Country: Netherlands 36 documents
Search documents matching “Netherlands” →Countries mentioned in each document. A country may be mentioned directly (e.g., France) or inferred from a related reference, such as a city (Paris -> France) or a domain name (.fr -> France).
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NSA BOUNDLESSINFORMANT Chart on Netherlands [pdf]
The Netherlands BOUNDLESSINFORMANT chart covering Dec 10, 2012 to Jan 8, 2013 shows that Dutch intelligence collected and shared about 1.8 million cellphone metadata records with the NSA, primarily through CERF CALL systems. According to the Dutch government, the records were collected by the Dutch National SIGINT Organisation (NSO) for counterterrorism and military operations abroad, with Dutch phone numbers filtered out before sharing, and were not interception of calls in the Netherlands.
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Afghanistan Coalition Dissemination Brief to Senior Leadership Forum [pdf]
This document ooutlines the structure, goals, and challenges of multinational signals intelligence (SIGINT) collaboration in Afghanistan as of 2009. It reveals how the U.S. and its intelligence-sharing allies (notably the 5 Eyes, 9 Eyes, and 14 Eyes) coordinated SIGINT collection, decryption, analysis, and dissemination across NATO and coalition forces.
“Mission Creep: How the NSA’s Game-Changing Targeting System Built for Iraq and Afghanistan Ended Up on the Mexico Border” - The Intercept ↗ (2019-05-29) · “Norges hemmelige krig i Afghanistan” - NRK ↗ (2019-05-29) · Moltke, Henrik · Skille, Øyvind Bye · Døvik, Olav · Hansen, Ståle Ellingsgard · Fjørtoft, Martin -
Approved SIGINT Partners [pdf]
A Foreign Affairs Directorate slide listing NSA's approved SIGINT partners: the four Second Parties, 33 Third Parties from Algeria to the United Arab Emirates, and the coalitions AFSC, NATO, SSEUR and SSPAC. This is document is from Fiscal Year 2013 "Foreign Partner Review."
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Assessment of Intelligence Opportunity - Juniper [pdf]
This document reveals that GCHQ, with NSA cooperation, developed capabilities to exploit vulnerabilities in 13 Juniper NetScreen firewall models and was expanding efforts to target Juniper’s broader JUNOS-based products for intelligence collection. It highlights the agencies’ strategic focus on maintaining access to critical network infrastructure globally, leveraging Juniper’s widespread use in high-priority countries.
Programs: HEADRESSNU -
Automated NOC detection [pdf]
This slide deck lays out how GCHQ and Canada’s CSEC systematically identified and penetrated Network Operations Centers—most notably Belgacom—by automating NOC discovery and weaponizing that mapping for QUANTUM INSERT attacks. It reads like a blueprint for turning router configs, metadata, and bulk scans into cookie-based targeting against telecom engineers inside core networks.
Programs: SURGE · NOCTURNALSURGE · RT · NACSHACK · CHAINGUARD · TIDALSURGE · GLOBALSURGE · PENTAHO · OLYMPIA · HYPERION · TERMINALSURGE · HACIENDA · QUANTUMINSERT · MUTANTBROTH · OPSOCIALIST · SAMUEL PEPYS · GEOFUSION · FIVEALIVE · NRTA · RADIUS“Operation Socialist: The Inside Story of How British Spies Hacked Belgium’s Largest Telco” - The Intercept ↗ (2014-12-13) · “Lees hier hoe de Britse geheime dienst GCHQ Belgacom aanviel” - NRC ↗ (2014-12-13) · “Britse geheime dienst bespioneerde jarenlang Belgacom-klanten” - De Standaard ↗ (2014-12-13) · Gallagher, Ryan · Modderkolk, Huib · Vanhecke, Nikolas · Eeckhaut, Mark -
Bad guys are everywhere, good guys are somewhere! [pdf]
A classified NSA NTOC presentation describing TREASURE MAP — the agency's near real-time global internet mapping platform — which combines open source, commercial, covert, and SIGINT data to chart every device, router, and autonomous system on the internet, including through 13 covert servers secretly planted in unwitting data centers across 18 countries spanning Asia, Europe, Russia, Africa, and South America, with networks marked in red indicating active SIGINT collection access points across at least 20 major telecommunications providers on three continents including allied nations' state-owned carriers.
Programs: TREASUREMAP · PACKAGEDGOODS · SOCIALSTAMP · SEASIDEFERRY · ARK · CAIDA · RUSTICBAGGAGE · PACKAGEDGOODS-GTR · PACKAGEDGOODS-SERVER · BLACKPEARL · LEAKYFAUCET · HYDROCASTLE · MASTERSHAKE · S-TRICKLER · TOYGRIPPE · DISCOROUTE · VITALAIR2 · IPGEOTRAP · JOLLYROGER · TUTELAGE · BYZANTINEHADES · XKEYSCORE · RADIUS · TACACS“Treasure Map: The NSA Breach of Telekom and Other German Firms” - Der Spiegel ↗ (2014-09-14) · “The NSA and GCHQ Campaign Against German Satellite Companies” - The Intercept ↗ (2014-09-14) · Müller-Maguhn, Andy · Poitras, Laura · Rosenbach, Marcel · Sontheimer, Michael · Grothoff, Christian -
Broadcast/Internet Radio Exploitation and Analysis, 6th November 2009, GCHQ [pdf]
This GCHQ report analyzes 6.68 million internet radio listening events collected over three months in 2009, detailing global broadcasting patterns, user behaviors, and specifically examining Islamic radio stations and Pakistan-UK connections for potential radicalization intelligence, while recommending integration with bulk surveillance databases like KARMA POLICE for enhanced user profiling.
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Cable Master List [pdf]
This GCHQ document is a comprehensive master list of undersea fiber optic cables tracked for surveillance purposes, including both cables with UK landing points and international cables without UK connections, detailing technical specifications, ownership, capacity data, and code names for telecommunications partner companies that provided the intelligence agency with surveillance access.
Programs: PINNAGE · PFENNINGALPHA · NIGELLA · REMEDY · HIASCO · GERONTIC · SCEPTRE · PRESCOTT · KIRKISTOWN · LINNELL · CATEGORY · DACRON · KNAPWEED · ELAPSE · VITREOUS · LITTLE · STREETCAR · GIBBUS · VISAGE · LATUS · NUMDAH“Vodafone – der lange Arm des britischen Geheimdienstes?” - WDR ↗ (2014-11-20) · “Spy cable revealed: how telecoms firm worked with GCHQ” - Channel 4 ↗ (2014-11-20) · “Der lange Arm des Geheimdienstes?” - NDR ↗ (2014-11-21) · “Snowden-Leaks: How Vodafone-Subsidiary Cable & Wireless Aided GCHQ’s Spying Efforts” - Süddeutsche Zeitung ↗ (2014-11-25) · Restle, Georg · White, Geoff · Strozyk, Jan · Moltke, Henrik · Poitras, Laura · Obermaier, Frederik -
Cables we do not currently have good access [pdf]
This GCHQ document, titled "Cables we do not currently have good access," lists numerous undersea fiber-optic cables along with their active data capacity ("Lit Capacity"), indicating the substantial portion of global telecommunications infrastructure where the agency lacks adequate surveillance access, in contrast to other internal reports detailing cables it successfully monitors.
“Vodafone – der lange Arm des britischen Geheimdienstes?” - WDR ↗ (2014-11-20) · “Spy cable revealed: how telecoms firm worked with GCHQ” - Channel 4 ↗ (2014-11-20) · “Der lange Arm des Geheimdienstes?” - NDR ↗ (2014-11-21) · “Snowden-Leaks: How Vodafone-Subsidiary Cable & Wireless Aided GCHQ’s Spying Efforts” - Süddeutsche Zeitung ↗ (2014-11-25) · Restle, Georg · White, Geoff · Strozyk, Jan · Moltke, Henrik · Poitras, Laura · Obermaier, Frederik -
Cooperation between the NSA and BND [pdf]
Comprehensive internal summary of the history and current state of cooperation between the NSA and BND
Programs: RT-RGPeople: Schindler, Gerhard -
Excerpt of May 2008 NSA Afghanistan Dataflow Analysis [pdf]
The document outlines how the NSA’s Real Time Regional Gateway (RT-RG) in Afghanistan progressively expanded from late 2007 through 2008 to ingest massive amounts of GSM, VHF, HF, and telephony metadata from dozens of locations across Afghanistan, supplemented by third-party “dirtbox” collection from allied nations such as the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Germany, and Spain. It details the specific collection sites, data types, and timelines (SPIN 9, 10, 11, etc.), illustrating how partner contributions and multiple signals sources fed into the RT-RG system to enable real-time intelligence.
Programs: FOURCORNERS · FORTRESS · WARRIOR · ECHIDNA · CASSIEOPIA · KARUS · SOUNDER · SNICK · TEMPOWOLFE · CALYPSO · TATTERAN · AIRBORNE · LEAVEBEHIND · UDEAUS · NELEUS · CROSSHAIR · SSO · DRT · RIVET JOINT · VOICESAIL“Mission Creep: How the NSA’s Game-Changing Targeting System Built for Iraq and Afghanistan Ended Up on the Mexico Border” - The Intercept ↗ (2019-05-29) · “Norges hemmelige krig i Afghanistan” - NRK ↗ (2019-05-29) · Moltke, Henrik · Skille, Øyvind Bye · Døvik, Olav · Hansen, Ståle Ellingsgard · Fjørtoft, Martin -
First-Ever Formal SIGINT Development (SIGDEV) Training Is Provided to SIGINT Seniors Europe (SSEUR) Partners [pdf]
This internal NSA report details the first formal training course on "SIGINT Development" (SIGDEV) offered to the "SIGINT Seniors Europe" (SSEUR) coalition, a group comprising the Five Eyes nations and nine European third-party partners. The document highlights the strategic goal of standardizing analytic tradecraft among these allies to improve collaboration on priority missions like counter-terrorism and the war in Afghanistan.
“New NSA Revelations: Inside Snowden's Germany File” - Der Spiegel ↗ (2014-06-18) · “Read the Snowden Documents From the NSA” - SVT Nyheter ↗ (2013-12-11) · Becker, Sven · Gude, Hubert · Horchert, Judith · Müller-Maguhn, Andy · Poitras, Laura · Reißmann, Ole · Rosenbach, Marcel · Schindler, Jörg · Schmid, Fidelius · Sontheimer, Michael · Stark, Holger · Björklund, Axel -
Full Log vs HTTP [pdf]
This 2009 NSA training presentation explains the difference between using the "Full Log" and "HTTP Activity" queries in the XKEYSCORE surveillance system, showing analysts how to use both in tandem to gain a complete picture of a target's online activities, including identifying the use of anonymizing proxies.
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Guidelines for the classification of NSA SIGINT details (1945-1967) [pdf]
This document is an NSA classification guide that defines how and why historical SIGINT material from 1945–1967 remains classified, in many cases for 75 years. It systematically explains which intelligence activities, targets, partnerships, and technical methods must stay protected because they still reveal sensitive sources, methods, and diplomatic equities.
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HIDDENSALAMANDER - Alerting and Characterization of Botnet Activity in TURMOIL [pdf]
This NSA briefing describes HIDDENSALAMANDER, a TURMOIL component that detects, tracks, and characterizes botnet command-and-control traffic on passive collection sensors worldwide, generating enriched metadata about bot herders, infected machines, attack commands, and malware families while providing low-latency defensive alerts when botnet activity involves high-value targets or protected networks. The system extends beyond traditional signature matching by decrypting Zeus RC4-encrypted traffic, extracting payload details like target IPs and DDoS commands, tracking C2 servers across multiple sessions, and categorizing botnet lifecycle stages (configuration, infection, reconnaissance, C&C communication, attack, exfiltration) to support both offensive attribution and defensive response.
Programs: HIDDENSALAMANDER · TURMOIL · CLOUDSHIELD · NETEZZA · TUTELAGE · GMPLACE · RONIN · CYBERCLOUD · MARINA · GHOSTMACHINE · QBOT · ASDF · MARIPOSA · XKEYSCORE · GOGADGET · TURQI · TRAFFICTHIEF · FALLOUT · POUNDSAND · BLUESMOKE · AEG · TURNABOUT · QUANTUMBOT -
Internal NSA presentation on the BND's organization [pdf]
These six organizational charts and briefing slides detail the structure of Germany's BND foreign intelligence service, specifically its SIGINT Directorate (Abteilung Technische Aufklärung) and new Cyber Intelligence division (T4), along with a cooperation model showing intelligence sharing between BND, domestic intelligence service BfV, and the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI).
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List of foreign governments and organizations authorized for surveillance [pdf]
This exhibit lists the 193 foreign governments as well as foreign factions, political organizations and other entities that were part of a 2010 certification approved by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. These are the entities about which the NSA may conduct surveillance, for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence. Each year a new certification must be approved by the court to permit such surveillance under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act.
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Mission Management Success Stories [pdf]
This document details a joint intelligence operation between the NSA and the Dutch Defense Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD) targeting Somali piracy. This document outlines how the NSA provided the Dutch flagship HMS Rotterdam with specialized intercept capabilities during Operation OCEAN SHIELD in 2012. This collaboration directly facilitated a successful special operation on 13 August 2012, which resulted in the rescue of a hijacked Pakistani vessel's crew and the capture of several pirates.
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NAC BUDE Partnership - SATELLITE TELEPORT KNOWLEDGE (GCHQ) [pdf]
A top secret GCHQ Network Analysis Centre document from GCHQ Bude detailing comprehensive intelligence profiles of three German satellite teleport operators — Stellar, Ce-Tel, and IABG — including their network infrastructure, router configurations, IP ranges, employee identities, satellite customers, and login credentials, compiled to identify access chokepoints for SIGINT collection against German IP transit infrastructure.
People: Steffen, Christian · Sommer, Christoph · Fares, Ali · Grave, Richard · Steffen, Simona · Skaletz, Oliver“Treasure Map: The NSA Breach of Telekom and Other German Firms” - Der Spiegel ↗ (2014-09-14) · “The NSA and GCHQ Campaign Against German Satellite Companies” - The Intercept ↗ (2014-09-14) · Müller-Maguhn, Andy · Poitras, Laura · Rosenbach, Marcel · Sontheimer, Michael · Grothoff, Christian -
Notes for Dutch SIGINT/Cyber Analytic Exchange [pdf]
This document provides top-secret notes between the NSA and the Dutch intelligence services (AIVD and MIVD). This document outlines a significant restructuring of the Dutch intelligence community, including the creation of a unified SIGINT and Cyber Division and a Single Point of Contact (SPOC) at AIVD headquarters in Zoetermeer. The briefing details the operational challenges of the newly formed National Cyber Security Center (NCSC), the development of the National Detection Network (NDN) for cyber sensors, and the shared technical interests between the two nations regarding malware detection, Tor (The Onion Router) exploitation, and the analysis of web forums via Computer Network Exploitation (CNE).
Programs: TUTELAGE