SIGINT Obtains Details of Usama bin Laden Message to Top al-Qa'ida Leader in Iraq
Open PDFDocument date: 2007-07-18
Type: SIDtoday
Pages: 2
Genre: newsletter
Banner: DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
Classification: TOP SECRET SI
Dissemination: REL
A 2007 NSA SIDtoday article describing how SIGINT analysts intercepted and decoded a message from Osama bin Laden to al-Qaeda's leader in Iraq, revealing bin Laden's strategic thinking on the Iraq war, his anger toward the UAE, and the communications pathway used by senior al-Qaeda figures between Pakistan, Iran, and Iraq.
SCQAWK
People mentioned:
bin Laden, Osama, al-Masri, Abu Ayyub
Countries:
Iraq, United Arab Emirates, Iran, Pakistan
Tags:
UBL, Al-Qaeda, Islamic State of Iraq, UAE, FATA, communications interception, counterterrorism, strategic intelligence, military intelligence, policymaker reporting, internal newsletter, Global Jihad Support Network, linguists, intelligence reporting, Vice President, Attorney General, coalition forces, iraq war
Identifier:
2007-07-18-sidtoday-sigint-obtains-deta-r
PDF SHA-256:
6e43928eb443f163395cd203f469078e6a76da6740d09536b42671ceede20bd5
My notes
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(TS//SI//REL) SIGINT Obtains Details of Usama bin Laden Message to Top al-Qa'ida Leader in Iraq
FROM: [REDACTED]
Chief, Global Jihad Support Network Branch (S2I13)
Run Date: 07/18/2007
(TS//SI//REL) In late April 2007, SIGINTers uncovered a message from Usama bin Laden (UBL) intended for al-Qa'ida's #1 man in Iraq: Abu-Ayyub al-Misri. The resulting SIGINT report provided a crucial window into al-Qa'ida's strategic plans and intentions for Iraq and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
(TS//SI//REL) The message shed light on UBL's mindset and revealed his knowledge of the current U.S. political situation. Much of the letter presented a timetable for the expansion of the authority of the "Islamic State of Iraq," with UBL apparently believing that they should delay until after an expected US "clash" with Iran or until the US President leaves office or loses authority in Congress. He felt that these events would leave the US in a weak position. Therefore, UBL advised Abu-Ayyub to try to prolong the war until these events took place.
(U//FOUO) Abu-Ayyub al-Misri, the al-Qa'ida leader in Iraq (AFP photo)
(TS//SI//REL) In addition, the letter revealed UBL's great anger towards the UAE for allowing Coalition forces to use UAE's airports and seaports. It further identified the new chief of al-Qa'ida's
external operations as Abu-'Ubaydah al-Misri, who had been charged with directing al-Qa'ida's plans against the UAE.
(TS//SI//REL) UBL's missive was dated 12 February 2007 and was passed via a communications conduit. The movement of the letter from Pakistan to Iran provided the U.S. Intelligence Community with unique insights into the communications path used by senior al-Qa'ida leaders in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan to communicate with al-Qa'ida leaders in Iran and Iraq.
(TS//SI//REL) The full text of the report (3/OO/9464-07) can be found here: UBL report.
(TS//SI//REL) A team of dedicated linguists and analysts in the Global Jihad Support Network Branch (S2I13) collaborated to process this key piece of traffic and partnered with their counterparts in S2I11 (Al-Qa'ida Leadership and Target Pursuit Branch) and S2I2 (CT's Middle East and Iraq Division) to ensure the production of an analytically accurate and comprehensive SIGINT intelligence report.
(TS//REL) The report received rave reviews from senior U.S. policymakers, including the Vice President, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, and the Attorney General, who retained a copy of the report - a step that was described as "unprecedented."
(U//FOUO) If you have specific questions or comments on this topic, please visit our homepage or contact us at DL S2I13.
(U//FOUO) POC: [REDACTED], Chief/S2I13 (Global Jihad Support Network), [REDACTED]s
(S) This report includes information from FBI FISA collection. Such information, and any information derived therefrom, may only be used in a U.S. legal or administrative proceeding with the advance authorization of the Attorney General. Any such recipient interested in obtaining authorization for such use in a U.S. legal or administrative proceeding should contact FBI Headquarters. Any further dissemination for any other purpose must be made through NSA. Any reproduction, dissemination, or communication (including, but not limited to, oral briefings) of this information must be accompanied by these restrictions.
Comments/Suggestions about this article?
"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)."
Information Owner: [REDACTED] S0121, [REDACTED], (email)
Page Publisher: [REDACTED], S0121, [REDACTED], (email)
Last Modified: 11/09/2012 / Last Reviewed: 11/09/2012
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108
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This document includes excerpts from the 2013 National Intelligence Program budget justification describing the integrated intelligence community efforts that led to locating and raiding Osama bin Laden's compound, detailing contributions from NSA's signal intelligence, CIA's geolocation analysis, NGA's imagery modeling, and post-raid forensic DNA confirmation.
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A SIDtoday internal NSA newsletter interview with a redacted TAO employee discussing hacker culture within the agency's offensive cyber unit, worker retention challenges, and the team's role in operations including the raid that killed Osama bin Laden.
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Regional Command Southwest Intelligence Report June 19 2011 [pdf]
A June 2011 intelligence summary from Regional Command Southwest in Afghanistan assessing the destabilizing aftermath of the Osama bin Laden raid on U.S.-Pakistan relations, Pakistani internal security, Taliban activity along the RC(SW) border, and local governance developments in Helmand Province.
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Regional Command Southwest Intelligence Report June 23 2011 [pdf]
A June 2011 RC Southwest intelligence summary documenting a covert ALP-Taliban collusion arrangement in Nad'Ali district, and a separate intelligence report detailing Taliban internal supply shortages, infighting, and morale deterioration across northern Helmand Province in the aftermath of Osama bin Laden's death.
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June 2011 Nato Afghanistan Intelligence Report [pdf]
A June 2011 SHAPE weekly report to NATO HQ assessing the state of ISAF operations in Afghanistan, covering Taliban command and control deterioration, insurgent supply shortages, the post-bin Laden strain on NATO's Pakistani logistics routes, and notable attacks across regional commands.
Marking: NATO SECRET -
May 2011 Nato Afghanistan Intelligence Report [pdf]
A May 2011 SHAPE weekly report to NATO HQ assessing ISAF operations in Afghanistan — including a major failed Taliban spring offensive in Kandahar, insurgent cache dispersal tactics, and the limited impact of bin Laden's death on Taliban operational capacity — alongside an update on Operation Unified Protector in Libya covering the Misrata siege and Gaddafi regime military activity.
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Related Documents
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What Does the Death of Usama bin Laden Mean? SIDtoday [pdf]
A 2011 NSA SIDtoday interview with SID's Associate Deputy Director for Counterterrorism assessing the significance of Osama bin Laden's death, revealing that NSA played a central role in identifying his compound and providing force-protection support during the SEAL raid, while also disclosing that bin Laden had been invisible to SIGINT since 1998.
Programs: SCQAWK -
SIGINT Year in Review, November 2011 SIDtoday [pdf]
A 2011 year-in-review message from NSA SIGINT Director Teresa Shea summarizing the directorate's major operational and capability accomplishments over the past year, including SIGINT contributions to the killing of Osama bin Laden, operations against Anwar al-Awlaki and other al-Qaeda figures, and support for military campaigns and crises across the Middle East.
Programs: SCQAWK -
Interview with a SID "Hacker" -- Part 2: Hacker Culture and Worker Retention SIDtoday [pdf]
A SIDtoday internal NSA newsletter interview with a redacted TAO employee discussing hacker culture within the agency's offensive cyber unit, worker retention challenges, and the team's role in operations including the raid that killed Osama bin Laden.
Programs: SCQAWKPeople: bin Laden, Osama -
FY2013 Congressional Budget Justification Bin Laden Excerpts [pdf]
This document includes excerpts from the 2013 National Intelligence Program budget justification describing the integrated intelligence community efforts that led to locating and raiding Osama bin Laden's compound, detailing contributions from NSA's signal intelligence, CIA's geolocation analysis, NGA's imagery modeling, and post-raid forensic DNA confirmation.
People: bin Laden, Osama -
SIGINT Target Package Leads to USMC Capture of al-Qa'ida Weapons Procurer SIDtoday [pdf]
This SIDtoday document details the capture of Abu Sayf, an Al-Qa'ida weapons procurer, by the U.S. Marine Corps in Iraq in May 2007, facilitated by SIGINT targeting from Menwith Hill Station and NSA Georgia. The operation disrupted weapons and insurgent smuggling into Iraq and may yield critical intelligence on Al-Qa'ida operations in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.
Programs: GHOSTHUNTER