Pay attention to that man behind the curtain: Discovering aliens on CNE infrastructure

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Creating agency: CSE Communications Security Establishment (Canada)
Document date: 2010-06-01
Pages: 30
Genre: slides
Banner:
Classification: TOP SECRET COMINT
Dissemination: -

CSEC briefing from 2010 outlines Canada’s counter–computer network exploitation efforts to detect, analyze, and pursue foreign and friendly cyber actors operating on shared CNE infrastructure. It details tools, methods, and a case study showing how hidden implants and overlapping state-sponsored operations were uncovered and attributed.

Long Description:
This document is a classified presentation by the Communications Security Establishment Canada delivered at an NSA SIGDEV Conference in June 2010, describing the mission and evolution of Counter-CNE at CSEC. It explains the need to actively identify and pursue foreign and friendly cyber actors encountered on existing exploitation targets, assess operational security, and provide situational awareness to CNE operators. The briefing introduces the CCNE team’s structure, blending analysts and operators from multiple disciplines to reverse engineer implants, track adversary personas, and correlate passive and active collection. A significant portion of the document focuses on CSEC’s exploitation and analysis platform and its extension into a signature-driven detection system. These capabilities enabled detailed host and network inspection, implant and rootkit detection, DNS and traffic analysis, and OPSEC review across Five Eyes operations. The presentation includes raw and parsed outputs demonstrating how implants, services, drivers, and suspicious processes were identified and classified, and how heuristic and actor-specific signatures were used to flag known and unknown adversaries operating on compromised infrastructure. The latter sections present a detailed case study of an implant family later attributed through forensic indicators such as beaconing behavior, encryption methods, localization artifacts, and global infrastructure patterns. The document highlights the operational challenge of de-confliction in a crowded state-sponsored cyber environment, where multiple actors may coexist on the same targets. It concludes by emphasizing that CCNE is essential for national cyber missions, enabling new actor discovery, improved attribution, and safer, more effective exploitation, while acknowledging that coordination and de-confliction across intelligence disciplines remain unresolved challenges.
Programs:
SNOWGLOBE, WARRIORPRIDE, DAREDEVIL, SLIPSTREAM, CHORDFLIER, NAMEDROPPER, WORMWOOD, REPLICANTFARM, OBELIX, SHEPHERD, CARBON, ALOOFNESS, REGBACKUP, DOGHOUSE, WALKER, CHOCOPOP, BLAZINGANGEL, WINDO, QUIVERINGSQUAB, DIESELRATTLE, CYDLL, CIVETCAT, WIDOWKEY, LASEX, PULLEDPORK, MAKERSMARK, FANNER, SEEDSPHERE, BYZANTINE, VOYEUR, SUPERDRAKE, GOSSIPGIRL, WATERMARK, DOURMAGNUM

People mentioned:
-

Countries:
France, Iran, Norway, Greece, Belgium, Algeria, United States, Canada

Tags:
implants, malware, cyber espionage, Computer Network Exploitation, Counter-CNE, CCNE, intelligence briefing, SIGDEV, OPSEC, actor discovery, target discovery, state sponsored hacking, advanced persistent threat, tradecraft analysis, reverse engineering, malware detection, rootkits, command and control, C2C, beaconing, DNS, network traffic analysis, host-based signatures, network-based signatures, heuristic detection, signature detection, infrastructure mapping, covert infrastructure, surveillance architecture, proxy and relay systems, hop points, de-confliction, multi-actor environments, cyber attribution, active collection, passive collection, intelligence sharing

Identifier:
media_35688_CSEC_document_on_the_handling_of_existing_trojans_when_trojanizing_computers

PDF SHA-256:
521fc860f7aa763352fd7677696e04568a25d585ada4fbbfa83b8a20623aefda

TOP SECRET // COMINT

Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada

Pay attention to that man behind the curtain: Discovering aliens on CNE infrastructure

[REDACTED]
CSEC Counter-CNE

Target Analytics thread
SIGDEV Conference
NSA – June 2010

Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information

Canada
1


TOP SECRET // COMINT

Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada

The need for Counter-CNE...

  • Foreign and friendly actors often encountered
  • CNE operators do not pursue them beyond their targets
  • Reporting groups need to be made aware
  • OPSEC evaluation is needed
  • Active pursuit of CNE actors: a different ballgame

Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information

Canada
2


TOP SECRET // COMINT

Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada

Outline

  • Introduction CCNE at CSEC
  • CCNE tools and methods
  • SNOWGLOBE
  • De-confliction

Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information

Canada
3


TOP SECRET // COMINT

Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada

CCNE Group at CSEC

  • Part of CSEC CNE operations (KO)
  • Recently formed matrix team
  • Analysts and operators from CNE Operations, IO Reporting Lines and Global Network Detection
  • Mandate:
    • Provide situational awareness to CNE operators
    • Discover unknown actors on existing CNE targets
    • Detect known actors on covert infrastructure
    • Pursue known actors through CNE
    • Review OPSEC of CNE operations

Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information

Canada
4


TOP SECRET // COMINT

Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada

CCNE team

Reverse engineering
Target development
Understand foreign CNE actors
CNE Operations
Cyber-CI
CCNE
Active collection
Foreign CNE persona
GND
Passive collection
Develop Collection signatures

Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information

Canada
5


TOP SECRET // COMINT

Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada

CNE Toolkit: WARRIORPRIDE

  • WARRIORPRIDE (WP):
    • Scalable, Flexible, Portable CNE platform
    • Unified framework within CSEC and across the 5 eyes
    • Do more with less effort
      • Common framework for sharing code/plugins across the 5 eyes
      • WARRIORPRIDE is an implementation of the “WZOWSKI” 5-eyes API
    • WARRIORPRIDE@CSE/etc. == DAREDEVIL@GCHQ
  • WARRIORPRIDE
    • xml command output to operators
    • Several plugins used for machine recon / OPSEC assessment

Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information

Canada
6


TOP SECRET // COMINT

Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada

WARRIORPRIDE

Command Prompt - U_Base x
pink:localhost> clistpeer
pink:localhost> rtlist
pink:localhost> sllistplugin
pink:localhost> ?
pink:localhost> sllistpersistent
pink:localhost> slliststore
pink:localhost> cgetimplantid
pink:localhost>
Output
Transaction Id: 138546
Core storage files for implant 127.0.0.1
======================================
Plugin Store:         c:\Temp\~DF3BE9.tmp
Config Store:         c:\Temp\configFileSys.sys
Note that this command does not list plugi

real work
LP
Console
LP Side
Plugin
comms
Implant
Implant Side
Plugin

Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information

Canada
7


TOP SECRET // COMINT

Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada

WARRIORPRIDE plug-ins and output

  • Several WP plugins are useful for CCNE:
    • Slipstream : machine reconnaissance
    • ImplantDetector : implant detection
    • RootkitDetector : rootkit detection
    • Chordflier/U_ftp : file identification / retrieval
    • NameDropper : DNS
    • WormWood : network sniffing and characterization
  • Already used for CNE OPSEC
  • Used for precise identification and heuristics

Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information

Canada
8


TOP SECRET // COMINT

Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada

WP xml output (raw)

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<response xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
   xsi:noNamespaceSchemaLocation="U_FileCollectorLp/U_FileCollectorLp_2.15.xsd"><implantl
   d>51.1.2.160</implantId><transaction><transactionSource>50.0.0.101</transactionSource><tr
   ansactionId>320453</transactionId></transaction><timestamp><TLT>2010-02-
   23T15:53:06.366</TLT><UTC>2010-02-
   23T15:47:43.448</UTC></timestamp><errors><errorPlugin>0</errorPlugin><errorOs>0</error
   Os></errors><commandInfo>fcstart</commandInfo><responseDetails><fcstart><status>Succe
   ss</status><standbyMode>FALSE</standbyMode></fcstart></responseDetails></response>

Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information

Canada
9


TOP SECRET // COMINT

Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada

WP SLIPSTREAM output (parsed)

[2010/05/18 - 16:28:05 (UTC)] Transaction Id: 582966
U_SLIPSTREAM - <ssservices>
ImplantId: <51.8.1.13>
Timestamp (UTC): 2010/02/09 06:42:42

PAGE: 1 of 1
| PID  | Service Name             | Status    | Startup Type | Service Process Type | Display Name                      | Binary Path                                            |
| :--- | :----------------------- | :-------- | :----------- | :------------------- | :-------------------------------- | :----------------------------------------------------- |
| 924  | AeLookupSvc              | RUNNING   | AUTOMATIC    | SHARED               | Application Experience Lookup Service | 'C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs           |
| 0    | Alerter LocalService     | STOPPED   | DISABLED     | SHARED               | Alerter                           | C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exe -k                     |
| 3184 | ALG C:\WINDOWS\System32\alg.exe | RUNNING   | MANUAL       | OWN PROCESS          | Application Layer Gateway Service |                                                        |
| 0    | AppMgmt -k netsvcs       | STOPPED   | MANUAL       | SHARED               | Application Management            | C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exe                        |
| 924  | AudioSrv -k netsvcs      | RUNNING   | AUTOMATIC    | SHARED               | Windows Audio                     | C:\WINDOWS\System32\svchost.exe                        |
| 0    | BITS C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs | STOPPED   | MANUAL       | SHARED               | Background Intelligent Transfer Service |                                                        |
| 0    | Browser -k netsvcs       | STOPPED   | AUTOMATIC    | SHARED               | Computer Browser                  |                                                        |
| 1028 | ccEvtMgr Files\Symantec Shared\ccSvcHst.exe" /h ccCommon | RUNNING   | AUTOMATIC    | SHARED               | Symantec Event Manager            | "C:\Program Files\Common                              |
| 1028 | ccSetMgr Files\Symantec Shared\ccSvcHst.exe" /h ccCommon | RUNNING   | AUTOMATIC    | SHARED               | Symantec Settings Manager         | "C:\Program Files\Common                              |
| 1708 | Cissesrv Files\HP\Cissesrv\cissesrv.exe" | RUNNING   | AUTOMATIC    | OWN PROCESS          | HP Smart Array SAS/SATA Event Notification Service | "C:\Program                                           |
| 0    | CiSvc                    | STOPPED   | DISABLED     | SHARED               | Indexing Service                  | C:\WINDOWS\system32\cisvc.exe                          |
| 0    | ClipSrv                 | STOPPED   | DISABLED     | OWN PROCESS          | ClipBook                          |                                                        |

Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information

Canada
10


TOP SECRET // COMINT

Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada

WP SLIPSTREAM output... drivers (parsed)

[2010/05/18 16:28:06 (UTC)] Transaction Id: 582968
U_SLIPSTREAM - <ssdrivers>
ImplantId: <51.8.1.13>
Timestamp (UTC): 2010/02/09 06:42:43

PAGE: 1 of 1

| SCM|Driver Name | Status  | Startup Type | Driver Type | Display Name | Binary Path                           |
| :--------------- | :------ | :----------- | :---------- | :----------- | :------------------------------------ |
| Intoskrnl.exe    | RUNNING |              |             |              | C:\WINDOWS\system32\ntoskrnl.exe      |
| hal.dll          | RUNNING |              |             |              | C:\WINDOWS\system32\hal.dll           |
| KDCOM.DLL        | RUNNING |              |             |              | C:\WINDOWS\system32\KDCOM.DLL         |
| BOOTVID.dll      | RUNNING |              |             |              | C:\WINDOWS\system32\BOOTVID.dll       |
| ACPI.sys         | RUNNING |              |             | ACPI.sys     |                                       |
| WMILIB.SYS       | RUNNING |              |             |              | C:\WINDOWS\system32\DRIVERS\WMILIB.SYS |
| pci.sys          | RUNNING |              |             | pci.sys      |                                       |
| isapnp.sys       | RUNNING |              |             | isapnp.sys   |                                       |
| pciide.sys       | RUNNING |              |             | pciide.sys   |                                       |
| PCIIDEX.SYS      | RUNNING |              |             |              | C:\WINDOWS\system32\DRIVERS\PCIIDEX.SYS |
| MountMgr.sys     | RUNNING |              |             | MountMgr.sys |                                       |
| ftdisk.sys       | RUNNING |              |             | ftdisk.sys   |                                       |
| dmload.sys       | RUNNING |              |             | dmload.sys   |                                       |
| dmio.sys         | RUNNING |              |             | dmio.sys     |                                       |
| volsnap.sys      | RUNNING |              |             | volsnap.sys  |                                       |

Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information

Canada
11


TOP SECRET // COMINT

Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada

REPLICANTFARM

  • Extend WP output to a signature based system: REPLICANTFARM
  • Module based parser/alert system running on real-time CNE operational data
  • Custom/module based analysis:
    • Actors
    • Implant technology
    • Host based signatures
    • Network based signatures

Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information

Canada
12


TOP SECRET // COMINT

CCNE/Opsec WPID Alerts - Mozilla Firefox
File Edit View History Bookmarks Tools Help
[REDACTED]
Most Visited Getting Started Latest Headlines LTT < Operations < TW... Opsec - k1svn - Trac CCNE/Opsec Systems http://obelix/systeminfo
CCNE/Opsec WPID Alerts | Exploits | http://obelix/ | CCNE/Opsec WPID Alerts | CCNE/Opsec WPID Alerts

CCNE/Opsec WPID Alerts
REPLICANTFARM

Note that the search is done with the fields as perl regular expressions...
Examples:
* Dots (.) are single-character wildcards
* Dot-Star (.*) means any number of characters
* Single WPID: 51\.8\.1\.13
* Class C WPID: 51\.8\.1\.
* Infrastructure: ^50\

Current Modules:
mod_1000_WH_Implant.pl
mod_100_MM_SHEPHERD.pl
mod_101_MM_CARBON.pl
mod_1200_AF_ALOOFNESS.pl
mod_102_MM_REGBACKUP.pl
mod_103_MM_DOGHOUSE.pl
mod_104_MM_WALKER.pl

mod_1100_VO_Implant.pl
mod_11_cloaked.pl
mod_15_procParents.pl
mod_16_recyclerexec.pl
mod_200_SD_MI20.pl
mod_201_SD_MI25FTP.pl
mod_24_expectedArguments.pl
mod_25_privileges.pl
mod_304_UNK_WINPACP.pl
mod_305_UNK_LASEX.pl
mod_310_UNK_WIDOWKEY.pl
mod_311_UNK_CIVETCAT.pl
mod_500_SJ_DDNT.pl
mod_5_knownips.pl
mod_7_mt
mod 800
mod_600_GR_IMPLANT.pl
mod_900_
mod_601_GR_FLAME.pl
mod_RFI
mod_6_knowndns.pl
mod RFI
mod_700_SG_CHOCOPOP.pl
mod_RFI

mod_12_system32var.pl
mod_13_rarpassword.pl
mod_14_strangedllextensions.pl
mod_17_tmpexec.pl
mod_18_passwordfilters.pl
mod_19_kernelcloaking.pl
mod_1_packed.pl

mod_20_pebmodification.pl
mod_21_scheduleat.pl
mod_22_ntuninstallexec.pl
mod_23_hidden.pl

mod_300_UNK_TCPSRV32.pl
mod_301_UNK_BLAZINGANGEL.pl
mod_302_TINYWEB.pl
mod_303_UNK_CYDLL.pl

mod_306_UNK_WINUPDATE.pl
mod_307_UNK_QUIVERINGSQUAB.pl
mod_308_UNK_WINDO.pl
mod_309_UNK_DIESELRATTLE.pl

mod_400_SS_WINBEE.pl
mod_401_SS_SSLINST.pl
mod_402_SS_SharpR.pl

WPID Regexp: [REDACTED]

Module Regexp: MM

Type:
Historic:
Live:

Submit Query

ALERTS

WPID:        Module:                     Date:                       Tag: File name:                                                  
[REDACTED]   mod_103_MM_DOGHOUSE.pl      2010-01-21T15:36:39.968     MM   ../datastore/archive/2010/01/21/15/TXID0000272485_18_Y2010M01D21_H15M28S59_MS642MU500NS0_RXID050_000_0

Details:
Possible MM DOGHOUSE driver file: C:\WINNT\$NtUninstallQ244598$.
Possible MM DOGHOUSE driver file: C:\WINNT\$NtUninstallQ244598$\afd.sys.
Possible MM DOGHOUSE driver file: C:\WINNT\$NtUninstallQ244598$\netbt.sys.
Possible MM DOGHOUSE driver file: C:\WINNT\$NtUninstallQ244598$\tcpip.sys.
Possible MM DOGHOUSE driver file: C:\WINNT\$NtUninstallQ244598$\hotfix.
----PULLEDPORK----

13


TOP SECRET // COMINT

Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada

CCNE/Opsec WPID Alerts - Mozilla Firefox
File Edit View History Bookmarks Tools Help
[REDACTED] Google
Most Visited Getting Started Latest Headlines LTT < Operations < TW... Opsec - k1svn - Trac CCNE/Opsec Systems http://obelix/systeminfo
CCNE/Opsec WPID Alerts | CCNE/Opsec WPID Alerts | CCNE/Opsec WPID Alerts | CCNE/Opsec Mondumppr...

CCNE/Opsec Mondumpprtracker

Note that the search is done on the wpids with a simple wildcard and a perl regexp for the command lines....

Examples:
* A value of * in a wpid indicates that "class" is a wildcard.
* Single WPID: 51.8.1.13
* Class B WPID: 51.1.*.*
* Class C WPID: 51.8.1.*
* The +Regexp is a perl regular expression applied to the command line. Only command lines satisfying the expression will be displayed.
* The -Regexp is a perl regular expression applied to the command line. Only command lines NOT satisfying the expression will be displayed.

WPID Regexp: 51.8.1.13
Date from: -2 months
Group:
+Regexp:
-Regexp:
Submit Query
proc cmdLine parent wpid lastSeen
msfeedssync.exe C:\WINDOWS\system32\msfeedssync.exe sync &lt;unknown_owner&gt; [REDACTED] 2010-05-24 12:13
dwhwizrd.exe "C:\Program Files\Symantec Symantec Endpoint Protection DWHWizrd.exe" &lt;unknown_owner&gt; [REDACTED] 2010-05-24 04:05
lucallbackproxy "C:\Program Files\Symantec LiveUpdate LuCallbackProxy.exe" (812CD25E-1049-4086-9DDD-A4FAE649FBDF) &lt;unknown_owner&gt; [REDACTED] 2010-05-24 04:05
lucallbackproxy "C:\Program Files\Symantec LiveUpdate LuCallbackProxy.exe" {E5A3EBEE-D580-421e-86DF-54C0B3739522) &lt;unknown_owner&gt; [REDACTED] 2010-05-24 04:05
lucallbackproxy "C:\Program Files\Symantec LiveUpdate LuCallbackProxy.exe" (D3769926-05B7-4ad1-9DCF-23051EEE78E3) &lt;unknown_owner&gt; [REDACTED] 2010-05-24 04:05
lucallbackproxy "C:\Program Files\Symantec LiveUpdate LuCallbackProxy.exe" {C60DC234-65F9-4674-94AE-62158EFCA433} &lt;unknown_owner&gt; [REDACTED] 2010-05-24 04:05
lucoms-1.exe "C:\PROGRA~1\Symantec LIVEUP~1\LUCOMS~1.EXE" &lt;unknown_owner&gt; [REDACTED] 2010-05-24 04:05
luall.exe "C:\Program Files\Symantec LiveUpdate\luall.exe" -S &lt;unknown_owner&gt; [REDACTED] 2010-05-24 04:05
sesclu.exe "C:\Program Files\Symantec Symantec Endpoint Protection SescLU.exe" -Embedding &lt;unknown_owner&gt; [REDACTED] 2010-05-24 04:04
wmiprvse.exe C:\WINDOWS\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding &lt;unknown_owner&gt; [REDACTED] 2010-05-24 02:10
helpsvc.exe "C:\WINDOWS\PCHealth HelpCtr Binaries HelpSvc.exed" /Embedding &lt;unknown_owner&gt; [REDACTED] 2010-05-24 02:10
accountprune.ex "C:\MDaemon\APP AccountPrune.exe" /d=1 /z="C:\MDaemon Logs OldLogs Logs-2010-05-22-Sat-00-00-20.zip" /p="C:\MDaemon/Logs" /r &lt;unknown_owner&gt; [REDACTED] 2010-05-23 19:32
sa-learn.exe "C:\MDaemon SpamAssassin\sa-learn.exe" -ham --configpath="C:\MMDaemon APP SpamAssassin\default_rules" -siteconfigpath="C:\MDaemon SpamAssassin rules" -dir "C:\MDaemon\PUBLIC~1 BAYESI~1.IMA NON-SP-1.IMA*.msg" &lt;unknown_owner&gt; [REDACTED] 2010-05-23 19:30
accountprune.ex " C: MDaemon APP AccountPrune.exe"/a &lt;unknown_owner&gt; [REDACTED] 2010-05-23 19:30
listprune.exe "C:\MDaemon APP ListPrune.exe" /s &lt;unknown_owner&gt; [REDACTED] 2010-05-23 19:30
sa-learn.exe "C:\MDaemon SpamAssassin sa-learn.exe" -spam-configpath="C:\MDaemon/APP/SpamAssassin\default_rules" siteconfigpath="C:\MDaemon\SpamAssassin rules" -dir "C:\MDaemon\PUBLIC~1\BAYESI~1.IMA\SPAM~1.IMA*.msg" &lt;unknown_owner&gt; [REDACTED] 2010-05-23 19:30
mdupdater.exe "C:\MDaemon APP MDUpdater.exe" /p="MDaemon Server" /s &lt;unknown_owner&gt; [REDACTED] 2010-05-23 19:30
cmd.exe "C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe" /c "C:\MDaemon APP Leam.bat" &lt;unknown_owner&gt; [REDACTED] 2010-05-23 19:30
cmd.exe "C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe" /c "C:\MDaemon APP Cleanup.bat" &lt;unknown_owner&gt; [REDACTED] 2010-05-23 19:30
avupdate.exe "C:\MDaemon SecurityPlus/avupdate.exe" /q/n &lt;unknown_owner&gt; [REDACTED] 2010-05-23 14:21
rundll32.exe C:\WINDOWS\system32\rund1132.exe C:\DOCUME~1\ALLUSE~1.WIN\APPLIC~1\Symantec SyKnAppS\SyKnAppS.dll, UpdateSyKnAppS &lt;unknown_owner&gt; [REDACTED] 2010-05-23 04:05
accountprune.ex "C:\MDaemon APP Account Prune.exe" /d=1/z="C:\MDaemon\Logs\OldLogs Logs-2010-05-21-Fri-00-00-03.zip" /p="C:\MDaemon Logs" /r &lt;unknown_owner&gt; [REDACTED] 2010-05-22 19:32
msfeedssync.exe C:\WINDOWS\system32 msfeedssync.exe sync &lt;unknown_owner&gt; [REDACTED] 2010-05-22 08:16
lucallbackproxy "C: Program Files\Symantec LiveUpdate LuCallbackProxy.exe" {812CD25E-1049-4086-9DDD-A4FAE649FBDF} &lt;unknown_owner&gt; [REDACTED] 2010-05-22 04:05
lucallbackproxy "C:\Program Files\Symantec LiveUpdate LuCallbackProxy.exe" {B5A3EBEE-D580-421-86DF-54C0B3739522) &lt;unknown_owner&gt; [REDACTED] 2010-05-22 04:05
lucallbackproxy "C:\Program Files\Symantec LiveUpdate LuCallbackProxy.exe" {D3769926-0587-4ad1-9DCF-23051EEE7883} &lt;unknown_owner&gt; [REDACTED] 2010-05-22 04:05
lucallbackproxy "C:\Program Files\Symantec LiveUpdate\LuCallbackProxy.exe" {C60DC234-65F9-4674-94AE-62158EFCA433} &lt;unknown_owner&gt; [REDACTED] 2010-05-22 04:05
lucoms-l.exe "C:\PROGRA~1\Symantec LIVEUP~1\LUCOMS-1.EXE" &lt;unknown_owner&gt; [REDACTED] 2010-05-22 04:05
luall.exe "C:\Program Files\Symantec LiveUpdate\luall.exe" -S &lt;unknown_owner&gt; [REDACTED] 2010-05-22 04:05

14


TOP SECRET // COMINT

Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada

REPLICANTFARM generic modules

  • Cloaked
  • Recycler
  • Rar password
  • Tmp executable
  • Packed
  • Peb modification
  • Privileges
  • MS pretender
  • System32 "variables”
  • Strange DLL extensions
  • Kernel cloaking
  • Schedule at
  • Ntuninstall execution
  • hidden

Other ideas....

Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information

Canada
15


TOP SECRET // COMINT

Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada

Generic modules : example

my @runningProcs = xml_isProcessRunning( $xml, 'svchost.{1,3}\\.exe',
    'winlogon.{1,3}\\.exe',
    'services.{1,3}\\.exe',
    'lsass.{1,3}\\.exe',
    'spoolsv.{1,3}\\.exe',
    'autochk.{1,3}\\.exe',
    'logon.{1,3}\\.scr',
    'rundll32.{1,3}\\.exe',
    'chkdsk.{1,3}\\.exe',
    'chkntfs.{1,3}\\.exe',
    'logonui.{1,3}\\.exe',
    'ntoskrnl.{1,3}\\.exe',
    'ntvdm.{1,3}\\.exe',
    'rdpclip.{1,3}\\.exe',
    'taskmgr.{1,3}\\.exe',
    'userinit.{1,3}\\.exe',
    'wscntfy.{1,3}\\.exe',
    'tcpmon.{1,3}\\.dll' );

foreach my $runningProc (@runningProcs)
{
    $alertText .= "Suspicious process detected, legitimate exe named appended with string: " . $runningProc . ".\n";
}

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Canada
16


TOP SECRET // COMINT

Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada

RF specific signatures

  • KNOWN actor filenames, processes, covert stores:
    • MAKERSMARK / FANNER
    • SEEDSPHERE / BYZANTINE
    • ALOOFNESS
    • SNOWGLOBE
    • VOYEUR
    • SUPERDRAKE
    • GOSSIPGIRL
  • Infrastructure
    • Known IP addresses
    • Known DNS queries
  • Other tools

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17


TOP SECRET // COMINT

Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada

Specific signatures : example

# Check a known drivers present
my @driversPresent = xml_isDriverPresent( $xml, 'usbdev\\.sys', 'acpimem32\\.sys',
'usblink32i\\.exe', '\\$NtUninstallQ722833\\$' );

foreach my $driver (@driversPresent)
{
    $alertText .= "Possible MM CARBON driver detected: " . $driver . ".\n";
}

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18


TOP SECRET // COMINT

Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada

Operations

  • Routine operations for CCNE investigations on current targets
    • Execution of OPSEC related plugins
    • Collection of files
    • Examination of network activity
  • Blanket approvals for addition of selectors to level 4 OPs against known actors: example WATERMARK operations against MAKERSMARK
  • Standard operating procedures for level 2 – level 4 operataions against foreign CCNE actor infrastructures

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19


TOP SECRET // COMINT

Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada

CCNE / OPSEC page on 5-Eyes K1SVN Wiki

  • Contains reverse engineering reports for CNE / IO consumption
  • Even logs and notes for several actors

[REDACTED]

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20


TOP SECRET // COMINT

Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada

CCNE operations – Covert Infrastructure

  • Some fusion of the WP and CCNE infrastructures
    • Dedicated ORB for CCNE
    • Unattributed dialups to the ORB
  • Philosophy: use low hanging fruits against the actors (public exploits and tools if available)
  • Discussions regarding repurpose of foreign toolkits
  • De-confliction

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21


TOP SECRET // COMINT

Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada

SNOWGLOBE

  • Provide the historical account of the activity on DOURMAGNUM (Imam Hussein University)
  • Implant identified while investigating another unattributed actor
  • rar archiving of emails on target
  • Beaconing using HTTP to php-based listening post

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22


TOP SECRET // COMINT

Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada

CCNE/Opsec WPID Alerts - Mozilla Firefox
File Edit View History Bookmarks Tools Help
Most Visited Getting Started Latest Headlines LTT < Operations < TW... Opsec - k1svn - Trac CCNE/Opsec Systems http://obelix/systeminfo/
http://obelix/ | CCNE/Opsec WPID Alerts | CCNE/Opsec WPID Alerts | Opsec - k1svn | Opsec - k1svn

CCNE/Opsec WPID Alerts

Note that the search is done with the fields as perl regular expressions...

Examples:
* Dots (.) are single-character wildcards
* Dot-Star (.*) means any number of characters
* Single WPID: 51\.\.1\.13
* Class C WPID: 51\.8\.11.
* Infrastructure: ^50\

Current Modules:
mod_1000_WH_Implant.pl
mod_100_MM_SHEPHERD.pl
mod_101_MM_CARBON.pl
mod_1200_AF_ALOOFNESS.pl
mod_102_MM_REGBACKUP.pl
mod_103_MM_DOGHOUSE.pl
mod_104_MM_WALKER.pl

mod_1100_VO_Implant.pl
mod_11_cloaked.pl
mod_15_procParents.pl
mod_16_recyclerexec.pl
mod_200_SD_MI20.pl
mod_201_SD_MI25FTP.pl
mod_24_expectedArguments.pl
mod_25_privileges.pl
mod_304_UNK_WINPACP.pl
mod_305_UNK_IASEX.pl
mod_310_UNK_WIDOWKEY.pl
mod_311_UNK_CIVETCAT.pl
mod_500_SJ_DDNT.pl
mod_5_knownips.pl
mod_7_mt
mod 800
mod_600_GR_IMPLANT.pl
mod_900_
mod_601_GR_FLAME.pl
mod_RFI
mod_6_knowndns.pl
mod RFI
mod_700_SG_CHOCOPOP.pl
mod_RFI

mod_12_system32var.pl
mod_13_rarpassword.pl
mod_14_strangedliextensions.pl
mod_17_tmpexec.pl
mod_18_passwordfilters.pl
mod_19_kemelcioaking.pl
mod_1_packed.pl

mod_20_pebmodification.pl
mod_21_scheduleat.pl
mod_22_ntuninstallexec.pl
mod_23_hidden.pl

mod_300_UNK_TCPSRV32.pl
mod_301_UNK_BLAZINGANGEL.pl
mod_302_TINYWEB.pl
mod_303_UNK_CYDLL.pl

mod_306_UNK_WINUPDATE.pl
mod_307_UNK_QUIVERINGSQUAB.pl
mod_308_UNK_WINDO.pl
mod_309_UNK_DIESELRATTLE.pl

mod_400_SS_WINBEE.pl
mod_401_SS_SSLINST.pl
mod_402_SS_SharpR.pl

WPID Regexp: [REDACTED]
Module Regexp: _700_SG_

Type:
Historic:
Live:

Submit Query

ALERTS


WPID: [REDACTED]   Module: mod_700_SG_CHOCOPOP.pl   Date: 2009-09-30T10:18:41.906   Tag: SG   File name: ../datastore/archive/2009/09/30/10/TXID0000074573_18_Y2009M09D30_H10M1

Details:
Possible SNOWGLOBE CHOCOPOP process detected: cmd.exe /C ""c:\RECYCLER\S-1-5-21-101796669-4102346875-220983236-500\rar.exe" a -r -inul-hplockless-aprfeghhi-tn1d temp\168.rar c:\MDAEMON\Users\ihu.a
Possible SNOWGLOBE CHOCOPOP process detected: cmd.exe /C ""c:\RECYCLER\S-1-5-21-101796669-4102346875-220983236-500\rar.exe" a -r-inul-hplockless-aprfeghhi-tn1d temp\168.rar c:\MDAEMON\Users\ihu.a
Possible SNOWGLOBE CHOCOPOP process detected: "c:\RECYCLER\S-1-5-21-101796669-4102346875-220983236-500\rar.exe" a -r -inul-hplockless-apSNazarian -tn1d C:\WINDOWS\TEMP\166.rar c:\MDAEMON\USI
Possible SNOWGLOBE CHOCOPOP process detected: "c:\RECYCLER\S-1-5-21-101796669-4102346875-220983236-500\rar.exe" a -r -inul-hplockless-apSNazarian -tn1d C:\WINDOWS\TEMP\166.rar c:\MDAEMON\US
Possible SNOWGLOBE CHOCOPOP process detected: cmd.exe /C ""c:\RECYCLER\S-1-5-21-101796669-4102346875-220983236-500\rar.exe" a -r -inul-hplockless-apSNazarian-tn1d temp\166.rar c:\MDAEMON\Users\ih
Possible SNOWGLOBE CHOCOPOP process detected: cmd.exe /C ""c:\RECYCLER\S-1-5-21-101796669-4102346875-220983236-500\rar.exe" a -r -inul-hplockless-apSNazarian-tn1d temp\166.rar c:\MDAEMON\Users\ih
Possible SNOWGLOBE CHOCOPOP process detected: "c:\RECYCLER\S-1-5-21-101796669-4102346875-220983236-500\rar.exe" a -r -inul-hplockless -apkpnazari -tn1d C:\WINDOWS\TEMP\166.rar c:\MDAEMON\User!
Possible SNOWGLOBE CHOCOPOP process detected: "c:\RECYCLER\S-1-5-21-101796669-4102346875-220983236-500\rar.exe" a -r -inul-hplockless -apkpnazari -tn1d C:\WINDOWS\TEMP\166.rar c:\MDAEMON\User:
Possible SNOWGLOBE CHOCOPOP process detected: cmd.exe /C ""c:\RECYCLER\S-1-5-21-101796669-4102346875-220983236-500 rar.exe" a -r -inul-hplockless-apkpnazari -tn1d temp\166.rar c:\MDAEMON\Users\ihu.
Possible SNOWGLOBE CHOCOPOP process detected: cmd.exe /C ""c:\RECYCLER\S-1-5-21-101796669-4102346875-220983236-500 rar.exe" a -r -inul-hplockless-apkpnazari-tnld temp\166.rar c:\MDAEMON\Users\ihu.
Possible SNOWGLOBE CHOCOPOP process detected: "c:\RECYCLER\S-1-5-21-101796669-4102346875-220983236-500\rar.exe" a -r -inul -hplockless -apmsaadati -tn1d C:\WINDOWS\TEMP\166.rar c:\MDAEMON\User
Possible SNOWGLOBE CHOCOPOP process detected: "c:\RECYCLER\S-1-5-21-101796669-4102346875-220983236-500 rar.exe" a -r -inul -hplockless -apmsaadati -tn1d C:\WINDOWS\TEMP\166.rar c:\MDAEMON\User
Possible SNOWGLOBE CHOCOPOP process detected: cmd.exe /C ""c:\RECYCLER\S-1-5-21-101796669-4102346875-220983236-500 rar.exe" a -r -inul -hplockless -apmsaadati-tn1d temp\166.rar c:\MDAEMON\Users\ihu
Possible SNOWGLOBE CHOCOPOP process detected: cmd.exe /C ""c:\RECYCLER\S-1-5-21-101796669-4102346875-220983236-500 rar.exe" a -r -inul -hplockless -apmsaadati-tn1d temp\166.rar c:\MDAEMON\Users\ihu
---DOURMAGNUM---

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23


TOP SECRET // COMINT

Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada

SNOWGLOBE on target

Possible SNOWGLOBE CHOCOPOP process detected:

cmd.exe /C ""c:\RECYCLER\S-1-5-21-101796669-
4102346875-220983236-500\rar.exe" a -r -inul
-hplockless -aprfeghhi -tn1d temp\168.rar
c:\MDAEMON\Users\ihu.ac.ir\rfeghhi\md5*.msg">nul.

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Canada
24


TOP SECRET // COMINT

Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada

SNOWGLOBE implant

  • Injects itself in svchost.exe
  • No cloaking / no hooking
  • Bootstraps in service called MSDTC64 (distributed
    transaction coordinator 64b
  • Service entry is permanent
  • Executable kept on disk in system32
  • Crypto: 16 byte string XOR
  • http beacons and tasking
  • Actor observed upgrading on target

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Canada
25


TOP SECRET // COMINT

Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada

SNOWGLOBE activity and attribution

  • Targeting is scarce but resembles CT / CP priorities
  • French localisation seen in exploit PDFs (GCHQ)
  • French commentary in the binary
  • French binary name / developer path
  • Observed in Iran, Norway, Greece, Belgium, Algeria,
    France, US targets
  • Listening posts worldwide – several French legit sites
  • Now seen in passive collection, several reports

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Canada
26


TOP SECRET // COMINT

Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada

De-confliction : on CCNE operations

  • State-sponsored landscape is very busy
  • CCNE Targets are de-conflicted
  • Actors on CCNE targets are not
  • Covert nature of foreign (and friendly actors) make de-confliction challenging
  • Often need to refer to precise technology for identification
  • CNE / CCNE from SIGINT + HUMINT need to get together on this issue

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27


TOP SECRET // COMINT

Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada

De-confliction FAIL

  • Actor discovered
  • 5 eyes effort
  • Several cohabitations
  • At CSEC: 400 man-hours:
  • Over 20 CNE Operations
    • Passive Collection
    • 4 Reports
    • Reverse engineering
    • Planning of active operations
TS // SI // REL

S0
unpack
driver
Kernel
User
winlogon

S1
unpack
driver
Kernel
Manual load DLL
User
winlogon
CMD
HTTP
Internet

DEV
CMD line
msn
Manual load DLL + params
Decrypt
File

S2
CMD line
Implant
Kernel
SSL/TCP
CMD
User
Internet

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Canada
28


TOP SECRET // COMINT

Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada

Conclusion

  • CCNE effort essential to the national cyber mandate:
    • CNE situational awareness
    • New actor discovery
    • Tracking known actors
  • Several new actors discovered using this process
  • De-confliction needs to be improved

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Canada
29


TOP SECRET // COMINT

Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada

MM CCNE contacts

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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