FASCIA: The NSA's huge trove of location records

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Creating agency: NSA National Security Agency (US)
Document date: -
Pages: 2
Genre: slides
Banner:
Classification: TOP SECRET COMINT
Dissemination: REL TO USA, FVEY
the copy shown on this page
The pages reprinted in the document appendix of No Place to Hide (appendix page 8).

FASCIA is the National Security Agency's enormous database containing trillions of metadata records, many with device locations, that are collected from a variety of sources. This document shows the volume and types of device-location data collected by the agency.

Long Description:
This top secret NSA document provides a technical glimpse of FASCIA, the agency's enormous repository of device-location records collected from a variety of signals intelligence sources. A volume chart covering January through May 2012 shows total DNR records received by FASCIA reaching peaks approaching 25 billion, while simultaneously tracking records deleted, records transferred to MARINA, and a DPS FIVE processing backlog — illustrating both the extraordinary scale of location data ingestion and the infrastructure strain of managing it. The chart reveals that FASCIA was not simply a passive archive but an active processing environment where data was continuously ingested, deduplicated, selectively retained, and forwarded to downstream repositories like MARINA. The deduplication methodology slide lists 40 distinct mobile network signaling identifiers used to compare records within time windows and eliminate duplicate location entries. These identifiers span the full range of mobile network protocols and cover every major mobile identity and location signal: device identifiers including IMSI, IMEI, MIN, ESN, and MSISDN; location identifiers including LAC, CellID, VLR, and TMSI variants; session and routing identifiers including TEID, TLLI, PTMSI, and PDP_Address; and authentication parameters including Kc, Rand, Sres, and cryptographic keys Q_CK1 and Q_IK1. The breadth of these identifiers reveals that FASCIA was ingesting not just basic call metadata but deep signaling-layer data from GSM, UMTS, and CDMA networks — the kind of low-level protocol information generated by mobile networks as devices register, authenticate, and move between cells.
Programs:
FASCIA, MARINA, DPS

People mentioned:
-

Countries:
-

Tags:
device location, geolocation, mobile tracking, metadata, DPS FIVE, deduplication, IMSI, IMEI, MSISDN, TMSI, LAC, CellID, VLR, PTMSI, GSM, UMTS, CDMA, mobile networks, bulk collection, record volume, location data, DNR, cell towers, authentication, cryptographic key, technical infrastructure, data processing

Identifier:
FASCIA_Powerpoint_Slide
Also known as:
ACLU_-_FASCIA_Powerpoint_Slide

PDF SHA-256:
e2753efe5a65ee62b9320786cb456a07b817f819e0c2e54ade402adb1ebd578d

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

Example of Current Volumes and Limits

0
5,000,000,000
10,000,000,000
15,000,000,000
20,000,000,000
25,000,000,000
1/1/2012
1/8/2012
1/15/2012
1/22/2012
1/29/2012
2/5/2012
2/12/2012
2/19/2012
2/26/2012
3/4/2012
3/11/2012
3/18/2012
3/25/2012
4/1/2012
4/8/2012
4/15/2012
4/22/2012
4/29/2012
5/6/2012

Total MetaDNI Records Deleted
Total Records Transferred to MARINA
Records in DPS FIVE Backlog
Total DNR Records Received by FASCIA

5
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

Dupe Methodology

Compare records within various time windows that share identical selectors and locations, specifically:

  • LAC
  • IMEI
  • TMSI
  • MSISDN
  • RegGID
  • CdIID
  • Sres
  • Q_CK1
  • OSME
  • TEID
  • CellID
  • ESN
  • MDN
  • RegFMID
  • CdGID
  • CgIID
  • Opcode
  • Q_IK1
  • DSME
  • TLLI
  • VLR
  • IMSI
  • CLI
  • CdFMID
  • RegIID
  • MSRN
  • RQ1
  • AU1
  • RTMSI
  • PTMSI
  • DesigChannelID
  • MIN
  • ODN
  • CgFMID
  • Kc
  • Rand
  • XR1
  • NewPTMSI
  • PDP_Address
  • PDDG

28
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY