Intrusion Analysis – GCHQ
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Pages: 2
Genre: report
Banner: SECRET STRAP1
Classification: SECRET STRAP 1
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An internal GCHQ write-up defines the Intrusion Analysis team’s remit inside the Joint Electronic Attack Cell: all‑source analysis of emerging and active electronic attacks, stewardship of electronic attack signatures, and SIGINT‑driven targeting under EITT oversight. It details sources, reporting channels, legal authorities, and auditing controls that govern how signatures are deployed and how selectors are managed.
HARUSPEX, JTRIG, PROSPERO, CORINTH
People mentioned:
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Countries:
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Tags:
Intrusion Analysis, Joint Electronic Attack Cell, electronic attack, signature development, signature release policy, HARUSPEX sensors, MessageLabs data, SIGINT targeting, EITT oversight, JTRIG, EA Threat Team, CNE tasking, Computer Network Exploitation, selectors, IP addresses, domain selectors, email selectors, PROSPERO reporting, MIRANDA numbers, JIC, LBPR authority, ISA section 5, ISA section 7, RIPA Part I, OPPLEG authorisations, domestic targeting controls, foreign intelligence services, attack vectors, infrastructure mapping, false positive rate management, audit, selector management, reporting, dissemination, all-source analysis, incident response, threat detection, data fusion, oversight, authorization
Identifier:
gchq-intrusion-analysis
PDF SHA-256:
9adf42a463af40657f79b6d960068c9df73ad81a0b967b4cbef1cdb9e57c4ca8
My notes
SECRET STRAP1
Intrusion Analysis/JeAC
The IA team conducts all-source analysis both of emerging and current electronic attack types. It forms part of the Joint Electronic Attack Cell (JeAC). (Other JeAC elements are EITT, JTRIG and the EA Threat Team). SIGINT targeting by the IA team falls under EITT oversight (see Seth's email of 6/12/07). The IA team is responsible for the management and release of eA signatures.
PoCs: [REDACTED] (Team Leader)
Main Customers: SS, GCHQ, SIS, HMG, 2nd Parties.
Sources: where does the material come from?
- SIGINT
- HARUSPEX (though most first-line analysis is done by the Incident Response Team)
- MessageLabs data managed via the HARUSPEX network
- Tasking of CNE
- Open Source
"Target" location
HARUSPEX sensors monitor attacks against UK systems based on known attack signatures. These signatures typically reflect attack vectors, infrastructure or entity identifiers associated with attacks. While the signatures reflect our knowledge of FIS activities, UK-to-UK traffic may be collected if the attacker is using UK infrastructure.
SIGINT is used to detect attack activity associated with FIS or Foreign Governments. Selectors include IP addresses, web domains and email addresses. In general these are not associated with the UK, but where UK infrastructure is involved, appropriate SIGINT processes are followed.
Report Types: How are results reported?
JeAC reports are issued as standard EPRs via PROSPERO.
Report Distribution Mechanism
PROSPERO
Legal Authorities
Authorisation varies depending on the source of the information:
Any CNE will be authorised under ISA and (where necessary) either with a warrant issued under s5 or under s7, depending on where the target is located.
Use of the SIGINT system is under the direction of EITT - all normal Ops rules apply and intercept will have been acquired under Part I of RIPA.
Any HARUSPEX information has been lawfully acquired under the LBPR, as for the Response Team.
Local Policy statements/documentation
- [REDACTED]'s signature release policy (X/29373/7008/009/000/0 of 26 June 2007)
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This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED] (non-sec) or email [REDACTED]@gchq
SECTRE STRAP 1
SECRET STRAP1
- [REDACTED]'s email of 6/12/07: "EITT/RCIT is accountable for eA use of the SIGINT system".
- [REDACTED] of EITT is working with OPPLEG on eA-specific authorisations for CNE (eg. to allow the targeting of UK-based victims).
- [REDACTED]'s description of the Signature Spreadsheet.
Auditing arrangements
The IA team has a fairly small number of selectors in CORINTH. Team members are prompted monthly to check the validity of their selectors. Formal audits are conducted under the auspices of EITT. HRA checking is enforced by the SIGINT system, in that selectors will age off if not re-validated. Use of SIGINT system for eA is covered by 2 MIRANDA numbers, corresponding to the separate JIC requirements for current and emerging electronic threats.
The team maintains a local spreadsheet of about 1500 eA signatures with associated information on nationality, release, likely false positive rate etc. The Signature Release Policy mentioned above controls the deployment of these signatures on HARUSPEX and their release to external agencies.
Number of reporters and their skill levels
There are 6 reporters in the IA team, of whom 2 are trained to Skill level 3 and 2 to Skill Level 2.
Other available legal/policy training
Operational Legalities Briefing.
Status:
Updated 23/7/08 with input from [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]
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This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED] (non-sec) or email [REDACTED]@gchq
SECTRE STRAP1
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