • Management is simplified for operators, focusing on sensor expansions
    • Standardized OS Versions and Optimizations

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY


CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation

Unified Sensor Environment

All Cyber Sensors form a complete eco-system

  • Access point is Mandate / Authority Agnostic
  • Sensors are Multi-Modal (Defence or Intelligence from any sensor, anytime)

Extend Messaging to Host Based Capabilities

  • IT Security Host Based Agents
  • CNE implants

Cyber Processing and analytic environments converge

Two-Tier Environment

  • Automated / GUI rich environment for operators
  • Command-Line Driven RAW access for Discovery

Shared Network Resources for Common Services

  • Wiki / Blog / Chat
  • NIS / NTP / DNS / Messaging / etc

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY


CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation

Synchronized Deployment Strategy

  • Where do you deploy sensors to maximize detection capabilities for Foreign Intelligence collection and Network Defence
  • Coverage-based deployment considerations – what are the gaps?
    • [REDACTED]
    • [REDACTED]
    • [REDACTED]
  • Threat-based deployment considerations – what are the gaps?
    • Based on EPRs
    • Threat trends and forecasting reports
    • Adversary TTPs

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY


CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation

Canadian Cyber Sensor Grid

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────┐┌─────────────────────────────┐
│                                             ││                             │
│                       ┌───────┐             ││                             │
│           ┌───────┐   │GC Dept│             ││                             │
│ ┌───────┐ │GC Dept│   └┬──────┘             ││    ┌────────────────┐       │
│ │GC Dept│ └────┬──┘    │         ┌───────┐  ││    │Foreign Internet│       │
│ └──┬────┘      │       │┌────────┼GC Dept│  ││    │Space           │       │
│    │           │       ││        └───────┘  ││    └──────────┬─────┘       │
│    │     ┌─────┴───────┴┤        ┌───────┐  ││               │             │
│    └─────┤Secure Channel┼────────┼GC Dept│  ││               │             │
│          └─────────────┬┘        └──┬────┘  ││               │             │
│                        │            │       ││               │             │
│                        │            │       ││               │             │
│                        │            │       ││               │             │
│  Defensive Monitoring  │            │       ││  FORNSAT      │             │
└────────────────────────┼────────────┼───────┘└───────────────┼─────────────┘
┌────────────────────────┼────────────┼───────┐                │              
│     ┌──────────────────┴────┐       │       │  ┌─────────────┴──┐           
│     │Canadian Internet Space├───────┘       │  │Foreign Internet│           
│     └──┬──────────────────┬┬┴───────────────┼──┤Space           │           
│        │                  ││                │  └────────────────┘           
│        │                  │└────────────────┼──┬────────────────┐           
│  ┌─────┴────┐          ┌──┴─────────────┐   │  │Foreign Internet│           
│  │System of │          │Foreign Internet│   │ ┌┼Space           ├──────────┐
│  │Importance│          │Space           │   │ │└────────────────┘          │
│  └──────────┘          └────────────────┘   │ │                 ┌────────┐ │
│                                             │ │                 │Foreign │ │
│                                             │ │                 │Internet│ │
│  Special Source / Special Access            │ │                 │Space   │ │
│  Warranted Access                           │ │  GAZEBO Access  └────────┘ │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────┘ └────────────────────────────┘

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY


CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY

Towards 2015

Beyond sensor unification

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY


CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation

CSEC 2015

  • Strategic Priorities for CSEC
    • Strengthen "Team CSEC" and Prepare for Our New Facility
    • Adopt Innovative and Agile Business Solutions
    • Expand Our Access Footprint
    • Improve Analytic Tradecraft
    • Automate Manual Processes
    • Synchronize the Cryptologic Enterprise for Cyber Security Mission
    • Enable "Effects" for Threat Mitigation

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY


CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation

Cyber Sensor in 2015

  • Expand Our Access Footprint
    • We will increase SPECIAL SOURCE access to include all international gateways accessible from Canada.
    • We will deploy a sensor system that creates a protective grid at multiple layers over Government operations in Canada, and at all classification levels.
  • Improve Analytic Tradecraft
    • We will equip SIGINT and cyber defence analysts with tools for flexible manipulation and customized analysis of large scale data sets.
    • We will build analytic tradecraft that understands, anticipates, and exploits the methodology of threat agents to provide comprehensive cyber- situational awareness based on multiple sources of cryptologic data.

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY


CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation

Cyber Sensor in 2015

  • Synchronize the Cryptologic Enterprise for the Cyber Security Mission
    • We will improve how we anticipate, identify, track and mitigate cyber threats on government systems through new concepts of joint operations.
    • We will design and develop joint SIGINT-ITS systems, including common data repositories, joint tasking and analytic systems.
    • We will increase operational capacity by ensuring SIGINT, ITS, and cryptologic partner sensors interoperate seamlessly.
    • We will synchronize and use ITS and SIGINT capabilities and complementary analyses to thwart cyber threats.
  • Enable "Effects" for Threat Mitigation
    • We will seek the authority to conduct a wide spectrum of Effects operations in support of our mandates.
    • We will build the technical infrastructure, policy architecture and tradecraft necessary to conduct Effects operations.
    • We will further integrate ITS and SIGINT authorities and operations to leverage common sensors, systems and capabilities necessary for active and expanded dynamic cyber defence measures.

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY


CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation

The Network Is The Sensor

Principles

Security needs to be transparent to the user in order to be effective

Security is a right for all Canadians

  • Federal Government
  • Municipal/Provincial Gov
  • Critical Infrastructure
  • Industry
  • The Citizen

End-Users should incur little cost for security

IT Assets should be distributed

Access is mandate / authority agnostic

Goals

Detect threats as they enter our national networks, not at the Gateway
Identify Exfiltration, Command and Control, anywhere in our national networks
The network is your defence for all infrastructure

Rationale

We can't keep pace with our adversary
Gateway / Device / End-Node protection is not sufficient (essential, yes)
Rather than plugging one hole at a time, build better layered defence

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY


CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation

Principles Explained

  • Security is Transparent
    • If security inhibits functionality, or interferes with user experience it will be bypassed
  • Security is a right
    • Attempting to protect everybody with end-node / gateway defenses is not feasible.
  • IT Assets should be distributed
    • We run an open market, network providers will compete to provide access
    • Consolidated gateways creates single points of failure
    • Cost / Redundancy considerations

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY


CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation

Goals

  • Detection before attack hits target
    • If we wish to enable defence we must have intelligence to know when attacks enter our national infrastructure
  • Identify Exfiltration / Command and Control
    • Some attacks will slip through or can't be seen (i.e. shaping)
    • Exploit our temporal advantage - aggressively pursue these implants as they will communicate 'home' for instruction
  • The Network IS your Defence
    • In some cases, in cooperation with our partners we can affect change at the CORE of the Internet on detection:
      • Modify traffic routes
      • Silently discard malicious traffic (hygiene filtering)
      • Insert payload to disrupt adversaries

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY


CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation

Rationale

  • Keeping pace with the Adversary
    • From the time a malicious PDF is opened, till SEEDSPHERE has interactive control of a workstation is <3 minutes
    • There are countless malicious actors (state, crime, generic malware)
  • Gateway / End-Node Defence by itself is insufficient
    • It is only one part of the problem
    • Over 600,000 Apps in the iTunes Appstore (How do you secure that?)
    • Defence in Depth includes network monitoring, and network interaction
  • Build better Defence
    • Our current MO is to resolve one incident at a time
    • Automate the defence through a robust network capable of not only detection, but manipulation of malicious traffic

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY


CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation

What does it Mean?

  • EONBLUE will be integrated into the Network
    • Monitoring Government of Canada
    • Monitoring Core Infrastructure (Special Source) extending the reach to view national infrastructure
    • Monitoring foreign Internet Space
  • EONBLUE will enable defensive operations
    • Through robust communication with host-based capabilities
    • Through direct manipulation of network communications
    • Through interaction with Teleco infrastructure to affect change

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY


CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY

Food for Thought

Changing the way we think

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY


CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation

Changing the way we think

  • Tipping and Cueing
    • If the purpose is to enable defence of national infrastructure it becomes unnecessary in a 5-eyes context
      • We have full visibility of our national infrastructure
      • The chance of 'beating' the internet for latency of an attack is minimal
      • The network will perform the filtering
    • What if instead T&C enables intelligence collection (Cyber Session Collection)?
  • Targeting and Tasking
    • We all share common targets and we will all target using our national capability the cyber threats we know about
    • No need for 2nd party tasking / targeting requests. Instead expose cyber information across the community
    • What if instead we focus on analytic collaboration and knowledge transfer
      • TEXPRO information, federated repositories (malware/traffic), etc

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY


CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation

Changing the way we think

  • Foreign SIGINT Intercept
    • Becomes the 'hunting ground' for discovery of new threats
    • Enables attribution and counter-intelligence reporting
    • Defence is taken care of by 'The Network'
    • Mobile Platforms are the next frontier, what is their implication on Cyber?
  • Domestic Defence
    • We will exhaust the treasury deploying network appliances to perform dynamic defence
    • The same capabilities will be integrated into the CORE of the Internet
    • Defence in Depth through complimentary capabilities on end-nodes, at the gateway, and in the core of the Internet.

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY


CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY
GLOBAL ACCESS Cyber Defence Operation

Conclusion

  • CASCADE
    • The harmonization of ITS/SIGINT Sensor capabilities
    • Lays the foundation for long-term integration of Cyber within the Cryptologic Enterprise
  • Towards 2015
    • The Network is the Sensor
      • Defence, Mitigation, Intelligence all formed from a single comprehensive network creating a perimeter around Canada
      • Extending our reach through 5-eyes partnerships to ensure mutual defence of national assets.

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL FVEY