Intellipedia – BIOS Threats

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Creating agency: NSA National Security Agency (US)
Document date: 2012-03-13
Pages: 7
Genre: wiki
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Classification: TOP SECRET SI
Dissemination: NOFORN

This from an internal wiki for the U.S. intelligence community, titled “BIOS Threats” details the use of malicious BIOS implants as a means of achieving persistent system compromise for cyber espionage and attack purposes. It discusses the history, technical challenges, detection limitations, and global development of BIOS-based malware by both state and non-state actors, including U.S. and Chinese cyber units.

Long Description:
This document, from an internal wiki for the U.S. intelligence community, titled “BIOS Threats”, examines the development, detection challenges, and operational implications of firmware-level malware implants residing in computer BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) firmware. It outlines how such implants—though not always malicious—can be exploited for both Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) and Computer Network Attack (CNA) operations by state and non-state actors. The document provides historical and technical context, citing early examples such as the Chernobyl (CIH) virus of 1998 and subsequent research from Black Hat and CanSecWest conferences that demonstrated methods for persistent BIOS-level compromise. It also notes legitimate manufacturer-embedded firmware like LoJack for Laptops as an example of benign implants that nonetheless illustrate the feasibility of such persistence mechanisms. From an intelligence and counterintelligence perspective, the document assesses that BIOS implants are exceptionally difficult to detect, particularly on networks such as NIPRNet, where current security methods would only reveal indirect signs of infection through anomalous network activity. The text emphasizes that BIOS-based malware can survive standard mitigation measures, including hard drive reformatting, OS reinstallation, and even BIOS reflashing, by hiding in unused firmware memory regions. The report further discusses the potential use of expansion card firmware (graphics, sound, and network cards) as alternative persistence vectors, capable of supporting covert data exfiltration channels—for instance, sound card–based ultrasonic transmissions or modified NICs used for covert communication. Intelligence judgments within the report suggest that Chinese PLA-linked groups and a capability codenamed MAKERSMARK have both explored or implemented persistent BIOS-based CNE tools, though without clear operational overlap. Specific BIOS vendors such as AMI and Award are noted as being compromised, increasing the systemic threat. Supporting references include classified bulletins and analyses from USCYBERCOM, DIA, and NSA’s NTOC, highlighting BIOS-level compromise as a key enabler of hardware-based persistence and supply chain infiltration. Ultimately, the document underscores that BIOS implants represent one of the most insidious categories of cyber threats—capable of eluding conventional detection, surviving system rebuilds, and granting deep control over targeted computing infrastructure, making them a critical frontier in both offensive cyber operations and defensive countermeasures.
Programs:
MAKERSMARK, TOUCHWOLF, STROMTIME, A-SPACE

People mentioned:
Heasman, John, Sacco, Anibal, Ortega, Alfredo, Yam, Marcus, Fisher, Dennis

Countries:
Singapore, Taiwan, China

Tags:
BIOS, firmware implants, Computer Network Exploitation, Computer Network Attack, persistent malware, firmware persistence, supply chain attacks, rootkits, AMI BIOS, Award BIOS, PLA cyber units, CYBERCOM, DIA, NTOC, CIH virus, Chernobyl, Black Hat, CanSecWest, DEF CON, Core Security Technologies, ACPI exploitation, BIOS reflashing, expansion card malware, network card covert channel, GPU, graphics card malware, sound card exfiltration, ultrasonic exfiltration, boot firmware, dual BIOS systems, hardware attack, supply chain vulnerability, insider threat, malware persistence, system integrity, advanced persistent threat, hardware implants, intelligence community, internal wiki, Intellipedia, malware mitigation, root access, hardware security, system firmware, embedded systems, firmware exploitation, computer hardware security, persistent threat actor, malware, stealth malware

Identifier:
Intellipedia-BIOS-Threats

PDF SHA-256:
daccaf9249ebed5d2ede0c6068d47dce8f8cf9271c1173d344bff3403470a157

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(U) BIOS Threats

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(U) I would like feedback on this page. Please edit or leave a comment on the Talk page!

(U) BIOS implants are firmware written which reside in a computer's BIOS and perform some function. Though not necessarily malicious, implants can be used to conduct CNA and CNE.[1]

(U) BIOS attacks and implants have been used and are known by both state and non nation-state actors. There have been presentations on them in previous Black Hat and DEF CON conventions.[2] LOJACK for laptops is an optionally manufacturer-installed BIOS implant for Dell laptops. [3] BIOS attacks can even be traced back at least to the Chernobyl virus in 1998.[4]

Contents

[hide]

  • 1 (U) Key Findings
  • 2 (U) Key Judgments
  • 3 (U) Recent News and Reporting
  • 4 (U) Virus attacks
    • 4.1 (U) CIH
    • 4.2 (U) Black Hat 2006
    • 4.3 (U) Persistent BIOS Infection
  • 5 (U) References
  • 6 (U) Additional Reading

[edit] (U) Key Findings

  • (U) Using a BIOS implant for CNE is more difficult than for CNA. Without specific information about the targeted system(s), the implant is much more likely to prevent proper system booting (CNA).[5]
  • (U) When using a BIOS implant for either CNE or CNA by remote means, there must be an initial infection by traditional malware. The intruder still needs to obtain administrator or root access. Supply chain and insider threat are both still possible.[5]
  • (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) There are currently no ways in use to detect a BIOS infection outright on NIPRNet. The only way we would see a BIOS infection using current methods would be indirectly, through network traffic generated when the implant phones home.[5]
  • (U//FOUO) The main reason for introducing malware into an expansion card (or BIOS) is to maintain a persisting presence through typical methods of system rebuilds. In addition to being immune to hard disk reformatting and OS reinstallations, some BIOS implants can survive a flashing of the BIOS by hiding in the BIOS's free space. Graphic, sound, and network card firmware could provide further hiding places. "Graphic cards have been subverted to support distributed brute-force password breaking. Network cards could be used to create covert channels. Security researchers have shown that sound cards can be controlled by malware to emit frequencies beyond normal hearing range designed to exfiltrate data."[6]

[edit] (U) Key Judgments

  • (TS//SI//NF) PLA and MAKERSMARK versions do not appear to have a common link beyond the interest in developing more persistent and stealthy CNE.[7][8][9]
  • (TS//SI//NF) Among currently compromised are AMI and Award based BIOS versions. The threat that BIOS implants pose increases significantly for systems running on compromised versions.[10]

[edit] (U) Recent News and Reporting

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[edit] (U) Virus attacks

(U) There are at least three known BIOS attack viruses.

[edit] (U) CIH

(U) The first was a virus which was able to erase Flash ROM BIOS content, rendering computer systems unstable. CIH, also known as "Chernobyl Virus", appeared for the first time in mid-1998 and became active in April 1999. It affected systems' BIOS and often could not be fixed on their own since they were no longer able to boot at all. To repair this, Flash ROM IC had to be ejected from the motherboard to be reprogrammed somewhere else. Damage from CIH was possible since the Virus was specifically targeted at the then widespread Intel i430TX motherboard chipset, and the most common operating systems of the time were based on the Windows 9x family allowing direct hardware access to all programs.

(U) Modern systems are not vulnerable to CIH because of a variety of chipsets being used which are incompatible with the Intel i430TX chipset, and also other Flash ROM IC types. There is also extra protection from accidental BIOS rewrites in the form of boot blocks which are protected from accidental overwrite or dual and quad BIOS equipped systems which may, in the event of a crash, use a backup BIOS. Also, all modern operating systems like Linux, Mac OS X, Windows NT-based Windows OS like Windows 2000, Windows XP and newer, do not allow user mode programs to have direct hardware access. As a result, as of 2008, CIH has become essentially harmless, at worst causing annoyance by infecting executable files and triggering alerts from antivirus software. Other BIOS viruses remain possible, however:[11] since most Windows users run all applications with administrative privileges, a modern CIH-like virus could, in principle, still gain access to hardware.

[edit] (U) Black Hat 2006

(U) The second one was a technique presented by John Heasman, principal security consultant for UK based Next-Generation Security Software at the Black Hat Security Conference (2006), where he showed how to elevate privileges and read physical memory, using malicious procedures that replaced normal ACPI functions stored in flash memory.

[edit] (U) Persistent BIOS Infection

(U) The third one, known as "Persistent BIOS infection", was a method presented in CanSecWest Security Conference (Vancouver, 2009) and SyScan Security Conference (Singapore, 2009) where researchers Anibal Sacco [12] and Alfredo Ortéga, from Core Security Technologies, demonstrated insertion of malicious code into the decompression routines in the BIOS, allowing for nearly full control of the PC at every start-up, even before the operating system is booted.

(U) The proof-of-concept does not exploit a flaw in the BIOS implementation, but only involves the normal BIOS flashing procedures. Thus, it requires physical access to the machine or for the user on the operating system to be root. Despite this, however, researchers underline the profound implications of their discovery: "We can patch a driver to drop a fully working rootkit. We even have a little code that can remove or disable antivirus."[13]

[edit] (U) References

  1. ↑ BIOS Threat Mitigation Info
  2. ↑ (U) www.coresecurity.com/content/Deactivate-the-Rootkit
  3. ↑ (U) www.absolute.com/en/lojackforlaptops/home.aspx
  4. ↑ (U) www.Symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2000-122010-2655-99
  5. ↑ 5.0 5.1 5.2 (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Basic Input-Output System (BIOS) based Malware by [REDACTED]
  6. ↑ (S//NF) USCYBERCOM; J2 Bulletin 10-03; Hardware-Based Malware Demonstrates Resistance to Standard Security Practices; 30 June 2010
  7. ↑ (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) NTOC; V22-ITN-087-10; Analysis of a BIOS Rootkit; 24 MAY 2010
  8. (U//FOUO) TDX-315/072060-10 240000Z SEP 10, source marked (TS//HCS//NF)
  9. IOC CTW 2010-02-4C 28 Feb 2010
  10. ↑ (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) DIRNSA, 3/00/521733-10 READDRESSAL Probable Contractor to PRC People's Liberation Army Conducts Computer Network Exploitation Against Taiwan Critical Infrastructure Networks; Develops Network Attack Capabilities, R 011521Z SEP 10
  11. ↑ New BIOS Virus Withstands HDD Wipes, March 27, 2009 by Marcus Yam – Tom's Hardware US
  12. ↑ Sacco, Anibal; Alfredo Ortega. Persistent BIOS Infection. Exploiting Stuff. Retrieved on 2010-02-06.
  13. Fisher, Dennis. Researchers unveil persistent BIOS attack methods. Threat Post. Retrieved on 2010-02-06.

[edit] (U) Additional Reading

  • (S) DIA; Defense Intelligence Digest: BIOS: China's Covert Cyber Capability; 14 Oct 2010 (A-Space required)
  • (U) TOUCHWOLF - NSANet Wikiinfo page
  • (U) STROMTIME BIOS Action Plan Status – NSANet Wikiinfo page

Retrieved from "http://[REDACTED]"
Categories: Cyber Threat Assessments | BIOS

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