Publication year: 2014 283 documents
Search documents matching “2014” →When a publisher first published each document. If a document is published multiple times, only the oldest one is used here.
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2009 SigDev Conference SIDtoday [pdf]
Internal NSA document describing the annual SIGDEV conference, which includes eighty-six representatives from the wider US Intelligence Community.
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2013 Black Budget - SSO Project Description [pdf]
This excerpt from the 2013 Congressional Budget Justification for the National Intelligence Program details the administrative and logistical backbone of the Special Source Operations (SSO). The document outlines how the SSO manages high-priority access programs, specifically MYSTIC, RAMPART-I, and RAMPART-X. It confirms that MYSTIC utilizes "partner-enabled" accesses to intercept communications from both cellular (GSM) and traditional landline (PSTN) networks. The budget highlights a strategic push to exploit Next-Generation Wireless (NGW) technologies and identifies the Caribbean, Mexico, Kenya, and the Philippines as primary regions for sustained, comprehensive metadata and content collection.
“NSA surveillance program reaches ‘into the past’ to retrieve, replay phone calls” - The Washington Post ↗ (2014-03-18) · “The NSA Is Recording Every Cell Phone Call in the Bahamas” - The Intercept ↗ (2014-05-19) · Gellman, Barton · Soltani, Ashkan · Devereaux, Ryan · Greenwald, Glenn · Poitras, Laura -
A Little Bad Aibling Nostalgia SIDtoday [pdf]
With the closing of Bad Aibling Station in Germany, some BA veterans post a list of nostalgic recollections from working there.
“The NSA in Germany: Snowden's Documents Available for Download” - Der Spiegel ↗ (2014-06-18) · The Intercept ↗ (2016-12-07) -
A potential technique to deanonymise users of the TOR network [pdf]
A TOP SECRET GCHQ research presentation describing a traffic correlation attack against Tor — using cumulative packet counts observed simultaneously at a controlled exit node and at SIGINT collection points near a target's guard node to deanonymise Tor users without breaking the encryption — with GTE and JTRIG having adapted owned exit nodes to collect the required data for live deployment.
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A potential technique to deanonymise users of the TOR network [pdf]
The GCHQ technical report documenting the entry-exit traffic correlation attack against Tor — providing the complete mathematical specification, test methodology, experimental results and software reference implementation, with distribution to NSA R1, NSA R4, NSA CES, CSE, DSD, SEQUOIA, ICTR, JTRIG, TEA, GTE and multiple OPC divisions.
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Access Breakdown [pdf]
This GCHQ document provides a technical breakdown of surveillance access points showing 11 different interception sites (with codenames like DONNINGTON, LATUS, SCEPTRE) accessing various undersea cables including Flag, Apollo North/South, BT, Cable & Wireless (C&W), SMW-3, Solas, and Verizon, totaling 541 10-gigabit connections representing 5,410 gigabits of surveillance capacity across the network.
Programs: DONNINGTON · LATUS · SCEPTRE · PRESCOTT · GIBUS · KIRKISTOWN · MONDELLO · LINNELL · CATEGORY · KNAPWEED · ELAPSE · BROKER“Vodafone – der lange Arm des britischen Geheimdienstes?” - WDR ↗ (2014-11-20) · “Spy cable revealed: how telecoms firm worked with GCHQ” - Channel 4 ↗ (2014-11-20) · “Der lange Arm des Geheimdienstes?” - NDR ↗ (2014-11-21) · “Snowden-Leaks: How Vodafone-Subsidiary Cable & Wireless Aided GCHQ’s Spying Efforts” - Süddeutsche Zeitung ↗ (2014-11-25) · Restle, Georg · White, Geoff · Strozyk, Jan · Moltke, Henrik · Poitras, Laura · Obermaier, Frederik -
Advanced HTTP Activity Analysis [pdf]
This NSA training document from 2009 teaches intelligence analysts how to analyze HTTP internet traffic and exploit it using the XKEYSCORE surveillance system to monitor and identify internet users globally.
“XKEYSCORE: NSA’s Google for the World’s Private Communications” - The Intercept ↗ (2015-07-01) · “No Place to Hide” - Metropolitan Books ↗ (2014-05-13) · Marquis-Boire, Morgan · Greenwald, Glenn · Lee, Micah -
Agenda 14-15 May 2013: Turkish Signal Intelligence Chief [pdf]
A draft NSA visit agenda, as of 30 April 2013, for the Turkish Signal Intelligence Chief and delegation attending a Strategic Planning conference on 14-15 May 2013 and an ELINT demonstration at the Naval Research Laboratory on 16 May 2013.
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Agenda for the visit of BSI Vice President Andreas Könen to the NSA [pdf]
An NSA visit schedule for Andreas Könen, Vice President of Germany's Federal Office for Information Security (BSI), covering briefings on NSA's Information Assurance Directorate, the FISHBOWL secure smartphone programme and the National Information Assurance Partnership — notable for being releasable to France but not Germany despite the visitor being a senior German government official.
Programs: FISHBOWLPeople: Könen, Andreas -
Analytic Challenges from Active-Passive Integration [pdf]
This NSA briefing addresses the technical and administrative friction caused by "shaping" operations. Shaping occurs when an active malware implant, typically situated on network infrastructure like a router, copies specific data streams and redirects them past a passive surveillance sensor such as TURMOIL. While this ensures the capture of data that might otherwise be missed, it creates a "double metadata" conflict where a single piece of intelligence carries two competing sets of identifiers: one from the active Tailored Access Operations (TAO) implant and another from the passive collection site. The document tasks analysts with finding a way to reconcile these source notations to ensure the data remains searchable and legally compliant within legacy databases.
Programs: BRAVENICKEL · HAMMERMILL · APEX · TURMOIL · HAMMERSTONE · PRESSUREWAVE · METROTUBE · TOYGRIPPE · TURBULENCE · METAWAVE · MARINA · SSO · CONVEYANCE · NUCLEON · FASCIA · HAMMERCHANT -
Applications Made to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court During Calendar Year 2012 [pdf]
The statutory report on applications to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court in calendar year 2012: 1,856 applications, 1,789 of them seeking electronic surveillance, one withdrawn by the government and none denied in whole or in part.
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Approved SIGINT Partners [pdf]
A Foreign Affairs Directorate slide listing NSA's approved SIGINT partners: the four Second Parties, 33 Third Parties from Algeria to the United Arab Emirates, and the coalitions AFSC, NATO, SSEUR and SSPAC. This is document is from Fiscal Year 2013 "Foreign Partner Review."
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Ashcroft Memo on Intelligence Sharing Procedures [pdf]
In August 2002, citing a recent surveillance court ruling, then-Attorney General John Ashcroft issued new procedures that lowered safeguards on providing to foreign governments information about Americans that was deemed relevant intelligence about terrorism issues. Under procedures disclosed in a 1984 report on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, the attorney general had to approve any international dissemination; the new procedures have allowed the National Security Agency to share such information without Justice Department clearance.
People: Ashcroft, John -
AURORAGOLD Working Aid [pdf]
This document is a technical reference guide for analysts that categorizes the specific data fields extracted from mobile network documents (IR.21s) and commercial databases. It serves as a manual for translating telecommunications infrastructure data—such as encryption types, network layer protocols, and hardware versions—into actionable intelligence for target development and cyber exploitation.
Programs: AURORAGOLD -
AURORAGOLD Working Group [pdf]
The "AURORAGOLD Working Group" briefing is a highly classified SIGINT development presentation from June 2012 that outlines the NSA's progress in mapping the global mobile landscape (GSM/UMTS/LTE). It focuses on the project's "value proposition": providing an exhaustive database of network identifiers and technical configurations—often obtained by intercepting internal company documents—to support tactical military operations and long-term surveillance forecasting.
Programs: AURORAGOLD · UTT · XKEYSCORE · CADENCE · JUBILEECORONA · RONIN · NKB · GLOBALTIPPER · PINWALE -
AURORAGOLD – Project Overview [pdf]
A technical briefing document outlining an NSA SIGINT initiative designed to map, monitor, and forecast the evolution of global mobile networks. It details the project's infrastructure, which aggregates both unclassified commercial data and classified intelligence intercepted from international roaming agreements to identify technical trends and exploitation opportunities.
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AURORAGOLD – Target Technology Trends Center support to WPMO [pdf]
This briefing details the technical architecture and data pipeline used to process global cellular network information. It specifically highlights the synergy between data gathering on GSM/UMTS networks and the implementation of "Auto-Minimization" to ensure the resulting SIGINT reporting complies with NSA legal and policy requirements.
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Automated NOC detection [pdf]
This slide deck lays out how GCHQ and Canada’s CSEC systematically identified and penetrated Network Operations Centers—most notably Belgacom—by automating NOC discovery and weaponizing that mapping for QUANTUM INSERT attacks. It reads like a blueprint for turning router configs, metadata, and bulk scans into cookie-based targeting against telecom engineers inside core networks.
Programs: SURGE · NOCTURNALSURGE · RT · NACSHACK · CHAINGUARD · TIDALSURGE · GLOBALSURGE · PENTAHO · OLYMPIA · HYPERION · TERMINALSURGE · HACIENDA · QUANTUMINSERT · MUTANTBROTH · OPSOCIALIST · SAMUEL PEPYS · GEOFUSION · FIVEALIVE · NRTA · RADIUS“Operation Socialist: The Inside Story of How British Spies Hacked Belgium’s Largest Telco” - The Intercept ↗ (2014-12-13) · “Lees hier hoe de Britse geheime dienst GCHQ Belgacom aanviel” - NRC ↗ (2014-12-13) · “Britse geheime dienst bespioneerde jarenlang Belgacom-klanten” - De Standaard ↗ (2014-12-13) · Gallagher, Ryan · Modderkolk, Huib · Vanhecke, Nikolas · Eeckhaut, Mark -
Bad guys are everywhere, good guys are somewhere! [pdf]
A classified NSA NTOC presentation describing TREASURE MAP — the agency's near real-time global internet mapping platform — which combines open source, commercial, covert, and SIGINT data to chart every device, router, and autonomous system on the internet, including through 13 covert servers secretly planted in unwitting data centers across 18 countries spanning Asia, Europe, Russia, Africa, and South America, with networks marked in red indicating active SIGINT collection access points across at least 20 major telecommunications providers on three continents including allied nations' state-owned carriers.
Programs: TREASUREMAP · PACKAGEDGOODS · SOCIALSTAMP · SEASIDEFERRY · ARK · CAIDA · RUSTICBAGGAGE · PACKAGEDGOODS-GTR · PACKAGEDGOODS-SERVER · BLACKPEARL · LEAKYFAUCET · HYDROCASTLE · MASTERSHAKE · S-TRICKLER · TOYGRIPPE · DISCOROUTE · VITALAIR2 · IPGEOTRAP · JOLLYROGER · TUTELAGE · BYZANTINEHADES · XKEYSCORE · RADIUS · TACACS“Treasure Map: The NSA Breach of Telekom and Other German Firms” - Der Spiegel ↗ (2014-09-14) · “The NSA and GCHQ Campaign Against German Satellite Companies” - The Intercept ↗ (2014-09-14) · Müller-Maguhn, Andy · Poitras, Laura · Rosenbach, Marcel · Sontheimer, Michael · Grothoff, Christian -
Belgacom connections [pdf]
A "Belgacom connections" map lays out the carrier’s sprawling roaming and backbone interconnects, precisely the arteries GCHQ wanted to get access into. Under Operation Socialist GCHQ successfully gained access to Belgacom’s infrastructure, including internal employee computers and encrypted and unencrypted streams of private communications handled by the company.
Programs: CARBONROD“Operation Socialist: The Inside Story of How British Spies Hacked Belgium’s Largest Telco” - The Intercept ↗ (2014-12-13) · “Lees hier hoe de Britse geheime dienst GCHQ Belgacom aanviel” - NRC ↗ (2014-12-13) · “Britse geheime dienst bespioneerde jarenlang Belgacom-klanten” - De Standaard ↗ (2014-12-13) · Gallagher, Ryan · Modderkolk, Huib · Vanhecke, Nikolas · Eeckhaut, Mark