How the NSA Pinpoints a Mobile Device

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Creating agency: NSA National Security Agency (US)
Document date: 2006-09-20
Pages: 2
Genre: guide
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Classification: TOP SECRET COMINT MR
Dissemination: REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

This document is an internal National Security Agency classification guide outlining the agency's abilities to intercept cellular communications.

Long Description:
This top secret NSA classification guide, shared with Five Eyes partners, provides handling instructions for information about the agency's GSM signals intelligence capabilities across collection, equipment, processing, reporting, and geolocation. The document is organized into sections covering general program facts, equipment, processing capabilities, reporting, and geolocation precision — each with specific classification levels calibrated to the sensitivity of the information disclosed. The collection section establishes that the mere fact NSA targets, collects, and processes GSM — whether encrypted or unencrypted — is classified Secret/COMINT, as is the fact that collection occurs through the global telecommunications infrastructure. The equipment section draws a precise legal and security distinction: commercial components used for GSM SIGINT collection are unclassified when not loaded with collection software, but become Secret/COMINT at minimum once running NSA-associated software. The processing section reveals a graduated hierarchy of capability sensitivity: processing unencrypted GSM is Secret/COMINT releasable to Five Eyes; processing encrypted GSM with a known cryptovariable is Secret/COMINT at minimum; but the ability to process A5/1 encrypted GSM when the cryptovariable is unknown — meaning NSA can break the most widely used GSM encryption standard without possessing the key — is classified Top Secret/COMINT and may require special access program protection. A5/1 was the standard encryption used by the vast majority of the world's GSM mobile networks, making this capability one of the most significant mobile surveillance disclosures in the document. The reporting and geolocation sections detail the classification levels for publishing user location data, with a granular hierarchy ranging from country-level location (Secret) through city, VLR Global Title, Location Area Code, Cell ID, and latitude/longitude coordinates (all Secret/COMINT, potentially Top Secret depending on source). The geolocation precision section establishes that cell tower-based handset location should be represented as a 2-3 kilometer ellipse accounting for urban and rural environmental factors including power, terrain, and interference — providing a rare public benchmark for the accuracy of NSA's GSM geolocation capability.
Programs:
ARCVIEW

People mentioned:
-

Countries:
-

Tags:
GSM, cell phones, mobile phones, geospatial data, cell towers, handset, mobile surveillance, cellular interception, encryption, encryption breaking, cryptographic key, geolocation, LAC, CellID, VLR, latitude longitude, SMS interception, TACrep, KLIEGLIGHT, classification guide, collection capabilities, data processing, equipment, handset tracking, mobile networks, urban rural

Identifier:
ACLU_-_2013-12-10_GMS_Classification_Guide
Also known as:
2013-12-10_GMS_Classification_Guide
EFF_-_20131210-wapo-gsm_classification_guide
nsa-gsm-tracking
gsm-classification-guide-20-sept-2006

PDF SHA-256:
d73a14649a953b8ba4ccffaac079dd0a4b2f1425d97e21744895009a7ffad501

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//MR

Description of Information Classification/ Markings Reason Declass Remarks
b. (U) In association with NSA, SIGINT or Intelligence. SECRET//COMINT 1.4(c) 20291123
A3. (S//SI) The fact that NSA targets, collects, and processes GSM (encrypted or unencrypted). SECRET//COMINT 1.4(c) 20291133 (U) No additional details.
A4. (S//SI) The fact that NSA can collect GSM calls through the global telecommunications infrastructure. SECRET//COMINT 1.4 (c) 20291123

B. (U) EQUIPMENT

Description of Information Classification/ Markings Reason Declass Remarks
B1. (FOUO) Commerical and government equipment that consists of general purpose components, such as receivers, digital signal processors, personal computer, etc., when not running or loaded with GSM SIGINT collection software and not associated with a SIGINT system. UNCLASSIFIED/ FOUO N/A N/A (U) No association with NSA, SIGINT or Intelligence.
B2. (S//SI) Commercial and government equipment that consists of general purpose components, such as receivers, digital signal processors, personal computer, etc, when running or loaded with GSM SIGINT collection software and associated with NSA, SIGINT or Intelligence. SECRET//COMINT At a minimum 1.4(c) 20291123

C. (U) PROCESSING

Description of Information Classification/ Markings Reason Declass Remarks
C1. (S//SI) The fact that NSA can process unencrypted GSM. SECRET//COMINT REL AUS/CAN/GBR/NZL/USA 1.4 (c) 20291123
C2. (S//SI) The fact that NSA can process encrypted GSM when the cryptovariable is known. SECRET//COMINT REL AUS/CAN/GBR/NZL/USA At a mimimum 1.4 (c) 20291123
C3. (TS//SI) The fact that NSA can process encrypted A5/1 GSM when the cryptovariable is unknown. TOP SECRET// COMINT REL 1.4 (c) 20291123 (U) Details may require protection via a special access

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//MR

Description of Information Classification/ Markings Reason Declass Remarks
b. Technical reports (TACREPs or Klieglights) SECRET//COMINT at a minimum 1.4(c) 20291123
F3. (S//SI) Reporting locations of GSM users in:

a. SIGINT product
--country
--city
--VLR Global Title
--Location Area Code
--Cell ID
--Latitude/Longitude
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET//COMINT SECRET//COMINT SECRET//COMINT SECRET//COMINT
1.4(c) 20291123 May be TOP SECRET//COMINT depending on the source.
b. Technical reports (TACREPs or Klieglights)
--country
--city
--VLR Global Title
--Location Area Code
--Cell ID
--Latitude/Longitude
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET//COMINT
SECRET//COMINT
SECRET//COMINT
SECRET//COMINT
1.4(c) 20291123 May be TOP SECRET//COMINT depending on the source.
F4. (S//SI) Any reporting from GSM Short Message system (SMS) messages SECRET//COMINT at a minimum. 1.4(c) 20291123 May be TOP SECRET//COMINT depending on the source.

G. (FOUO) GSM PRECISIONAL ACCURACY

Description of Information Classification/ Markings Reason Declass Remarks
G1. (S//SI) The fact that GSM Cell Towers can be used as a physical- geolocational reference point in relation to a GSM handset of interest: SECRET//COMINT 1.4(c) 20291123 A GSM handset in relationship to a GSM Cell tower should be portrayed in a 2-3 KM ellipse estimate that takes into consideration urban and rural environmental dependencies (power, terrain and interference).
G2. (S//SI) The fact of a singular SIGINT GSM handset metadata point with no exact timing SECRET 1.4(c) 20291123 GEO periodically issues a geospatially presented (ArcView,

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//MR