XKEYSCORE for Counter-CNE

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Creating agency: NSA National Security Agency (US)
Document date: 2011-03-01
Pages: 21
Genre: slides
Banner:
Classification: TOP SECRET COMINT
Dissemination: REL TO USA, FVEY

A TOP SECRET presentation from March 2011 describing how NSA uses XKeyscore for counter-CNE — detecting and exploiting foreign hacking operations — including ingesting NSA's own TAO implant data, hunting for foreign intrusion sets like DISGRUNTLEDDUCK, and a success story in which Menwith Hill used TAO-stolen Iranian implant encryption keys to decrypt and read keylogger data the Iranian Revolutionary Guard's hackers were stealing from their own victims.

Long Description:
This is a TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY presentation from March 2011 by the XKeyscore CNE team (xks-cne@r1.r.nsa). It describes using XKeyscore for Computer Network Exploitation work — both processing NSA's own hacking data and conducting "counter-CNE," the detection and exploitation of foreign hacking operations. The presentation opens with a July 2010 quote from Menwith Hill Station: using the XKeyscore CNE dataset and a DISGRUNTLEDDUCK fingerprint, they identified at least 21 TAO boxes showing evidence of a foreign intrusion set, most associated with projects targeting Iranian WMD targets — meaning the same machines NSA had compromised were also being hacked by another actor. The presentation reframes XKeyscore beyond its classic DNI processing role. The GUI screenshots reveal a CNE-specific navigation menu with searches for Keylogger, Machine Information, Network Information and Registry, alongside the standard email, extracted files and document metadata searches. One screenshot shows category hits geolocated to Neuilly-sur-Seine, France. The fingerprint/AppID language is named GENESIS ("go genesis-language") — providing the formal name for the syntax documented in the companion AppID presentations — with examples for Wikipedia detection and malware domain DNS fingerprinting. The document confirms three pattern types: appid (a contest where the highest-scoring wins), fingerprint (many per session), and microplugin (a complex fingerprint or appid that extracts and databases metadata). The CNE data section reveals what flows into XKeyscore: TAO endpoint data (with no ECIs), GCHQ endpoint data (almost all of it), and limited flows from the SIGINT Forensics Center and TAO STAT. Payload types are labeled dnt_payload in the AppID/fingerprint ontology and include directory walks, extracted files, system surveys, network configs, captured credentials, registry queries and keylogger output. The DANDERSPRITZ example shows a full process list (dnt_payload/processlist) exfiltrated from a compromised Windows machine on 13 April 2011 (processes running since 5 April), listing every running process including lsass.exe, svchost instances, Symantec (ccSvcHst.exe), VMware services, an HP LaserJet service and various executables — the kind of host survey data a TAO implant collects after compromising a target. DANDERSPRITZ is the post-exploitation framework later exposed in the Shadow Brokers leak, here confirmed feeding data into XKeyscore in 2011. The counter-CNE methodology section describes how foreign intrusions are hunted: hypothesis-driven research (e.g. "could South Korean CNE be using similar selectors to FVEY CNE?"), detection of bogus or unusual traffic (HTTP GET with content, HTTP POST at odd hours from Russia between 0200-0359Z, funky user agents), and known-host or drop-site driven discovery. CNE-specific techniques include registry searches (SIMBAR), fused active/passive search using common selectors and document hashes, known malicious process detection, and map-reduce within the CNE cluster using GENESIS calls. The resources slide reveals a Five Eyes-wide counter-CNE collaboration infrastructure: an MHS INDEX Foreign CNE Discovery wiki page, CSEC and GCHQ's DONUT project for unknown protocols, GCHQ research on detecting Man-on-the-Side attacks (MOTS), and the GCHQ DISCO team's intrusion proof-of-concepts and weekly "Discovery Afternoons" theories. The success story is the document's most significant disclosure. The MHS INDEX team used TAO-obtained Iranian implant encryption keys to perform inline decryption via an XKeyscore microplugin, recovering keylogger data being collected by an IRGC-QF (Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force) operation. The recovered keylogger.txt shows captured keystrokes from a victim using Yahoo Mail and Yahoo Messenger, with the username mehrab.raisi visible and keystroke-by-keystroke capture including backspaces. The session is tagged with AMULETSTELLAR and AMULET fingerprints — connecting to the AMULET STELLAR case described in the ELEGANT CHAOS presentation, where the same IRGC-QF Ramazan Corps intrusion set was being exploited. This is a concrete example of fourth-party collection at the technical level: NSA stole the Iranian hackers' encryption keys, then read the data the Iranians were stealing from their own victims. The document is significant for demonstrating the full circle of XKeyscore's CNE capabilities — it processes NSA's own implant exfiltration, hunts foreign intrusion sets compromising the same targets (and even the same machines) NSA had compromised, and enables fourth-party collection by decrypting stolen data using keys obtained through TAO operations. The recurring USSID-18 and Human Rights Act compliance banner on the GUI screenshots indicates these capabilities were shared with or used at GCHQ sites. The points of contact span MHS Index, CES/TRANSGRESSION (NSA's counter-CNE/fourth-party programme), NSA's Countering Foreign Intelligence element, NTOC and the XKeyscore CNE team.

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

XKEYSCORE for Counter-CNE

"Using the XKS CNE dataset and a
DISGRUNTLEDDUCK fingerprint, we now see at least
21 TAO boxes with evidence of this intrusion set, most
of which are associated with projects aimed at Iran
WMD targets." -- MHS, July 2010

March, 2011
[REDACTED]
xks-cne@r1.r.nsa

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY


UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

Overall Classification

The overall classification of this presentation is:

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO


SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

What is XKEYSCORE?

  • A suite of software running on a Linux host
  • Classically, used for DNI processing, selection and survey
  • A distributed hierarchy of servers at field sites and headquarters
    • Extract and tag metadata & content from traffic
    • Servicing analyst queries and workflows
  • Web and programmatic front-ends

SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY


SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

What is XKEYSCORE?

  • A suite of software running on a Linux host
  • Classically, used for DNI processing, selection and survey
  • A distributed hierarchy of servers at field sites and headquarters
    • Extract and tag metadata & content from traffic
    • Servicing analyst queries and workflows
  • Web and programmatic front-ends

SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

XKEYSCORE GUI

XK Metaviewer: shared by f610065: Category Hits at 67D - Mozilla Firefox
File Edit View History Bookmarks Tools Help
ic.gov https://xks-central.corp.nsa.iv.gov:8113/XKEYSCORE/search/standardSearch/searchHome wp Ethernet
ESS1377: SIDToday for 1/24... | Ethernet - Wikipedia, the fre... | My Signatures | XK Metaviewer shared by ... | XKEYSCORE - For Analysts ...

This system is audited for USSID 18 and Human Rights Act compliance
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
X-KEYSCORE Welcome [REDACTED] og Out
Home Admin Users Search Workflow Central Results Fingerprints Statistics Map My Account XK Help
Navigation
SearchWizard
CNE
  EmailAddresses
  Extracted Files
  Full Log DNI
  Keylogger
  Machine Information
  Network Information
  Registry
Classic
  MultiSearch
  Classic A-M
    Alert
    BlackBerry
    CallLogs
    Category DNI
    
    Cisco Passwords
    
    DNS
    Document metadata
    Document tagging
    Email Addresses
    Extracted Files
    FullLog DNI
    Geo Info
    HTTP Activity
    KEParser
    Keylogger
    Logins and Passwords

Histogram Grid
Page 1 of 1 Clear Searcher Displaying 1- 1 of 1
Filter Fm Port Count Displaying 1 - 1 of 3
2804 174

shared by f810085 Category Hit...
Help Actions Reports View MapView FILTERS
Sigad Active User Casenotation Full IP To IP Fm Port To Port Fm Country Fm City (IP) Fm Latitude Fm Longti To Country ( To City (IP) To L
US-967D UA2AA0DCB 57[REDACTED] 57[REDACTED] 2304 2631 FR NEUILLYSUR 48.88 2.27 FR NEUILLYSUR 48
US-967D UA2AA0DCB 57[REDACTED] 57[REDACTED] 2304 1679 FR NEUILLYSUR 48.88 2.27 FR NEUILLYSUR 48
US-967D UA2AA0DCB 57[REDACTED] 57[REDACTED] 2304 3190 FR NEUILLYSUR 48.88 2.27 FR NEUILLYSUR 48
US-987D UA2AA0DCB 57[REDACTED] 57[REDACTED] 2304 1853 FR NEUILLYSUR 48.88 2.27 FR NEUILLYSUR 48
US-967D UA2AA0DCB 57[REDACTED] 57[REDACTED] 2304 1120 FR NEUILLYSUR 48.88 2.27 FR NEUILLYSUR 48
US-967D UA2AA0DCB 57[REDACTED] 57[REDACTED] 2304 1138 FR NEUILLYSUR 48.88 2.27 FR NEUILLYSUR 48
US-967D UA2AA0DCB 57[REDACTED] 57[REDACTED] 2304 1579 FR NEUILLYSUR 48.88 2.27 FR NEUILLYSUR 48
US-987D UA2AA0DCB 57[REDACTED] 57[REDACTED] 2304 7581 FR NEUILLYSUR 48.88 2.27 FR NEUILLYSUR 48
US-967D UA2AA0DCB 57[REDACTED] 57[REDACTED] 2304 3190 FR NEUILLYSUR 48.88 2.27 FR NEUILLYSUR 48
US-967D UA2AA0DCB 57[REDACTED] 57[REDACTED] 2304 1120 FR NEUILLYSUR 48.88 2.27 FR NEUILLYSUR 48
US-967D UA2AA0DCB 57[REDACTED] 57[REDACTED] 2304 1603 FR NEUILLYSUR 48.88 2.27 FR NEUILLYSUR 48
US-967D UA2AA0DCB 57[REDACTED] 57[REDACTED] 2304 1603 FR NEUILLYSUR 48.88 2.27 FR NEUILLYSUR 48
US-987D UA2AA0DCB 57[REDACTED] 57[REDACTED] 2304 3050 FR NEUILLYSUR 48.88 2.27 FR NEUILLYSUR 48
Page 1 of 6 Page Size: 30 (Max 200 rows per page) Displaying 1 - 30 of 174
saved_802197577093313
This system is audited for USSID 18 and Human Rights Act compliance
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

Example Search

  • Let's try a search for suspicious stuff...

http_activity search, 5-eyes defeat, look for fingerprints:

ndist/discovery/heuristic/BHAM/get_with_content or http/get/with_content
  • While the search runs, some gotchas:
    • You choose where your query is run
    • Content and metadata age-off
    • Burden is on user/auditor to comply with USSID-18 or other rules
    • Geolocation based on IP

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY


SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

Search Results

XK Session Viewer - Mozilla Firefox
File Edit Views History Bookmarks Tools Help
ic.gov https://xks-central.corp.nsa.ic.gov:8443/XKEYSCORE/layouts/popOutLayout.jsp?pageTitle=Session Viewer&rowUrl=5621
This system is audited for USSID 18 and Human Rights Act compliance
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
X-KEYSCORE C2C Session Viewer
Session 15 of 17
Datetime | Case Notation | From IP | To IP | From Port | To Port | Protocol | Length
2011-04-11 08:47:44 | 3 441836   | 192[REDACTED] (Private Address | TO [REDACTED] Private Address | 4370 | 12468 | TCP | 224 |

Formatter ASCII | Send to: Download Session | Mode: Snippet | Options | Search Content: Enter text to search
Quick Clicks
Session
Attachments
  unknown
    text
      unknown_515.xww
One-Click Searches
  Find fingerprint
    nd/discovery
    http/gc/with_content
    ndis/discovery
  Find traffic on
    192[REDACTED]
    10[REDACTED]
  Find application
    http//get/x-www-form-url
  Find proxy hash
    0d0020f7
  Find opposite side of sess
    192[REDACTED]4307
      10.[REDACTED]
GET /?CAVIT HTTP/1.0
User-Agent: 62591C333F62DA7333FB2C02702B7BD2
Accept: */*
Host: 10.[REDACTED]:12466
Content-Type: application/w-www-form-urlencoded
Connection: Keep-Alive

Reset from local: (1231) seq = 2662134980
This system is audited for USSID 18 and Human Rights Act compliance
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
Done

Notes:

  • Strange User-Agent
  • Probably NOT CNE but definitely something non-standard
  • Content: maybe a HTTP tunnel for some weird protocol?
  • Reset from local...
  • Should we write a Fingerprint?

SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY


SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

Fingerprints and Appids

  • Useful for identifying classes of traffic or particular targets (for SIGDEV or collection):
mail/webmail/yahoo
browser/cellphone/blackberry
topic/s2B/chinese_missile
  • appid – a contest, highest scoring appid wins
  • fingerprint – many fingerprints per session
  • microplugin – a fingerprint or appid that is relatively complex (e.g. extracts and databases metadata)

SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY


SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

Fingerprints and Appids (more)

  • Written in language called “GENESIS" (go genesis-language):
  appid('encyclopedia/wikipedia', 2.0) =
    http_host('wikipedia' or 'wikimedia`);
  fingerprint('dns/malware/MalwareDomains') =
    dns_host('erofreex.info' or 'datayakoz.info'
    or 'erogirlx.info' or 'pornero.info' or ...
  • If a fingerprint contains a schema definition, a search form automatically appears in the XKEYSCORE GUI
  • Power users can drop in to C++ to express themselves

SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY


SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

More about searches

  • Many different searches
    • Base search is Full Log DNI
    • Depending on traffic type, will generate searchable results for (example):
HTTP Activity Network Information GEO Info
Extracted Files Email Addresses Registry
Logins and Passwords Document Metadata Machine Info
  • workflow – a user query that is run automatically usually every 24 hours

SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY


SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

XKEYSCORE Gotchas

  • Not all sites run latest XKEYSCORE software or fingerprints
  • fingerprint submission:
    • XKEYSCORE team weighs mission-worthiness of user fingerprints vs computational cost
  • Content and metadata ageoff

SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

XKEYSCORE CNE

  • Lots of endpoint data flows into XKS
    • TAO (no ECIs), GCHQ (almost all)
  • Other limited flows include SIGINT Forensics Center, TAO STAT
  • XKEYSCORE works well for endpoint data
  • Sometimes the paradigm breaks (e.g. collected browser history file)

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

XKEYSCORE CNE (more)

  • Payload types:
dirwalk, extracted file, system
survey, network config, captured
credentials, registry query, key
logger, etc.
  • Labeled dnt_payload in appid/fingerprint ontology
  • Let's look at some DANDERSPRITZ data...

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

XKEYSCORE CNE (more)

XK Session Viewer - Mozilla Firefox
File Edit View History Bookmarks Tools Help
ic.gov  https://xks-central.corp.nsa.ic.gov:8443/XKEYSCORE/layouts/popOutLayout.jsp?pageTitle=Session+Viewer&rowUrl=%2FXKEYSCORE%2F%2Fmetaviewer$
This system is audited for US SID 18 and Human Rights Act compliance
CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
X-KEYSCORE C2C Session Viewer

Session 56 of 703
Datetime              Case Notation       From IP              To IP            From Port  To Port  Protocol  Length
2011-04-13 02:06:12   CC.WYUDCCAACDTD                                                                         10074

Session  | Header (3) |  Meta (4)

Format:  DNT_PAYLOAD | Send to: Download Session | Mode: Snippet | Options | Search Content | enter text to search Clear

Quick Clicks
Session
One-Click Searches
  Find fingerprint
    exfil/experimental/proces
  Find traffic on
  Find application
    dnt_payload/processlist
  Find opposite side of sess o
    :0 ->
      :0

PAYLOAD XML
<Process creationTime="2011-04-05T00:37:09.031250000" description="Initia." pid="469" ppid="912">lsass.cxe</Process>
<Process creationTime="2011-04-05T00:37:27.281250000" description="Initia." pid="655" ppid="440">svchost.exe</Process>
<Process creationTime="2011-04-05T00:37:32.343750000" description="Initia." pid="728" ppid="440">svchost.exe</Process>
<Process creationTime="2011-04-05T00:37:35.359375000" description="Initia." pid="792" ppid="440">svchost.exe</Process>
<Process creationTime="2011-04-05T00:37:36.484375000" description="Initia." pid="844" ppid="440">svc..exe</Process>
<Process creationTime="2011-04-05T00:37:40.703125000" description="Initia." pid="867" ppid="440">svchost.exe</Process>
<Process creationTime="2011-04-05T00:37:41.421875000" description="Initia." pid="895" ppid="440">svchost.exe</Process>
<Process creationTime="2011-04-05T00:37:42.218750000" description="Initia." pid="968" ppid="440">ccSvcHst.exe</Process>
<Process creationTime="2011-04-05T00:37:44.281250000" description="Initia." pid="1320" ppid="440">spoolsv.exe</Process>
<Process creationTime="2011-04-05T00:37:54.640625000" description="Initia." pid="1348" ppid="440">msdtc.exe</Process>
<Process creationTime="2011-04-05T00:37:57.171875000" description="Initia." pid="1454" ppid="440">NWRCS.EXE</Process>
<Process creationTime="2011-04-05T00:37:57.718750000" description="Initia." pid="1500" ppid="440">svchost.exe</Process>
<Process creationTime="2011-04-05T00:37:50.046875000" description="Initia." pid="1532" ppid="440">HPLaserJetService.exe</Process>
<Process creationTime="2011-04-05T00:38:00.625000000" description="Initia." pid="1539" ppid="440">HPSIsvc.exe</Process>
<Process creationTime="2011-04-05T00:38:00.750000000" description="Initia." pid="1630" ppid="440">KRPRDU-1.EXE</Process>
<Process creationTime="2011-04-05T00:38:01.234375000" description="Initia." pid="1620" ppid="440">svchost.exe</Process>
<Process creationTime="2011-04-05T00:38:01.421875000" description="Initia." pid="1668" ppid="440">MHOSTSVC.EXE</Process>
<Process creationTime="2011-04-05T00:38:01.125000000" description="Initia." pid="1672" ppid="440">svchost.exe</Process>
<Process creationTime="2011-04-05T00:38:02.500000000" description="Initia." pid="1696" ppid="440">svchost.exe</Process>
<Process creationTime="2011-04-05T00:38:02.625000000" description="Initia." pid="1720" ppid="440">fltvscon.exe</Process>
<Process creationTime="2011-04-05T00:38:04.640625000" description="Initia." pid="1832" ppid="440">svchost.exe</Process>
<Process creationTime="2011-04-05T00:38:08.437500000" description="Initia." pid="964" ppid="440">VMwareService.exe</Process>
<Process creationTime="2011-04-05T00:38:14.562500000" description="Initia." pid="1620" ppid="440">svchost.exe</Process>
<Process creationTime="2011-04-05T00:38:14.671875000" description="Initia." pid="2240" ppid="440">UIHSTMP7.FXP</Process>
<Process creationTime="2011-04-05T00:38:17.625000000" description="Initia." pid="2390" ppid="2243">SIDRMP3.FXP</Process>
<Process creationTime="2011-04-05T00:38:23.031250000" description="Initia." pid="2620" ppid="656">wmiprvse.exe</Process>
<Process creationTime="2011-04-05T00:38:45:47.108340500" description="Initia." pid="1638" ppid="704">explorer.exe</Process>
<Process creationTime="2011-04-05T00:45:48.012923700" description="Started" pid="1756" ppid="844">hncau.exe</Process>
<Process creationTime="2011-04-05T00:45:51.601365000" description="Initia." pid="2092" ppid="1688">VMwareTray.exe</Process>
<Process creationTime="2011-04-05T00:45:57.839938660" description="Initia." pid="2888" ppid="1688">VMwareUser.exe</Process>
<Process creationTime="2011-04-05T00:46:00.250078600" description="Initia." pid="1688">jusched.exe</Process>
<Process creationTime="2011-04-05T00:46:02.203003200" description="Initia." pid="755" ppid="1000">ccfmon.exe</Process>
<Process creationTime="2011-04-05T00:46:06.675999700" description="Initia." pid="452" ppid="1000">kpsservice.exe</Process>
<Process creationTime="2011-04-05T00:46:15.408822600" description="Initia." pid="3530" ppid="3395">conime.exe</Process>
<Process creationTime="2011-04-05T01:23.535889300" description="Initia." pid="3280" ppid="1820">dwwm.exe</Process>
<Process creationTime="2011-04-05T00:56:53.997113900" description="Initia." pid="392" ppid="320">logon.scr</Process>
<Process creationTime="2011-04-11T22:26:03.066816500" description="Started" pid="2424" ppid="320">csrss.exe</Process>
<Process creationTime="2011-04-11T22:26:03.416685500" description="Started" pid="5136" ppid="320">winlogon.exe</Process>
<Process creationTime="2011-04-11T22:29:30.503950000" description="Started" pid="5440" ppid="320">csrss.exe</Process>
<Process creationTime="2011-04-11T22:29:39.066816500" description="Started" pid="5430" ppid="320">winlogon.exe</Process>
<Process creationTime="2011-04-11T22:48:31.000.453235000" description="Started" pid="368" ppid="320">csrss.exe</Process>
<Process creationTime="2011-04-11T22:48:34" description="Started" pid="354" ppid="320">winlogon.exe</Process>
<Process creationTime="2011-04-11T22:48:36.768533500" description="Started" pid="4656" ppid="320">csrss.exe</Process>
<Process creationTime="2011-04-11T22:48:46.766533500" description="Started" pid="2572" ppid="320">winlogon.exe</Process>

This system is audited for USSID 18 and Human Rights Act compliance
CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Done

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

XKEYSCORE CNE (more)

  • Recent Developments
    • Upgrade of XKEYSCORE CNE
    • Keyloggers: keylogger/perfect/extension
    • PCAP Reingestion
  • Router Redirection

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

Counter CNE Methodology

(refer to Counter CNE Resources slide...)

  • Hypothesis/research-driven
    • "Could South Korean CNE be using similar selectors to FVEY CNE?"
    • "What keywords could be used to find keyloggers ("example: keylog OR keystroke")
  • Bogus or Unusual Traffic
    • HTTP GET with content (example in this presentation)
    • HTTP POST at odd hours (from Russia 0200-0359Z)
    • Funky user agents
  • Known-Host or User driven (e.g. drop sites)
  • XKEYSCORE is GOOD at these kinds of things

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

CNE-Specific

  • Registry searches (e.g. SIMBAR)
  • Fused Active/Passive search
    • common selectors
    • document hashes
  • Known Processes (malicious executables or code)
    • ... Let's enhance the process list appid
  • map-reduce within CNE cluster using GENESIS calls

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

XKEYSCORE Doesn't Do...

  • ... at all (well, automatically, anyways)
    • Paired traffic heuristic-based approach
      • HTTP[S] imbalance (e.g. GET without response)
      • IP/DNS mismatch*
  • ... on an automatic basis
    • Network or host characterization
    • Changes in IP/DNS mapping over time
    • Changes over time in malware comms

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

Counter CNE Resources

  • How to Discover Intrusions [using XKEYSCORE] by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] (paper)
  • MHS INDEX - Foreign CNE Discovery Page
    • https://wiki.itd.nsa/wiki/Foreign_CNE_Discovery
  • CSEC and GCHQ - DONUT (unknown protocols):
    • https://tiso.sigint.cse/snipehunt/index.php/DONUT
  • GCHQ Discovery Posted some Research of Detecting Man-on-the-Side Attacks:
    • https://tiso.sigint.cse/snipehunt/index.php/MOTS
  • GCQH Disco Team posts POC's for different Intrusions and some Details:
    • https://wiki.gchq/index.php/Discovery
  • The GCHQ DISCO team also posts Discovery Theories they run once a week:
    • https://wiki.gchq/index.php/Discovery_Afternoons
  • XKEYSCORE Fingerprints

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

Success Story - MHS INDEX

Using TAO-obtained Iranian implant encryption keys, inline decrypt using XKS microplugin - IRGC-QF keylogger data!

XK Session Viewer - Mozilla Firefox
File Edit View History Bookmarks Tools Help
https://xks-central.corp.nsa.ic.gov:8443/XKEYSCORE/layouts/popOutLayout.jsp?pageTitle=Session Viewer&rowUrl=%2FXKEYSCORE%2F%2Fmetaview

This system is audited for USSID 18 and Human Rights Act compliance
CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

X-KEYSCORE C2C Session Viewer

Session 15 of 70
| Datetime            | Case Notation | From IP             | To IP                       | From Po | To Port | Protoc | Length
| 2011-03-28 19:51:28 | IRS1014       | 78[REDACTED] (Iran) | 174[REDACTED] United States | 42325   | 80      | tcp    | 320

Session | Header (3) | Attachments (2) | Meta (9)
Formatter: AUTO | Send to: Download Session | Mode: Snippet | Options | Search Content: Exter text to search

Quick Clicks
Session
Attachments
  unknown
    text
      keylogger.txt
      unknown_1931.x-www-
One-Click Searches
  Find fingerprint
    ntoc/ntocg/malware/amulet
    botnet/AMULETSTELLAR/k
  Find traffic on
    78.38.110.163
    174.132.180.34
  Find application
    mail/webmail/yahoo
  Find proxy hash
    c8b0d875
  Find opposite side of session
    78[REDACTED]:42325 ->
      174.[REDACTED]

Download this from XKEYSCORE
keylogger.txt FORMATTER AUTO
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Using TXT formatter

<< (2 unread) Yahoo! Mail, mehrab.raisi - Mozilla Firefox >>
[] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] []
<< The page at http://us.mg4.mail.yahoo.com says: >>
[]
<< (1 unread) Yahoo! Mail, [REDACTED] - Mozilla Firefox >>
[][][][Backspace]sa[Backspace][Backspace][][Right Alt]...[Space]...[Backs
<< Yahoo! Messenger >>
[Backspace]sara[Space][Backspace]ce[REDACTED]
<< (0 unread) Yahoo! Mail, mehrab.raisi - Mozilla Firefox >>
[] [] [] [] [] cloo[Down]
[] []5250024300

This system is audited for USSID 18 and Human Rights Act compliance
CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
Done xks-central.corp.nsa.ic.gov:8443
  • Login

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

Points of Contact

  • MHS Index Team
    • [REDACTED] : [REDACTED]@nsa.ic.gov
  • CES/TRANGRESSION
    • [REDACTED] : [REDACTED]@nsa.ic.gov
    • [REDACTED] : [REDACTED]@nsa.ic.gov
  • NSA/Countering Foreign Intelligence
    • [REDACTED] : [REDACTED]@nsa.ic.gov
  • NTOC ??
  • XKEYSCORE
    • [REDACTED],[REDACTED] : xks-cne@r1.r.nsa

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY