Hackers are Humans too - Cyber leads to CI leads

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Creating agency: CSE Communications Security Establishment (Canada)
Document date: 2011-01-01
Pages: 13
Genre: slides
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Classification: TOP SECRET SI
Dissemination: REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, USA

This document from Canada’s Communications Security Establishment (CSE) analyzes the Russian hacking team MAKERSMARK, highlighting how its operators misused technically sophisticated but poorly secured infrastructure, mixing personal and operational activity, which made them traceable despite their advanced tools. It details CSE’s methods for attributing cyber intrusions, monitoring malware-infected systems, and exploiting operational security lapses to gain intelligence on Russian cyber operations.

Long Description:
This document is an intelligence‑community briefing from Canada’s Communications Security Establishment (CSE) that dissects a Russian computer network exploitation (CNE) group codenamed MAKERSMARK. It frames the adversary as technically sophisticated at the design level yet operationally sloppy — “designed by geniuses, implemented by morons” — and walks through concrete OPSEC failures the analysts exploited: reuse of operational infrastructure for personal browsing and webmail, live testing of implant protocols on LA (less‑attributable) systems, and an infected development environment (the Gumblar crimeware infection) that bled operator credentials and telemetry into 4th‑party collection. The presentation lays out CSE’s attribution approach (passive infrastructure tasking and contact‑chaining), shows how apparently robust masking systems can be undone by mundane human behaviour, and stresses that these simple leads often open short, fragile windows of exploitation. Operationally the paper is a how‑to and a cautionary tale. It documents routine but effective analyst tradecraft — careful monitoring of anomalous network sessions, tracing callbacks and exfiltration paths, and linking metadata to operator habits — which allowed CSE to expose management structure and operator activity beyond the mere “hacking face” of an intrusion set. The briefing highlights practical pitfalls for CNE operators: mixing personal and operational traffic, conducting live tests on operational infrastructure, and failing to sanitize development environments — all of which increase traceability and reduce the security benefit of “less attributable” hosting. The slides also underscore that many exploitation opportunities are transient; timely attention to small leads can yield disproportionate intelligence returns.

TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA

Communications Security
Establishment Canada

Centre de la sécurité
des télécommunications Canada

Hackers are Humans too

Cyber leads to CI leads

Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
1


TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA

Communications Security
Establishment Canada

Centre de la sécurité
des télécommunications Canada

Introductions

  • [REDACTED]
  • Cyber-counter intelligence
  • My primary focus is MAKERSMARK (Russia)
  • CSEC – Covert Network Threat (CNT) group
    • New name, same Cyber/CI group you know and love
    • Cyber and traditional CI sitting side by side
    • Focused on Foreign Intelligence, not Information Assurance

Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
2


TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA

Communications Security
Establishment Canada

Centre de la sécurité
des télécommunications Canada

Goals

  • How do we attribute cyber intrusion sets?
  • How do we go beyond the hacking face of a CNE program?
    • Expose management structure, operators
    • Requirements, technological advances
  • This presentation portrays only one method
    • Passive infrastructure tasking/contact chaining
    • Many other are available

Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
3


TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA

Communications Security
Establishment Canada

Centre de la sécurité
des télécommunications Canada

Initial Seed

  • Infrastructure tasking
    • Mostly exposed through malware/content delivery
  • Careful and manual monitoring of anomalous network sessions
  • Nothing fancy
  • Not Web 2.0, but it works

Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
4


TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA

Communications Security
Establishment Canada

Centre de la sécurité
des télécommunications Canada

Overview

  • MAKERSMARK
    • Misuse of Operational Infrastructure
    • Poor OPSEC practices
      [REDACTED]

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Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
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TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA

Communications Security
Establishment Canada

Centre de la sécurité
des télécommunications Canada

MAKERSMARK (Russian CNE)

Designed by geniuses
Implemented by morons

Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
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TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA

Communications Security
Establishment Canada

Centre de la sécurité
des télécommunications Canada

MAKERSMARK

  • The MAKERSMARK less attributed (LA) systems are really well designed
  • This has not translated into security for MAKERSMARK operators
  • Personal browsing through LA systems
    • Workshops, ORBs, and controllers
  • Development shop infected by crimeware
    • 4th party collection

Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
7


TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA

Communications Security
Establishment Canada

Centre de la sécurité
des télécommunications Canada

MAKERSMARK: Less Attributed Overview

Downlink is collected by MM
Satellite
SIGINT Intercept
Packet Returned to Attack Station
Spoofed Source IP
MAKERSMARK
IP Routes to a Satellite Customer
Satellite ISP Transmitter
Response to Spoofed IP
Destination Server

Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
8


TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA

Communications Security
Establishment Canada

Centre de la sécurité
des télécommunications Canada

MAKERSMARK: Misuse of Infrastructure

  • Less Attributable infrastructure used for highly attributable purposes:
    • Hosting implant callback servers
    • Live testing of new implant protocols
    • Collecting exfiltration
  • This is not CNE best practices

Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
9


TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA

Communications Security
Establishment Canada

Centre de la sécurité
des télécommunications Canada

MAKERSMARK: Misuse of LA Systems

  • Personal Social Networking
    • Vkontakt
    • (mail/inbox/bk).ru accounts
  • Personal Email
    • Webmail/POP
    • Personal retrieval through masquerading infrastructure
  • Personal web browsing

Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
10


TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA

Communications Security
Establishment Canada

Centre de la sécurité
des télécommunications Canada

MAKERSMARK: 4th party collection

  • Implant development shop infected by GUMBLAR botnet
    • Crimeware
    • Sends pharmaceutical spam
  • Exfiltration to Canadian "bullet proof" host
    • HTTP/FTP logins
    • Collection of MM operator browsing habits
    • MM LiveJournal accounts included in collection

Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
11


TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA

Communications Security
Establishment Canada

Centre de la sécurité
des télécommunications Canada

Closing Remarks

  • You have to keep an eye out
    • A lot of value can be lost by not following leads
    • Typically the window to exploit information is short
    • Knowing what to look for is half the battle
  • These exploitation opportunities don't last forever
  • As a CNE program matures, so will its OPSEC

Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
24


TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA

Communications Security
Establishment Canada

Centre de la sécurité
des télécommunications Canada

Questions?

Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
25