Pay attention to that man behind the curtain: Discovering aliens on CNE infrastructure
Open PDFDocument date: 2010-06-01
Pages: 30
Genre: slides
Banner: TOP SECRET // COMINT
Classification: TOP SECRET COMINT
Dissemination: -
CSEC briefing from 2010 outlines Canada’s counter–computer network exploitation efforts to detect, analyze, and pursue foreign and friendly cyber actors operating on shared CNE infrastructure. It details tools, methods, and a case study showing how hidden implants and overlapping state-sponsored operations were uncovered and attributed.
My notes
TOP SECRET // COMINT
Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
Pay attention to that man behind the curtain: Discovering aliens on CNE infrastructure
[REDACTED]
CSEC Counter-CNE
Target Analytics thread
SIGDEV Conference
NSA – June 2010
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1
TOP SECRET // COMINT
Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
The need for Counter-CNE...
- Foreign and friendly actors often encountered
- CNE operators do not pursue them beyond their targets
- Reporting groups need to be made aware
- OPSEC evaluation is needed
- Active pursuit of CNE actors: a different ballgame
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
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2
TOP SECRET // COMINT
Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
Outline
- Introduction CCNE at CSEC
- CCNE tools and methods
- SNOWGLOBE
- De-confliction
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
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3
TOP SECRET // COMINT
Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
CCNE Group at CSEC
- Part of CSEC CNE operations (KO)
- Recently formed matrix team
- Analysts and operators from CNE Operations, IO Reporting Lines and Global Network Detection
- Mandate:
- Provide situational awareness to CNE operators
- Discover unknown actors on existing CNE targets
- Detect known actors on covert infrastructure
- Pursue known actors through CNE
- Review OPSEC of CNE operations
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
4
TOP SECRET // COMINT
Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
CCNE team
Reverse engineering
Target development
Understand foreign CNE actors
CNE Operations
Cyber-CI
CCNE
Active collection
Foreign CNE persona
GND
Passive collection
Develop Collection signatures
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
5
TOP SECRET // COMINT
Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
CNE Toolkit: WARRIORPRIDE
- WARRIORPRIDE (WP):
- Scalable, Flexible, Portable CNE platform
- Unified framework within CSEC and across the 5 eyes
- Do more with less effort
- Common framework for sharing code/plugins across the 5 eyes
- WARRIORPRIDE is an implementation of the “WZOWSKI” 5-eyes API
- WARRIORPRIDE@CSE/etc. == DAREDEVIL@GCHQ
- WARRIORPRIDE
- xml command output to operators
- Several plugins used for machine recon / OPSEC assessment
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
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6
TOP SECRET // COMINT
Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
WARRIORPRIDE
Command Prompt - U_Base x
pink:localhost> clistpeer
pink:localhost> rtlist
pink:localhost> sllistplugin
pink:localhost> ?
pink:localhost> sllistpersistent
pink:localhost> slliststore
pink:localhost> cgetimplantid
pink:localhost>
Output
Transaction Id: 138546
Core storage files for implant 127.0.0.1
======================================
Plugin Store: c:\Temp\~DF3BE9.tmp
Config Store: c:\Temp\configFileSys.sys
Note that this command does not list plugi
real work
LP
Console
LP Side
Plugin
comms
Implant
Implant Side
Plugin
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
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7
TOP SECRET // COMINT
Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
WARRIORPRIDE plug-ins and output
- Several WP plugins are useful for CCNE:
- Slipstream : machine reconnaissance
- ImplantDetector : implant detection
- RootkitDetector : rootkit detection
- Chordflier/U_ftp : file identification / retrieval
- NameDropper : DNS
- WormWood : network sniffing and characterization
- Already used for CNE OPSEC
- Used for precise identification and heuristics
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
8
TOP SECRET // COMINT
Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
WP xml output (raw)
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<response xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xsi:noNamespaceSchemaLocation="U_FileCollectorLp/U_FileCollectorLp_2.15.xsd"><implantl
d>51.1.2.160</implantId><transaction><transactionSource>50.0.0.101</transactionSource><tr
ansactionId>320453</transactionId></transaction><timestamp><TLT>2010-02-
23T15:53:06.366</TLT><UTC>2010-02-
23T15:47:43.448</UTC></timestamp><errors><errorPlugin>0</errorPlugin><errorOs>0</error
Os></errors><commandInfo>fcstart</commandInfo><responseDetails><fcstart><status>Succe
ss</status><standbyMode>FALSE</standbyMode></fcstart></responseDetails></response>
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
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9
TOP SECRET // COMINT
Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
WP SLIPSTREAM output (parsed)
[2010/05/18 - 16:28:05 (UTC)] Transaction Id: 582966
U_SLIPSTREAM - <ssservices>
ImplantId: <51.8.1.13>
Timestamp (UTC): 2010/02/09 06:42:42
PAGE: 1 of 1
| PID | Service Name | Status | Startup Type | Service Process Type | Display Name | Binary Path |
| :--- | :----------------------- | :-------- | :----------- | :------------------- | :-------------------------------- | :----------------------------------------------------- |
| 924 | AeLookupSvc | RUNNING | AUTOMATIC | SHARED | Application Experience Lookup Service | 'C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs |
| 0 | Alerter LocalService | STOPPED | DISABLED | SHARED | Alerter | C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exe -k |
| 3184 | ALG C:\WINDOWS\System32\alg.exe | RUNNING | MANUAL | OWN PROCESS | Application Layer Gateway Service | |
| 0 | AppMgmt -k netsvcs | STOPPED | MANUAL | SHARED | Application Management | C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exe |
| 924 | AudioSrv -k netsvcs | RUNNING | AUTOMATIC | SHARED | Windows Audio | C:\WINDOWS\System32\svchost.exe |
| 0 | BITS C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs | STOPPED | MANUAL | SHARED | Background Intelligent Transfer Service | |
| 0 | Browser -k netsvcs | STOPPED | AUTOMATIC | SHARED | Computer Browser | |
| 1028 | ccEvtMgr Files\Symantec Shared\ccSvcHst.exe" /h ccCommon | RUNNING | AUTOMATIC | SHARED | Symantec Event Manager | "C:\Program Files\Common |
| 1028 | ccSetMgr Files\Symantec Shared\ccSvcHst.exe" /h ccCommon | RUNNING | AUTOMATIC | SHARED | Symantec Settings Manager | "C:\Program Files\Common |
| 1708 | Cissesrv Files\HP\Cissesrv\cissesrv.exe" | RUNNING | AUTOMATIC | OWN PROCESS | HP Smart Array SAS/SATA Event Notification Service | "C:\Program |
| 0 | CiSvc | STOPPED | DISABLED | SHARED | Indexing Service | C:\WINDOWS\system32\cisvc.exe |
| 0 | ClipSrv | STOPPED | DISABLED | OWN PROCESS | ClipBook | |
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
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10
TOP SECRET // COMINT
Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
WP SLIPSTREAM output... drivers (parsed)
[2010/05/18 16:28:06 (UTC)] Transaction Id: 582968
U_SLIPSTREAM - <ssdrivers>
ImplantId: <51.8.1.13>
Timestamp (UTC): 2010/02/09 06:42:43
PAGE: 1 of 1
| SCM|Driver Name | Status | Startup Type | Driver Type | Display Name | Binary Path |
| :--------------- | :------ | :----------- | :---------- | :----------- | :------------------------------------ |
| Intoskrnl.exe | RUNNING | | | | C:\WINDOWS\system32\ntoskrnl.exe |
| hal.dll | RUNNING | | | | C:\WINDOWS\system32\hal.dll |
| KDCOM.DLL | RUNNING | | | | C:\WINDOWS\system32\KDCOM.DLL |
| BOOTVID.dll | RUNNING | | | | C:\WINDOWS\system32\BOOTVID.dll |
| ACPI.sys | RUNNING | | | ACPI.sys | |
| WMILIB.SYS | RUNNING | | | | C:\WINDOWS\system32\DRIVERS\WMILIB.SYS |
| pci.sys | RUNNING | | | pci.sys | |
| isapnp.sys | RUNNING | | | isapnp.sys | |
| pciide.sys | RUNNING | | | pciide.sys | |
| PCIIDEX.SYS | RUNNING | | | | C:\WINDOWS\system32\DRIVERS\PCIIDEX.SYS |
| MountMgr.sys | RUNNING | | | MountMgr.sys | |
| ftdisk.sys | RUNNING | | | ftdisk.sys | |
| dmload.sys | RUNNING | | | dmload.sys | |
| dmio.sys | RUNNING | | | dmio.sys | |
| volsnap.sys | RUNNING | | | volsnap.sys | |
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
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11
TOP SECRET // COMINT
Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
REPLICANTFARM
- Extend WP output to a signature based system: REPLICANTFARM
- Module based parser/alert system running on real-time CNE operational data
- Custom/module based analysis:
- Actors
- Implant technology
- Host based signatures
- Network based signatures
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
12
TOP SECRET // COMINT
CCNE/Opsec WPID Alerts - Mozilla Firefox
File Edit View History Bookmarks Tools Help
[REDACTED]
Most Visited Getting Started Latest Headlines LTT < Operations < TW... Opsec - k1svn - Trac CCNE/Opsec Systems http://obelix/systeminfo
CCNE/Opsec WPID Alerts | Exploits | http://obelix/ | CCNE/Opsec WPID Alerts | CCNE/Opsec WPID Alerts
CCNE/Opsec WPID Alerts
REPLICANTFARM
Note that the search is done with the fields as perl regular expressions...
Examples:
* Dots (.) are single-character wildcards
* Dot-Star (.*) means any number of characters
* Single WPID: 51\.8\.1\.13
* Class C WPID: 51\.8\.1\.
* Infrastructure: ^50\
Current Modules:
mod_1000_WH_Implant.pl
mod_100_MM_SHEPHERD.pl
mod_101_MM_CARBON.pl
mod_1200_AF_ALOOFNESS.pl
mod_102_MM_REGBACKUP.pl
mod_103_MM_DOGHOUSE.pl
mod_104_MM_WALKER.pl
mod_1100_VO_Implant.pl
mod_11_cloaked.pl
mod_15_procParents.pl
mod_16_recyclerexec.pl
mod_200_SD_MI20.pl
mod_201_SD_MI25FTP.pl
mod_24_expectedArguments.pl
mod_25_privileges.pl
mod_304_UNK_WINPACP.pl
mod_305_UNK_LASEX.pl
mod_310_UNK_WIDOWKEY.pl
mod_311_UNK_CIVETCAT.pl
mod_500_SJ_DDNT.pl
mod_5_knownips.pl
mod_7_mt
mod 800
mod_600_GR_IMPLANT.pl
mod_900_
mod_601_GR_FLAME.pl
mod_RFI
mod_6_knowndns.pl
mod RFI
mod_700_SG_CHOCOPOP.pl
mod_RFI
mod_12_system32var.pl
mod_13_rarpassword.pl
mod_14_strangedllextensions.pl
mod_17_tmpexec.pl
mod_18_passwordfilters.pl
mod_19_kernelcloaking.pl
mod_1_packed.pl
mod_20_pebmodification.pl
mod_21_scheduleat.pl
mod_22_ntuninstallexec.pl
mod_23_hidden.pl
mod_300_UNK_TCPSRV32.pl
mod_301_UNK_BLAZINGANGEL.pl
mod_302_TINYWEB.pl
mod_303_UNK_CYDLL.pl
mod_306_UNK_WINUPDATE.pl
mod_307_UNK_QUIVERINGSQUAB.pl
mod_308_UNK_WINDO.pl
mod_309_UNK_DIESELRATTLE.pl
mod_400_SS_WINBEE.pl
mod_401_SS_SSLINST.pl
mod_402_SS_SharpR.pl
WPID Regexp: [REDACTED]
Module Regexp: MM
Type:
Historic:
Live:
Submit Query
ALERTS
WPID: Module: Date: Tag: File name:
[REDACTED] mod_103_MM_DOGHOUSE.pl 2010-01-21T15:36:39.968 MM ../datastore/archive/2010/01/21/15/TXID0000272485_18_Y2010M01D21_H15M28S59_MS642MU500NS0_RXID050_000_0
Details:
Possible MM DOGHOUSE driver file: C:\WINNT\$NtUninstallQ244598$.
Possible MM DOGHOUSE driver file: C:\WINNT\$NtUninstallQ244598$\afd.sys.
Possible MM DOGHOUSE driver file: C:\WINNT\$NtUninstallQ244598$\netbt.sys.
Possible MM DOGHOUSE driver file: C:\WINNT\$NtUninstallQ244598$\tcpip.sys.
Possible MM DOGHOUSE driver file: C:\WINNT\$NtUninstallQ244598$\hotfix.
----PULLEDPORK----
13
TOP SECRET // COMINT
Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
CCNE/Opsec WPID Alerts - Mozilla Firefox
File Edit View History Bookmarks Tools Help
[REDACTED] Google
Most Visited Getting Started Latest Headlines LTT < Operations < TW... Opsec - k1svn - Trac CCNE/Opsec Systems http://obelix/systeminfo
CCNE/Opsec WPID Alerts | CCNE/Opsec WPID Alerts | CCNE/Opsec WPID Alerts | CCNE/Opsec Mondumppr...
CCNE/Opsec Mondumpprtracker
Note that the search is done on the wpids with a simple wildcard and a perl regexp for the command lines....
Examples:
* A value of * in a wpid indicates that "class" is a wildcard.
* Single WPID: 51.8.1.13
* Class B WPID: 51.1.*.*
* Class C WPID: 51.8.1.*
* The +Regexp is a perl regular expression applied to the command line. Only command lines satisfying the expression will be displayed.
* The -Regexp is a perl regular expression applied to the command line. Only command lines NOT satisfying the expression will be displayed.
WPID Regexp: 51.8.1.13
Date from: -2 months
Group:
+Regexp:
-Regexp:
Submit Query
| proc | cmdLine | parent | wpid | lastSeen |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| msfeedssync.exe | C:\WINDOWS\system32\msfeedssync.exe sync | <unknown_owner> | [REDACTED] | 2010-05-24 12:13 |
| dwhwizrd.exe | "C:\Program Files\Symantec Symantec Endpoint Protection DWHWizrd.exe" | <unknown_owner> | [REDACTED] | 2010-05-24 04:05 |
| lucallbackproxy | "C:\Program Files\Symantec LiveUpdate LuCallbackProxy.exe" (812CD25E-1049-4086-9DDD-A4FAE649FBDF) | <unknown_owner> | [REDACTED] | 2010-05-24 04:05 |
| lucallbackproxy | "C:\Program Files\Symantec LiveUpdate LuCallbackProxy.exe" {E5A3EBEE-D580-421e-86DF-54C0B3739522) | <unknown_owner> | [REDACTED] | 2010-05-24 04:05 |
| lucallbackproxy | "C:\Program Files\Symantec LiveUpdate LuCallbackProxy.exe" (D3769926-05B7-4ad1-9DCF-23051EEE78E3) | <unknown_owner> | [REDACTED] | 2010-05-24 04:05 |
| lucallbackproxy | "C:\Program Files\Symantec LiveUpdate LuCallbackProxy.exe" {C60DC234-65F9-4674-94AE-62158EFCA433} | <unknown_owner> | [REDACTED] | 2010-05-24 04:05 |
| lucoms-1.exe | "C:\PROGRA~1\Symantec LIVEUP~1\LUCOMS~1.EXE" | <unknown_owner> | [REDACTED] | 2010-05-24 04:05 |
| luall.exe | "C:\Program Files\Symantec LiveUpdate\luall.exe" -S | <unknown_owner> | [REDACTED] | 2010-05-24 04:05 |
| sesclu.exe | "C:\Program Files\Symantec Symantec Endpoint Protection SescLU.exe" -Embedding | <unknown_owner> | [REDACTED] | 2010-05-24 04:04 |
| wmiprvse.exe | C:\WINDOWS\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding | <unknown_owner> | [REDACTED] | 2010-05-24 02:10 |
| helpsvc.exe | "C:\WINDOWS\PCHealth HelpCtr Binaries HelpSvc.exed" /Embedding | <unknown_owner> | [REDACTED] | 2010-05-24 02:10 |
| accountprune.ex | "C:\MDaemon\APP AccountPrune.exe" /d=1 /z="C:\MDaemon Logs OldLogs Logs-2010-05-22-Sat-00-00-20.zip" /p="C:\MDaemon/Logs" /r | <unknown_owner> | [REDACTED] | 2010-05-23 19:32 |
| sa-learn.exe | "C:\MDaemon SpamAssassin\sa-learn.exe" -ham --configpath="C:\MMDaemon APP SpamAssassin\default_rules" -siteconfigpath="C:\MDaemon SpamAssassin rules" -dir "C:\MDaemon\PUBLIC~1 BAYESI~1.IMA NON-SP-1.IMA*.msg" | <unknown_owner> | [REDACTED] | 2010-05-23 19:30 |
| accountprune.ex | " C: MDaemon APP AccountPrune.exe"/a | <unknown_owner> | [REDACTED] | 2010-05-23 19:30 |
| listprune.exe | "C:\MDaemon APP ListPrune.exe" /s | <unknown_owner> | [REDACTED] | 2010-05-23 19:30 |
| sa-learn.exe | "C:\MDaemon SpamAssassin sa-learn.exe" -spam-configpath="C:\MDaemon/APP/SpamAssassin\default_rules" siteconfigpath="C:\MDaemon\SpamAssassin rules" -dir "C:\MDaemon\PUBLIC~1\BAYESI~1.IMA\SPAM~1.IMA*.msg" | <unknown_owner> | [REDACTED] | 2010-05-23 19:30 |
| mdupdater.exe | "C:\MDaemon APP MDUpdater.exe" /p="MDaemon Server" /s | <unknown_owner> | [REDACTED] | 2010-05-23 19:30 |
| cmd.exe | "C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe" /c "C:\MDaemon APP Leam.bat" | <unknown_owner> | [REDACTED] | 2010-05-23 19:30 |
| cmd.exe | "C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe" /c "C:\MDaemon APP Cleanup.bat" | <unknown_owner> | [REDACTED] | 2010-05-23 19:30 |
| avupdate.exe | "C:\MDaemon SecurityPlus/avupdate.exe" /q/n | <unknown_owner> | [REDACTED] | 2010-05-23 14:21 |
| rundll32.exe | C:\WINDOWS\system32\rund1132.exe C:\DOCUME~1\ALLUSE~1.WIN\APPLIC~1\Symantec SyKnAppS\SyKnAppS.dll, UpdateSyKnAppS | <unknown_owner> | [REDACTED] | 2010-05-23 04:05 |
| accountprune.ex | "C:\MDaemon APP Account Prune.exe" /d=1/z="C:\MDaemon\Logs\OldLogs Logs-2010-05-21-Fri-00-00-03.zip" /p="C:\MDaemon Logs" /r | <unknown_owner> | [REDACTED] | 2010-05-22 19:32 |
| msfeedssync.exe | C:\WINDOWS\system32 msfeedssync.exe sync | <unknown_owner> | [REDACTED] | 2010-05-22 08:16 |
| lucallbackproxy | "C: Program Files\Symantec LiveUpdate LuCallbackProxy.exe" {812CD25E-1049-4086-9DDD-A4FAE649FBDF} | <unknown_owner> | [REDACTED] | 2010-05-22 04:05 |
| lucallbackproxy | "C:\Program Files\Symantec LiveUpdate LuCallbackProxy.exe" {B5A3EBEE-D580-421-86DF-54C0B3739522) | <unknown_owner> | [REDACTED] | 2010-05-22 04:05 |
| lucallbackproxy | "C:\Program Files\Symantec LiveUpdate LuCallbackProxy.exe" {D3769926-0587-4ad1-9DCF-23051EEE7883} | <unknown_owner> | [REDACTED] | 2010-05-22 04:05 |
| lucallbackproxy | "C:\Program Files\Symantec LiveUpdate\LuCallbackProxy.exe" {C60DC234-65F9-4674-94AE-62158EFCA433} | <unknown_owner> | [REDACTED] | 2010-05-22 04:05 |
| lucoms-l.exe | "C:\PROGRA~1\Symantec LIVEUP~1\LUCOMS-1.EXE" | <unknown_owner> | [REDACTED] | 2010-05-22 04:05 |
| luall.exe | "C:\Program Files\Symantec LiveUpdate\luall.exe" -S | <unknown_owner> | [REDACTED] | 2010-05-22 04:05 |
14
TOP SECRET // COMINT
Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
REPLICANTFARM generic modules
- Cloaked
- Recycler
- Rar password
- Tmp executable
- Packed
- Peb modification
- Privileges
- MS pretender
- System32 "variables”
- Strange DLL extensions
- Kernel cloaking
- Schedule at
- Ntuninstall execution
- hidden
Other ideas....
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
15
TOP SECRET // COMINT
Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
Generic modules : example
my @runningProcs = xml_isProcessRunning( $xml, 'svchost.{1,3}\\.exe',
'winlogon.{1,3}\\.exe',
'services.{1,3}\\.exe',
'lsass.{1,3}\\.exe',
'spoolsv.{1,3}\\.exe',
'autochk.{1,3}\\.exe',
'logon.{1,3}\\.scr',
'rundll32.{1,3}\\.exe',
'chkdsk.{1,3}\\.exe',
'chkntfs.{1,3}\\.exe',
'logonui.{1,3}\\.exe',
'ntoskrnl.{1,3}\\.exe',
'ntvdm.{1,3}\\.exe',
'rdpclip.{1,3}\\.exe',
'taskmgr.{1,3}\\.exe',
'userinit.{1,3}\\.exe',
'wscntfy.{1,3}\\.exe',
'tcpmon.{1,3}\\.dll' );
foreach my $runningProc (@runningProcs)
{
$alertText .= "Suspicious process detected, legitimate exe named appended with string: " . $runningProc . ".\n";
}
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
16
TOP SECRET // COMINT
Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
RF specific signatures
- KNOWN actor filenames, processes, covert stores:
- MAKERSMARK / FANNER
- SEEDSPHERE / BYZANTINE
- ALOOFNESS
- SNOWGLOBE
- VOYEUR
- SUPERDRAKE
- GOSSIPGIRL
- Infrastructure
- Known IP addresses
- Known DNS queries
- Other tools
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
17
TOP SECRET // COMINT
Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
Specific signatures : example
# Check a known drivers present
my @driversPresent = xml_isDriverPresent( $xml, 'usbdev\\.sys', 'acpimem32\\.sys',
'usblink32i\\.exe', '\\$NtUninstallQ722833\\$' );
foreach my $driver (@driversPresent)
{
$alertText .= "Possible MM CARBON driver detected: " . $driver . ".\n";
}
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
18
TOP SECRET // COMINT
Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
Operations
- Routine operations for CCNE investigations on current targets
- Execution of OPSEC related plugins
- Collection of files
- Examination of network activity
- Blanket approvals for addition of selectors to level 4 OPs against known actors: example WATERMARK operations against MAKERSMARK
- Standard operating procedures for level 2 – level 4 operataions against foreign CCNE actor infrastructures
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
19
TOP SECRET // COMINT
Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
CCNE / OPSEC page on 5-Eyes K1SVN Wiki
- Contains reverse engineering reports for CNE / IO consumption
- Even logs and notes for several actors
[REDACTED]
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
20
TOP SECRET // COMINT
Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
CCNE operations – Covert Infrastructure
- Some fusion of the WP and CCNE infrastructures
- Dedicated ORB for CCNE
- Unattributed dialups to the ORB
- Philosophy: use low hanging fruits against the actors (public exploits and tools if available)
- Discussions regarding repurpose of foreign toolkits
- De-confliction
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
21
TOP SECRET // COMINT
Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
SNOWGLOBE
- Provide the historical account of the activity on DOURMAGNUM (Imam Hussein University)
- Implant identified while investigating another unattributed actor
- rar archiving of emails on target
- Beaconing using HTTP to php-based listening post
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
22
TOP SECRET // COMINT
Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
CCNE/Opsec WPID Alerts - Mozilla Firefox
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Most Visited Getting Started Latest Headlines LTT < Operations < TW... Opsec - k1svn - Trac CCNE/Opsec Systems http://obelix/systeminfo/
http://obelix/ | CCNE/Opsec WPID Alerts | CCNE/Opsec WPID Alerts | Opsec - k1svn | Opsec - k1svn
CCNE/Opsec WPID Alerts
Note that the search is done with the fields as perl regular expressions...
Examples:
* Dots (.) are single-character wildcards
* Dot-Star (.*) means any number of characters
* Single WPID: 51\.\.1\.13
* Class C WPID: 51\.8\.11.
* Infrastructure: ^50\
Current Modules:
mod_1000_WH_Implant.pl
mod_100_MM_SHEPHERD.pl
mod_101_MM_CARBON.pl
mod_1200_AF_ALOOFNESS.pl
mod_102_MM_REGBACKUP.pl
mod_103_MM_DOGHOUSE.pl
mod_104_MM_WALKER.pl
mod_1100_VO_Implant.pl
mod_11_cloaked.pl
mod_15_procParents.pl
mod_16_recyclerexec.pl
mod_200_SD_MI20.pl
mod_201_SD_MI25FTP.pl
mod_24_expectedArguments.pl
mod_25_privileges.pl
mod_304_UNK_WINPACP.pl
mod_305_UNK_IASEX.pl
mod_310_UNK_WIDOWKEY.pl
mod_311_UNK_CIVETCAT.pl
mod_500_SJ_DDNT.pl
mod_5_knownips.pl
mod_7_mt
mod 800
mod_600_GR_IMPLANT.pl
mod_900_
mod_601_GR_FLAME.pl
mod_RFI
mod_6_knowndns.pl
mod RFI
mod_700_SG_CHOCOPOP.pl
mod_RFI
mod_12_system32var.pl
mod_13_rarpassword.pl
mod_14_strangedliextensions.pl
mod_17_tmpexec.pl
mod_18_passwordfilters.pl
mod_19_kemelcioaking.pl
mod_1_packed.pl
mod_20_pebmodification.pl
mod_21_scheduleat.pl
mod_22_ntuninstallexec.pl
mod_23_hidden.pl
mod_300_UNK_TCPSRV32.pl
mod_301_UNK_BLAZINGANGEL.pl
mod_302_TINYWEB.pl
mod_303_UNK_CYDLL.pl
mod_306_UNK_WINUPDATE.pl
mod_307_UNK_QUIVERINGSQUAB.pl
mod_308_UNK_WINDO.pl
mod_309_UNK_DIESELRATTLE.pl
mod_400_SS_WINBEE.pl
mod_401_SS_SSLINST.pl
mod_402_SS_SharpR.pl
WPID Regexp: [REDACTED]
Module Regexp: _700_SG_
Type:
Historic:
Live:
Submit Query
ALERTS
WPID: [REDACTED] Module: mod_700_SG_CHOCOPOP.pl Date: 2009-09-30T10:18:41.906 Tag: SG File name: ../datastore/archive/2009/09/30/10/TXID0000074573_18_Y2009M09D30_H10M1
Details:
Possible SNOWGLOBE CHOCOPOP process detected: cmd.exe /C ""c:\RECYCLER\S-1-5-21-101796669-4102346875-220983236-500\rar.exe" a -r -inul-hplockless-aprfeghhi-tn1d temp\168.rar c:\MDAEMON\Users\ihu.a
Possible SNOWGLOBE CHOCOPOP process detected: cmd.exe /C ""c:\RECYCLER\S-1-5-21-101796669-4102346875-220983236-500\rar.exe" a -r-inul-hplockless-aprfeghhi-tn1d temp\168.rar c:\MDAEMON\Users\ihu.a
Possible SNOWGLOBE CHOCOPOP process detected: "c:\RECYCLER\S-1-5-21-101796669-4102346875-220983236-500\rar.exe" a -r -inul-hplockless-apSNazarian -tn1d C:\WINDOWS\TEMP\166.rar c:\MDAEMON\USI
Possible SNOWGLOBE CHOCOPOP process detected: "c:\RECYCLER\S-1-5-21-101796669-4102346875-220983236-500\rar.exe" a -r -inul-hplockless-apSNazarian -tn1d C:\WINDOWS\TEMP\166.rar c:\MDAEMON\US
Possible SNOWGLOBE CHOCOPOP process detected: cmd.exe /C ""c:\RECYCLER\S-1-5-21-101796669-4102346875-220983236-500\rar.exe" a -r -inul-hplockless-apSNazarian-tn1d temp\166.rar c:\MDAEMON\Users\ih
Possible SNOWGLOBE CHOCOPOP process detected: cmd.exe /C ""c:\RECYCLER\S-1-5-21-101796669-4102346875-220983236-500\rar.exe" a -r -inul-hplockless-apSNazarian-tn1d temp\166.rar c:\MDAEMON\Users\ih
Possible SNOWGLOBE CHOCOPOP process detected: "c:\RECYCLER\S-1-5-21-101796669-4102346875-220983236-500\rar.exe" a -r -inul-hplockless -apkpnazari -tn1d C:\WINDOWS\TEMP\166.rar c:\MDAEMON\User!
Possible SNOWGLOBE CHOCOPOP process detected: "c:\RECYCLER\S-1-5-21-101796669-4102346875-220983236-500\rar.exe" a -r -inul-hplockless -apkpnazari -tn1d C:\WINDOWS\TEMP\166.rar c:\MDAEMON\User:
Possible SNOWGLOBE CHOCOPOP process detected: cmd.exe /C ""c:\RECYCLER\S-1-5-21-101796669-4102346875-220983236-500 rar.exe" a -r -inul-hplockless-apkpnazari -tn1d temp\166.rar c:\MDAEMON\Users\ihu.
Possible SNOWGLOBE CHOCOPOP process detected: cmd.exe /C ""c:\RECYCLER\S-1-5-21-101796669-4102346875-220983236-500 rar.exe" a -r -inul-hplockless-apkpnazari-tnld temp\166.rar c:\MDAEMON\Users\ihu.
Possible SNOWGLOBE CHOCOPOP process detected: "c:\RECYCLER\S-1-5-21-101796669-4102346875-220983236-500\rar.exe" a -r -inul -hplockless -apmsaadati -tn1d C:\WINDOWS\TEMP\166.rar c:\MDAEMON\User
Possible SNOWGLOBE CHOCOPOP process detected: "c:\RECYCLER\S-1-5-21-101796669-4102346875-220983236-500 rar.exe" a -r -inul -hplockless -apmsaadati -tn1d C:\WINDOWS\TEMP\166.rar c:\MDAEMON\User
Possible SNOWGLOBE CHOCOPOP process detected: cmd.exe /C ""c:\RECYCLER\S-1-5-21-101796669-4102346875-220983236-500 rar.exe" a -r -inul -hplockless -apmsaadati-tn1d temp\166.rar c:\MDAEMON\Users\ihu
Possible SNOWGLOBE CHOCOPOP process detected: cmd.exe /C ""c:\RECYCLER\S-1-5-21-101796669-4102346875-220983236-500 rar.exe" a -r -inul -hplockless -apmsaadati-tn1d temp\166.rar c:\MDAEMON\Users\ihu
---DOURMAGNUM---
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
23
TOP SECRET // COMINT
Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
SNOWGLOBE on target
Possible SNOWGLOBE CHOCOPOP process detected:
cmd.exe /C ""c:\RECYCLER\S-1-5-21-101796669-
4102346875-220983236-500\rar.exe" a -r -inul
-hplockless -aprfeghhi -tn1d temp\168.rar
c:\MDAEMON\Users\ihu.ac.ir\rfeghhi\md5*.msg">nul.
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
24
TOP SECRET // COMINT
Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
SNOWGLOBE implant
- Injects itself in svchost.exe
- No cloaking / no hooking
- Bootstraps in service called MSDTC64 (distributed
transaction coordinator 64b - Service entry is permanent
- Executable kept on disk in system32
- Crypto: 16 byte string XOR
- http beacons and tasking
- Actor observed upgrading on target
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
25
TOP SECRET // COMINT
Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
SNOWGLOBE activity and attribution
- Targeting is scarce but resembles CT / CP priorities
- French localisation seen in exploit PDFs (GCHQ)
- French commentary in the binary
- French binary name / developer path
- Observed in Iran, Norway, Greece, Belgium, Algeria,
France, US targets - Listening posts worldwide – several French legit sites
- Now seen in passive collection, several reports
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
26
TOP SECRET // COMINT
Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
De-confliction : on CCNE operations
- State-sponsored landscape is very busy
- CCNE Targets are de-conflicted
- Actors on CCNE targets are not
- Covert nature of foreign (and friendly actors) make de-confliction challenging
- Often need to refer to precise technology for identification
- CNE / CCNE from SIGINT + HUMINT need to get together on this issue
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
27
TOP SECRET // COMINT
Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
De-confliction FAIL
- Actor discovered
- 5 eyes effort
- Several cohabitations
- At CSEC: 400 man-hours:
- Over 20 CNE Operations
- Passive Collection
- 4 Reports
- Reverse engineering
- Planning of active operations
TS // SI // REL
S0
unpack
driver
Kernel
User
winlogon
S1
unpack
driver
Kernel
Manual load DLL
User
winlogon
CMD
HTTP
Internet
DEV
CMD line
msn
Manual load DLL + params
Decrypt
File
S2
CMD line
Implant
Kernel
SSL/TCP
CMD
User
Internet
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
28
TOP SECRET // COMINT
Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
Conclusion
- CCNE effort essential to the national cyber mandate:
- CNE situational awareness
- New actor discovery
- Tracking known actors
- Several new actors discovered using this process
- De-confliction needs to be improved
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
29
TOP SECRET // COMINT
Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada
MM CCNE contacts
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
30