Using XKEYSCORE to Enable TAO

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Creating agency: NSA National Security Agency (US)
Document date: 2009-07-16
Pages: 47
Genre: slides
Banner:
Classification: TOP SECRET COMINT
Dissemination: REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

A TOP SECRET training presentation from 2009, authored by a Booz Allen Hamilton contractor, teaching NSA analysts how to use XKeyscore to harvest the login credentials, router configurations, browser versions and server software details that the Tailored Access Operations hacking unit needs to break into foreign computer networks — with worked examples stealing Cisco router passwords, Iranian government webmail logins and jihadi web forum credentials directly from intercepted internet traffic.

Long Description:
This is a TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL training presentation dated 16 July 2009, authored by a Booz Allen Hamilton SDS analyst from NSA's S2 analytical division, published by The Intercept as part of the XKeyscore document release. The presentation teaches S2 intelligence analysts how to use XKeyscore queries to extract information that TAO needs to conduct computer network exploitation — effectively showing how passive bulk internet collection directly enables offensive hacking operations. The presentation defines four categories of information TAO requires from analysts: network information (login credentials and router configurations), software information (browser types, version numbers and operating systems), server information (web server software and versions) and target device connectivity details. A critical note warns that if a target device is under a satellite hop, the analyst should consult their TAO liaison before proceeding. The presentation explicitly instructs analysts never to use discovered credentials to log in as a target themselves — credentials must be recorded and passed to TAO. The telnet exploitation section is the most technically detailed. Three types of telnet traffic are targeted using different XKeyscore queries. "Banner grabbing" uses Full Log DNI queries from port 23 and the target's IP address to capture the welcome messages that routers and servers broadcast when a telnet connection is established, revealing equipment manufacturer, model, software version and sometimes default credentials. The live examples show a Cisco SDM router in Saudi Arabia broadcasting its default username and password ("cisco"/"cisco") in plaintext, a Huawei IAD2000 Integrated Access Device in Cuba, a ZTE Full Service Access Platform also in Cuba, and another Huawei device in Cuba — all captured from Chinese IP addresses connecting to Cuban infrastructure. The login/password capture section uses Logins and Passwords queries targeting port 23 traffic to the target IP, with a live example showing a session from Yemen to China capturing FTP credentials (USER 123, PASS 321) and a file retrieval command for "1.exe." The router configuration section uses Full Log DNI queries from port 23 with a minimum data length of 500 bytes — ensuring only substantive configuration dumps are returned — with a live example showing a complete Cisco IOS router configuration extracted from Iranian MOIS (Ministry of Intelligence and Security) infrastructure, including interface configurations and serial port settings. The annotation reads: "Thanks for the router config — TAO." The browser identification section demonstrates using HTTP Activity queries to profile visitors to websites of intelligence interest. One worked example targets visitors to known jihadi web forums — hanein.info, ansar1.net, ansarnet.info and others — with a country filter explicitly excluding Five Eyes nations (!US AND !GB AND !CA AND !NZ AND !AU), annotated with a smiley face and the word "Foreign :)". The results show visitors from Djibouti, Somalia, Pakistan, Austria, Indonesia, Lebanon and other countries with their full user-agent strings, enabling TAO to identify which browsers and operating systems to develop exploits against. A second example targets visitors to Iranian government websites (*.gov.ir) including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Industries, and health ministry domains, with visitors observed from China, UAE, Philippines, Japan, Iraq, Germany, Switzerland, Egypt and Pakistan — demonstrating that browser profiling was being conducted against visitors to government infrastructure, not just extremist forums. Mobile browser identification is highlighted as particularly valuable because Nokia Symbian user-agents include exact phone models, creating IMEI correlation opportunities. The web forum and webmail login sections demonstrate credential harvesting at scale. Forum logins are captured by querying the Logins and Passwords search against known jihadi forum domains (moqawmh.com, al-shouraa.com, alhur) with Five Eyes country exclusion. A live example shows a vBulletin registration form captured from ashiyane.org — an Iranian security forum — with username, password, email address and security token all visible in plaintext. The webmail section targets Iranian government webmail users on *.gov.ir domains across ports 80, 3000 and 8080, with country filters for Iran, Brazil, Venezuela, Colombia, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and South Africa. Port 3000 is specifically highlighted as carrying XDaemon webmail traffic. Live examples show Iranian MFA visa system credentials captured in cookie fields from a session transiting Guinea, Chinese 126.com webmail logins captured via Coremail webmail, and XDaemon credentials from Chinese users accessing Cuban-hosted mail servers. The presentation notes that webmail credentials are valuable not just for masquerading as the user but potentially for gaining full access to the web server itself — the secondary and more valuable use case for TAO. The server identification section completes the intelligence cycle by showing how HTTP response traffic reveals web server software versions — Apache, IIS, PHP versions, SSL modules and operating systems — that TAO can match against known exploits. The worked example queries response traffic from Iranian MOIS IP ranges to catalogue all server software running on their network. The document is significant because it's a detailed demonstration of the direct operational pipeline from passive bulk collection to offensive hacking enablement — showing that XKeyscore served not only as a retrospective analysis tool but as an active reconnaissance platform feeding TAO's targeting cycle. The Booz Allen Hamilton authorship — the same contractor firm that employed Edward Snowden — confirms that private contractors were developing and delivering training on offensive intelligence collection techniques. The Five Eyes country exclusion filter ("Foreign :)" with smiley face) appearing in many query demonstrates the USSID-18 compliance mechanism in practice while simultaneously illustrating its limitations — the filter is a voluntary analyst step, not a technical enforcement mechanism.
Programs:
XKEYSCORE, UIS, AIRGAP

People mentioned:
-

Countries:
Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, China, Cuba, Yemen, Iran, Germany, Pakistan, Djibouti, Somalia, Austria, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, United Arab Emirates, Japan, Mexico, South Korea, France, Netherlands, Italy, Egypt, Russia, Brazil, Venezuela, Colombia, Kuwait, South Africa, Guinea

Tags:
Tailored Access Operations, Booz Allen Hamilton, banner grabbing, telnet, FTP, router configuration, Cisco, Huawei, ZTE, login credentials, passwords, browser fingerprinting, User-Agent, HTTP Activity, server mapping, Apache, vBulletin, XDaemon, Coremail, MOIS, gov.ir, MFA, web forums, Computer Network Exploitation, USSID-18, Nokia, Symbian

Identifier:
using-xks-to-enable-tao

PDF SHA-256:
d33efaa2e364be1a4fb85e67d68fcdd5ff7f92947cf0fa77e8a533ff37bce813

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20291123

Using XKEYSCORE to Enable TAO

[REDACTED]
Booz | Allen | Hamilton SDS Analyst
16 July 2009

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
Dated: 20070108
Declassify On: 20291123
DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20291123
08


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Purpose of This Briefing

  • To show S2 Analysts how to use XKS to enable TAO operations
  • The material covers some of the more common searches in XKS, and shows you how to retrieve valuable SIGINT data that S3/TAO finds useful to exploit a target
  • It's NOT designed to teach you about TAO (there are many other briefings for that)

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Agenda

  • What TAO needs from analysts
  • TELNET Sessions in XKS
  • Identifying Browers
  • Web Forum Logins / Passwords
  • Webmail Logins / Passwords

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Agenda

  • What TAO needs from analysts
  • TELNET Sessions in XKS
  • Identifying Browsers
  • Web Forum Logins / Passwords
  • Webmail Logins / Passwords

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

What does TAO need?

  • Network Information
    • Logins and Passwords
    • Router configuration information
  • Software Information
    • Browser
    • Version Numbers
    • Operating Systems
  • NOTE: If target device is under a satellite hop, please consult your TAO Liaison on how to proceed.

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

How Do We Get That?

  • Network Information
    • We target TELNET, FTP, etc for logins and passwords
      • Use a LOGIN and PASSWORD QUERY "TO" ports of interest (21, 23, 110, 69, etc)
  • WEBMAIL logins and passwords
    • Use LOGIN and PASSWORD QUERY "TO" ports of interest (80, 3000, 8080) **DO NOT use the login/password you find to log in as your target in Airgap. Ever. Just record them and pass to TAO.
  • Router configuration information
    • Use "Full Log DNI query" FROM port 23 and "From" IP of interest

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

How Do We Get That?

  • Software Information
    • Browsers
      • Use HTTP Activity Query and results are in the "browser" field
    • Servers
      • Use HTTP Activity: HTTP "Response" traffic contains web server information
    • Operating Systems or Version Numbers
      • Using FULL LOG DNI we can do "Banner Grabbing" on content FROM port 23 and FROM the target's IP address

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Agenda

  • What TAO needs from analysts
  • TELNET Sessions in XKS
  • Identifying Browers
  • Web Forum Logins / Passwords
  • Webmail Logins / Passwords

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Help me Understand Telnet

Administrator attempts to reach remote host using Telnet

From Port 3434
"Telnet 202.[REDACTED]
To Port 23

To Port 3434
From Port 23
"Welcome to xyz router,
Apache 2.0 - Please
enter Login & Password"

From Port 3434
To Port 23
"Username: Admin
Password: Admin"

To Port 3434
From Port 23
"Here's your router
configuration information

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Help me Understand Telnet

Administrator attempts to reach remote host using Telnet

From Port 3434
"Telnet 202.[REDACTED]
To Port 23

Let's make a query
and target this traffic!

To Port 3434
From Port 23
"Welcome to xyz router,
Apache 2.0 - Please
enter Login & Password"

From Port 3434
To Port 23
"Username: Admin
Password: Admin"

To Port 3434
From Port 23
"Here's your router
configuration information

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Banner Grabbing

Search: Full Log
Query Name: [REDACTED]
Justification: saudi mail server
Additional Justification:
Miranda Number:

Datetime: 1 Week Start: 2009-07-09 00:00 Stop: 2009-0

This is the
router's IP
address for
which you're
trying to gain
access (mail
server maybe?)

Client IP:
Username:
Attribute Info: [Populate with Fiel
IP Address: 213.[REDACTED] From
IP Address: To
Port: 23 From

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Banner Grabbing

To Port 3434
"Welcome to xyz router,
Apache 2.0 - Please
enter Login & Password"
From Port 23

Session 2 | of 431
Datetime | Case Notation | From IP | To IP | From Port | To Port | Protocol |
2009-07-11 15:12:30 | [REDACTED] | 213.[REDACTED] (Saudi Arabia) | 212.[REDACTED] (Lebanon) | 23 | 44595 | TCP |

Session | Header (3) | Meta (6)

Formatter: AUTO | Send to: Download Session | Mode: Full Session | Options | Search Content: Enter text to search

Quick Clicks
*   Session
*   One-Click Searches
    *   Find opposite side of sess
       * 213.[REDACTED]:23 ->
          * 212.[REDACTED]:445
    *   Find traffic on
       * 212.[REDACTED]
       * 213.[REDACTED]
    *   Find application
       * terminal/telnet/from_se
    *   Find fingerprint
       * misc/network/configura
    *   Find email address
       * [REDACTED]

AUTO FORMATTER: app_id=terminal/telnet/from_server(port23) Viewer= ASCII formatter. Info=
..............
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cisco Router and Security Device Manager (SDM) is installed on this device.
This feature requires the one-time use of the username "cisco"
with the password "cisco". The default username and password have a privilege level of 15

Please change these publicly known initial credentials using SDM or the IOS CLI.
Here are the Cisco IOS commands.

username <myuser> privilege 15 secret 0 <mypassword>
no username cisco

Replace <myuser> and <mypassword> with the username and password you want to use.
For more information about SDM please follow the instructions in the QUICK START
GUIDE for your router or go to http://www.cisco.com/go/sdm
------------------------------------------------------------------------

User Access Verification
Username: ......isp
Password:

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Banner Grabbing (another example)

To Port 3434
"Welcome to xyz router,
Apache 2.0 - Please
enter Login & Password"
From Port 23

Datetime | Case Notation | From IP | To IP | From Port | To Port |
2009-07-11 04:22:46 | [REDACTED]| 125[REDACTED] (China) | 200[REDACTED] (Cuba) | 23 | 2192

Session | Header (3) | Meta (4) |

Formatter: AUTO | Send to: Download Session | Mode: Full Session | Options | Search Content: Enter text to se

Quick Clicks
*   Session
*   One-Click Searches
    *   Find opposite side of sess
       * 125.[REDACTED] ->
          * 200.[REDACTED]:2
    *   Find traffic on
       * 200.[REDACTED]
       * 125.[REDACTED]
    *   Find application
       * terminal/telnet/from_se

AUTO FORMATTER: app_id= terminal/telnet/from_server(port23) Viewer= ASCII format
.....
    *******************************************
    *                                         *
    *    IAD2000 Integrated Access Device     *
    *                                         *
    *******************************************
  Copyright 2002-2005 Huawei Technology. Co., Ltd.
               Location Name:
               Phone Number:
User name (<=15 chars):

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Banner Grabbing (another example)

| Datetime | Case Notation | From IP | To IP | From Port | To Port | Proto |
2009-07-12 23:59:33 | [REDACTED] | 61.[REDACTED] (China) | 200[REDACTED] (Cuba) | 23 | 2541 |

| Session | Header (3) | Meta (3) |

Formatter: AUTO | Send to: Download Session | Mode: Full Session | Options | Search Content: Enter text to s

Quick Clicks
*   Session
*   One-Click Searches
    *   Find opposite side of sess
       * 61.[REDACTED]:23 ->
          * 200.[REDACTED]:25
    *   Find traffic on
       * 200.[REDACTED]
       * 61.[REDACTED]
    *   Find application
       * terminal/telnet/from_se

........."...
######################################################################
#          Welcome to ZTE Full Service Access Platform               #
#          Press Return to get started                               #
#          Copyright 2005-2009 , ZTE Co.,Ltd.                        #
######################################################################
Login:

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Banner Grabbing (another example)

Datetime | Case Notation | From IP | To IP | From Port | To Port | TCP |
2009-07-13 19:36:52 | [REDACTED] | 200[REDACTED] (Cuba) | 210[REDACTED] (China) | 23 | 44710 | TCP |

Session | Header (3) | Meta (4) |

Formatter: AUTO | Send to: Download Session | Mode: Full Session | Options | Search Content: Enter text to search

Quick Clicks
*   Session
*   One-Click Searches
    *   Find opposite side of sess
       * 200[REDACTED]:23 ->
          * 210.[REDACTED]:44
    *   Find fingerprint
       * sigdev/huawei
       * misc/network/configura
    *   Find traffic on
       * 210.[REDACTED]
       * 200.[REDACTED]
    *   Find application
       * terminal/telnet/from_se

AUTO FORMATTER: app_id= terminal/telnet/from_server(port23) Viewer= ASCII formatter. I

...........
*********************************************************************************
*   Copyright (c) 1998-2006 Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. All rights reserved.  *
*   Without the owner's prior written consent,                                  *
*   no decompiling or reverse-engineering shall be allowed.                     *
*********************************************************************************
Login authentication

Username:............'.......
Username:
Username:

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Help me Understand Telnet

Administrator attempts to reach remote host using Telnet

From Port 3434
"Telnet 202.[REDACTED]
To Port 23

From Port 23
To Port 3434
"Welcome to xyz router,
Apache 2.0 - Please
enter Login & Password"

From Port 3434
To Port 23
"Username: Admin
Password: Admin"

Let's make a query
and target this traffic!

To Port 3434
From Port 23
"Here's your router
configuration information

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Telnet Logins and Passwords

Search: Logins and Passwords
Query Name: [REDACTED]
Justification: chinese telnet sys admin login password
Additional Justification:
Miranda Number:

Datetime: 1 Day Start: 2009-07-14 00:00 Stop: 2009

This is the
router's IP
address for
which you're
trying to gain
access (mail
server maybe?)

User Name:
Password:
Domain:

IP Address: From
IP Address: 202.[REDACTED] To
Port: From
Port: 23 To

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Telnet Usernames and PWs

From Port 3434
"Username: Admin
Password: Admin"
To Port 23

Datetime | Case Notation | From IP | To IP | From Port | To Po |
2009-07-13 07:37:47 | [REDACTED] | 195.[REDACTED] (Yemen) | 202.[REDACTED] (China) | 1047 | 23 |

| Session | Header (3) | Meta (4) |

Formatter: AUTO | Send to: Download Session | Mode: Full Session | Options | Search Content: Enter text to


Quick Clicks
*   Session
*   One-Click Searches
    *   Find opposite side of sess
       * 195.[REDACTED]:1047
          * 202.[REDACTED]:2
    *   Find traffic on
       * 202.[REDACTED]
       * 195.[REDACTED]
    *   Find application
       * terminal/telnet/to_serv

AUTO FORMATTER: app_id= terminal/telnet/to_server(port23) Viewer= ASCII forma
USER 123
PASS 321
TYPE I
PORT 195,219,37,199,4,24
RETR 1.exe
QUIT

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Help me Understand Telnet

Administrator attempts to reach remote host using Telnet

From Port 3434
"Telnet 202.[REDACTED]"
To Port 23

From Port 23
To Port 3434
"Welcome to xyz router,
Apache 2.0 - Please
enter Login & Password"

From Port 3434
To Port 23
"Username: Admin
Password: Admin"

Let's make a query
and target this traffic!

To Port 3434
From Port 23
"Here's your router
configuration information

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Router Configs

Search: Full Log
Query Name: [REDACTED]
Justification: iranian mois telnet traffic configs
Additional Justification:
Miranda Number:

Datetime: Custom Start: 2009-07-12 21:00 Stop: 2009-07-15

Client IP:
Username:
Attribute Info:

IP Address: 78.[REDACTED] Fr
IP Address: To
Port: 23 From
Data Length: >500

From your target's IP
From Port 23
Greater than 500 bytes

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Router Configs

Datetime | Case Notation | From IP | To IP | From Port |
2009-07-15 14:32:13 | 515920 | 78.[REDACTED] (Iran) | 85.[REDACTED] (Iran) | 23 |

Session | Header (3) | Meta (5) |

Formatter: ASCII | Send to: Download Session | Mode: Full Session | Options | Search Content: Enter

Quick Clicks
*   Session
*   One-Click Searches
    *   Find opposite side of sess
       * 78.[REDACTED]->
       * 85.[REDACTED]:196->
    *   Find fingerprint
       * fingerprint/router/cisco/
       * misc/network/configura
       * fingerprint/router/cisco
    *   Find traffic on
       * 85[REDACTED]
       * 78[REDACTED]
    *   Find application
       * terminal/telnet/from_se

"Thanks for the router config"
-TAO

Many times will contain
Access Control Lists (ACLs)
- VERY important pieces of
Intel. Copy/Paste out full
Config...

!
interface Ethernet0
 no ip address
 shutdown
!
interface Serial0
 no ip address
 shutdown
 clock rate 2015232
 no fair-queue
1
interface Serial
 no ip address
 shutdown
 clock rate 2015232
 no fair-queue
!
--More-- ......... ............interface Serial2
 no ip address
 shutdown
 clock rate 2015232
 no fair-queue
!
interface Serial3
 no ip address
 shutdown
 clock rate 2015232
 no fair-queue
!
interface Serial1:15
 ip unnumbered FastEthernet0
 encapsulation ppp
 isdn switch-type primary-net5
!
interface Serial2:15
 ip unnumbered FastEthernet0
 encapsulation ppp

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Agenda

  • What TAO needs from analysts
  • TELNET Sessions in XKS
  • Identifying Browsers
  • Web Forum Logins / Passwords
  • Webmail Logins and Passwords

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Identifying Web Browsers

  • Why?
    • TAO can exploit the browsers that lack strong security

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

User Agent (Browser) pulls

This query targets foreign-based targets visiting known Jihadi
web forums to learn about what browsers they use.

Search: HTTP Activity
Query Name: web forum browsers
Justification: targets visiting known jihadi web forums
Additional Justification:
Miranda Number:

Datetime: Custom Start: 2009-07-12 00:00 Stop: 2009-07-15 21:59

HTTP Type:
Host: or *hanein.info or *ansar1.net or *ansarnet.info [Populate with URL Field Builder]
Browser:
Country: !US AND !GB AND !CA AND !NZ AND !AU From

Foreign :)

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Web Forum Visitor profiling

HTTP Type Fm Cou Fm IP Host Browser
get DJ 196. www.alqimmah.net Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0; Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1); SLCC1; .NET
get SO 196 alqimmah.net Nokia2680s-2/1.0 (04.91) Profile/MIDP-2.1 Configuration/CLDC-1.1
get PK 121. www.alqimmah.net Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; AskTB5.4)
get AT 80. www.ashiyane.org Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0; SLCC1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; Media Center PC 5.0; .NET CLR 3.0.04506;
get ID 125. www.alqimmah.net Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.0; en-US; rv:1.9.0.11) Gecko/2009060215 Firefox/3.0.11
get LB 77 hanein.info Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; Media Center PC 3.0; .NET CLR 1.0.3705; FDM; Creative AutoUpdat
get www.alhureya.org Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE
get www.al-faloja.info Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; S
get XX 10. www.ashiyane.org Opera/9.25 (Windows NT 5.1; U; en)
get PK 116. www.alqimmah.net Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0; SLCC1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; Media Center PC 5.0; .NET CLR 3.0.04506;
get DJ 196 www.alqimmah.net Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727)
get PK 203. www.alqimmah.net Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/525.19 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/1.0.154.36 Safari/525.
get MY 60. www.alqimmah.net Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10_5_6; en-us) AppleWebKit/525.18.1 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/3.1.2 Safari/5
get PK 119. www.hanein.info Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; ImageShack Toolbar 4.5.1
www.hanein.info Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows ist=0;vbulle
www.hanein.info Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSI
www.al-faloja.info Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Win dows NT 5.1; SV
www.alqimmah.net Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
get MY 60. 4.02 186B9FB5D); GTB6; SLCC1;.
get DJ 196. 3.0.8
get AT DEEVEYYE-VOYZ-TIDE-847E-00158307C8DD):.NET CLR

This displays the From Country (where target is
located), their IP, the website they visited, AND their
browser

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

HTTP Activity to find Browsers

Here's another example where we
MS targeted the people visiting *gov.ir
websites

HTTP Type Fm Cou Host Browser
get CN mefa.gov.ir Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1)
get XX www.moc.gov.ir Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; Ms
get IR www.khcu.gov.ir Mozilla/4.0 (compatible;
get AE www.mim.gov.ir Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MS
get PH edd.behdasht.gov.ir Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MS
get JP vsa.behdasht.gov.ir Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; FREE; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
get IR www.women.gov.ir Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; GTB6; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.648; .NET
post MX it.behdasht.gov.ir Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
get IR www.khcu.gov.ir Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.0.3705; .NET CLR 1.
get PK cms.mfa.gov.ir Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
get AE www.mfa.gov.ir Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0
get IR www.khcu.gov.ir Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0
get CH www.sabt.gov.ir Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0
get IR www.women.gov.ir Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0
get EU www2.refah.gov.ir Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0
get IR transport.irica.gov.ir Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; InfoPath.2)
get PK www.mim.gov.ir Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727)
get IR www.women.gov.ir Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 1
get IR www.razavimet.gov.ir Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 1
1/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 1
1/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3
/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3
get DE www.sabt.gov.ir Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3
get IR www.mim.gov.ir Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; FDM)
get IR www.iscu.gov.ir Mozillaid (compatible MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; InfoPath 21

POP Quiz:
Which browser are we seeing????

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

HTTP Activity to find Browsers

HTTP Type Fm Cou Host Browser
get CN mefa.gov.ir Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1)
get XX www.moc.gov.ir Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
get IR www.khcu.gov.ir Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.507.
get AE www.mim.gov.ir Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727)
get PH edd.behdasht.gov.ir Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; DigExt)
get JP vsa.behdasht.gov.ir Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; FREE; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
get IR www.women.gov.ir Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE
post MX it.behdasht.gov.ir Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE
get IR www.khcu.gov.ir Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE
get PK cms.mfa.gov.ir Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV I, JNCT ULIK 1.1.43221
get AE www.mfa.gov.ir Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0
get IR www.khcu.gov.ir Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0
get CH www.sabt.gov.ir Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0
get IR www.women.gov.ir Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.
get EU www2.refah.gov.ir Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0
get IR transport.irica.gov.ir Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; InfoPath.2)
get PK www.mim.gov.ir Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727)
get IR www.women.gov.ir Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 1
get IR www.razavimet.gov.ir Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 1
get PK www.mfa.gov.ir Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 1
get IQ www.mim.gov.ir Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3
get IR www.shohada.gov.ir Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3
get DE www.sabt.gov.ir Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3
get compatible MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; FDM)
get Compatible MSIER Windows NT 51-51 NET CLR 2050727- InfoPath 21

The browser is "MSIE 6.0" =
Internet Explorer 6.0

Mozilla 4.0 is NOT a browser

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

HTTP Activity to find Browsers

Fm IP Fm Cou HTTP T Host Browser
114.[REDACTED] KR get mine.mim.gov.ir Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; NaverBot/1.0; http://help.naver.com/customer_webtxt_02.jsp)
114.[REDACTED] KR get www.mim.gov.ir Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; NaverBot/1.0; http://help.naver.com/delete_main.asp)
217.[REDACTED] AT get www.mfa.gov.ir Mozilla/4.0 (compatible;)
202.[REDACTED] CN get women.mim.gov.ir Mozilla/5.0
66.[REDACTED] DE get www.qazvin.gov.ir Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Googlebot/2.1; +http://www.google.com/bot.html)
193.[REDACTED] FR get www2.refah.gov.ir Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Konqueror/3.5; Linux) KHTML/3.5.5 (like Gecko) (Exabot-Thumbnails)
94.[REDACTED] FR get www.icm.gov.ir Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MJ12bot/v1.2.5; http://www.majestic12.co.uk/bot.php?+)
81.[REDACTED] AT get www.mim.gov.ir Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; monitis.com - free monitoring service; http://monitis.com)
61.[REDACTED] CN get www.moc.gov.ir Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; YodaoBot/1.0; http://www.youdao.com/help/webmaster/spider)
72.[REDACTED] NL get www.sabt.gov.ir Mozilla/5.0 (en-us) AppleWebKit/525.13 (KHTML, like Gecko; Google Wireless Transcoder) Version/3.1 Safari/525.13
80.[REDACTED] AE get intl.mim.gov.ir Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10_4_11; en) AppleWebKit/525. 18 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/3.1.2 Safari/525.2
77.[REDACTED] FR get www.behdasht.gov.ir Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10_5_5; fr-fr) AppleWebKit/525.18.1 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/3.1.2 Safari/525
87.[REDACTED] IT get www.mefa.gov.ir Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10_5_7; it-it) AppleWebKit/530.18 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/4.0.1 Safari/530.1
115.[REDACTED] CN get www.mefa.gov.ir Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X; zh-cn) AppleWebKit/523.15.1 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/3.0.4 Safari/523.15
88.[REDACTED] DE get www.sabt.gov.ir Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; PPC Mac OS X 1
41.[REDACTED] EG get miningstrategy.mim.gov.ir Mozilla/5.0 (Symbian OS/9.2; U; Series60/3. Kit
85.[REDACTED] IR get www.irica.gov.ir Mozilla/5.0 (SymbianOS/9.2; U; Series60/3.1 Nokia N95_8GB/31.0.015; Profile/MIDP-2.0 Configuration/CLDC-1.1) AppleWebt
85.[REDACTED] RU get www.mefa.gov.ir Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; ar; rv:1.9.0.11) Gecko/2009060215 Firefox/3.0.11
80.[REDACTED] AT get www.mfa.gov.ir Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; ar; rv:1.9.0.9) Gecko/2009040821 Firefox/3.0.9
193.[REDACTED] DE get www.moc.gov.ir Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; de; rv:1.8.1.13) Gecko/2008031 Firefox/2.0.0.13 (.NET CLR 3.5.30729)
217.[REDACTED] IR get mpo-kj.gov.ir Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-GB; rv:1.9.0.11) Gecko/2009060215 Firefox/3.0.11
80.[REDACTED] IR get www.tabrizcommerce.gov.ir Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/525.19 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/1.0.154.53 Safari/525.
85.[REDACTED] DE get selection.behdasht.gov.ir Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/528.8 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/2.0.156.1 Safari/528.8
193.[REDACTED] FR get lawoffice.mohme.gov.ir Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/530.17 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/4.0 Safari/530.17
78[REDACTED] IR get www.bin.gov.ir Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/530.5 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/2.0.172.31 Safari/530.5

Firefox, Chrome and Safari

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Mobile Browsers

Browser
IRAPP/1.5.0 NokiaN96-1/1.20; Series60/3.2 Profile/MIDP-2.1 Configuration/CLDC-1.1
Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 5.0; Series60/2.6 Nokia6630/5.03.21 Profile/MIDP-2.0 Configuration/CLDC-1.1)
Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 5.0; Series80/2.0 Nokia9300/4.53 Profile/MIDP-2.0 Configuration/CLDC-1.1)
Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 5.0; Series90/1.1 Nokia7710/4.10.0 Profile/MIDP-2.0 Configuration/CLDC-1.0)
Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Symbian OS; Nokia N70/5.063 8.3.0.1
Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Symbian OS; Nokia N70/5.0705.3.0.1
Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Symbian OS; Nokia N70/5.0706.4.0.1
Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Symbian OS; Nokia N70/5.0737.3.0.1
Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Symbian OS; Nokia N70/5.0741.4.0.1
Mozilla/5.0 (Symbian OS/9.2; U; Series60/3.1 Nokia5700/3.27; Profile/MIDP-2.0 Configuration/CLDC-1.1) AppleWebKit/413 (KHTML,
Mozilla/5.0 (Symbian OS/9.2; U; Series60/3.1 Nokia5700/3.83.1; Profile/MIDP-2.0 Configuration/CLDC-1.1) AppleWebKit/413 (KHTMI
Mozilla/5.0 (Symbian OS/9.2; U; Series60/3.1 Nokia5700/4.21; Profile/MIDP-2.0 Configuration/CLDC-1.1) AppleWebKit/413 (KHTML,
Mozilla/5.0 (Symbian OS/9.2; U; Series60/3.1 Nokia5700/5.11; Profile/MIDP-2.0 Configuration/CLDC-1.1) AppleWebKit/413 (KHTML,
4 Mozilla/5.0 (Symbian OS/9.2; U; Series60/3.1 Nokia6110Navigator/3.58; Profile/MIDP-2.0 Configuration/CLDC-1.1) AppleWebKit/413 (KHTML, like Gecko) Safari/413
Mozilla/5.0 (Symbian OS/9.2; U; Series60/3.1 Nokia6120c/3.83; Profile/MIDP-2.0 Configuration/CLDC-1.1) AppleWebKit/413 (KHTML, like Gecko) Safari/413
Mozilla/5.0 (Symbian OS/9.2; U; Series60/3.1 Nokia6120c/4.21; Profile/MIDI
Mozilla/5.0 (SymbianOS/9.2; U; Series60/3.1 Nokia6120c/5.11; Profile/MIDI
Mozilla/5.0 (Symbian OS/9.2; U; Series60/3.1 Nokia6120c/6.01; Profile/MIDI
Mozilla/5.0 (Symbian OS/9.2; U; Series60/3.1 Nokia6120c/6.51; Profile/MIDP-2.0 Configuration/CLDC-1.1) AppleWebKit/413
Mozilla/5.0 (Symbian OS/9.2; U; Series60/3.1 NokiaE51-1/100.34.20; Profile/MIDP-2.0 Configuration/CLDC-1.1) AppleWebKit/413 (KHTML, like Gecko) Safari/413
Mozilla/5.0 (Symbian OS/9.2; U; Series60/3.1 NokiaE51-1/200.34.36; Profile/MIDP-2.0 Configuration/CLDC-1.1) AppleWebKit/413 (KHTML, like Gecko) Safari/413
Mozilla/5.0 (Symbian OS/9.2; U; Series60/3.1 NokiaE51-1/300.34.56; Profile/MIDP-2.0 Configuration/CLDC-1.1) AppleWebKit/413 (KHTML, like Gecko) Safari/413

If you have thousands of
results, try to "Group By"
to "dedupe" results

Watch for Mobile
browsers!

Sort Ascending
Sort Descending
Filters
Color By
Group By
Histogram
Pivot Data
Histogram Grid
Show/Hide...
AutoFit Column Width

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Agenda

  • What TAO needs from analysts
  • TELNET Sessions in XKS
  • Identifying Browers
  • Web Forum Logins / Passwords
  • Webmail Logins / Passwords

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Web Forum Logins/PW

Search: Logins and Passwords
Query Name: [REDACTED]
Justification: foreign jihadi web forum users' logins passwords
Additional Justification:
Miranda Number:
Datetime: 2 Days Start: 2009-07-13 00:00 Stop: 2009-07-15 23:5
User Name:
Password:
Domain: *moqawmh.com or *al-shouraa.com or *alhur
IP Address: From
IP Address: To
Port: From
Port: To
Country: !US AND !GB AND !CA AND !NZ AND !AU From

Foreign :)

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Datetime | Case Notation | From IP | To IP | From Port | To Por
2009-07-15 11:27:11 | IRS1021A | 92[REDACTED] (Iran) | 207.[REDACTED] (United States) | 9253 | 80

Session | Header (3) | Meta (11) | Attachments (19)
Formatter: AUTO | Send to: Download Session | Mode: Full Session | Options | Search Content: Enter text to search

Quick Clicks
Session
* Attachments
   * unknown
      * text
         * embedded_base6
         * embedded_base6
         * embedded_base6
         * embedded_base6
         * embedded_base6
         * unknown_500.x-w
         * embedded_base6
         * embedded_base6
         * embedded_base6
         * embedded_base6
         * embedded_base6
         * embedded_base6
         * embedded_base6
         * embedded_base6
         * embedded_base6
         * embedded_base6
         * embedded_base6
         * embedded_base6
         * embedded_base6
* One-Click Searches
   * Find opposite side of se
      * 92.[REDACTED]:925
         * 207.[REDACTED]

AUTO FORMATTER: app_id=mail/webmail/vbulletin Viewer= DNI_PRESENTER formatter. Info=

Display Information: HTTP-POST/Form-Data Se
UIS Web Form Display
Form Fields
s
securitytoken e3eebcf2d93b3b578369032964ae9edac62a442b
do addmember
url http://www.ashiyane.org/forums/register.php?do=register
agree 1
password_md5
passwordconfirm_md5
day 0
month 0
year 0
username [REDACTED]
password [REDACTED]
passwordconfirm [REDACTED]
email [REDACTED]@yahoo.com
emailconfirm [REDACTED]@yahoo.com
imagestamp d382qy
imagehash b976e8497b5a4aec43a49ad2969958e1

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Agenda

  • What TAO needs from analysts
  • TELNET Sessions in XKS
  • FTP Sessions in XKS
  • Identifying Browers
  • Web Forum Logins / Passwords
  • Webmail Logins / Passwords

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Webmail Logins – Why?

  • Masquerade as user and read mail
    • Useful, but secondary to...
  • Potentially use Login/PW to get full access to web server itself
    • Port 80 is useful but...
    • Port 3000 has XDaemon traffic (woo hoo! Let's take a look)

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Web Mail Logins XKEYSCORE

Targeting foreign-based (non-5EYES) Iranian government webmail users

Webmail Ports

Users in and out of Iran

Search: Logins and Passwords
Query Name: [REDACTED]
Justification: Iranian based webmail servers in iran.
ion:
er:
me: 1 Week Start: 2009-07-08 00:0
User Name:
Password:
Domain: *gov.ir
IP Address: From
IP Address: To
Port: From
Port: 80 or 3000 or 8080 To
Country: IR or BR or VE or CO or SA or KW or ZA From
Country To

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Session 38 of 134 Read
Datetime | Case Notation | From IP | To IP | From Port | To Port | Protocol |
2009-07-13 11:54:00 | [REDACTED] | 193.[REDACTED] (Guinea) | 217.[REDACTED] (Iran) | 50423 | 80 | TCP |
Session | Header (3) | Meta (6)
ormatter: AUTO | Send to: Download Session | Mode: Full Session | Options | Search Content: Enter text to search

Quick Clicks
Session
One-Click Seachers
   * Find opposite side of sess
      * 193.[REDACTED]:50423
         * 217.[REDACTED]:80
   * Find traffic on
      * 217.[REDACTED]
      * 193.[REDACTED]
   * Find application
      * http/proxy_to_server/s
   * Find proxy hash
      * c03a567a
   * Find x-forwarded-for IP
      * 193[REDACTED]

AUTO FORMATTER: app_id=http/proxy_to_server/squid_proxy Viewer=DNI_PRESENTER formatter.Info=

Display Information: HTTP-GET
GET /load_users.php HTTP/1.0
Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-shockwave-flash,
application/vnd.ms-powerpoint, application/vnd.ms-excel, application/msword, */*
Referer: http://wvisa.mfa.gov.ir/logo_top_user.php
Accept-Language: fa
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: wvisa.mfa.gov.ir
Cookie: azhans_name=...
azhans_user=[REDACTED]
azhans_pass=[REDACTED]
azhans_semat=user
user=THR
username=---
place=deleted
famil=deleted
_utma=238135644.2300981863224871400.1239874722.1243255420.1107685748.4
_utmz=238135644.1107685748.4.4.utmcsr=fardanews.com|utmccn=(referral)|utmcmd=re
ferral|utmcct=/fa/pages/links.php
Via: 1.1 centremounainternet-cache.com:3128 (squid/2.6.STABLE16)
X-Forwarded-For: 193.[REDACTED]

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Webmail Logins

  • More webmail examples...

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Chinese webmail users

Search: Logins and Passwords
Query Name: [REDACTED]
Justification: chinese webmail logins
Additional Justification:
Miranda Number:

Datetime: Custom Start: 2009-07-12 21:00 Stop: 2009-07-15

User Name:
Password:
Domain:

IP Address: From
IP Address: 200.[REDACTED] To
Port:
Port: 80 or 3000 To
Country: CN From

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


XDaemon Logins (webmail)

Session 15 of 114
Datetime | Case Notation | From IP | To IP | From Port | To Port |
2009-07-11 10:08:42 | [REDACTED] | 61.[REDACTED] (China) | 200.[REDACTED] (Cuba) | 18445 | 3000 |

Session | Header (3) | Meta (6) | Attachments (1) |

Formatter: AUTO | Send to: Download Session | Mode: Full Session | Options | Search Contents Enter text to search

Quick Clicks
*   Session
*   Attachments
     *   unknown
        *   text
           *   unknown_621.x-ww
*   One-Click Searches
     *   Find opposite side of sess
        * 61.[REDACTED]18445 ->
           * 200.[REDACTED]:3
        *   Find traffic on: 200.***.***.***, 61.***.***.***
     *   Find application
        * http/post/x-www-form-

AUTO FORMATTER: app_id= http/post/x-www-form-urlencoded Viewer= DNI_PRESENTER formatter. Info=

TOP SECRET//COMINT//20320108
ID: sess_orig_proc | Document type: HTTP-POST/Form-Data
Display Information: HTTP-POST/Form-Data
Display | Raw Data | CCDF
Document Information: File Expand All
Contents
File name ile size Attachments
html 9 0
UIS Web Form
Form Fields
User [REDACTED]
Password [REDACTED]
Logon Autofirma

Form Fields
User [REDACTED]
Password [REDACTED]
Logon Autofirma

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Search: Logins and Passwords
Query Name: [REDACTED]
Justification: chinese webmail logins
Additional Justification:
Miranda Number:

Datetime: Custom Start: 2009-07-12 21:00 Stop: 200

User Name:
Password:
Domain: *126.com

IP Address: From
IP Address: To
Port: From
Port: To
Country: CN From

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Webmail Logins PWs

| Datetime | Case Notation | From IP | To IP | From Port | To Port |
| 2009-07-15 07:53:19 | [REDACTED] | 10.34.35.45 (Private Address) | 61.[REDACTED] (China) | 2745 | 80 |

Session | Header (3) | Meta (9) | Attachments (1) |

Formatter: AUTO | Send to: Download Session | Mode: Full Session | Options | Search Content: Enter text to search

Quick Clicks
*   Session
*   Attachments
   *   unknown
      *   text
         *   unknown_395.x-ww
*   One-Click Searches
   *   Find opposite side of sess
      * 10.34.35.45:2745 ->
         * 61.[REDACTED]:80
   *   Find traffic on
      * 61.[REDACTED]
      * 10.34.35.45
   *   Find application
      * mail/webmail/coremail
   *   Find email address
      * [REDACTED]

AUTO FORMATTER: app_id= mail/webmail/coremail Viewer= DNI_PRESENTER formatter. Info=

Document Information: File
Contents (1)
File name | File type | File size | Attachment |
| html | HTTP-POST/Form-Data | 138 | 0 |

Display Information: HTTP-POST/Form-Data
UIS Web Form Display

Form Fields
| domain | 126.com |
| language | 0 |
| bCookie | |
| username | [REDACTED]@126.com |
| savelogin | |
| user | [REDACTED] |
| password | [REDACTED] |
| style | -1 |
| enter.x | µÇ¡Á |

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

| Datetime | Case Notation | From IP | To IP | From Port | To Port |
| 2009-07-13 07:27:18 | [REDACTED] | 82[REDACTED] (United Arab Emirates) | 79[REDACTED] (Iran) | 32227 | 80 |

| Session | Header (3) | Meta (7) | Attachments (1) |

Formatter: AUTO | Send to: Download Session | Mode: Full Session | Options | Search Content: Enter text to search

Quick Clicks
*   Session
*   Attachments
   *   unknown
      *   text
         *   unknown_402.x-ww
*   One-Click Searches
   *   Find opposite side of sess
      * 82.[REDACTED]32227
         * 79.[REDACTED]:80
   *   Find traffic on
      * 79[REDACTED]
      * 82[REDACTED]
   *   Find application
      * mail/webmail/vbulletin

AUTO FORMATTER: app_id=mail/webmail/vbulletin Viewer= DNI_PRESENTER formatter. Info=

ID: sess_orig_proc | Document type: HTTP-POST/Form-Data
Display | Raw Data | CCDF

Document Information: File
Contents (1)
File name | File type | File size | Attachments |
| html | HTTP-POST/Form-Data | 158 | 0 |

Display Information: HTTP-POST/Form-Data
UIS Web Form Display

Form Fields
| username | [REDACTED] |
| passwd | [REDACTED] |
| Submit | ورود |
| option | com_user |
| task | login |
| return | L2hvbWUuaHRtbA== |
| 1dfabb339f736fbfa32843e9ebf36b52 | 1 |

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Identifying Servers

  • Web Servers run particular software
    • E.g. Apache, Microsoft IIS, Unix, et...
    • TAO has exploits for particular ones

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

XKS query to find server info

  • This targets Jihadi web forums for their Server information
Search: HTTP Activity
Query Name: [REDACTED]
Justification: jihad web forums
Additional Justification:
Miranda Number:

Datetime: 3 Days Start: 2009-07-12 00:00 Stop: 2009-07-

HTTP Type: response
Host: *moqawmh.com or *al-shouraa.com or *alhur [Populate with URL]
Country: !US AND !GB AND !CA AND !NZ AND !AU To

Foreign :)

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

XKS query to find server info

This is the network to
which I'm trying to gain
access (IR MOIS).

Search: HTTP Activity
Query Name: [REDACTED]
Justification: ir mois web servers
Additional Justification:
Miranda Number:

Datetime: Custom Start: 2009-07-12 21:00 S

HTTP Type: response
IP Address: regex:87\.247\.16[0-3]\.[0-255] From
Country: !US AND !GB AND !CA AND !NZ AND !AU To

Foreign :)

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Results for Server query

  • In the HTTP Activity results, you see the servers listed
Server Type
Apache/2.2.11 (Unix) PHP/4.4.7 with Suhosin-Patch mod_ssl/2.2.11 OpenSSL/0.9
Apache/2.2.11 (Unix) PHP/5.2.6 with Suhosin-Patch mod_ssl/2.2.11 OpenSSL/0.9
Apache/2.2.11 (Unix) PHP/5.2.8
Apache/2.2.11 (Unix) PHP/5.2.8 with Suhosin-Patch mod_ssl/2.2.11 OpenSSL/0.9
Apache/2.2.11 (Unix) PHP/5.2.9
Apache/2.2.11 (Win32) DAV/2 mod_ssl/2.2.11 OpenSSL/0.9.8i mod_autoindex_cc
Apache/2.2.2 (Unix)
Apache/2.2.3 (CentOS)
Apache/2.2.3 (Debian) DAV/2 mod_perl/2.0.2 Perl/v5.8.8

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Summary

  • Many times when we task TAO we have back/forth conversations about how to exploit the target. These slides should help you find the things that TAO needs from S2 Analysts. It's difficult to cover all of the examples of how XKS can help, but this is a good start..
  • Good luck.

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL