JTAC Attack Methodology Team
Open PDFDocument date: 2011-09-08
Pages: 3
Genre: wiki
Banner: TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
Classification: TOP SECRET STRAP 1 COMINT
Dissemination: -
This September 2011 GCWiki page describes GCHQ's Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) Attack Methodology Team, a thematic assessment unit staffed by secondees from various government and military departments with access to Five Eyes intelligence, specializing in analyzing Islamist weaponry, tactics, training, IED construction, and terrorist attack methodologies.
RUSSETT
People mentioned:
-
Countries:
Norway
Tags:
GCHQ wiki, GCWiki, all-source analysis, thematic assessment, counterterrorism, explosives, weapons systems, tactics assessment, training evaluation, coded language interpretation, aviation
Identifier:
jtac-attack-intercept-15-0515
PDF SHA-256:
f45785e459266a2155808abf488a558e5af63427c7313fa20ed5122c1bd4b6b0
My notes
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JTAC Attack Methodology Team
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Contents
1 Who we are and what we do
- 1.1 Points of Contact:
- 1.2 Current Work Priorities:
- 1.3 Recent End Product Reports of note:
[edit] Who we are and what we do
The JTB team in JTAC is the thematic assessment team for Islamist Attack Methodology. Like all of
JTAC, it is staffed by secondees from various government/military departments. We have unparallelled
access to all-source intelligence from the 5-eyes community and can be consulted by GCHQ staff on
any CT issues related to weaponry, tactics and training.
We can also put you in contact with other relevant JTAC Thematic teams with expertise in
CBRN, Critical National Infrastructure, Aviation, Finance and Facilitation, Propaganda and
Ideology, etc.
We provide formal comment for Sigint EPR, or informal answers to questions requiring specialist
knowledge e.g. construction of IEDs, use of coded language, kidnapping methodology.
JTAC is based in [REDACTED].
[edit] Points of Contact:
| Name | Russett BSS Designator | Specialism | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Post gapped | tbc | JTB-1 | tbc |
| [REDACTED] (Royal Navy) | [REDACTED] | JTB-2 | Explosives / Weapons Systems |
| [REDACTED] (SO15) | [REDACTED] | JTB-3 | Firearms / Hostile Reconaissance |
| [REDACTED] (Forensic Explosives Lab) | [REDACTED] | JTB-7 | Bomb Chemist |
| Post gapped | JTB-8 | Operational Security / Cyber Threats |
[edit] Current Work Priorities:
- Analysis of Norway VBEID and Firearms attack methodology
- Exploitation of UBL compound intelligence
- Lone terrorist IED capabilities
[edit] Recent End Product Reports of note:
- JTR/762/11: Norway Attacks: What Could Islamist Extremists Learn?
- JTR/661/11: Cyber Terrorism: AQ Statement of Intent
- JTR/676/11/B: Surgical Implementation of IEDs
- JTR/560/11: AQ-M's Comsec Evolution
- JTR/057/11: UK: What An Attack On Heathrow Airport And London Underground Might Look Like
- JTR/007/11/A: GIMF Publishes New Explosives Manual
Retrieved from "https://wiki.gchq/[REDACTED]/JTAC_Attack_Methodology_Team"
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- This page was last modified on 8 September 2011, at 15:30.
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report inappropriate content.
Published in the Same Report
(10 documents)
-
SIGINT Obtains Details of Usama bin Laden Message to Top al-Qa'ida Leader in Iraq SIDtoday [pdf]
A 2007 NSA SIDtoday article describing how SIGINT analysts intercepted and decoded a message from Osama bin Laden to al-Qaeda's leader in Iraq, revealing bin Laden's strategic thinking on the Iraq war, his anger toward the UAE, and the communications pathway used by senior al-Qaeda figures between Pakistan, Iran, and Iraq.
Programs: SCQAWK -
What Does the Death of Usama bin Laden Mean? SIDtoday [pdf]
A 2011 NSA SIDtoday interview with SID's Associate Deputy Director for Counterterrorism assessing the significance of Osama bin Laden's death, revealing that NSA played a central role in identifying his compound and providing force-protection support during the SEAL raid, while also disclosing that bin Laden had been invisible to SIGINT since 1998.
Programs: SCQAWK -
SIGINT Year in Review, November 2011 SIDtoday [pdf]
A 2011 year-in-review message from NSA SIGINT Director Teresa Shea summarizing the directorate's major operational and capability accomplishments over the past year, including SIGINT contributions to the killing of Osama bin Laden, operations against Anwar al-Awlaki and other al-Qaeda figures, and support for military campaigns and crises across the Middle East.
Programs: SCQAWK -
FY2013 Congressional Budget Justification Bin Laden Excerpts [pdf]
This document includes excerpts from the 2013 National Intelligence Program budget justification describing the integrated intelligence community efforts that led to locating and raiding Osama bin Laden's compound, detailing contributions from NSA's signal intelligence, CIA's geolocation analysis, NGA's imagery modeling, and post-raid forensic DNA confirmation.
People: bin Laden, Osama -
NCTC Current Status of Major Terrorism Figures [pdf]
A TOP SECRET joint HUMINT–COMINT status report from June 2008 summarizes the whereabouts and threat posture of senior al‑Qaida leaders, highlighting Usama bin Ladin, Ayman al‑Zawahiri, and a key courier assessed as critical to locating them. The document reflects U.S. intelligence tracking priorities just three years before bin Ladin’s death.
-
Interview with a SID "Hacker" -- Part 2: Hacker Culture and Worker Retention SIDtoday [pdf]
A SIDtoday internal NSA newsletter interview with a redacted TAO employee discussing hacker culture within the agency's offensive cyber unit, worker retention challenges, and the team's role in operations including the raid that killed Osama bin Laden.
Programs: SCQAWKPeople: bin Laden, Osama -
Regional Command Southwest Intelligence Report June 19 2011 [pdf]
A June 2011 intelligence summary from Regional Command Southwest in Afghanistan assessing the destabilizing aftermath of the Osama bin Laden raid on U.S.-Pakistan relations, Pakistani internal security, Taliban activity along the RC(SW) border, and local governance developments in Helmand Province.
-
Regional Command Southwest Intelligence Report June 23 2011 [pdf]
A June 2011 RC Southwest intelligence summary documenting a covert ALP-Taliban collusion arrangement in Nad'Ali district, and a separate intelligence report detailing Taliban internal supply shortages, infighting, and morale deterioration across northern Helmand Province in the aftermath of Osama bin Laden's death.
-
June 2011 Nato Afghanistan Intelligence Report [pdf]
A June 2011 SHAPE weekly report to NATO HQ assessing the state of ISAF operations in Afghanistan, covering Taliban command and control deterioration, insurgent supply shortages, the post-bin Laden strain on NATO's Pakistani logistics routes, and notable attacks across regional commands.
Marking: NATO SECRET -
May 2011 Nato Afghanistan Intelligence Report [pdf]
A May 2011 SHAPE weekly report to NATO HQ assessing ISAF operations in Afghanistan — including a major failed Taliban spring offensive in Kandahar, insurgent cache dispersal tactics, and the limited impact of bin Laden's death on Taliban operational capacity — alongside an update on Operation Unified Protector in Libya covering the Misrata siege and Gaddafi regime military activity.
Marking: NATO SECRET
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