What Your Mother Never Told You About SIGDEV Analysis

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Creating agency: NSA National Security Agency (US)
Document date: -
Pages: 87
Genre: slides
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Classification: TOP SECRET COMINT
Dissemination: REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

An NSA presentation covering VPN signals development tradecraft and the prototype DARKSUNRISE VPN analytics tool — describing how analysts use DISCOROUTE, BLACKPEARL, TOYGRIPPE, NKB, RONIN and GNETWORK GNOME to map target VPN networks from router configuration data, with live screenshots of DARKSUNRISE's SHADOWNET interface showing IPSec VPN connections associated with Pakistani, Afghan and other targets collected through MUSCULAR (DS-200B).

Long Description:
This is a TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY presentation from NSA's Network Analysis Center, produced by SSG21 Net Pursuit and SSG22, published by Der Spiegel as part of the December 2014 encryption investigation. The document is titled "What Your Mother Never Told You About SIGDEV Analysis" and covers two related topics: operational tradecraft for VPN signals development using existing tools, and the prototype DARKSUNRISE VPN analytics tool under development as a joint CES/NAC collaboration. The first half covers the analyst toolkit for VPN network knowledge building. DISCOROUTE is described as the NAC's router configuration database — a project to acquire, parse, database and display configuration files from network devices collected through passive interception and TAO active operations. The document explains DISCOROUTE's three manifest tags in detail: K for configs containing crypto keys, H for configs where TAO has a presence on the router, and M for multihop configs where an administrator telnetted through multiple devices. Separate parsers exist for Cisco, Huawei and Juniper devices to extract VPN endpoints and pre-shared keys. The document provides actual router configuration excerpts showing VPN pre-shared keys, SNMP community strings, usernames and domain names extracted from target devices — including a Huawei config with PSK "GoHokies" and a Juniper config labelled "BadguyVPN" with base64-encoded PSKs. A worked example traces discovery of Somalia's Hormuud network through iterative DISCOROUTE and BLACKPEARL searches, ultimately compiling approximately 400 IP addresses for over 50 devices passed to TAO. A second example shows TOYGRIPPE being used to map an Iranian corporate intranet with branches in Izmir, Istanbul, Malaysia, Armenia, Ankara and South Korea, all connected through a hub in Tehran, with two anomalous VPN connections outside the expected corporate network flagged as suspicious. BLACKPEARL is described as a NAC tool for automated DNI link and network characterisation against survey collection, supporting VPN reports, MPLS analysis, five-tuple analysis and inner tunnelled IP discovery. NKB is the corporate Network Knowledge Base delivering target communications DNI and enrichment data, with RONIN as a device characterisation database providing server analytics, wiki VPN metadata and VPN analytics. GNETWORK GNOME extracts and correlates information from NAC, SSG, SSO, NTOC and other metadata databases. ROYALNET and TREASUREMAP are mentioned as additional tools in the analyst workflow. The second half introduces DARKSUNRISE, a prototype VPN analytics tool developed as a joint CES/NAC collaboration storing data in MDR-2, the corporate metadata repository holding one year of DNI metadata. The SHADOWNET interface screenshots — the most operationally revealing content in the document — show live VPN data from MUSCULAR (DS-200B) filtered to Pakistan-related connections, displaying 236 IPSec VPN connections between Pakistan and counterparts in Romania, Turkey, UAE, Czech Republic, Singapore, Kazakhstan, Spain, the UK and the US. The drilldown views show NKB geolocation data resolving specific IP addresses to Bucharest/Romtelecom, Karachi/Micronet Broadband and Islamabad/Nayatel. The IPSec details drilldown shows encryption parameters including AES-CBC and DES-CBC, authentication methods and Microsoft Vista/Longhorn vendor IDs. The centrality tab identifies VPN hub nodes by counting how many other VPNs connect to a base IP. The metrics tab shows VPN type counts broken down by SIGAD — with a total of 307,181 VPN records across sites including USJ-759A (60,684), DS-200B (31,995), USD-1001TEC (10,793), US-3141B (196,558), USJ-759 (4,919) and UKC-1155W (24). The Target Network Service integration flags VPN connections hitting against known targets, including Telenor Pakistan nodes marked at Strategic and Routine priority. In plain terms this document is a training manual and capability demonstration for NSA analysts who track targets through encrypted VPN connections. It shows how analysts work backward from intercepted router configuration files — which contain the passwords and network maps needed to understand and potentially decrypt VPN connections — and how they cross-reference multiple databases to build a complete picture of a target's encrypted network infrastructure. The DARKSUNRISE screenshots provide the most direct published view of how NSA operationalises VPN intelligence at scale, showing hundreds of specific encrypted connections between Pakistan and countries across Europe, Asia and the United States being tracked in a single analyst interface.
Programs:
TOYGRIPPE, DISCOROUTE, BLACKPEARL, GNETWORKGNOME, NKB, RONIN, XKEYSCORE, TREASUREMAP, RENOIR, ROYALNET, GNOME, ASDF, DARKSUNRISE, SHADOWNET, WEALTHYCLUSTER, MUSCULAR, CASPORT, CUE, BLACKSAND, DANCINGOASIS, BLACKBEACH, POTLUCK, SSO, DNIPRESENTER, TNS, BLACKPEAL, ROADBED, TROPICNET, SILVERZEPHYR, SITESTORE

People mentioned:
Apfel, Lynn, Schaffer, John, Mariella, Tony

Countries:
Iraq, Lebanon, Somalia, Iran, Turkey, Malaysia, Armenia, South Korea, Kenya, Romania, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Netherlands, United Arab Emirates, Czech Republic, Sweden, India, Singapore, Egypt, Kazakhstan, Spain, Hong Kong

Tags:
NAC, Network Analysis Centre, SSG21, SSG22, DISCOROUTE, BLACKPEARL, TOYGRIPPE, NKB, RONIN, GNETWORK GNOME, DARKSUNRISE, SHADOWNET, ROYALNET, TREASUREMAP, RENOIR, MDR-2, VPNs, IPSec, IKE, PSK, pre-shared key, router configuration, Tailored Access Operations, MUSCULAR, DS-200B, USJ-759, USJ-759A, USD-1001TEC, US-3141B, UKC-1155W, USF-790, US-3140, Hormuud, Somalia, Telenor, Nayatel, Romtelecom, VIPNET, PPTP, MPLS, L2TP, five-tuple, centrality, TNS, Target Network Service, Cisco, Huawei, Juniper, cryptographic key, multi-hop, manifest tag, SIGDEV, network knowledge, inner IP, Der Spiegel 2014, Snowden, Five Eyes, FVEY

Identifier:
spiegel_-_media-35551

PDF SHA-256:
496de62ae34e685952863a233026f3fbccf0806d451abc5c3a3559cc930d7ee6

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(S//SI//REL) What Your Mother Never Told You About SIGDEV Analysis

[REDACTED]
SSG21 Net Pursuit
Network Analysis Center

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
Dated: 20070108
Declassify On: 20370401

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(U//FOUO) What have I learned in my first two years in SIGDEV.....

  • (U//FOUO) Important to understand the data that you are searching against
  • (S//SI//REL) Important to understand the hidden treasures and nuances in various SIGDEV tools
  • (U//FOUO) Nothing is 100%: there are always exceptions to the tools and the rules
  • (S//SI//REL) Took a network view of VPNs

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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(TS//SI//REL) What Makes SIGDEV Analysis Challenging?

  • (U//FOUO) Requires knowledge of.....
    • (S//SI//REL) Access and collection
    • (S//SI//REL) Network protocols
    • (S//SI//REL) Routing
    • (TS//SI//REL) Encryption

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

##(U//FOUO) Challenges etc....

(TS//SI//REL) Technical jargon and abbreviations

  • IPSEC
  • IKE
  • MPLS
  • PSK
  • PPTP
  • L2TP
  • GRE
  • Cisco commands

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(TS//SI//REL)Challenges etc....

(S//SI//REL) Tools

  • How to use them
  • Knowing that they exist
  • Multiple query languages
  • SQL for TOYGRIPPE
  • Oracle Text Query in DISCOROUTE
  • Quantity

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(U//FOUO) Tools

  • DISCOROUTE
  • BLACKPEARL
  • TOYGRIPPE
  • GNETWORK GNOME
  • NKB & RONIN
  • XKEYSCORE
  • TREASUREMAP
  • RENOIR
  • ....and more....

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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(S//SI//REL) Building Network Knowledge

BLACKPEARL BLACKPEARL
TOYGRIPPE TOYGRIPPE
XKEYSCORE XKEYSCORE

Maximize the overlap of the tools for success

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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(S//SI//REL) DISCOROUTE

NAC's router configuration database

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(U//FOUO) DISCOROUTE

  • (C) NAC project to acquire, parse, database and display configuration files from network devices
  • (C) Allows analysts to mine device configs for SIGDEV discovery

Router configs are a rich source of network and VPN information

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(S//SI//REL) DISCOROUTE Methodology

  • (S//SI//REL) All IPs are important because they all belong to a device and they all have a purpose in the network
  • (S//SI//REL) Search for
    • Endpoint IPs
    • Loopback IPs
    • Opposite end of a point-to-point connection
    • IPs found in pings and telnets
  • (S//SI//REL) Make note of the source and destination IPs of the config

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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(U//FOUO) DISCOROUTE Searches

  • (U//FOUO) Country
  • (U//FOUO) IP Search
  • (U//FOUO) Text Query
  • (TS//SI//REL) Manifest Tag Selection
    • K - Crypto Keys
    • H - TAO Pop
    • M - Multihop
  • (S//SI//REL) VPN report

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(S//SI//REL) DISCOROUTE: Country Search

  • (S//SI//REL) IPGeo lookup on every IP address that is parsed
  • (S//SI//REL) Configs with only private IPs will not show up in the results of a country search

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


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(S//SI//REL) DISCOROUTE: Searching for IP Addresses

  • (S//SI//REL) Text query IP search
    • searches through the payload
    • If you only search using this field, then you will miss configs that have your IPs of interest as the source and destination address configs where your IP falls within the range of the interface mask
  • (S//SI//REL) IP address field search
    • searches through the parsed file
    • If you only search using this field, then you will miss configs with your IPs of interest in pings, telnets, arp commands

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(S//SI//REL) DISCOROUTE Search 1Feb to 13 Apr:

  • (S//SI//REL) [REDACTED] in the payload
    • 3 results
  • (S//SI//REL) IP Address Search: searching for the IP in the parsed file
    • Exact IP search
    • De-duped by most recent
    • 28 results (27 had [REDACTED] as the source IP)
  • (S//SI//REL) Somalia Country search: 66 results (12 of those had a source IP of [REDACTED])
  • (S//SI//REL) Difference: IP was the source IP for configs more times than it occurred in the payload data

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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(S//SI//REL) Why fewer configs for [REDACTED] in the country search?

  • (S//SI//REL) 12 as opposed to 27
  • (S//SI//REL) Geo location for [REDACTED] was Hong Kong for a period of time
  • (S//SI//REL) Geo is assigned to router configs at the time of ingest and not changed if the IP location is corrected

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(S//SI//REL) Data Found in a Text Query: Inner Network IPs in a Huawei Config

<LNS>dis firew se t
04:19:05 2011/06/18
Current total sessions : 19
udp VPN: public -> public
[REDACTED] Inner IPs
Press CTRL+K to abort
Connected to [REDACTED] ...

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(S//SI//REL) DISCOROUTE Manifest Tag

  • (TS//SI//REL) H - TAO has a presence on the router
  • (S//SI//REL) M - multihop router. The admin telnetted into a router and then telnetted again to another device. Potential goldmine of information about your network, but be careful when looking through them to make sure you are associating an IP with the correct device.
  • (TS//SI//REL) K – crypto keys

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(S//SI//REL) VPNs in Router Configs

  • (TS//SI//REL) DISCOROUTE sets manifest tags to 'K' for configs with crypto information
  • (S//SI//REL) Separate parsers developed for each vendor to pull out the endpoints and the pre-shared keys
    • Cisco
    • Huawei
    • Juniper

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(S//SI//REL) VPN Information in a Cisco Config

(S//SI//REL) Endpoint IPs, and PSK and Description Fields

crypto isakmp key VpnsAreCool address [REDACTED]

crypto map VPNS-ROCK 10 ipsec-isakmp
set peer [REDACTED]

interface Tunnel1
    description Tunnel TO theStars
    bandwidth 512
    ip address [REDACTED]
    ip tcp adjust-mss 1350
    load-interval 30 keepalive 5 2
    tunnel source [REDACTED]
    tunnel destination [REDACTED]
    crypto map VPNS-ROCK

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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(S//SI//REL) VPN Information in a Cisco Config

(S//SI//REL) Netstrings: Usernames, SNMP Community & Domain Names

Username deb privilege 5 password 7
082C495A0C1617

snmp-server community dancer RW 70
snmp-server community tangosnmp RW 60

ip domain name lifesabeach

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(S//SI//REL) VPN Information in a Huawei Config

# ike proposal 60 authentication-algorithm md5
# ike peer e ---- More ----.[42D .[42D
exchange-mode aggressive pre-shared-key GoHokies
ike-proposal 60
undo version 2
local-id-type name
remote-name svn
remote-address [REDACTED]
remote-address authentication-address [REDACTED]
nat traversal
# ipsec proposal GoHokies
# ipsec policy helloworld 60 isakmp
security acl 3060
ike-peer proposal GoHokies
# interface Virtual-Template1 ---- More ----.[42D .[42D
ip address [REDACTED]
remote address pool 1
# interface GigabitEthernet0/0/0
ip address [REDACTED]
# interface GigabitEthernet0/0/1
description GigabitEthernet0/0/1 Interface
ip address [REDACTED]
ipsec policy helloworld

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(S//SI//REL) VPN Information in a Juniper Config

set ike gateway "BadguyVPN" address [REDACTED] Main outgoing-interface "untrust" preshare "xGe7YOYfNx3DNGsp4GCq+fgCdondsCBQtVwo/3YfCvbR7zJyDUewVD4=" proposal "pre-g2-3des-sha" "pre-g2-3des-md5"
set ike gateway "BadguyVPN" cert peer-ca all
set ike gateway "BadguyVPN Backup" address [REDACTED] Main outgoing-interface "untrust" preshare "YWZpKbUvNGQvCbsiXdCwv3pxRDnLEAxo9877SfJFLBgg9utCdSyYPPI=" proposal "pre-g2-3des-sha" "pre-g2-3des-md5"
set ike gateway "To Mouse" address [REDACTED] Main outgoing-interface "untrust" preshare "fn3VG5E1NI+amHsDeyChciqYVHnuTsbj4w==" proposal "pre-g2-3des-sha"
set ike respond-bad-spi 1
set vpn "BadguyVPN" gateway "BadguyVPN" no-replay tunnel idletime 0 proposal "nopfs-esp-3des-sha"
set vpn "BadguyVPN" monitor optimized rekey
set vpn "BadguyVPN" id 5 bind interface tunnel.3
set vpn "backup BadguyVPN" gateway "BadguyVPN Backup" no-replay tunnel idletime 0 proposal "nopfs-esp-3des-sha" "nopfs-esp-3des-sha" "nopfs-esp-3des-sha" "nopfs-esp-3des-md5"
set vpn "backup BadguyVPN" monitor optimized rekey
set vpn "backup BadguyVPN" id 4 bind interface tunnel.1
set vpn "From Rat" gateway "To Mouse" no-replay tunnel idletime 0 proposal "nopfs-esp-des-md5"
set vpn "From Rat" monitor optimized rekey
set vpn "From Rat" id 6 bind interface tunnel.2

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(S//SI//REL) VPN Report Search Fields

  • (S//SI//REL) Some of the fields that you can search in...
    • Country
    • IP Address
    • SIGAD/Case Notation
    • Descriptions: crypto map and interface
    • Netstrings: Username, Domain Name
    • Pre-shared keys
    • Device Hostname
    • TAO Project Name

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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(S//SI//REL) DISCOROUTE VPN Report

Click to edit Master text styles
Second level
Third level
Fourth level
Fifth level

Network Knowledge Base
DiscoRoute (Version 2.17) NKB HOME
Query   Reports New!   Network Mgmt Query   Wiki   Feedback
DiscoRoute Reports
VPN Report Form
Query | Results

Date
Start Date: 2012-03-14 00:00:00
End Date: 2012-04-13 23:59:59
DOI Load Date Entire Database

IP Address
IP Address:
(1.2.3.4)
Tunnel Source
Tunnel Dest
Interface
VPN Source
VPN Remote

Hostname:
SIGAD:
Case:
Country:
TAO Project Name:
Session ID:
Pre-Shared Keys:
Snmp Community:
Interface Descr:
Crypto Descr:
Username:
Domain Name:
Generate Report | Generate Report in New Window | Clear Panel

NAC
Powered by the SIGDEV Lab
Version Number: 2.17 New!
Last Modified Date: March 28, 2012
Last Reviewed Date: March 28, 2012
Content Steward [REDACTED]
Page Publisher: [REDACTED]

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(S//SI//REL) VPN Report

Network Knowledge Base
DiscoRoute
Query   Reports New!   Network Mgmt Query   Wiki   Feedback
VPN Report Form
Query | Results

Session ID: 1332289408998
Hostname           Vendor  Sigad Case Notation        Collection Source Country TAO Project TAO Pop
IBL_Baghdad_Router cisco   USJ-759A   E9BDJ00000M0000 XKeyscore         LB                  No

Interfaces
Interface ID     IP Address  Network Mask     Description
Loopback0       [REDACTED]  255.255.255.255   voice traffic
FastEthernet0/0 [REDACTED]  255.255.255.240   Connected To ASA/Firewall
FastEthernet0/1 [REDACTED]  255.255.255.248   Connected To 2MB DSL
Serial0/1/0     [REDACTED]  255.255.255.240   Connected To DVB

Tunnels
ID      Source     Dest       Description
Tunnel1 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Tunnel TO Beirut
Tunnel1 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Tunnel TO Beirut
Tunnel1 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Tunnel TO Beirut
Tunnel1 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Tunnel TO Beirut

VPN Peers
ID            Router IP  Remote IP   VPN Type  PSKs        Description
Serial0/1/0  [REDACTED]  [REDACTED]  ipsec     IblBaghdad
Tunnel1      [REDACTED]  [REDACTED]  ipsec     IblvoiceVpn
Serial0/1/0  [REDACTED]  [REDACTED]  ipsec     IblBaghdad
Tunnel1      [REDACTED]  [REDACTED]  ipsec     IblvoiceVpn
Serial0/1/0  [REDACTED]  [REDACTED]  ipsec     IblBaghdad
Tunnel1      [REDACTED]  [REDACTED]  ipsec     IblvoiceVpn
Serial0/1/0  [REDACTED]  [REDACTED]  ipsec     IblBaghdad
Tunnel1      [REDACTED]  [REDACTED]  ipsec     IblvoiceVpn

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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

## (S//SI//REL) VPN Report Hints...

- (TS//SI//REL) Use the VPN report as a start but not as the final answer for VPNs from a country or a SIGAD
- (C) Query in different ways to make sure you get as much of the data as possible
- (TS//SI//REL) Depending on your scenario you may want to start with a country search, an IP range or a descriptive
term

VPN Peers Section contains the endpoint IPs for your VPN which can be entered into TOYGRIPPE

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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

## (S//SI//REL) Description &Net Strings Searches

- (S//SI//REL) Suppose you do a general VPN report query
    - Search by country
    - Search by SIGAD
- (S//SI//REL) Find a VPN of interest
- (S//SI//REL) Analyze the NetStrings and the description fields

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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

## (S//SI//REL) NetStrings Examples

- (S//SI//REL) Do a follow-on VPN report using a netstring specific to your network
    - Snmp community string: pegasus
    - Domain name: badguy.com
    - Username
- (S//SI//REL) Search ROYALNET
    - Analytics to find other netstrings related to your target
    - Analytics to find links likely to carry your target's communications

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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

# (U//FOUO) BLACKPEARL

(S//SI//REL) NAC tool enabling automated DNI link and network characterization against survey collection across the SIGINT system

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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

## (S//SI//REL) BLACKPEARL Searches

- (U//FOUO) General Query
- (S//SI//REL) Customized reports
    - VPN report
    - DNI Access Essentials
    - MPLS report
    - Five Tuple Report

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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

## (S//SI//REL) BLACKPEARL IP Searches

- Endpoint IPs
- Interface IPs
- Loopback IPs
- Source or destination IPs of the router config file
- Inner network IPs
- Analyze other IPs on the link

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## (U//FOUO) BLACKPEARL

- (S//SI//REL) Search 'All traffic' and include subchannels and tunnels if no results found under limited search
- (S//SI//REL) If link is identified as MPLS then look at the other IPs in inner labels, if present
- (S//SI//REL) Use BLACKPEARL for finding access and gathering information on your network

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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

## (S//SI//REL) Search for Inner Tunneled IPs

- (S//SI//REL) Query BLACKPEARL with an endpoint IP
    - Find other tunneled IPs - inner network IPs that you can do follow on searches
- (S//SI//REL) Query DISCOROUTE with any new IPs found
- (TS//SI//REL) Success: Discovered information on Somalia's Hormuud network

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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

## (TS//SI//REL) Example: Hormuud Network

- (S//SI//REL) Began with loopback IPs from a spreadsheet
    - [REDACTED]
- (S//SI//REL) Found configs for 2 of the 12 loopbacks in a text query in DISCOROUTE
    - [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were in the payload but not parsed
- (S//SI//REL) Took the IPs from those configs and found other configs, one with hostname 'LNS'

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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

## (U) Example continued

- (S//SI//REL) BLACKPEARL hit on LNS IP [REDACTED]
    - Inner IPs in L2TP tunnels
    - DR search for inner IPs from the L2TP tunnels and found more configs
- (U//FOUO) Many of the configs were multi-hop
- (S//SI//REL) Information compiled for TAO
    - ~400 IPs for over 50 devices

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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

## (S//SI//REL) BLACKPEARL Search:
[REDACTED]

L2TP tunnel Source Address = [REDACTED] and Destination Address = [REDACTED]
Number of Five Tuples: 1 43 total packets

Source Address Dest Address Source Port Dest Port Next Protocol % Packets # Pac

1 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 22 4527 TCP (6) 100.0 43

L2TP tunnel Source Address = [REDACTED] and Destination Address = [REDACTED]
Number of Five Tuples: 6 58 total packets

Source Address Dest Address Source Port Dest Port Next Protocol % Packets # Pack

1 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 9101 53771 TCP (6) 67.2 39
2 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 6006 53779 TCP (6) 8.6 5
3 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 6000 53050 TCP (6) 6.0 1
4 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 6006 53783 TCP (6) 6.9 4
5 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 6000 53778 TCP (6) 5.2 3
6 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 6000 53782 TCP (6) 5.2 3

L2TP tunnel Source Address = [REDACTED] and Destination Address = [REDACTED]
Number of Five Tuples: 2 24 total packets

Source Address Dest Address Source Port Dest Port Next Protocol % Packets # Pack

1 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 23 3078 TCP (6) 83.3 20
2 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 23 3080 TCP (6) 16.7 4

Content Steward: [REDACTED] General Support: Contact the Mission Support Team [REDACTED] Contact Us


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

---

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

## (S//SI//REL) BLACKPEARL MPLS

6 7938 255
+Tuple List (label stack 1046418, 7938):
7 7211 255
+Tuple List (label stack 1046418, 7211):
8 6660 255
+Tuple List (label stack 1046418, 6660):
9 6306 255
Tuple List (label stack 1046418, 6306):

Source Address Dest Address Protocol Number Pkt Count

1 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] SIPP-ESP (50) 1
1 of 1
10 7180 255
Tuple List (label stack 1046418, 7180):
11 8120 255
Tuple List (label stack 1046418, 8120):
12 6315 255
Tuple List (label stack 1046418, 6315):

Source Address Dest Address Protocol Number Pkt Count

1 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] SIPP-ESP (50) 1
2 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] SIPP-ESP (50) 6
3 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] SIPP-ESP (50) 1
4 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] SIPP-ESP (50) 1
4 of 4
13 6705 255
+Tuple List (label stack 1046418, 6705):
Find: 1046418 Next Previous Highlight all Match case

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(U//FOUO) TOYGRIPPE

(S//SI//REL) VPN Metadata Repository

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(S//SI//REL)Building VPN Network Knowledge

  • (S//SI//REL)VPNs are part of a larger network
  • (S//SI//REL)Inner or tunneled IPs are a peek inside the target's network
  • (S//SI//REL) Beneficial to look beyond the endpoints of your VPN
  • (S//SI//REL)Combine information from as many SIGDEV databases as you can

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(U/FOUO) TOYGRIPPE Searches

  • (U//FOUO) Search 3 months at a time
  • (U//FOUO) Keep going back in time if no results found
  • (S//SI//REL) Take endpoint IPs found here and search in
    • DISCOROUTE -- device information
    • BLACKPEARL -- inner tunneled IPs
  • (S//SI//REL) Country report

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(U//FOUO) TOYGRIPPE Searches

  • (S//SI//REL) Make note of other connections to the IP of interest and search for them separately
  • (S//SI//REL) You might not find what you are looking for, but it still may be important
  • (S//SI//REL) Convert the target domain name to hex and search for it in the idData field
    • badguy.com 6261646775792e636f6d
    • (idData LIKE '%6261646775792e636f6d')

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(U//FOUO) Endpoint IP Search

  • (TS//SI//REL)Query each IP in TOYGRIPPE separately
    • Try to determine the importance of the connections
    • Note other VPN connections: all IPs are important until proven otherwise
  • (TS//SI//REL)Success: Discovered Iranian corporate intranet

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(S//SI//REL) Building a VPN Intranet: Searching back through TOYGRIPPE

Izmir
Malaysia
Istanbul

Tehran
All branches of the same company.
Hub was in Tehran.

Armenia
Ankara
South Korea

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(S//SI//REL) Finding Suspicious VPN Connections

Izmir
Malaysia
Istanbul
Armenia
Tehran
Ankara
South Korea

(TS//SI//REL)Two connections outside the target company

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(S//SI//REL) Discovery of a Data Center

I had IP A, an endpoint IP from a router config...

And was looking for VPN connections to IP B, which I did not find...

....but in the process of looking, I found VPN connections to IP C in TOYGRIPPE....

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(S//SI//REL) Discovery of a Data Center

...and when I did a follow on search in TOYGRIPPE for IP C....

...I only found it only established VPN connections to IP A

Later discovered that IP C belonged to a data center in another country

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(S//SI//REL) Search for other end of the point-to-point connection

  • (S//SI//REL) What if you already have VPN endpoints from a GNOME report or a TOYGRIPPE search
  • (S//SI//REL) Search for that IP in the DISCOROUTE VPN report GUI – you don't find it
  • (S//SI//REL) Try to search for the other end of what would be a point-to-point connection in DISCOROUTE
    to find the customer edge router
  • (S//SI//REL) END GOAL: find more information about the network

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(S//SI//REL) Customer Edge Routers

Ju
E

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(U//FOUO) NKB and RONIN

(S//SI//REL) NKB is NSA's Network Knowledge Base delivering target communications' DNI and enrichment data
(S//SI//REL) RONIN is a device characterization database and one of the enrichments to NKB

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(U//FOUO) NKB

  • (S//SI//REL) RONIN data
    • Server Analytics: VPN identified through application layer information in ASDF
    • Wiki: VPN Metadata in ASDF
    • VPN Analytics: endpoint in TOYGRIPPE
    • Router Config: new descriptive information coming soon to include tunnel & VPN information for IPs
    • Example: Kenya VPN IP [REDACTED]

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(TS//SI//REL) NKB Search for [REDACTED]: Device Details

NKB: Home | NKB: Results
Interface: ROUTER
Service Interface: ROUTER IP ROUTE: Routed By
Hardware Interface: ROUTER fast ethernet: IP
Service Interface: SERVER vpn:IKEv1
Service Interface: SERVER VPN:Cisco
Hardware Interface: ROUTER fast ethernet: IP
Hardware Interface: ROUTER unknown: IP
Hardware Interface: ROUTER unknown: IP
DataSource Service/Device Type Properties Comments Last Seen
RONIN Hardware Interface:ROUTER fast ethernet: IP count=1 source=Router Config IP=[REDACTED] [REDACTED] is serviced by interface "FastEthernet3" on the Cisco router named "pnbo192", model "c870", with netmask [REDACTED] and description "--- To DSL provider". (Query DISCOROUTE) 2011-Aug-10
RONIN Hardware Interface:ROUTER fast ethernet: IP count=5 source=Router Config IP=[REDACTED] [REDACTED] is serviced by interface "FastEthernet4" on the Cisco router named "pnbo192", model "c870", with netmask [REDACTED] and description "--- To DSL provider". (Query DISCOROUTE) 2011-Oct-12
RONIN Hardware Interface:ROUTER unknown: IP count=1 source=Router Config IP=[REDACTED] [REDACTED] is serviced by interface "FastEther. [REDACTED] on the Cisco router named "pnbo192", model "c870", with netmask [REDACTED] and description "--- To DSL provider". (Query DISCOROUTE) 2011-Oct-11
RONIN Hardware Interface:ROUTER unknown:IP count=1 source=Router Config IP=[REDACTED] [REDACTED] is serviced by interface "FastEther. [REDACTED] .N.9.....net4" on the Cisco router named "pnbo192", model "c870", with netmask [REDACTED] and description "--- To DSL provider". (Query DISCOROUTE) 2011-Oct-13
RONIN Service Interface:ROUTER IP ROUTE: Routed By count=1 source=Router Config IP=[REDACTED] [REDACTED] was seen in a static route with a [REDACTED] on router "BP_AGG01". 41.206.52.139/32 was found as the IP for interface [REDACTED]. 2011-Sep-12
RONIN Hardware Interface:ROUTER fast ethernet: IP count= 1 source=Router Config IP=[REDACTED] [REDACTED] count=50 source=SERVER_ANALYTIC IP=[REDACTED]
RONIN Service Interface:SERVER vpn:IKEv1 count=50 source=SERVER_ANALYTIC IP=[REDACTED]
RONIN Service Interface:SERVER VPN:Cisco count=195 source=VPN Analytic IP=[REDACTED]

Done

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(U//FOUO) GNETWORK GNOME

(S//SI//REL) Tool used to extract and correlate information from a variety of NAC, SSG, SSO, NTOC and other metadata databases

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(S//SI//REL) Keep an Eye on the Entire Netblock

  • (S//SI//REL) Multiple VPNs for one target
    • different purposes
    • different clients

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(S//SI//REL) GNOME Task: Private IP VPNs

  • (S//SI//REL) Find a public IP associated with your private IP
    • Loopback IP
    • Another interface IP
  • (S//SI//REL) Use those for your GNOME report and look for your private IP on the same link
  • (S//SI//REL) Data presented in the VPN tab in GNOME report is limited

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(U//FOUO) Network Patterns...

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(S//SI//REL) IP Patterns

  • (S//SI//REL) Admins are people -- lean towards predictability in assignment of IPs to make their job easier
  • (S//SI//REL) IP or a combination of the octets could be an indication of:
    • network provider
    • location
    • specific purpose in the network

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(S//SI//REL) Example #1:Private IP VPN Network Patterns

  • (S//SI//REL) Client side of the VPN: [REDACTED]
    • Second octet indicated the network provider
      • 20 = network provider #1
      • 21 = network provider #2
    • Second and third octet = country
      • 20.30 and 21.30 were the same country but different providers
    • 40 = individual target entity in that country
  • (S//SI//REL) Server side of the VPN: [REDACTED]
    • Second octet indicated network provider
      • 51= network provider #1
      • 52 = network provider #2

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(S//SI//REL) Example #2:Network Patterns

(S//SI//REL) Public IP VPN: [REDACTED].#

  • Third octet = country location of this IP (three possible)
  • Fourth octet= country location of the other side of the VPN connection

Analyzed the opposite side of this /24 and identified the country for 167 4th octet values (out of 209) when this public IP connects to a private IP we know the country location of the private IP.

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(U//FOUO) Final Thoughts...

  • (S//SI//REL) Just because you don't get results doesn't mean the answer isn't there
    • If you're looking for a connection from A to B and don't find it, then maybe you need to look for one from A to C to B
  • (S//SI//REL) Try the query a different way
    • Widen the search either by wildcarding (if permitted) or by selecting a different drop-down option
    • Enter information in a different field

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(U//FOUO)Final Thoughts...

  • (S//SI//REL) All IPs are important until proven otherwise
    • They all serve a purpose and belong to a device
    • Make note of what you find even if you don't know at the time what it means
  • (S//SI//REL) Search for data even if results are unlikely
  • (S//SI//REL) Don't necessarily discard dated information

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(U//FOUO) Final Thoughts...

  • (U//FOUO) Understand the data that you are searching and what the fields in the GUI are searching for
  • (U//FOUO) Take an iterative approach: start searches wide, then narrow them down, then widen back out again
  • (S//SI//REL) Bounce between the different databases and use the tools for every aspect of your network analysis

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(S//SI//REL) VPN SIGDEV: Build the network knowledge...

  • (TS//SI//REL) Dig beyond paired collection, PSKs and persistence
  • (S//SI//REL) Discovery of the inner IPs of the VPN is possible in ways other than decryption
  • (S//SI//REL) Investigate device IPs
  • (U//FOUO) Look for patterns
  • (S//SI//REL) Discover the 'N' of your VPN

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(U//FOUO) Questions?

[REDACTED]
SSG21 Net Pursuit
Network Analysis Center

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(S//SI//REL) Simplifying and Automating VPN SIGDEV

[REDACTED]
SSG22
Network Analysis Center

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(U//FOUO) The Ultimate Goals

  • (S//SI//REL) Integrate VPN information into mainstream analytic tools and knowledge bases.
  • (S//SI//REL) Give analysts the ability to discover, develop, and track known targets using VPNs.
  • (S//SI//REL) Give analysts the ability to discover new targets using VPNs.

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(U//FOUO) The Start . . .

  • (S//SI//REL) Develop new corporate VPN tool (DARKSUNRISE).
    • Joint collaboration between CES and the NAC.
    • Take advantage of cloud architecture.
    • Strive to meet the needs of the entire VPN community.

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(U//FOUO) To The Cloud!

  • (S//SI//REL) Data stored in MDR-2, the corporate metadata repository.
    • Stores one year of DNI metadata.
    • Enables filtering, aggregating, and transforming large datasets quickly.
    • Manage high data volumes.
    • Answer VPN questions efficiently and easily.

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(S//SI//REL) What are Some of the Needs of the VPN SIGDEV Community?

  • (S//SI//REL) Answer VPN SIGDEV questions quickly.
  • (S//SI//REL) Allow SIGDEVers to spend time analyzing data instead of gathering and processing the data first.
  • (S//SI//REL) Make VPN SIGDEV more widely understood by simplifying and automating the SIGDEV process.
  • (S//SI//REL) Robust Structure
    • Allow for multiple VPN and network encryption protocols
    • Allow for incorporation of new analytics.

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(S//SI//REL) What are Some of the Questions?

  • (S//SI//REL) Basic Questions
    • Is my target using a VPN?
    • What are all of the VPNs from country BadGuyLand?
    • Tell me all of the VPNs where domain = sita*.
    • Tell me all of the VPNs where the vendor ID = Cisco.

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(S//SI//REL) What are Some of the Questions?

  • (S//SI//REL) Specialized Questions?
    • What are all of the VPNs that are bi-directional?
    • What are all of the VPNs that are paired?
    • Tell me all of the VPNs (and how many) that a particular VPN talks to (persistent hubs/centrality).
    • What are all of the VPNs that are of interest (via Target Network Service)?
    • What VPNs are associated to a router config?
    • What are all of the VPNs that are persistent?
    • For which VPNs do we have a PSK?

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(S//SI//REL) What are Some of the Questions?

  • (S//SI//REL) Synthesizing Information
    • What are all of the VPNs that are bi-directional, persistent, and of interest?
    • What are all of the VPNs that are paired, persistent, and for which we have a PSK?
    • What are all of the VPNs from country BadGuyLand that are paired, associated to a router config, and of interest?

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(U//FOUO) DARKSUNRISE

  • (U//FOUO) This is a prototype GUI.
  • (U//FOUO) Comingg Fall 2012

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(S//SI//REL) DARKSUNRISE

Mozilla Firefox
File Edit View History Bookmarks Tools Help
Virtual Private Network Working Group - ... | [REDACTED] | RoyalNet *Prototype* | Free Form | BLACKPEARL - WikiInfo | [REDACTED] 
[REDACTED] Google
DNI Presenter - index TOYGRIPPE XKEYSCORE dsridge

DYNAMIC PAGE - HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
TOP SECRET//COMINT//TK//NOFORN

Main | Centrality | Stats | General Queries |
SRI Source Destination BiDir... Protocol Data Source Classification First Seen Last Seen

DarkSunrise

Shadownet Filters
SIGAD:
CASN:
Protocol:
IP Ranges:
Source IP:
Destination IP:
Domain:
ExchangeTypeId:
VendorId:
Country Code:
FVEY Only
BiDirectional
First Seen:
Start
End:
Last Seen:
Start:
End:
Submit
Clear All filters
Gray Theme
Clear Cache
SRI Source Destination BiDir Protocol Data Source Classification First Seen Last Seen
SIGAD CASN IP Realm Country Domain IP Realm Country Domain
DS-200B PK1S011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public SE [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public PK [REDACTED] ● IPSEC VPN-TU TS//SI//REL TO USA...
DS-200B PK1S011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public RO [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public PK [REDACTED] ● IPSEC VPN-TU TS//SI//REL TO USA...
DS-200B PK1S011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public RO [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public PK [REDACTED] ● IPSEC VPN-TU TS//SI//REL TO USA...
DS-200B PK1S011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public TR [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public PK [REDACTED] ● IPSEC VPN-TU TS//SI//REL TO USA...
DS-200B PK1S011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public TR [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public PK [REDACTED] ● IPSEC VPN-TU TS//SI//REL TO USA...
DS-200B PK1S011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public AE [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public AF [REDACTED] ◐ IPSEC VPN-TU TS//SI//REL TO USA...
DS-200B PK1S011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public AE [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public PK [REDACTED] ◐ IPSEC VPN-TU TS//SI//REL TO USA...
DS-200B PK1S011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public AE [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public PK [REDACTED] ◐ IPSEC VPN-TU TS//SI//REL TO USA...
DS-200B PK1S011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public CZ [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public PK [REDACTED] ● IPSEC VPN-TU TS//SI//REL TO USA...
DS-200B PK1S011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public CZ [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public PK [REDACTED] ● IPSEC VPN-TU TS//SI//REL TO USA...
DS-200B PK1S011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public AE [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public AF [REDACTED] ◐ IPSEC VPN-TU TS//SI//REL TO USA...
DS-200B PK1S011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public TR [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public PK [REDACTED] ● IPSEC VPN-TU TS//SI//REL TO USA...
DS-200B PK1S011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public NL [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public PK [REDACTED] ● IPSEC VPN-TU TS//SI//REL TO USA...
DS-200B PK1S011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public US [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public PK [REDACTED] ● IPSEC VPN-TU TS//SI//REL TO USA...
Page 1 of 3 Checking TNS.. Finished! Clear Filters
Reports: csv html xls ren ivml Displaying 1-100 of 236 Page Size 100

Drilldown/Details
NKB Location Data | PPTP Details | IPSec Details | VipNet Details
Source IP
IP: [REDACTED]
CountryCode: RO
CountryName: ROMANIA
City: BUCHAREST
Domain: ROMTELECOM.NET
Company: ROMTELECOM DATA NETWORK
ASN: 9050

Destination IP
IP: [REDACTED]
CountryCode: PK
CountryName: PAKISTAN
City: KARACHI
Domain: TW1.COM
Company: GRUPM
ASN: 38193

Content Steward [REDACTED] General Support: Contact the SHADOWNET Team [REDACTED] feedback
DYNAMIC PAGE - HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
TOP SECRET//COMINT//TK//NOFORN

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(TS//SI//REL) The NKB Location Data Drilldown

Mozilla Firefox
File Edit View History Bookmarks Tools Help
Virtual Private Network Working Group - ... | JSignout: User [REDACTED] | RoyalNet *Prototype* | Free Form | BLACKPEARL - WikiInfo | [REDACTED] 
[REDACTED] Google
DNI Presenter - index TOYGRIPPE XKEYSCORE dsridge

DYNAMIC PAGE - HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
TOP SECRET//COMINT//TK//NOFORN

Main | Centrality | Stats | General Queries |
SRI Source Destination BiDir... Protocol Data Source Classification First Seen Last Seen

DarkSunrise

Shadownet Filters
SIGAD:
CASN:
Protocol:
IP Ranges:
Source IP:
Destination IP:
Domain:
ExchangeTypeId:
VendorId:
Country Code:
FVEY Only
BiDirectional
First Seen:
Start
End:
Last Seen:
Start:
End:
Submit
Clear All filters
Gray Theme
Clear Cache
SRI Source Destination BiDir Protocol Data Source Classification First Seen Last Seen
SIGAD CASN IP Realm Country Domain IP Realm Country Domain
DS-200B PK1S011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public SE [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public PK [REDACTED] ● IPSEC VPN-TU TS//SI//REL TO USA...
DS-200B PK1S011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public RO [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public PK [REDACTED] ● IPSEC VPN-TU TS//SI//REL TO USA...
DS-200B PK1S011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public RO [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public PK [REDACTED] ● IPSEC VPN-TU TS//SI//REL TO USA...
DS-200B PK1S011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public TR [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public PK [REDACTED] ● IPSEC VPN-TU TS//SI//REL TO USA...
DS-200B PK1S011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public TR [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public PK [REDACTED] ● IPSEC VPN-TU TS//SI//REL TO USA...
DS-200B PK1S011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public AE [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public AF [REDACTED] ◐ IPSEC VPN-TU TS//SI//REL TO USA...
DS-200B PK1S011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public AE [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public PK [REDACTED] ◐ IPSEC VPN-TU TS//SI//REL TO USA...
DS-200B PK1S011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public AE [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public PK [REDACTED] ◐ IPSEC VPN-TU TS//SI//REL TO USA...
DS-200B PK1S011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public CZ [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public PK [REDACTED] ● IPSEC VPN-TU TS//SI//REL TO USA...
DS-200B PK1S011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public CZ [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public PK [REDACTED] ● IPSEC VPN-TU TS//SI//REL TO USA...
DS-200B PK1S011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public AE [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public AF [REDACTED] ◐ IPSEC VPN-TU TS//SI//REL TO USA...
DS-200B PK1S011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public TR [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public PK [REDACTED] ● IPSEC VPN-TU TS//SI//REL TO USA...
DS-200B PK1S011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public NL [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public PK [REDACTED] ● IPSEC VPN-TU TS//SI//REL TO USA...
Page 1 of 3 Checking TNS.. Finished! Clear Filters
Reports: csv html xls ren ivml Displaying 1-100 of 236 Page Size 100
Drilldown/Details
NKB Location Data | PPTP Details | IPSec Details | VipNet Details

Source IP
IP: [REDACTED]
CountryCode: RO
CountryName: ROMANIA
City: BUCHAREST
Domain: ROMTELECOM.NET
Company: ROMTELECOM DATA NETWORK
ASN: 9050

Destination IP
IP: [REDACTED]
CountryCode: PK
CountryName: PAKISTAN
City: KARACHI
Domain: TW1.COM
Company: GRUPM
ASN: 38193

Content Steward [REDACTED] General Support: Contact the SHADOWNET Team [REDACTED] feedback
DYNAMIC PAGE - HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
TOP SECRET//COMINT//TK//NOFORN

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(TS//SI//REL) The IPSec Details Drilldown

Mozilla Firefox
File Edit View History Bookmarks Tools Help
[REDACTED] Potluck
DNI Presenter - index TOYGRIPPE XKEYSCORE dsridge
Problem loading page | Virtual Private Network Working Group ... | RoyalNet *Prototype* | [REDACTED]

DYNAMIC PAGE - HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
TOP SECRET//COMINT//TK//NOFORN

Shadownet | Centrality
SHADOWnet
SIGAD:
CASN:
Protocol:
IP Ranges:
Source IP:
Destination IP:
Domain:
ExchangeTypeId:
VendorId: %
Country Code: PK
FVEY Only
FVEY ONLY
BiDirectional

Apply Filters and Reload Table Data
Clear all Filters
Blue Theme
Clear Cache
SRI Source Destination Protocol Data Source
SIGAD CASN IP Country Domain Realm IP Country Domain Realm
US-972U AF.OJPOS [REDACTED] PK [REDACTED] IPv4_public [REDACTED] PK [REDACTED] IPv4_public IPSEC WC2_BRASYH
US-972U AF.OJPOS [REDACTED] US [REDACTED] IPv4_public [REDACTED] PK [REDACTED] IPv4_public IPSEC WC2_BRASYH
US-972U AF.OJPOS [REDACTED] US [REDACTED] IPv4_public [REDACTED] PK [REDACTED] IPv4_public IPSEC WC2_BRASYH
US-972U AF.OJPOS [REDACTED] US [REDACTED] IPv4_public [REDACTED] PK [REDACTED] IPv4_public IPSEC WC2_BRASYH
US-972U AF.OJPOS [REDACTED] US [REDACTED] IPv4_public [REDACTED] PK [REDACTED] IPv4_public IPSEC WC2_BRASYH
US-972U AF.OJPOS [REDACTED] US [REDACTED] IPv4_public [REDACTED] PK [REDACTED] IPv4_public IPSEC WC2_BRASYH
US-968Z D8V115100110000 [REDACTED] US [REDACTED] IPv4_public [REDACTED] PK [REDACTED] IPv4_public IPSEC WC2_BRASYH
US-972U AF.OJPOS [REDACTED] IN [REDACTED] IPv4_public [REDACTED] PK [REDACTED] IPv4_public IPSEC WC2_BRASYH
US-972U AF.OJPOS [REDACTED] IN [REDACTED] IPv4_public [REDACTED] PK [REDACTED] IPv4_public IPSEC WC2_BRASYH
US-972U AF.NJPOS [REDACTED] IN [REDACTED] IPv4_public [REDACTED] PK [REDACTED] IPv4_public IPSEC WC2_BRASYH
US-972U AF.OJPOS [REDACTED] IN [REDACTED] IPv4_public [REDACTED] PK [REDACTED] IPv4_public IPSEC WC2_BRASYH
Page 2 of Checking TNS.. Finished! Clear Filters Reports: csv html ivml Displaying 21 - 40 of Page Size 20

Drilldown/Details

NKB Location Data | PPTP Details | IPSec Details | VipNet Details

IP:

Encryption Alg ID:          7        Encryption Algorithm:    AES-CBC     Group ID:              [REDACTED]   ID Data:
ID Type:                    --       Private Attr Value:                   Private Attr Type:               Vendor Name:    ---
Authentication Method Id:   3        Authentication Method:   RSA Signature

[-] Ike Vendor Ids

Vendor ID:                                    VID Type:      Brand/Provider:      Details/Version:
214ca4faffa7f32d6748e5303395ae83              Vendor         Microsoft            Vista/Longhorn (AuthIP supported)

[-] Exchange Type Ids

Exchange Type ID:                             Exchange Translation:      [REDACTED]

Content Steward: [REDACTED] General Support: Contact the SHADOWNET Team [REDACTED]
DYNAMIC PAGE - HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
TOP SECRET//COMINT//TK//NOFORN
Mozilla Firefox
File Edit View History Bookmarks Tools Help
[REDACTED] Potluck
DNI Presenter - index TOYGRIPPE XKEYSCORE dsridge
Problem loading page | Virtual Private Network Working Group ... | RoyalNet *Prototype* | [REDACTED]

DYNAMIC PAGE - HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
TOP SECRET//COMINT//TK//NOFORN

Shadownet | Centrality
SHADOWnet
SIGAD:
CASN:
Protocol:
IP Ranges:
Source IP:
Destination IP:
Domain:
ExchangeTypeId:
VendorId: %
Country Code: PK
FVEY Only
FVEY ONLY
BiDirectional

Apply Filters and Reload Table Data
Clear all Filters
Blue Theme
Clear Cache
SRI Source Destination Protocol Data Source
SIGAD CASN IP Country Domain Realm IP Country Domain Realm
US-972U AF.OJPOS [REDACTED] PK [REDACTED] IPv4_public [REDACTED] PK IPv4_public IPSEC WC2_BRASYH
US-972U AF.OJPUS [REDACTED] US [REDACTED] IPv4_public [REDACTED] PK IPv4_public IPSEC WC2_BRASYH
UO-972U AF.OC [REDACTED] UO [REDACTED] IPv4_public [REDACTED] PK IPv4_public IPSEC WC2_BRASYH
UE-972U AF.O1R [REDACTED] US [REDACTED] IPv4_public [REDACTED] PK IPv4_public IPSEC WC2_BRASYH
US-572U AF.OJPOS [REDACTED] US [REDACTED] IPv4_public [REDACTED] PK IPv4_public IPSEC WC2_BRASYH
US-972U AF.OJPOS [REDACTED] US [REDACTED] IPv4_public [REDACTED] PK [REDACTED] IPv4_public IPSEC WC2_BRASYH
US-972U AF.OJPOS [REDACTED] US [REDACTED] IPv4_public [REDACTED] PK IPv4_public IPSEC WC2_BRASYH
US-906Z D8V115100110000 [REDACTED] US [REDACTED] IPv4_public [REDACTED] PK IPv4_public IPSEC WC2_BRASYH
US-972U AF.OJPUS [REDACTED] IN [REDACTED] IPv4_public [REDACTED] PK IPv4_public IPSEC WC2_BRASYH
UO-972U AF.OJPOC [REDACTED] IN [REDACTED] IPv4_public [REDACTED] PK IPv4_public IPSEC WC2_BRASOYH
US-972U AF.OJPOS [REDACTED] IN [REDACTED] IPv4_public [REDACTED] PK IPv4_public IPSEC WC2_BRASYH
Page 2 of 5 Checking TNS.. Finished! Clear Filters Reports: csv html ivml Displaying 21 - 40 of 82 Page Size 20
NKB Location Data | PPTP Details | IPSec Details | VipNet Details

IP:

Encryption Alg ID:          7        Encryption Algorithm:    AES-CBC     Group ID:              7        ID Data:
ID Type:                    --       Private Attr Value:                   Private Attr Type:     --       Vendor Name:    ---
Authentication Method Id:   3        Authentication Method:   RSA Signature

[-] Ike Vendor Ids

Vendor ID:                                    VID Type:      Brand/Provider:      Details/Version:
214ca4faffe7f32d6748e5303395ae83              Vendor         Microsoft            Vista/Longhorn (AuthIP supported)

[-] Exchange Type Ids

Exchange Type ID:                             Exchange Translation:

Content Steward: [REDACTED] General Support: Contact the SHADOWNET Team [REDACTED]
DYNAMIC PAGE - HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
TOP SECRET//COMINT//TK//NOFORN

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(TS//SI//REL) Automatic Identification of Bi-directional VPNs

Mozilla Firefox
File Edit View History Bookmarks Tools Help
ic.gov [REDACTED] Google
DNI Presenter - index TOYGRIPPE XKEYSCORE dsridge
Virtual Private Network Worki... | JSignout: User [REDACTED] | RoyalNet *Prototype* | [REDACTED] | RoyalNet *Prototype* | [REDACTED] 
DYNAMIC PAGE - HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
TOP SECRET//COMINT//TK//NOFORN
Main | Centrality

SHADOWnet

Shadownet Filters
SIGAD:
CASN:
Protocol:
IP Ranges:
Source IP:
Destination IP:
Domain:
ExchangeTypeId:
VendorId:
Country Code:
FVEY Only
FVEY Only
BiDirectional
BiDirectional Only

Submit
Clear all Filters
Gray Theme
Clear Cache
SRI Source Destination BiDirect Protocol Data Source
SIGAD CASN IP Realm Country Domain IP Realm Country Domain
DS-200B PK1S011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public US [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public PK [REDACTED] ● IPSEC VPN-TU
DS-200B PK1S011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public US [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public PK [REDACTED] ● IPSEC VPN-TU
DS-200B PK1S011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public SG [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public PK [REDACTED] ● IPSEC VPN-TU
DS-200B PKS1011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public PK [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public SG [REDACTED] ● IPSEC VPN-TU
DS-200B PKS1011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public PK [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public EG [REDACTED] ◐ IPSEC VPN-TU
DS-200B PK1S011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public US [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public PK [REDACTED] ● IPSEC VPN-TU
DS-200B PKS1011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public PK [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public US [REDACTED] ◐ IPSEC VPN-TU
DS-200B PKS1011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public PK [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public RO [REDACTED] ● IPSEC VPN-TU
DS-200B PK1S011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public RO [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public PK [REDACTED] ● IPSEC VPN-TU
DS-200B PKS1011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public RO [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public RO [REDACTED] ● IPSEC VPN-TU
DS-200B PK1S011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public RO [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public PK [REDACTED] ● IPSEC VPN-TU
DS-200B PK1S011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public KZ [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public PK [REDACTED] ● IPSEC VPN-TU
Page 1 of 4 | Checking TNS.. Finished! | Clear Filters
Reports: csv html ivml | Displaying 1-20 of 74 | Page Size: 20

Drilldown/Details
NKB Location Data | PPTP Details | IPSec Details | VipNet Details

Source IP
IP:             [REDACTED]
CountryCode:    SG
CountryName:    SINGAPORE
City:           SINGAPORE
Domain:         1M1.ACOSAC.COM
Company:        STARHUB INTLRNTL PTE LTD
ASN:            0871

Destination IP
IP:             [REDACTED]
CountryCode:    PK
CountryName:    PAKISTAN
City:           ISLAMABAD
Domain:         NAYATEL.PK
Company:        MICRONET BROADBAND (PVT) LTD.
ASN:            4874

Content Steward [REDACTED] General Support: Contact the SHADOWNET Team [REDACTED] feedback
DYNAMIC PAGE - HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
TOP SECRET//COMINT//TK//NOFORN

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(TS//SI//REL) Automatic Identification of VPNs Of Interest

Mozilla Firefox

File Edit View History Bookmarks Tools Help
ic.gov [REDACTED] Google
DNI Presenter - index TOYGRIPPE XKEYSCORE dsridge
Virtual Private Network Worki... | JSignout: Us[REDACTED] | Ro Net *Pro type* | https // n bd-b.Gx Clien html | oyalNet *Pro to e* | [REDACTED] 

DYNAMIC PAGE - HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
TOP SECRET//COMINT//TK//NOFORN

Main | Centrality

SHADOWnet

Shadownet Filters
SIGAD:
DS-200B
CASN:
Protocol:
IP Ranges:
Source IP:
Destination IP:
Domain:
NAYATEL.PK
ExchangeTypeId:
VendorId:
Country Code:
FVEY Only
FVEY Only
BiDirectional
BiDirectional Only

Submit
Clear all Filters
Gray Theme
Clear Cache
SRI Source Destination BiDirect Protocol Data Source
SIGAD CASN IP Realm Country Domain IP Realm Country Domain
DS-200B PK1S011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public RO [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public PK [REDACTED] ● IPSEC VPN-TU
DS-200B PKS1011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public PK [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public RO [REDACTED] ● IPSEC VPN-TU
DS-200B PK1S011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public RO [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public PK [REDACTED] ● IPSEC VPN-TU
DS-200B PK1S011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public KZ [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public PK [REDACTED] ● IPSEC VPN-TU
DS-200B PK1S011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public ES [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public PK [REDACTED] ● IPSEC VPN-TU
DS-200B PKS1011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public PK [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public US [REDACTED] ◐ IPSEC VPN-TU
DS-200B PKS1011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public PK [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public US [REDACTED] ● IPSEC VPN-TU
DS-200B PKS1011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public PK [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public PK [REDACTED] ◐ IPSEC VPN-TU
DS-200B PKS1011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public PK [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public PK [REDACTED] ● IPSEC VPN-TU
DS-200B PK1S011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public PK [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public US [REDACTED] ● IPSEC VPN-TU
DS-200B PKS1011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public GB [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public PK [REDACTED] ● IPSEC VPN-TU
DS-200B PKS1011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public PK [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public GB [REDACTED] ● IPSEC VPN-TU
Page 1 of 4 | Checking TNS..Finished! | Clear Filters
Reports: csv html ivml | Displaying 1-20 of 74 | Page Size:

Drilldown/Details
NKD Location Data | PPTP Details | IPSec Details | VipNet Details

[-] IPSec
Encryption Alg ID:          1        Encryption Algorithm:    DES-CBC     Group ID:              1        ID Data:
ID Type:                    --       Private Attr Value:                   Private Attr Type:     --       Vendor Name:    ---
Authentication Method Id:   65005    Authentication Method:   RSA Signature with initiator

[-] Ike Vendor Ids
Vendor ID:                            VID Type:                Brand/Provider:                      Details/Version:

[-] Exchange Type Ids
Exchange Type ID:                     Exchange Translation:

Content Steward: [REDACTED]  General Support: Contact the SHADOWNET Team  [REDACTED]  feedback

DYNAMIC PAGE - HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
TOP SECRET//COMINT//TK//NOFORN
  • (S//SI//REL) The icon means this record hits against the Target Network Service (TNS).

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(TS//SI//REL) Automatic Identification of VPNs Of Interest

Mozilla Firefox

File Edit View History Bookmarks Tools Help
ic.gov [REDACTED] Google
DNI Presenter - index TOYGRIPPE XKEYSCORE dsridge
Virtual Private Network Worki... | JSignout: Use[REDACTED] | RoyalNet *prototype* | https://ncmd-bl...GxtClient.html | oyalNet *Pro to e* | [REDACTED] 

DYNAMIC PAGE - HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
TOP SECRET//COMINT//TK//NOFORN

Main | Centrality

SHADOWnet

Shadownet Filters
SIGAD:
DS-200B
CASN:
Protocol:
IP Ranges:
Source IP:
Destination IP:
Domain:
NAYATEL.PK
ExchangeTypeId:
VendorId:
Country Code:
FVEY Only
FVEY Only
BiDirectional
BiDirectional Only

Submit
Clear all Filters
Gray Theme
Clear Cache
SRI Source Destination BiDirect Protocol Data Source
SIGAD CASN IP Realm Country Domain IP Realm Country Domain
DS-200B PK1S011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public RO [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public PK [REDACTED] ● IPSEC VPN-TU
DS-200B PKS1011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public PK [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public RO [REDACTED] ● IPSEC VPN-TU
DS-200B PK1S011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public RO [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public PK [REDACTED] ● IPSEC VPN-TU
DS-200B PK1S011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public KZ [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public PK [REDACTED] ● IPSEC VPN-TU
DS-200B PK1S011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public ES [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public PK [REDACTED] ● IPSEC VPN-TU
DS-200B PKS1011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public PK [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public US [REDACTED] ◐ IPSEC VPN-TU
DS-200B PKS1011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public PK [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public US [REDACTED] ● IPSEC VPN-TU
DS-200B PKS1011 [REDACTED] IPv4_public PK [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IPv4_public PK [REDACTED] ◐ IPSEC VPN-TU
DS-200B VPN-TU
DS-200B VPN-TU
DS-200B VPN-TU
DS-200B VPN-TU
Target Networks
FVEY | Command ranges | Value 202.69.15.145 Realm IPv4_public
Target Indicator Realm Category Classification Agency Priority Description Source
[REDACTED] IPv4_public TARGET TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY NSA Strategic PK Telenor VPN\vpn node GNETWORKGNOME
[REDACTED] IPv4_public TARGET S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY NSA Routine Telenor GPRS\Telenor's GPRS Subnet GNETWORKGNOME
[REDACTED] IPv4_public TARGET TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA NSA pri3 TELENOR PK; Karachi, PK; [TELENOR TU PROMOTION
Page 1 of 1 | Page Size: 20 Displaying 1 - 3 of 3

Drilldown/D
NKD Location

[-] IPSec
Encryption       ---
ID Type:         ---
Authentic

[-] Ike Ve
Vendor ID:

[-] Exchange Type Ids
Exchange Type ID:                     Exchange Translation:

Content Steward: [REDACTED]  General Support: Contact the SHADOWNET Team  [REDACTED]  feedback

DYNAMIC PAGE - HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
TOP SECRET//COMINT//TK//NOFORN

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(S//SI//REL) The Centrality Tab

  • (S//SI//REL) Find all VPNs that talk to a base VPN.
    • Discover persistent hubs.
    • Can continue chaining outwards.
Mozilla Firefox
File Edit View History Bookmarks Tools Help
Virtual Private Network Working Grou... | JSignout: User[REDACTED] | RoyalNet *Prototype* | CUE :: CASPORT User Entitlements Lo... | https://ncmd-black...wnetGxtClient.html | Round Table | (U) Where can one get... | Common Access Card (CAC) | [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] G where do you get a CAC card
DNI Presenter - index TOYGRIPPE XKEYSCORE dsridge

DYNAMIC PAGE - HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
TOP SECRET//COMINT//TK//NOFORN

Main | Centrality | Stats | General Queries
Centrality Filters
IP Ranges: [REDACTED]
Submit

Centrality
Address     Realm       Centrality
[REDACTED]  IPv4_publi c 2
Page 1 of 1 Clear Filters

Content Steward [REDACTED] General Support: Contact the SHADOWNET Team [REDACTED] feedback
DYNAMIC PAGE - HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
TOP SECRET//COMINT//TK//NOFORN

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(S//SI//REL) The Centrality Tab

Mozilla Firefox
File Edit View History Bookmarks Tools Help
Virtual Private Network Working Grou... | JSignout: User[REDACTED] | RoyalNet *Prototype* | CUE :: CASPORT User Entitlements Lo... | https://ncmd-black...wnetGxtClient.html | Round Table | (U) Where can one get... | Common Access Card (CAC) | [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] G where do you get a CAC card
DNI Presenter - index TOYGRIPPE XKEYSCORE dsridge

DYNAMIC PAGE - HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
TOP SECRET//COMINT//TK//NOFORN

Main | Centrality | Stats | General Queries
Centrality Filters
IP Ranges: [REDACTED]
Submit

Centrality
Address     Realm       Centrality
[REDACTED]  IPv4_publi c 2
Page 1 of 1 Clear Filters

Content Steward [REDACTED] General Support: Contact the SHADOWNET Team [REDACTED] feedback
DYNAMIC PAGE - HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
TOP SECRET//COMINT//TK//NOFORN

Mozilla Firefox
File Edit View History Bookmarks Tools Help
Virtual Private Network Working Grou... JSignout: Use[REDACTED] RoyalNet *Prototype* CUE :: CASPORT User Entitlements Lo... [REDACTED] Round Table | (U) Where can one get... Common Access Card (CAC) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] where do you get a CAC card
DNI Presenter - index TOYGRIPPE XKEYSCORE dsridge
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
TOP SECRET//COMINT//TK//NOFORN

Main Centrality Stats General Queries
Centrality Filters Centrality
IP Ranges:
[REDACTED]
Submit
Address | Realm | Centrality
[REDACTED] | IPv4_public | 2

Partner[REDACTED]
Address | Realm | Centrality
[REDACTED] | IPv4_Public | 3
[REDACTED] | IPv4_Public | 3

Content Stew[REDACTED]eral Support: Contact the SHADOW[REDACTED]feedback
PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
TOP SECRET//COMINT//TK//NOFORN

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(S//SI//REL) The Centrality Tab

Mozilla Firefox
File Edit View History Bookmarks Tools Help
Virtual Private Network Working Grou... | JSignout: User[REDACTED] | RoyalNet *Prototype* | CUE :: CASPORT User Entitlements Lo... | https://ncmd-black...wnetGxtClient.html | Round Table | (U) Where can one get... | Common Access Card (CAC) | [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] G where do you get a CAC card
DNI Presenter - index TOYGRIPPE XKEYSCORE dsridge

DYNAMIC PAGE - HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
TOP SECRET//COMINT//TK//NOFORN

Main | Centrality | Stats | General Queries
Centrality Filters
IP Ranges: [REDACTED]
Submit

Centrality
Address     Realm       Centrality
[REDACTED]  IPv4_publi c 2
Page 1 of 1 Clear Filters

Content Steward [REDACTED] General Support: Contact the SHADOWNET Team [REDACTED] feedback
DYNAMIC PAGE - HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
TOP SECRET//COMINT//TK//NOFORN


Mozilla Firefox
File Edit View History Bookmarks Tools Help
Virtual Private Network Working Grou... JSignout: Use[REDACTED] RoyalNet *Prototype* CUE :: CASPORT User Entitlements Lo... [REDACTED] Round Table | (U) Where can one get... Common Access Card (CAC) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] where do you get a CAC card
DNI Presenter - index TOYGRIPPE XKEYSCORE dsridge
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
TOP SECRET//COMINT//TK//NOFORN

Main Centrality Stats General Queries
Centrality Filters Centrality
IP Ranges:
[REDACTED]
Submit
Address | Realm | Centrality
[REDACTED] | IPv4_public | 2

Partners of[REDACTED]
Address | Realm | Centrality
[REDACTED] | IPv4_Public | 3
[REDACTED] | IPv4_Public | 3

Partners of[REDACTED]
Address | Realm | Centrality
[REDACTED] | IPv4_Public | 7
[REDACTED] | IPv4_Public | 3
[REDACTED] | IPv4_Public | 2

Content Stew[REDACTED]eral Support: Contact the SHADOW[REDACTED]feedback
PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
TOP SECRET//COMINT//TK//NOFORN

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(S//SI//REL) The Centrality Tab

Mozilla Firefox
File Edit View History Bookmarks Tools Help
Virtual Private Network Working Grou... | JSignout: User[REDACTED] | RoyalNet *Prototype* | CUE :: CASPORT User Entitlements Lo... | https://ncmd-black...wnetGxtClient.html | Round Table | (U) Where can one get... | Common Access Card (CAC) | [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] G where do you get a CAC card
DNI Presenter - index TOYGRIPPE XKEYSCORE dsridge

DYNAMIC PAGE - HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
TOP SECRET//COMINT//TK//NOFORN

Main | Centrality | Stats | General Queries
Centrality Filters
IP Ranges: [REDACTED]
Submit

Centrality
Address     Realm       Centrality
[REDACTED]  IPv4_publi c 2
Page 1 of 1 Clear Filters

Content Steward [REDACTED] General Support: Contact the SHADOWNET Team [REDACTED] feedback
DYNAMIC PAGE - HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
TOP SECRET//COMINT//TK//NOFORN


Mozilla Firefox
File Edit View History Bookmarks Tools Help
Virtual Private Network Working Grou... JSignout: Use[REDACTED] RoyalNet *Prototype* CUE :: CASPORT User Entitlements Lo... [REDACTED] Round Table | (U) Where can one get... Common Access Card (CAC) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] where do you get a CAC card
DNI Presenter - index TOYGRIPPE XKEYSCORE dsridge
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
TOP SECRET//COMINT//TK//NOFORN

Main Centrality Stats General Queries
Centrality Filters Centrality
IP Ranges:
[REDACTED]
Submit
Address | Realm | Centrality
[REDACTED] | IPv4_public | 2

Partners of[REDACTED]
Address | Realm | Centrality
[REDACTED] | IPv4_Public | 3
[REDACTED] | IPv4_Public | 3

Partners of[REDACTED]
Address | Realm | Centrality
[REDACTED] | IPv4_Public | 7
[REDACTED] | IPv4_Public | 3
[REDACTED] | IPv4_Public | 2

Partners o[REDACTED]
Address | Realm | Centrality
[REDACTED] | IPv4_Public | 4
[REDACTED] | IPv4_Public | 3
[REDACTED] | IPv4_Public | 3
[REDACTED] | IPv4_Public | 3
[REDACTED] | IPv4_Public | 3
[REDACTED] | IPv4_Public | 3
[REDACTED] | IPv4_Public | 1

Content Steward[REDACTED]General Support: Contact the SHADOWNET Team[REDACTED]feedback
PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
TOP SECRET//COMINT//TK//NOFORN

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(S//SI//REL) The Centrality Tab

Mozilla Firefox
File Edit View History Bookmarks Tools Help
Virtual Private Network Working Grou... | JSignout: User[REDACTED] | RoyalNet *Prototype* | CUE :: CASPORT User Entitlements Lo... | https://ncmd-black...wnetGxtClient.html | Round Table | (U) Where can one get... | Common Access Card (CAC) | [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] G where do you get a CAC card
DNI Presenter - index TOYGRIPPE XKEYSCORE dsridge

DYNAMIC PAGE - HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
TOP SECRET//COMINT//TK//NOFORN

Main | Centrality | Stats | General Queries
Centrality Filters
IP Ranges: [REDACTED]
Submit

Centrality
Address     Realm       Centrality
[REDACTED]  IPv4_publi c 2
Page 1 of 1 Clear Filters

Content Steward [REDACTED] General Support: Contact the SHADOWNET Team [REDACTED] feedback
DYNAMIC PAGE - HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
TOP SECRET//COMINT//TK//NOFORN

Mozilla Firefox
File Edit View History Bookmarks Tools Help
Virtual Private Network Working Grou... JSignout: Use[REDACTED] RoyalNet *Prototype* CUE :: CASPORT User Entitlements Lo... [REDACTED] Round Table | (U) Where can one get... Common Access Card (CAC) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] where do you get a CAC card
DNI Presenter - index TOYGRIPPE XKEYSCORE dsridge
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
TOP SECRET//COMINT//TK//NOFORN

Main Centrality Stats General Queries
Centrality Filters Centrality
IP Ranges:
[REDACTED]
Submit
Address | Realm | Centrality
[REDACTED] | IPv4_public | 2

Partners of[REDACTED]
Address | Realm | Centrality
[REDACTED] | IPv4_Public | 3
[REDACTED] | IPv4_Public | 3

Partners of[REDACTED]
Address | Realm | Centrality
[REDACTED] | IPv4_Public | 7
[REDACTED] | IPv4_Public | 3
[REDACTED] | IPv4_Public | 2

Partners of[REDACTED]
Address | Realm | Centrality
[REDACTED] | IPv4_Public | 4
[REDACTED] | IPv4_Public | 3
[REDACTED] | IPv4_Public | 3
[REDACTED] | IPv4_Public | 3
[REDACTED] | IPv4_Public | 3
[REDACTED] | IPv4_Public | 3
[REDACTED] | IPv4_Public | 1

Partners of[REDACTED]
Address | Realm | Centrality
[REDACTED] | IPv4_Public | 31
[REDACTED] | IPv4_Public | 29
[REDACTED] | IPv4_Public | 7

Content Steward[REDACTED]General Support: Contact the SHADOWNET Team[REDACTED]feedback
PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
TOP SECRET//COMINT//TK//NOFORN

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(U//FOUO) The Metrics Tab

  • (S//SI//REL) Count distinct VPN records, grouping them by one or more of the following attributes:
    • SIGAD
    • Source
    • VPN Type
    • Case Notation
    • Date

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(U//FOUO) The Metrics Tab: One Example

Mozilla Firefox
File Edit View History Bookmarks Tools Help
TOYG E Stats *Prototype* | JSignout: User:[REDACTED] | RoyalNet: *Prototype* | CUE :: CASPORT User Entit nts Lo... | https://ncmd-black...wnetGxtClient.html | Round Table | (U) Where can one get... | Common Access Card (CAC) | [REDACTED]
DNI P nter -index TOYGRIPPE SCORE ds

DYNAMIC PAGE - HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
TOP SECRET//COMINT//TK//NOFORN

Main |  Centrality | Stats | General Queries
Filters
Row Headers: SIGAD
Column Headers: VPN Type
SIGAD
DS-200B,UKC-1155W
Source:
--No Selection--
VPN Type:
ESP,IKEv1,PPTP,VIPN
DatE:
Start:
End:
Table
CSV Report
HTML Report

ESP IKE_ESP_NAT... IKEv1 IKEv2 IPSEC PPTP RDP SSH VIPNET Total
DS-200B 31931 64 31995
USJ-799 238 238
USD-1001TEC 10793 10793
USJ-799 1 1
551 45978 144688 5341 196558
UKC-1155W 24 24
USF-790 12 12
USJ-759 4919 4919
US-3140 1 1956 1957
ESP, IKEV1, PPTP, VIPNET 109110 48042 144688 5341 307181
Date: Start: End:
Table CSV Report HTML Report XLS Report

Row Headers: SIGAD
Column Headers: VPN Type
Filter by SIGAD: DS-200B, UKC-1155W,US-3140, US-3141B,USD-1001TEC, USF-790,USJ-759, USJ-759A, USJ-799
Filter by Source: --No Selection--
Filter by VPN Type: ESP,IKEv1,PPTP,VIPNET

SIGAD X

[SIGAD] [VPN Type]
SIGAD ESP IKEESP_NAT... IKEv1 IKEv2 IPSEC PPTP RDP SSH VIPNET Total
USJ-759A 60677 7 60684
DS-200B 31931 64 31995
USJ-799 238 238
USD-1001TEC 10793 10793
USJ-799 1 1
US-3141B 551 45978 144688 5341 196558
UKC-1155W 24 24
USF-790 12 12
USJ-759 4919 4919
US-3140 1 1956 1957
109110 48042 144688 5341 307181
Content Steward [REDACTED] General Support: Contact the SHADOWNET Team [REDACTED] feedback
DYNAMIC PAGE - HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
TOP SECRET//COMINT//TK//NOFORN
  • (TS//SI//REL) Total number of VPN type per SIGAD.

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(U//FOUO) The Ultimate Goals

  • (S//SI//REL) Integrate VPN information into mainstream analytic tools and knowledge bases.
  • (S//SI//REL) Give analysts the ability to discover, develop, and track known targets using VPNs.
  • (S//SI//REL) Give analysts the ability to discover new targets using VPNs.

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(U//FOUO) Questions?

[REDACTED]
SSG22
Network Analysis Center

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Archive note: The slide deck is not properly redacted, and the content can be seen under many black boxes when the PDF is zoomed in. The PDF also has a screenshot embedded, which reveals the TNS WikiInfo page (see redaction-mistake version, found by Libroot collective https://libroot.org/posts/going-through-snowden-documents-part-7/).