Project CAMBERDADA

Open PDF
Creating agency: NSA National Security Agency (US)
Document date: -
Pages: 13
Genre: slides
Banner:
Classification: TOP SECRET COMINT
Dissemination: REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

NSA presentation on Project CAMBERDADA, a programme that intercepts emails sent to antivirus companies reporting new malware, uses SIGINT collection to monitor antivirus vendor communications, and identifies opportunities to repurpose malware before vendors detect it — listing 23 antivirus companies from around the world as targets, with Kaspersky as the primary focus.

Long Description:
This NSA presentation jointly authored by analysts from IAD (Information Assurance Directorate, unit I412) and NTOC (National Threat Operations Center, unit V252), describing Project CAMBERDADA — a programme to intercept communications flowing into antivirus companies and exploit the resulting intelligence for offensive and defensive cyber operations. The document reveals that NSA was systematically monitoring emails sent by security researchers and members of the public to antivirus vendors reporting new malware samples. The example shown is a genuine email from François Picard of Montreal-based NewRoma.net, sent in May 2012, reporting a phishing file targeting BMO Financial Group customers — intercepted without Picard's knowledge. NSA analysts use these intercepts to triage approximately 10 potentially malicious files per day, with over 500 collected since 2009. Roughly 50 CAMBERDADA signatures had been deployed to NIPRnet for alerting, and 9 domains had been placed under DNS interdiction — where a Cloudshield device intercepts DNS requests and redirects them to a Department of Defense listening post while logging the responses. The document connects CAMBERDADA to multiple collection streams: SSO (Special Source Operations cable tapping), overhead (satellite), SCS (Special Collection Service), and FORNSAT (foreign satellite collection), along with CADENCE selectors, daily PINWALE queries, EXIT4 models, and MAILORDER. The listed applications of the programme include repurposing captured malware through TAO, checking whether Kaspersky continues to detect intercepted virus files, monitoring the individuals who submitted the malware for further intelligence value, and establishing automated reporting. The BRICKTOP (2009) slide lists Russian entities under surveillance including Kaspersky, Rosoboronexport, ComCor and Famatech. The "More Targets!" section lists 23 additional antivirus companies across Europe, Asia and the Middle East as targets for the same SIGINT-based monitoring, including F-Secure (Finland), AVG (Czech), Norman (Norway), DrWeb (Russia), Avira (Germany), ESET (Slovakia), Avast (Czech), Check Point (Israel) and Ahnlab (South Korea) — notably excluding American vendors McAfee and Symantec and British vendor Sophos.
Programs:
CAMBERDADA, BRICKTOP, CLOUDSHIELD, CADENCE, PINWALE, MAILORDER, SSO

People mentioned:
Picard, François

Countries:
Russia, Iran, India, China, Georgia, Jordan, Japan, France, Romania, Italy, Israel, Norway, Iceland, Czech Republic, Finland, Austria, Germany, Poland, Slovakia, South Korea

Tags:
antivirus, PSP, Kaspersky, NTOC, IAD, Tailored Access Operations, malware interception, DNS interdiction, NIPRnet, SSO, FORNSAT, Special Collection Service, email interception, security research, malware analysis, SRE, F-Secure, AVG, DrWeb, ESET, Avast, Check Point, Rosoboronexport, cyber operations, antivirus evasion, zero-day exploits, vulnerabilities, vulnerability stockpiling, malware, BMO Financial Group, OVERHEAD

Identifier:
project-camberdada

PDF SHA-256:
02822ae2dc779287d023f331b8baa157cd718858f095ed16b8b09e5363c7d056

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

An Easy Win: Using SIGINT to Learn about New Viruses

Project CAMBERDADA
By [REDACTED], I412 (IAD)
& [REDACTED], V252
(NTOC)

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
Dated: 20070108
Declassify On: 20370301

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Overall classification

TOPSECRET//COMINT//
REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

BRICKTOP (2009)

  • Tascom
  • RusComNet
  • Kaspersky
  • Rosoboron export
  • nstitute of Information & Analytical Technology (IIAT)
  • Moscow Telecommunication Corporation (ComCor)
  • Famatech
  • Comstar
  • Komet

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

IR
IN

Антивирус
Касперского

JP
JO
PRC
GE

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Sample Email Received by an AV Vendor

PWZA20120510218350000197506

Good day,

A phishing scam file is attached for your analysis.
Zip file password = virus

The file tricks the user into giving her/his bank account
credentials. This can be verified by clicking on the Sign In
button.

FYI: https://www.virustotal.com/file/8fb6447fdc9cfe204cde...

Regards,
Francois Picard
www.NewRoma.net

Attachment: BMOFinancialGroup.zip

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Duh
Duh
Duh
Duh

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Work Flow

IR

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


Analytic value

  • SIGINT brings in ~10 potentially malicious files per day for malware triage
  • Over 500 potentially malicious files collected since 2009
  • ~ 50 CAMBERDADA signatures deployed to NIPRnet for alerting
  • 9 domains mitigated

DNS Interdiction

  • 9 domains under DNS Interdiction
  • Cloudshield intercepts the DNS request
  • Returns the address of a DoD listening post
  • Munged version of the request is sent out
  • DNS response is sent to a log

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Current status

  • CRN
    • SSO
    • Overhead
    • SCS
    • FORNSAT
  • IN L-C-2010-147 - Multi-Country: Computer Network Ops
  • Dozens of CADENCE selectors
  • PINWALE daily queries; EXIT4 models
  • MAILORDER

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


What else can we do?

  • TAO can repurpose the malware
  • Check Kaspersky AV to see if they continue to let any of these virus files through their Anti-Virus product
  • Monitor the folks who provide the malware to see if they're into more nefarious activity
  • Establish automated reporting

More Targets!

  • fsb-antivirus (France)
  • Bit-Defender (Romania)
  • Viritpro (Italy)
  • eAladdin (Israel)
  • F-secure (Finland)
  • AVG (Czech)
  • F-prot (Iceland)
  • Norman (Norway)
  • DrWeb (Russia)
  • k7computing (India)
  • Ikarus (Austria)
  • Hauri (Korea)
  • Arcabit (Poland)
  • Antiy (Chinese)
  • Avira (Germany)
  • Spy-Emergency (Slovakia)
  • Nod32 (Slovakia)
  • Ahnlab (S Korea)
  • Novirusthanks (Italy)
  • Emsisoft (Austria)
  • Eset (Slovakia)
  • Avast (Czech)
  • Checkpoint (Israel)

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

THANK YOU!

[REDACTED]
I4121
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
V252
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED](s)
[REDACTED](s)

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
Dated: 20070108
Declassify On: 20370301

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL