SIGINT Development Support II Program Management Review, 24 April 2013 (select slides)

Open PDF
Creating agency: NSA National Security Agency (US)
Document date: 2013-04-24
Pages: 4
Genre: slides
Banner:
Classification: TOP SECRET SI
Dissemination: NOFORN

These selected slides briefly celebrate two NSA “success stories”: penetrating Pakistan’s Green Line infrastructure with SECONDDATE-enabled implants, and seizing country-wide leverage over Lebanon’s internet backbone through Ogero to siphon off Hezbollah-related data. It shows how U.S. intelligence treated supposedly inaccessible national networks as targets to be shaped, exploited, and folded into its global surveillance machine. See extra slide in "NSA Supply Chain Attack From PMR 4-24-13" https://theintercept.com/document/2019/01/24/nsa-supply-chain-attack-from-pmr-4-24-13/

Long Description:
This document offers a revealing snapshot of two NSA SIGINT development wins, framed as routine operational progress. The first centers on Pakistan’s National Telecommunications Corporation (NTC) and its VIP Division, which maintains the Green Line network used by senior civilian and military leadership. Analysts conducted selector analysis and SIGDEV work to map out additional targets before deploying SECONDDATE and QUANTUM to implant four new CNE accesses directly into machines holding Green Exchange–related documents. The tone treats the compromise of a core national communications system—one explicitly built for a government’s top leadership—as a technical milestone rather than a geopolitical intrusion, underscoring how the agency normalizes access to “traditionally inaccessible” foreign networks. The second operation highlights an even broader achievement: enabling country-wide shaping and man-in-the-middle capabilities against Lebanon’s internet traffic. Working under the TAO project REXKWONDO, NSA components collaborated to exploit Ogero, the Lebanese state-run ISP, targeting its NOC and core routers with custom-built exploits and HAMMERCORE implants. This compromise allowed the agency to shape and divert traffic—particularly data linked to Hezbollah Unit 1800—into STORMBREW collection systems, making new intelligence streams available to XKEYSCORE analysts within a day. Presented as a clean technical success, the narrative glosses over the political sensitivity of commandeering an entire nation’s international gateway, while offering an unvarnished look at the scale and ambition of U.S. offensive SIGINT operations.

TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN

(U) SIGINT Development Support II Program Management Review

24 April 2013

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
SIGDEV
SIGINT DEVELOPMENT

The overall classification of this brief is
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
Dated: 20070108
Declassify On: 20291123

SDS
Booz Allen Hamilton
SIGINT | Development | Support
Team

TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN


TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN

PMR Agenda

  • Strategic & Technical Overview - [REDACTED]
  • Placemats & Highlights – Client Service Leads (CSLs) & Senior Mission Technical Leads (SMTLs)
  • PMR Spotlight
    • MONSTERMIND - [REDACTED]
    • SDS Support to CHELSEABLUE - [REDACTED]
  • Technical Health - [REDACTED]

SDS
Booz | Allen | Hamilton
SIGINT | Development | Support
Team

TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN


TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)

SID Priority: Traditionally Inaccessible Network

SIGINT Development Challenge: Establish a proven foundation of targets in Pakistan's National Telecommunications Corporation's (NTC) VIP Division.

Mission Example and Result: Successfully enabled positive identification of users in NTC's VIP division who focus on maintaining the Green Exchange. The Green Exchange branch houses ZXJ-10 switches, which are the backbone of Pakistan's Green Line communications network. This network is used by senior Pakistani civilian and military leadership. Four machines in the VIP division who have Green Exchange related documents on their machines were successfully implanted.

Our Approach

  • Evaluated currently tasked selectors related to NTC's VIP division.
  • Conducted SIGDEV against known selectors to identify other related targets.
  • Collaborated with R&T to use SECONDDATE and QUANTUM to successfully implant four new CNE accesses within the Green Exchange.

GREEN EXCHANGE ISLAMABAD ROOM MAP
GLASS
WINDOW
GLASS
WINDOW
GLASS
WINDOW
GLASS
WINDOW

  • DOOR
  • REVOLVING CHAIR
  • CHAIR
  • TABLE
  • Aluminium Partitioning
  • WALL

STAFF ROOM

SWITCH ROOM

RECTIFIER
IPE SHELF
IPE SHELF

Slipper Rack

Entrance

A.Es ROOM

SPARES RACK

M.D.F FRAME

SIGINT Development Outcome: Four new CNE accesses were gained for the VIP Division and a baseline of collection related to the Green Exchange was established.

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)

SDS
Booz | Allen | Hamilton
SIGINT | Development | Support
Team

TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN


TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN

SID Priority: Traditionally Inaccessible Target Networks

(TS//SI//NF)

SIGINT Development Challenge: Passive access in Lebanon is limited, thereby hindering SIGDEV, Discovery, and Mobility Exploitation. TAO project REXKWONDO successfully enabled Country-Wide Shaping and Man-in-the-Middle (MiTM) capabilities against Lebanon's Internet traffic for the first time ever.

Mission Example and Result: Combined CT SIGDEV and CNE analysis effort within REXKWONDO, the Lebanese owned OGERO ISP, resulted in multiple successful CNE operations that yielded initial access and collection from Lebanon's International Gateway routers. Currently shaping Hizballah-related traffic to SSO-STORMBREW, providing SIGDEV discovery opportunities for S2I, S2E, and SSG\NAC via
XKEYSCORE and MARINA.

Our Approach

  • S2I53 CT SIGDEV SDS analysts provided technical support on various high-interest targets and assisted in exploitation and implant of the head of the OGERO NOC and the core routers.
  • Collaboration between multiple divisions within TAO and S2I5 led to the development of a custom-built router exploit and new HAMMERCORE implant builds.
  • The OGERO ISP gateway router (RB) was exploited via HAMREX to enable SECONDDATE MiTM.
  • The OGERO upstream Liban Telecom routers were exploited with CGDB, then implanted with HAMMERCORE and HAMMERSTEIN to enable successful Shaping of Hizballah Unit 1800 related traffic for multiple CT projects.
  • Traffic was exfiltrated to STORMBREW from core routers and was accessible to S21, S2E, and SSGINAC analysts via XKEYSCORE in less than 24 hours following the successful shaping tasking.
Data Le... Protocol Quality Sigad AppId... Application  AppID (+Fingerprints)
547       TCP      g      US-3105S8  http/get           http get ndist discovery IR CERT II
34        TCP      g      US-3105S8  http/post          http post heuristics/oA BHAM/user
34        TCP      g      US-3105S8  
34        TCP      g      US-3105S8  
84        TCP      g      US-3105S8  
34        TCP      g      US-310556  
21        TCP      g      US-3105S8  
34        TCP      g      US-3105S8  
34        TCP      g      US-3105S8  
34        TCP      g      US-3105S8  http/post          BHAM/user
34        TCP      g      US-3105S8  http/post          BHAM/user
34        TCP      g      US-310556  http/post          BHAM/user
34        TCP      g      US-3105S8  http/post          BHAM/user
641       TCP      g      US-3105S8  mail/webmail       rowser.Mic
275       TCP      g      US-3105S8  http/get           wabPRJ/Lin
84        TCP      g      US-3105S8  http/post          BHAM/user
84        TCP      g      US-3105S8  http/post          BHAM/user
84        TCP      g      US-3105S8  http/post          BHAM/user

Equals Filter
Column: Application
Equals: maps/google_earth/respo
        advertisement/http/get
        advertisement/http/go...
        analytics/web/google
        domain/google
        http/get
        http/head
        http/post
        http/post/ocsp-request
        http/post/x-www-form...
        mail/webmail/hotmail
        mail/webmail/windowslive
        maps/google_earth/get
        maps/google_earth/req...
        maps/google_earth/res...
Apply Not:

| 03reubup-e9enecqfwwy_oaho<facebookMachine> | OGERO ISP NEEDS 2 | US-310558 | LE.QTHABTAAMDT2
| curtncl7oa3k0<tclicYahoo-uicl-b> curtncl7oa3k0<yahooBCookie> | OGERO ISP NEEDS 2 | US-310558 | LE.QTHABTAAMDT2
| curtncl7oa3k0<tclicYahoo-uicl-b> curtncl7oa3k0<yahooBCookie> | OGERO ISP NEEDS 2 | US-310558 | LE.QTHABTAAMDT2
| b3115b9949185eba<GooglePREFID> | OGERO ISP NEEDS 2 | US-310558 | LE.QTHABTAAMDT2
| b3115b9949185eba<GooglePREFID> | OGERO ISP NEEDS 2 | US-310558 | LE.QTHABTAAMDT2

SIGINT Development Outcome: SDS collaboration across the TAO and S2I5 previously denied access to the International Gateway routers in Lebanon and Sole-Source Discovery against Hizballah. 100 +MB of Hizballah Unit 1800 data has been collected and ingested into XKEYSCORE. S2122 confirms CADENCE dictionary and XKEYSCORE fingerprint hits. NSA SIGINT Enterprise analysts can now conduct SIGDEV on any target IP range of interest in Lebanon using a single passive database [US-3105S8] in XKEYSCORE.

(TS//SI//NF)

SDS
Booz | Allen | Hamilton
SIGINT | Development | Support
Team

TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN