Tor: Overview of Existing Techniques

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Creating agency: GCHQ Government Communications Headquarters (UK)
Document date: -
Pages: 5
Genre: slides
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Classification: TOP SECRET STRAP 1
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A TOP SECRET GCHQ presentation summarising existing Tor exploitation techniques and 2012/13 plans documenting GCHQ's Tor-related programmes, naming QUICK ANT, HOMING TROLL, NEWTONS CRADLE, TRIBAL CARNEM, EPIC FAIL, THEMP, NATURAL SELECTION and HAKIM alongside the MCR deanonymisation research, traffic shaping, hidden service investigation and bridge discovery work.

Long Description:
This is a UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 GCHQ ICTR Network Exploitation presentation. It is a short briefing — noted as 15 minutes — providing an inventory of existing GCHQ Tor exploitation techniques and plans for 2012/13, delivered in the context of the REMATION II workshop referenced in the MIP GCWiki page. The document provides an inventory of GCHQ's Tor-related programme portfolio. It covers bridge discovery, a low latency deanonymisation prototype under evaluation, statistical deanonymisation research by MCR, bulk traffic logging, active injection and detection of timing patterns, hidden service investigation, shaping research, extraction of hidden service domain names from passive events, Tor implementation analysis under contract, and some work through contract on Freenet. Several of these are named programmes involving JTRIG and CT as well as ICTR-NE, confirming that Tor exploitation was a multi-team effort spanning GCHQ's network exploitation, mathematical research, online covert operations and counter-terrorism functions. The 2012/13 goals section confirms the operational direction: further Tor deanonymisation work in collaboration with MCR and JTRIG, Tor traffic shaping with JTRIG, next-stage Tor implementation analysis under contract, and recording hidden service hostnames in a named collection system for target discovery purposes. The reference to REMATION II fitting in well confirms this presentation was delivered at that workshop as a scene-setting brief on the state of existing capabilities. The 2011 ideas reference slide is particularly revealing as it documents the full range of techniques under consideration at that time, including deliberately herding targets through GCHQ-controlled exit nodes, finding target digital identifiers that appear on both Tor and non-Tor infrastructure, characterising hidden web servers through passive analysis and web crawling, identifying IP addresses hosting hidden services, spotting private Tor networks, and investigating TorChat. Some of these had progressed to named programmes by 2012 while others remained at the ideas or experimental stage. The data sources slide establishes the classification tier for each collection method: the public Tor node consensus is unclassified; bridge information is Confidential; collection from exit nodes is Secret; passive intercept covering SSL events in collection clouds, Tor packet logging via the ICTR system, and content exiting the Tor network is Secret to Top Secret. Taken together with the other Tor-related documents — the OPC-MCR correlation attack presentation, the hidden services analysis, the MIP GCWiki project page, and the NSA Internet Anonymity 2011 survey — this presentation provides a good picture of GCHQ's Tor exploitation architecture as a coordinated multi-team capability portfolio spanning passive traffic analysis, exit node control, bridge discovery, timing attacks, traffic shaping and target identifier correlation.
Programs:
HOMINGTROLL, NEWTONSCRADLE, JTRIG, TRIBALCARNEM, EPICFAIL, QUICKANT, NATURALSELECTION, REMATION, HAKIM, THEMP

People mentioned:
-

Countries:
-

Tags:
ICTR, Tor, hidden services, bridge discovery, de-anonymization, traffic shaping, exit node, timing attack, low latency attack, traffic analysis

Identifier:
spiegel_-_media-35542

PDF SHA-256:
1ebc9a3a5cc54590f2420292071de2fe48681d1794a1f18545cd57ef415b2bba

NETWORK
EXPLOITATION

TOP SECRET STRAP1

Tor: Overview of Existing Techniques

(15 minutes)

[REDACTED]
ICTR-NE

TOP SECRET STRAP 1

TR

THIS INFORMATION IS EXEMPT UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000 (FOIA) AND MAY BE EXEMPT UNDER OTHER UK INFORMATION LEGISLATION. REFER ANY FOIA QUERIES TO GCHQ ON [REDACTED]
CONTAINS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNED AND/OR MANAGED BY GCHQ.
THE MATERIAL MAY BE DISSEMINATED THROUGHOUT THE RECIPIENT ORGANISATION, BUT GCHQ PERMISSION MUST BE OBTAINED FOR DISSEMINATION OUTSIDE THE ORGANISATION.

GCHQ


Previous Work/Current Techniques

ICTR-related techniques

  • Identification of events by content
  • Tor node dictionary generation - available from web site
  • HOMING TROLL - Bridge discovery prototype that feeds dictionary
  • Statistical deanonymisation research (MCR)
  • NEWTONS CRADLE (JTRIG)
  • TRIBAL CARNEM (with CT)
  • EPIC FAIL (CT)
  • Bulk traffic logging
  • QUICK ANT - Low latency deanonymisation. Prototype under evaluation.
  • Introducing timing patterns – report available
  • Hidden service investigation – report available
  • Shaping research – some initial experiments.
  • Some extraction of hidden service domain names from passive events.
  • Tor implementation analysis (contract task)

Also some work (through contract) on Freenet.

TOP SECRET STRAP 1

THIS INFORMATION IS EXEMPT UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000 (FOIA) AND MAY BE EXEMPT UNDER OTHER UK INFORMATION LEGISLATION. REFER ANY FOIA QUERIES TO GCHQ ON [REDACTED]
CONTAINS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNED AND/OR MANAGED BY GCHQ.


ICTR-NE Goals for 2012/13

Our plans at present are:

  • Tor deanonymisation – collaboration with MCR and JTRIG
  • Tor shaping – with JTRIG
  • Contract: next stage of Tor Implementation Analysis
  • ICTR-CISA: record hidden service hostnames (*.onion) in NATURAL SELECTION.

... so REMATION II fits in well.

Any questions?

TOP SECRET STRAP 1

THIS INFORMATION IS EXEMPT UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000 (FOIA) AND MAY BE EXEMPT UNDER OTHER UK INFORMATION LEGISLATION. REFER ANY FOIA QUERIES TO GCHQ ON [REDACTED]
CONTAINS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNED AND/OR MANAGED BY GCHQ.


Reference: Ideas (2011)

  • Maintain knowledge of Tor network – Pullthrough from NE?
  • Log Tor events into HAKIM for target discovery – TR-FSP
  • Build tool to implement low latency attack? – ICTR
  • Collecting traffic at exit nodes to feed passive SIGINT - JTRIG
  • Testing of MCR passive deanonymisation technique. – MCR/JTRIG/ICTR
  • Active injection and detection of timing patterns (probably following test of MCR technique) - ICTR/JTRIG/MCR
  • Herding of targets through our exit nodes (THEMP) – ICTR/JTRIG
  • Bulk logging of hidden service onion addresses (possibly only those hosting web sites) – experiment carried out by ICTR
  • Characterisation of hidden web servers by passive analysis – ICTR?
  • Characterisation of hidden web servers by web crawling – ICTR?
  • Identification of IP addresses hosting hidden services – ICTR?
  • Ongoing use/maintenance of TRIBAL CARNEM - CT
  • Find TDIs that appear on Tor and non-tor IP addresses (EPIC FAIL) - CT
  • Understanding Tor circuit creation and destruction – ICTR contract
  • Understanding future developments in Tor – ICTR contract?
  • Spotting private Tor networks – ICTR?
  • TorChat investigation? – ICTR?

TOP SECRET STRAP 1

THIS INFORMATION IS EXEMPT UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000 (FOIA) AND MAY BE EXEMPT UNDER OTHER UK INFORMATION LEGISLATION. REFER ANY FOIA QUERIES TO GCHQ ON [REDACTED]
CONTAINS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNED AND/OR MANAGED BY GCHQ.


Reference: Data Sources

  • Tor node consensus (obtained by Tor client) - UNCLASSIFIED
  • Information on Tor Bridges – CONFIDENTIAL
  • Collection from exit nodes - SECRET
  • Passive intercept (SECRET/TOP SECRET)
    • SSL events in cloud(s)
    • Tor packet logging (ICTR system)
    • Content exiting Tor network

TOP SECRET STRAP 1

THIS INFORMATION IS EXEMPT UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000 (FOIA) AND MAY BE EXEMPT UNDER OTHER UK INFORMATION LEGISLATION. REFER ANY FOIA QUERIES TO GCHQ ON [REDACTED]
CONTAINS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNED AND/OR MANAGED BY GCHQ.