Special Collection Service – Pacific SIGDEV Conference March 2011 – Supply Chain Excepts

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Creating agency: NSA National Security Agency (US)
Document date: 2011-03-01
Pages: 4
Genre: slides
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Classification: TOP SECRET COMINT
Dissemination: REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

This top-secret 2011 NSA presentation outlines how the Special Collection Service—a joint NSA–CIA program operating from U.S. embassies—leverages its global network of “points of presence” to conduct human-enabled SIGINT and cyber operations directly inside “adversary space.” Framed as a “home field advantage,” it portrays U.S. diplomatic sites as launchpads for infiltration, surveillance, and even supply chain attacks, blurring the line between diplomacy and digital espionage.

Long Description:
The 2011 NSA presentation on the Special Collection Service (SCS) reveals the breadth and scope of the U.S. intelligence community's global operations, emphasizing its ability to conduct surveillance and cyber operations from diplomatic facilities worldwide. Described as providing a "home field advantage," the SCS leverages 80 “points of presence” (PoPs) located at U.S. embassies and consulates across the globe. These PoPs enable SIGINT collection, exfiltration, and manipulation of foreign communications, particularly in adversarial regions. The presentation highlights how SCS, with its joint NSA-CIA operations, can gain access to a wide array of communications infrastructure, including satellite links, microwave networks, and wireless systems such as WiFi and GSM. By living in the "environment" of their adversaries, the SCS can collect sensitive information undetected, opening up a range of intelligence opportunities for both the NSA and CIA. One of the most striking aspects of the document is the implicit suggestion that these diplomatic locations are not only used for traditional SIGINT collection but also for cyber operations, including the manipulation and sabotage of foreign communications and supply chains. The presentation alludes to the potential for compromising hardware and software at various points in the supply chain, exploiting weaknesses in global networks to achieve intelligence-gathering objectives. It emphasizes the element of surprise, suggesting that SCS can remain undetected while conducting operations that span both cyber and SIGINT domains. This blurred distinction between cyber and traditional SIGINT operations further underscores the growing intersection of these fields in modern intelligence work. The document also suggests that the NSA and CIA, through the SCS, possess unparalleled access to foreign networks and targets, ranging from terrorist groups and criminal organizations to foreign intelligence agents and hackers. This access is framed not just as a collection effort but as a platform for enabling broader intelligence community operations, blending SIGINT with cyber capabilities for a more integrated, comprehensive approach. While the details of specific operations remain classified, the document paints a picture of an intelligence enterprise capable of conducting sophisticated, far-reaching surveillance and cyber-espionage operations, all while operating within the cover of U.S. diplomatic missions.

TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Special Collection Service

Pacific SIGDEV Conference

March 2011

The Overall Classification of this Briefing:
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
Dated: 20070108
Declassify On: 20360301


TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

The SCS Cyber Advantage

SIGINT prowess provides cyber advantage

  • Unified operations provides holistic approach
  • The right intelligence delivered to the right customer

Home field advantage in adversary's space

  • Where our customers want us and our adversaries do not
  • Capitalizing on the "element of surprise"

Signal access for collection, exfil, and infil

  • Microwave, WiFi, WiMAX, GSM, CDMA, Satellite, etc.

Living in the environment

  • Insights on infrastructure and configurations
  • Discovery of targets, signatures, and behavior

Tailored intelligence products

  • Diverse products driven by national objectives and
    local needs through formal reporting, target packages,
    analytic insights, situational awareness, threat warning

Unique platform for conducting and enabling IC operations

  • Fully leveraging 30-years of experience within the NSA and
    CIA enterprises and using existing authorities

Broad Spectrum of Capability

  • Geographic Advantage
    • Signal Access
      • Analysis
        • Dissemination
  • Unique Platform for IC Operations

Integrated Mission

TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Human enabled SIGINT
Employ all the capabilities of the SCS to gain access to the targets – Maybe use a SIGINT focused mission to highlight how it can easily contribute to a cyber focus in the CNE/CNA/ CND world? Make the use of SIGINT information operations a liability for our adversaries in cyber operations

Unique place within the Intelligence Community where we can and do blend CIA and NSA operations to further IC intelligence needs


TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

80 Points of Presence

1000s of Opportunities on the Net

SCS lives on the Net at worldwide Points of Presence

SCS PoPs provide opportunities for access, enabling, and analysis

Large Networks: 3,000 – 5,000
WLANs: 10,000 – 30,000

TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Need to know how to better survey, populate databases, and understand what accesses we have 1 guy – 4 systems

Significant diversity in the parts of the network that we see, not just fiber and router access


TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

SCS Opportunities

  • TERRORISTS
  • CRIMINAL GROUPS
  • SATELLITE
  • SUPPLY CHAIN
  • FOREIGN INTEL AGENTS
  • CELL PHONE
  • HACKERS
  • TROJAN
  • BOTNET DDOS

SCS PoPs provide opportunities for access, enabling, and analysis

Look at what we are doing with a cyber viewpoint, not just SIGINT