Location Cookies
Open PDFDocument date: 2013-04-01
Pages: 4
Genre: slides
Classification: SECRET SI
Dissemination: REL TO USA, FVEY
These slides contain excerpts from an April 2013 National Security Agency presentation detailing signal surveillance techniques and successes. They reveal that the NSA and its British counterpart, Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), use a Google-specific tracking cookie to pinpoint targets for hacking.
MAINWAY, SEDB, HAPPYFOOT, XKEYSCORE, ANCHORMAN, SSO
People mentioned:
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Countries:
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Tags:
XKS, XKR ANCHORMAN, GCHQ, Google, cookies, PREF Cookie, online activity, internet surveillance, target identification, Computer Network Exploitation, remote exploitation, Tailored Access Operations, SSO, metadata analysis, DNI, DNR, mobile phones, cell phones, mobile tracking, location data, cell towers, geolocation, IP addresses, web browsers, apps, smart phones, advertising, target discovery, NGA, social network analysis, surveillance infrastructure, internet backbone, target hacking, cloud analytics, Google PREF cookie, tracking cookies, cell fan data, browser fingerprinting, IP geolocation, location-aware apps, mobile apps, maritime surveillance, cell tower querying, passive internet traffic, DSL accounts, wireless local loop, fbi, convergence, endpoint access, realming, automated analysis, identity intelligence
Identifier:
EFF_-_20131210-wapo-location_cookies
Also known as:
nsa-sigint-successesACLU_-_2013-12-10_Location_Cookies2013-12-10_Location_Cookies
PDF SHA-256:
1c2451bd1b29d578424a96e4df77184b038ac5837fbab1618890223402845d3c
My notes
Discovered [REDACTED] opposition individuals who could have possibly been traveling with the ships of interest.
Our Approach
- Queried over 900 towers and other selectors in MAINWAY/SEDB in attempt to discover any identifiable selectors around the coordinates of interest.
- Created another query based on identified selectors of interest to pull for any cell fan information in order to more precisely locate each selector of interest.
- Queried in SEDB ship data on the ships of interest and plotted the track the ships took into
- Identified selectors by cell fan information seen near the ports where the ships of interest had docked. Also correlated any selectors moving in relation to the ships' movements using cell fan data.
Mission Example and Result: The HAPPYFOOT analytic aggregates leaked location-based service / location-aware application data to infer IP address geo-locations. SDS identified 'Public' and 'private' usage of the same IP address that caused HAPPYFOOT to assign [REDACTED] netblocks to [REDACTED] geo-locations (the IP address was used in both countries). This private network is now being realmed and properly geo-located. Ongoing work will solve this realming problem for networks affecting other cloud analytics.
Our Approach
- Tracked [REDACTED] target's converged communications and CNE accesses.
- Monitored passive internet traffic; created automated processes where possible (XKS ANCHORMAN, Workflows, Fingerprints).
- Provided TAO/GCHQ with WLLids/DSL accounts, Cookies, GoogiePREFIDs to enable remote exploitation.
- Partnered with NGA and R4 to confirm locations and USRP equipment based on collected photographs.
- Drove CNE collection and partnered with TAO to increase USRP specific endpoint accesses.
- Provided knowledge to interagency partners for potential on the ground survey options and FBI-led intelligence guiding efforts.
(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Metadata/Target Discovery: Analyze DNR/DNI/Convergence metadata for target discovery, identify gaps in collection, processing, and analytic methodologies; Improve metadata collection and processing; Create analytics that automate or improve analytic methodologies; Conduct target discovery through multiple technology thrusts, including endpoint, web-based technologies/services, mobile applications and networks, geo-location analysis, correlations/identity Analysis, Social Network Analysis; Collaboration/facilitation with TAO, S3, CIA, ODNI, SSO, CES, and SSG centers.
Published in the Same Report
(4 documents)
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How the NSA Pinpoints a Mobile Device [pdf]
This document is an internal National Security Agency classification guide outlining the agency's abilities to intercept cellular communications.
Programs: ARCVIEW -
Summary of DNR and DNI Co-Travel Analytics [pdf]
The document outlines the NSA’s development and testing of multiple “co-traveler” analytics—sophisticated tools that analyze bulk mobile location data to identify people who travel together or follow similar patterns, even if they are not known intelligence targets. It details various analytic systems, their data sources (such as FASCIA, VLR, GCID), architectures, scoring methods, and future enhancements, illustrating a large-scale surveillance framework for mapping human movement and relationships.
Programs: CO-TRAVELER · CHALKFUN · TMI · PACT · RT-RG · SORTINGLEAD · FASCIA · Hectic Snare · DRT · Juggernaut · GM-PLACE · Fast Follower · MGSC · ELKPRINTS · VOICESAIL · CULTWEAVE · OCTAVE · OCTSKYWARD · SEDB · JEMA · The Café · UTT · ASDF · GHOSTMACHINE · CLOUDBASE · FASTSCOPE · GOLDMINER · CHET · GEOT · TMAC · SPCMA · MAPREDUCE · ACCUMULO · GAMBIT · ICREACH -
SSO GHOSTMACHINE Analytics [pdf]
This document describes the NSA’s cloud analytics platform GHOSTMACHINE, used by Special Source Operations (SSO) to process and analyze massive volumes of data (e.g., from FASCIA) using Hadoop-based infrastructure. It’s essentially the backbone system for querying, correlating, and enriching surveillance data at scale — not just a single analytic, but the analytic/cloud environment powering many programs.
Programs: GHOSTMACHINE · FASCIA · CERF · POPTOP · DRT · SIGDASYS · JUGGERNAUT · SEADIVER · AST128 · TUSKATTIRE · ASDF · BROKENRECORD · REDHAWK · SSO -
How the NSA verifies a target's location [pdf]
This is an excerpt from a transcript of National Security Agency training videos that describe how to verify the location of a targeted device. It explains how the NSA monitors different types of mobile signaling information known as HLR and VLR registrations in order to locate individuals. It also makes clear that the agency is able to use location tracking to ascertain whether a target is in the United States.
Related Documents
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SSO dictionary relevant entries [pdf]
This document provides a detailed list of relevant entries related to NSA's Special Source Operations (SSO), highlighting various NSA surveillance and data collection systems used to monitor global communications. It includes descriptions of programs such as BIGBIRD and DISHFIRE, which focus on cable and SMS interception, as well as tools like LOPERS and COURIERSKILL for processing telephony metadata and refining target selection. The entries emphasize the extensive and automated nature of the NSA's intelligence-gathering operations, particularly in relation to undersea cables and telecommunication networks, and underscore the secretive and expansive scope of SSO's global surveillance activities.
Programs: ARTIFICE · BIGBIRD · FAIRVIEW · SSO · POORWILL · PINECONE · BLACKBELT · CADENCE · BLACKNIGHT · SHIPMASTER · COURIERSKILL · THEORYMASTER · WEALTHYCLUSTER · CLIFFSIDE · DISHFIRE · MARINA · MAINWAY · NUCLEON · PINWALE · FASCIA · BANYAN · LAMPSHADE · ASSOCIATION · HOMEBASE · SEDB · FRIAR · KEYCARD · TURMOIL · TURBULENCE · UTT · IRISHBEAUTY · OCTAVE · KOZYKOVE · LITHIUM · BLARNEY · LOPERS · MAILORDER · LUMBERYARD · MERLIN · NODDY · SAGUARO · NUTHATCH · CONTRAOCTAVE · XKEYSCORE · PLANK · RODEOSTAR · SAGURA · SERENADE · STARGATE · SILVERCOLLAM · SEALION · SEAGULL · SLIVER · SORA-2 · TITANPOINTE · TUBE · VPCS · STONEGATE“NSA Spying Relies on AT&T’s ‘Extreme Willingness to Help’” - ProPublica ↗ (2015-08-15) · “AT&T Helped U.S. Spy on Internet on a Vast Scale” - The New York Times ↗ (2015-08-15) · “The Wiretap Rooms: The NSA’s Hidden Spy Hubs in Eight U.S. Cities” - The Intercept ↗ (2018-06-25) · Angwin, Julia · Larson, Jeff · Savage, Charlie · Moltke, Henrik · Poitras, Laura · Risen, James · Gallagher, Ryan -
Summary of DNR and DNI Co-Travel Analytics [pdf]
The document outlines the NSA’s development and testing of multiple “co-traveler” analytics—sophisticated tools that analyze bulk mobile location data to identify people who travel together or follow similar patterns, even if they are not known intelligence targets. It details various analytic systems, their data sources (such as FASCIA, VLR, GCID), architectures, scoring methods, and future enhancements, illustrating a large-scale surveillance framework for mapping human movement and relationships.
Programs: CO-TRAVELER · CHALKFUN · TMI · PACT · RT-RG · SORTINGLEAD · FASCIA · Hectic Snare · DRT · Juggernaut · GM-PLACE · Fast Follower · MGSC · ELKPRINTS · VOICESAIL · CULTWEAVE · OCTAVE · OCTSKYWARD · SEDB · JEMA · The Café · UTT · ASDF · GHOSTMACHINE · CLOUDBASE · FASTSCOPE · GOLDMINER · CHET · GEOT · TMAC · SPCMA · MAPREDUCE · ACCUMULO · GAMBIT · ICREACH -
Tailored Access Operations, FOXACID, QUANTUM [pdf]
These NSA presentation slides detail "QUANTUM," a sophisticated system that allows the agency to intercept internet traffic and inject malware onto target computers with up to 80% success rates, far exceeding traditional spam-based methods. The system works by monitoring internet traffic for specific identifiers (like Yahoo or Facebook cookies), then racing to inject malicious code before legitimate web servers can respond, thereby compromising targets' computers without their knowledge and establishing persistent backdoor access.
Programs: FOXACID · QUANTUM · QUANTUMTHEORY · QUANTUMBISCUIT · VALIDATOR · OLYMPUS · UNITEDRAKE · OLYMPUSFIRE · SSO · FORESTPLACE -
SSO Collection Optimization Overview [pdf]
This excerpt is from an article in the NSA's "Intellipedia," a classified system built with the same open-source software used by Wikipedia. Like the other documents, it describes the problem of high-volume, low-value data collection — and the NSA's response — with a focus on Internet contact lists.
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SSO Corporate Portfolio Overview [pdf]
A classified NSA training presentation providing analysts with a detailed overview of SSO's corporate collection portfolio — covering FAIRVIEW, STORMBREW, BLARNEY, MADCAPOCELOT, and OAKSTAR — including their legal authorities, collection capabilities, tasking procedures, and data repositories, with BLARNEY identified as contributing to over 60% of counterterrorism reporting and over 80% of all FAA reporting.
Programs: OCTAVE · UTT · CADENCE · BLARNEY · STORMBREW · FAIRVIEW · DARKTHUNDER · STEELFLAUTA · MONKEYROCKET · SHIFTINGSHADOW · ORANGECRUSH · YACHTSHOP · ORANGEBLOSSOM · SILVERZEPHYR · BLUEZEPHYR · COBALTFALCON · PINWALE · YANKEE · XKEYSCORE · MAINWAY · TOYGRIPPE · BLACKPEARL · TWISTEDPATH · NUCLEON · DISHFIRE · WHITESQUALL · MISTRALWIND · SERRATEDEDGE · PERFECTSTORM · MARINA · MADCAPOCELOT · FIST · MDCP · OAKSTAR · SSO · PRISM · TMM · COWBOY“NSA Spying Relies on AT&T’s ‘Extreme Willingness to Help’” - ProPublica ↗ (2015-08-15) · “AT&T Helped U.S. Spy on Internet on a Vast Scale” - The New York Times ↗ (2015-08-15) · “No Place to Hide” - Metropolitan Books ↗ (2014-05-13) · Angwin, Julia · Larson, Jeff · Savage, Charlie · Moltke, Henrik · Poitras, Laura · Risen, James · Greenwald, Glenn