VALIANTSURF (VS): Capability Levels
Open PDFDocument date: -
Pages: 3
Genre: slides
Banner: TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
Classification: TOP SECRET COMINT
Dissemination: REL TO USA, FVEY
A capability status document for VALIANTSURF — NSA's programme for large-scale IPSec VPN decryption integrated with TURMOIL passive collection and LONGHAUL key recovery — defining five capability levels from basic key recovery through full hardware-accelerated on-site decryption with XKEYSCORE integration, and showing deployment status across named collection sites.
VALIANTSURF, LONGHAUL, XKEYSCORE, TURMOIL, UTT, KEYCARD, ISLANDTRANSPORT
People mentioned:
-
Countries:
-
Tags:
CES, IPSec, VPN decryption, Data Network Cipher, DNSC, key recovery, hardware acceleration, CAVIUM, IBM 3650, CA Server, ITx, KEYCARD, OTP, SSG, passive collection, cable collection, target development, SIGDEV, JCE, Joint Capability Experiment, MHS, Menwith Hill, MUSC, collection sites
Identifier:
spiegel_-_media-35517
PDF SHA-256:
250c306a6de9237268e71cf012c42c11e110832e71960d01e940a86d1ce139f0
My notes
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
VALIANTSURF (VS): Capability Levels
| VALIANTSURF Capability Level | Beneficiaries | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CES & LONGHAUL | OTP & SSG | TOPIS | Link Access | CES | |
| A Key Recovery, no on-site decryption | X | ||||
| B Key Recovery, on-site SW Decryption, XKS SIGDEV | X | X | |||
| C Key Recovery, on-site SW Decryption, XKS SIGDEV, offsite processing of full take decrypt | X | X | X | ||
| D Key Recovery, on-site SW Decryption, XKS SIGDEV, on-site packet and session selection and forwarding of decrypt | X | X | X | X | |
| E Key Recovery, on-site HW Decryption, XKS SIGDEV, on-site packet and session selection and forwarding of decrypt | X | X | X | X | X |
NOTE: bolded parts above represent added capability over prior level
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
VALIANTSURF (VS): Success Criteria
- DNC (Data Network Cipher) target development performed using metadata
- TURMOIL DNC targeting in place (via UTT & KEYCARD) and needed CASNs on cover
- ITx connectivity between CES backend and CA Servers at site
- CA Servers at site accessible, hardened, loaded and functioning
- Pairing exists for the targeted DNC IP addresses
- LONGHAUL is able to exploit the traffic
- VS-compatible TURMOIL software loaded
- XKS retrospective available for DNC plain text target development (i.e. determine selectors)
- Bandwidth available and policy approves
- Plain text selectors loaded in TURMOIL and XKS
- Needed mission applications available in TURMOIL stage 1 prime
- XKEYSCORE-Stage 2 functioning
- CA Server with hardware acceleration in place with sufficient TU network configuration
Success Criteria Required
| VS Capability Level | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A | X | X | X | X | X | X | |||||||
| B | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | |||||
| C | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | ||||
| D | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | |
| E | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
VALIANTSURF (VS): Current Capability Status
| Site | A | B | C | D | E | 1. IP SIGDEV | 2. TARGETTING | 3. ITx | 4. CA Server | 5. Pairing | 6. Exploitable | 7. TML/VS | 8. XKS Retrospective | 9. BW & Policy | 10. P/T Selectors | 11. Stage 1' Apps | 11. XKS Stage2 | CA Server | Cavium Included ? |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MUSC | 18.1.7 | 1.5.5-146 | IBM 3650 | yes | |||||||||||||||
| XCUT | 15.6.1 | n/a | HP DL180 | no | |||||||||||||||
| TEC | 15.6.1 | n/a | Dell 2950 | no | |||||||||||||||
| MHS | 13.1.6 | 1.5.5.234 | Dell 2950 | no | |||||||||||||||
| G1 | 3.1.6 | 1.5.5-14x | Dell 2950 | no | |||||||||||||||
| G3 | 3.1.6 | 1.5.5-14x | Dell 2950 | no | |||||||||||||||
| S 5G | 17.1 | n/a | Dell 2950 | no | |||||||||||||||
| S BCH | 1.5.5-14x | Dell 2950 | no | ||||||||||||||||
| GH | 18.1.6 | 1.5.5-145 | IBM 3650 | Eventually* | |||||||||||||||
| JCE 20G** | IBM 3650 | yes | |||||||||||||||||
| 240G (6/11) | IBM 3650 | yes | |||||||||||||||||
| PSK Defensive (1/11) | IBM 3650 | Eventually* | |||||||||||||||||
| Remaining Defensive (9 sites) | IBM 3650 | Eventually* |
* Cavium cards still to be ordered for these sites
** JCE 20G is a dev system
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
Published in the Same Report
(10 of 43 documents)
-
BULLRUN CoI - Briefing Sheet [pdf]
A GCHQ briefing sheet introducing the BULLRUN Community of Interest — the access control framework protecting Five Eyes capabilities to defeat encryption across TLS/SSL, HTTPS, SSH, VPNs, IPSec, encrypted chat and encrypted VoIP — covering the classification structure, handling procedures and protective marking guidance for intelligence derived from cryptanalytic exploitation.
“N.S.A. Able to Foil Basic Safeguards of Privacy on Web” - The New York Times ↗ (2013-09-05) · “Revealed: The NSA's Secret Campaign to Crack, Undermine Internet Security” - ProPublica ↗ (2013-09-05) · “Prying Eyes: Inside the NSA's War on Internet Security” - Der Spiegel ↗ (2014-12-28) · Perlroth, Nicole · Larson, Jeff · Shane, Scott · Appelbaum, Jacob · Gibson, Aaron · Grothoff, Christian · Müller-Maguhn, Andy · Poitras, Laura · Sontheimer, Michael · Stöcker, Christian -
CLASSIFICATION GUIDE FOR CRYPTANALYSIS, 2-12 [pdf]
An NSA/CSS classification guide for cryptanalysis establishing the precise classification level for each type of information about NSA's capabilities to exploit commercial and indigenous encryption systems — from the unclassified acknowledgement that NSA exploits cryptographic devices, through to the Top Secret protection of cryptographic modifications made to commercial products to render them exploitable and industry relationships used to obtain cryptographic details.
“Revealed: how US and UK spy agencies defeat internet privacy and security” - The Guardian ↗ (2013-09-05) · “Prying Eyes: Inside the NSA's War on Internet Security” - Der Spiegel ↗ (2014-12-28) · Ball, James · Borger, Julian · Greenwald, Glenn · Appelbaum, Jacob · Gibson, Aaron · Grothoff, Christian · Müller-Maguhn, Andy · Poitras, Laura · Sontheimer, Michael · Stöcker, Christian -
Innov8 Experiment Profile Template [pdf]
A TOP SECRET STRAP1 joint NSA/GCHQ experiment profile documenting a 2010-2011 Joint Capability Experiment to test hardware-accelerated bulk decryption of common internet encryption technologies at scale, integrating TURMOIL's passive collection with NSA's LONGHAUL key recovery service via the ISLANDTRANSPORT messaging system, as part of the broader BULLRUN assault on internet encryption.
“Prying Eyes: Inside the NSA's War on Internet Security” - Der Spiegel ↗ (2014-12-28) · “Revealed: how US and UK spy agencies defeat internet privacy and security” - The Guardian ↗ (2013-09-05) · Appelbaum, Jacob · Gibson, Aaron · Grothoff, Christian · Müller-Maguhn, Andy · Poitras, Laura · Sontheimer, Michael · Stöcker, Christian · Ball, James · Borger, Julian · Greenwald, Glenn -
TLS Trends: A roundtable discussion on current usage and future directions [pdf]
A presentation by Canada's Communications Security Establishment describing their TLS trend analysis programme, which systematically tracked SSL/TLS encryption parameters across warranted collection and Special Source access to identify cryptanalytic opportunities, monitor target behaviour and collaborate with GCHQ on exploiting weaknesses in widely-used encryption implementations.
-
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) / Transport Layer Security (TLS) [pdf]
A classified NSA Network Security Products training presentation providing a comprehensive technical overview of SSL/TLS protocol mechanics and NSA's exploitation approaches, including observed usage statistics from intercepted traffic, RSA key exchange decryption methodology, exploitation of the Debian OpenSSL RNG weakness, and the practical challenges of decrypting millions of SSL sessions per day at scale.
Programs: SCARLETFEVER -
TLS trends at GCHQ [pdf]
A GCHQ presentation describing their TLS trends analysis programme, which processed approximately 10 billion SSL/TLS Server Hello events per week from Special Source cable tapping and COMSAT collection to produce weekly trend reports, alongside two operational tools — TargeTLS for matching TLS events against BROAD OAK target profiles, and FLYING PIG, a TLS knowledge base enabling analysts to query certificate, IP and client data across the full intercept base.
-
TURMOIL/APEX/APEX High Level Description Document [pdf]
NSA WikiInfo page providing the high-level design description of APEX — the Active-Passive Integration capability integrating HAMMERMILL router implants with TURMOIL passive collection — enabling real-time exfiltration of targeted VPN (HAMMERSTEIN) and VoIP (HAMMERCHANT) traffic from compromised routers directly into NSA's passive collection and cryptanalytic attack infrastructure, with TURBINE providing automated command and control of the combined active-passive system.
Programs: TURMOIL · APEX · HAMMERMILL · HAMMERCHANT · HAMMERSTEIN · FASHIONCLEFT · TURBINE · TOYGRIPPE · METROTUBE · CHIMNEYPOOL · PIQBLADE · KEYCARD · FASCIA · ISLANDTRANSPORT · PRESSUREWAVE · ASDF · CONVEYANCE · TURBULENCE -
GALLANTWAVE [pdf]
NSA presentation describing GALLANTWAVE — a LONGHAUL capability for VPN decryption — specifically its scaling architecture to handle increased collection volumes and a peering mechanism allowing partner agencies to share single-sided VPN key exchange events so that LONGHAUL can complete decryption attempts that would otherwise fail due to one-sided collection.
-
Intro to the VPN Exploitation Process [pdf]
NSA introduction to the VPN exploitation process from September 2010, presented by the OTP VPN Exploitation Team, covering the full workflow from initial collection through to sustained decryption of IPSec, PPTP, SSL and SSH traffic, with named exploitation successes including airlines, diplomatic missions, banks and intelligence services across Iran, Jordan, Russia, Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Somalia, Indonesia and Mexico.
Programs: BLEAKINQUIRY · TOYGRIPPE · XKEYSCORE · MAILORDER · CORALREEF · VULCANDEATHGRIP · SCISSORS · TURTLEPOWER · PINWALE · FOURSCORE · CADENCE · UTT · VULCANMINDMELD · CAPRIOS · AGILITY · NKB · FOLLOWTHEMONEY -
Analytic Challenges from Active-Passive Integration [pdf]
This NSA briefing addresses the technical and administrative friction caused by "shaping" operations. Shaping occurs when an active malware implant, typically situated on network infrastructure like a router, copies specific data streams and redirects them past a passive surveillance sensor such as TURMOIL. While this ensures the capture of data that might otherwise be missed, it creates a "double metadata" conflict where a single piece of intelligence carries two competing sets of identifiers: one from the active Tailored Access Operations (TAO) implant and another from the passive collection site. The document tasks analysts with finding a way to reconcile these source notations to ensure the data remains searchable and legally compliant within legacy databases.
Programs: BRAVENICKEL · HAMMERMILL · APEX · TURMOIL · HAMMERSTONE · PRESSUREWAVE · METROTUBE · TOYGRIPPE · TURBULENCE · METAWAVE · MARINA · SSO · CONVEYANCE · NUCLEON · FASCIA · HAMMERCHANT
Related Documents
-
VALIANTSURF [pdf]
An NSA WikiInfo page for VALIANTSURF — the coverterm for NSA's IPSec VPN decryption capability within the TURMOIL collection platform — describing the four data flow types for intercepting and breaking encrypted VPN traffic, the full deployment roster across collection sites including Menwith Hill, SMOKYSINK, MUSCULAR, CROSSCUT and others, and the architectural taxonomy of the VALIANTSURF programme including its MALIBU and WAIMEA processing architectures and their relationship to LONGHAUL, POISONNUT and GALLANTWAVE.
Programs: VALIANTSURF · TURMOIL · TURBULENCE · HOOKED · HOOKEDHAND · CINDER · CINDERASH · CINDERTRACK · SCARLETFEVER · LONGHAUL · FALLOUT · TOYGRIPPE · PICARESQUE · XKEYSCORE · PRESSUREWAVE · ASDF · MAILORDER · TUBE · KEYCARD · POISONNUT · ISLANDHIDEAWAY · ISLANDTRANSPORT · EXOPUMP · CORALREEF · PINWALE · TUSCARORA · ONEROOF · CONVEYANCE · TURTLEPOWER · WDM · CADENCE · UTT · SCISSORS · FISHWAY · BTUBE · DNCA · ROMULANALE · GALLANTWAVE · ROMULANGAWK · ROMULANGOWL · MALIBU · WAIMEA · WAIMEAVISAGE · ROMULANVISAGE · WAIMEAVISE · ROMULANVISE · APEX · METROTUBE · MADFORGE · JSORCERER · CROSSCUT · CIET · LATTICE · STARQUAKE · SARATOGA · MUSCULAR · SMOKYSINK · SLACKKEY · TUMMS · PURGE · SURGE · NUCLEON · SPAGIC · PPF · SOAP · TUMULT · FIP · PIQBLADE · DEEPDIVE · IBRIDGE -
VS MALIBU IKE And ESP Metadata Flows [pdf]
A TOP SECRET four-slide architecture document describing MALIBU — NSA's system for intercepting and decrypting IPSec VPN traffic at the point where it crosses monitored internet cables — showing how intercepted VPN connections are processed, cryptographic keys recovered, traffic decrypted and results delivered to analysts, with separate diagrams for metadata collection, software decryption, full exploitation and survey modes.
-
TURMOIL GALLANTWAVE [pdf]
An NSA WikiInfo page describing TURMOIL GALLANTWAVE — a CES mission application hosted on TURMOIL that decrypts communications using Data Network Session Cipher (DNSC) technologies, such as SSL/TLS, by integrating with the LONGHAUL SCARLETFEVER key recovery service and forwarding decrypted sessions to XKEYSCORE for analyst access.
Programs: VALIANTSURF · XKEYSCORE · TURMOIL · GALLANTWAVE · LONGHAUL · TURBULENCE · BULLRUN · SCARLETFEVER · TUMULT · TUBE · UTT · BTUBE · FISHWAY · EXOPUMP · PURGE · SURGE · SCISSORS · PINWALE · TUSCARORA · NUCLEON · WDM · TURTLEPOWER · CONVEYANCE · ONEROOF · KEYCARD · SLIDETACKLE · POLARSTARKEY · TUMMS · CEMETERY · TEPIDTSUNAMI · PPF · ISLANDTRANSPORT -
TURMOIL VPN PROCESSING [pdf]
A TURMOIL VPN Processing technical briefing from October 2009 describing the full architecture for intercepting and decrypting IPSec VPN traffic within the TURMOIL passive collection platform — covering IKE/ESP protocol handling, five distinct data flow types, the Dell LPT hardware implementation, and live operational metrics showing over 8 million packets decrypted at Menwith Hill and 1.4 million at SMOKYSINK during a single week in October 2009.
-
Innov8 Experiment Profile Template [pdf]
A TOP SECRET STRAP1 joint NSA/GCHQ experiment profile documenting a 2010-2011 Joint Capability Experiment to test hardware-accelerated bulk decryption of common internet encryption technologies at scale, integrating TURMOIL's passive collection with NSA's LONGHAUL key recovery service via the ISLANDTRANSPORT messaging system, as part of the broader BULLRUN assault on internet encryption.
“Prying Eyes: Inside the NSA's War on Internet Security” - Der Spiegel ↗ (2014-12-28) · “Revealed: how US and UK spy agencies defeat internet privacy and security” - The Guardian ↗ (2013-09-05) · Appelbaum, Jacob · Gibson, Aaron · Grothoff, Christian · Müller-Maguhn, Andy · Poitras, Laura · Sontheimer, Michael · Stöcker, Christian · Ball, James · Borger, Julian · Greenwald, Glenn