Quadrennial Intelligence Review Final Report, 2009

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Creating agency: ODNI Office of the Director of National Intelligence (US)
Document date: 2009-04-01
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This 2009 strategic review from the Director of National Intelligence outlines potential future operating concepts for the US Intelligence Community, including "safe bets" like mass data analysis (Sentient Enterprise) and controversial "strategic hedges" such as using clandestine cyber operations to acquire proprietary technology from foreign corporations to benefit US industry (Technology Acquisition by All Means).

Long Description:
The Quadrennial Intelligence Community Review (QICR) is a 2009 long-term strategic planning document from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence that uses scenario-based analysis to explore how the Intelligence Community (IC) should prepare for the year 2025. The report identifies three "safe bets"—concepts critical to any future—which include the Sentient Enterprise for analyzing exabytes of data, Segmented Customers for providing tailored intelligence, and Responsive Presence for deploying expeditionary intelligence teams. These foundational concepts focus on adapting to a transformed information environment and a new generation of "digital native" customers and intelligence officers. The report also outlines three "strategic hedges"—concepts to be developed for specific, more challenging future scenarios. The most notable of these isTechnology Acquisition by All Means, which explicitly proposes using "clandestine penetration (through physical and cyber means)" to gather "proprietary information" from foreign corporations if the U.S. loses its technological edge. The document gives an "illustrative example" of conducting cyber operations against foreign R&D facilities and then assessing how the findings "would be useful to U.S. industry." The other hedges include Human Terrain in the Virtual World to track actors across physical and virtual domains and Money Mastery to penetrate foreign financial institutions to create an "economic operating picture."
Programs:
-

People mentioned:
Shedd, David R.

Countries:
Brazil, Russia, India, China, Hong Kong, Iran, Thailand

Tags:
BRICS, Quadrennial Intelligence Community Review, ODNI, DNI, strategic planning, scenario-based analysis, National Intelligence Council, NIC, strategic hedges, Sentient Enterprise, Segmented Customers Differentiated Services, Responsive Presence, Technology Acquisition by All Means, all means, Human Terrain in the Virtual World, Money Mastery, economic espionage, industrial espionage, cyber operations, clandestine operations, proprietary information, S&T analysis, Computer Network Exploitation, humint, non-official cover, counterintelligence, exabytes, artificial intelligence, big data, expeditionary sigint, virtual presence, online cover, financial intelligence, economic intelligence, human-machine interface, David R. Shedd

Identifier:
dni-qicr-2009-the-intercept-14-0905

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QICR
Quadrennial Intelligence Community Review

FINAL REPORT
April 2009

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Office of the Director of National Intelligence

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Derived From: ODNI POL-08
Declassify On: 20340306

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QICR
Quadrennial Intelligence Community Review
FINAL REPORT
April 2009

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(U) FOREWORD

(U) If one does not consider the long-range future, one will never cease to be surprised. The Director of
National Intelligence (DNI) has an annualized planning/programming process to guide short-term (1-5 years)
perspectives. The National Intelligence Strategy (NIS) and Vision 2015 provide mid-term (5-10 years) perspec-
tives. The Quadrennial Intelligence Community Review (QICR) provides an essential long-term piece, looking
out between 10 and 20 years. This longer term view complements shorter term assessments, challenges basic
assumptions, exposes the potential risks of extrapolating tomorrow's needs from today's conditions, and
examines missions and capabilities in light of alternative futures.

(U) This report describes the results of the 10-month QICR. Building on the National Intelligence Council's
Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World, experts from across the Intelligence Community (IC), other U.S.
departments and agencies, academia, think tanks, and industry assessed the implications of the year 2025 for
the IC.

(U) QICR 2009 developed alternative future scenarios based on Global Trends 2025 to explore concepts and
capabilities the IC may need to fulfill critical missions in support of U.S. national security. It does not purport
that any one future will materialize, but rather outlines a range of plausible futures so that the IC can best
posture itself to meet the range of challenges it may face.

(S//REL) This Final Report summarizes six concepts for how the IC may need to operate by 2025. Of particular
note, QICR 2009 identifies three concepts that are critical to the success of the IC across a wide range of future
scenarios ("safe bets") and suggests that these concepts merit attention in the IC's longer term planning
efforts, including the NIS, Intelligence Planning Guidance, and other guidance documents. The first concept
is the development of a sensing and learning environment capable of handling massive amounts of infor-
mation (Sentient Enterprise). The second is the adoption of a more dynamic and tailored customer-services
model (Segmented Customers, Differentiated Services). The third is the adoption of an expeditionary mindset
that can project operational capability and enhanced analytic connectivity in both physical and virtual
venues (Responsive Presence).

(U) We hope this report will stimulate spirited debate and rigorous thinking as to how the IC can best posture
and prepare for a range of future environments.

David R. Shedd
Deputy Director of National Intelligence
Policy, Plans & Requirements
April 21, 2009

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(U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(U) Introduction. The Quadrennial Intelligence Community Review (QICR) 2009 used scenario-based analysis to help the Intel-
ligence Community (IC) consider how to best minimize strategic surprise and manage institutional risk to meet challenges that
may emerge by 2025.

(C//REL) Drawing on the National Intelligence Council's Global Trends 2025: A World Transformed, QICR made three key assump-
tions about the future landscape for intelligence. First, other actors will increase in power and relevance relative to the United
States. Second, the information environment will radically transform in scope, complexity, and intensity, with intelligence targets
operating seamlessly and simultaneously between the physical and virtual worlds. Third, customers and the IC workforce will be
"digital natives" with different operating models and expectations for how to perform and leverage the business of intelligence.

(U) Concepts for Intelligence in 2025. In this landscape, certain organizing principles for performing intelligence functions-
"concepts" in this report-could help turn future challenges into opportunities. QICR identified three concepts ("safe bets") that
appear critical to the success of the IC across a wide range of possible futures and therefore merit consideration in today's long-
term planning activities.

  • (C//REL) Sentient Enterprise is an IC that creates a sensing and learning environment for humans and intelligent machines to
    analyze "exabytes" of data in near-real time to generate and test hypotheses, autonomously process and evaluate insights to
    cue collection, and self-update/self-correct.
  • (C//REL) Segmented Customers, Differentiated Services envisions an IC postured to provide more customized tools, products,
    and services to an expanding set of customers with different styles and end uses.
  • (C//REL) In Responsive Presence, the IC has an expeditionary intelligence capacity to deploy small teams to hostile (physical or
    virtual) environments with minimal infrastructure, while readily drawing on more diverse and instantly collaborative analytic
    expertise to guide operations and directly leverage the insights gained.

(U) "Strategic hedges" are concepts deemed highly relevant in some possible futures but less relevant in others, which the IC may
need to develop as circumstances warrant.

  • (C//REL) Technology Acquisition by All Means envisions the IC aggressively employing a mix of overt means, clandestine
    penetration, and counterintelligence tactics to address severe U.S. technological erosion vis-à-vis near-peer competitors and
    global corporations.
  • (C//REL) In Human Terrain in the Virtual World, the IC confronts environments dominated by non-state actors, requiring uncon-
    ventional human collection methods with more flexible sets of analytic partners to track highly empowered, cyber-immersed
    individuals and groups.
  • (C//REL) Money Mastery describes an operating concept that requires the IC to compensate for the possible loss of access to
    reliable financial and economic data (at the global, national, and sector levels) by penetrating corporations, foreign finance
    ministries, central banks, and market participants to create an "economic operating picture."

(S//REL) Conclusion. Four broader implications arise from the QICR 2009. First, the IC will have to manage highly fluid relation-
ships to deal with the dynamism of a more competitive national security environment. Second, it will need to manage a singular
operational architecture to deal with the new ways that a greater volume of information will flow. Third, the IC will need to main-
tain strong information and identity assurance to address the likely erosion in its technological advantage and the new dynamics
of the digital medium. Fourth, the IC will need to change the role of the intelligence officer to deal with a dynamic external envi-
ronment and adapt to new customer needs. To posture the IC to deal with these implications, QICR suggests the value of further
study by appropriate IC elements in the areas of policy, regulation, and law; organization and structure; workforce management;
and information and identity assurance.

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(U) TABLE OF CONTENTS

(U) INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................1
(U) Methodology...............................................................................................................1
(U) Key Assumptions........................................................................................................2

(U) CONCEPTS FOR INTELLIGENCE IN 2025...................................................5
(U) Safe Bet: Sentient Enterprise......................................................................................6
(U) Safe Bet: Segmented Customers, Differentiated Services..........................................8
(U) Safe Bet: Responsive Presence..................................................................................10
(U) Strategic Hedge: Technology Acquisition by All Means...........................................12
(U) Strategic Hedge: Human Terrain in the Virtual World..............................................14
(U) Strategic Hedge: Money Mastery..............................................................................16

(U) CONCLUSION ........................................................................................19

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(U) INTRODUCTION

(U) Every 4 years, the Intelligence Community (IC)
assesses the most challenging issues it could face
beyond the standard planning cycle. This process is
known as the Quadrennial Intelligence Community
Review (QICR).

(U) QICR 2009 was a scenario-based strategic planning
activity that looked out to the year 2025 and consid-
ered alternative future environments (i.e., "scenarios"),
missions the IC might be called on to perform, and the
concepts and some illustrative capabilities that would
be needed to fulfill those missions. This Final Report
summarizes the key findings and recommends next
steps to help position the IC to address the challenges
of the future.

(U) Methodology

(U) The QICR 2009 applied best practices of scenario
planning used in both industry and government. Using
as a starting point Global Trends 2025: A Transformed
World, produced by the National Intelligence Council
(NIC), QICR developed four scenarios that were de-
signed to be divergent, plausible, challenging, and rel-
evant to the IC. These scenarios are not predictive, but
illustrate the range of possible challenges we might
confront. QICR organized the scenarios along two key
dimensions of uncertainty-the relative importance
of the nation-state and the extent of global coop-
eration-and then incorporated additional relevant
features of possible future environments gleaned
from seven recognized geo-strategic scenario sets
developed by public, private, U.S., and foreign sources.
(See the QICR Scenarios Report, January 2009, for a full
discussion of the scenarios.)

(U) The scenarios served as the basis for analysis of
missions the IC might be asked to perform in support
of national objectives and the concepts and capabili-
ties the IC would need to perform these missions. (The
four scenarios are summarized in the figure on page
2.) Each scenario implied a core set of missions for the
IC that was not exhaustive but highlighted the key de-
mands customers would likely place on the IC in 2025
beyond the array of established intelligence activities:

  • (C//REL) World Without the West: Although a coali-
    tion of four well-armed competitor states calls for
    continued robust military analysis, understanding
    energy, natural resources, and technological inno-
    vation emerges as a critical mission for the IC.
  • (C//REL) BRIC's* Bust-Up: As the United States
    struggles to maintain its world standing amidst
    competing and insular blocs, the IC is predomi-
    nantly focused on economics and commercial
    science and technology (S&T) missions.
  • (C//REL) Politics Is Not Always Local: With non-state
    affinity groups driving international politics, the
    IC is focused on transnational threats, particularly
    crime and cyber attack.

* (U) The acronym BRIC refers to Brazil, Russia, India, and
China, or more generally, the big developing economies.

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(U) QICR Scenarios

STATE DOMINATED

ALIGNED

GLOBAL COOPERATION

NON-STATE DOMINATED

KEY PLAYERS

FRAGMENTED

A China/Russia/India/Iran-centered bloc challenges U.S. supremacy and sets the pace for innovation in key technologies

WORLD WITHOUT THE WEST

Identity-based groups supplant the authority of nation-states, competing with one another for influence in a
chaotic political environment

POLITICS IS NOT ALWAYS LOCAL

BRIC'S BUST-UP OCTOBER SURPRISE

Locked in multi-polar competition, states jockey for resources and adopt mercantilist trade policies in a precarious balance of power

Power shifts to corporations and megacities, allowing global ills (climate change to international crime) to spiral out of control

  • (C//REL) October Surprise: Amidst the rise of mega-
    corporations as the purveyors of traditional state
    functions, the IC focuses on uncovering economic,
    financial, and corporate ground truth, as well as on
    providing early warning on outbreaks of infectious
    disease and natural disasters.

(U) QICR developed concepts to illustrate how today's
operating model will have to change for the intel-
ligence enterprise to remain effective. QICR identified
two sets of concepts. Concepts that were critical to the
success of the IC across all the scenarios were labeled
"safe bets," indicating that we should begin planning
for their eventual adoption. Concepts that were critical
to only one or two scenarios were deemed "strategic
hedges," implying that we should experiment with
them and consider long-lead development of essential
elements, while monitoring ongoing events to assess
whether more aggressive action is appropriate.

(U) The QICR process also delineated sample capabili-
ties to clarify the intent and impact of these concepts
for activities, people, technology, etc. These capabilities
are not meant to be either definitive or exhaustive, but
rather serve as a starting point for further analysis.

(U) Key Assumptions

(C//REL) Based on the NIC's Global Trends 2025 study,
the QICR identified three key assumptions that set
the context for the future posture of the IC. First, the
United States will remain among the most prominent

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forces in world politics, but the relative ascent of
other state and non-state actors across the full range
of power dimensions-military, economic, technologi-
cal, and social-will place new and different demands
on the IC.

  • (C//REL) The proliferation, differentiation, and
    sophistication of actors in global politics will
    make it far more difficult to access targets
    (whether in the physical or virtual world),
    maintain a consistent and continuous presence,
    and influence populations.
  • (S//REL) With more tenuous U.S. technological
    leadership in key sectors such as biotechnology,
    nanotechnology, and computing, the IC may have
    less unilateral advantage in critical intelligence
    capabilities (e.g., penetrating encrypted informa-
    tion networks).
  • (S//REL) The IC will increasingly rely on information
    and communication technology that is at least
    partly of foreign origin, rendering critical IC func-
    tions more vulnerable to attack or manipulation in
    increasingly hard-to-detect ways.

(C//REL) The second key assumption about the world in
2025 is the transformation in the information (and
thus cyber) environment, specifically in the volume,
velocity, and variability with which information flows
between and among individuals, groups, and states.
This new environment will be enabled by two paral-
lel and reinforcing phenomena: the incorporation of
sensors and processors into many more items (from
weaponry to foodstuffs) and almost universal access to
inexpensive networked computing and communica-
tions technologies. As such, there will be an exponen-
tial increase in the amount of data of all types poten-
tially available to the IC, its U.S. Government customers,
hostile governments, and adversary non-state actors.
Information will also move at ever increasing speeds,
and it will exist in greater ranges of formats that
change more frequently.

  • (C//REL) Most intelligence targets will increasingly
    operate simultaneously in the physical and virtual
    worlds, requiring the IC to adopt a seamless ap-
    proach between the two domains as well.
  • (C//REL) Balancing intelligence with the protection
    of privacy and civil liberties will be even more chal-
    lenging in 2025. The IC will need socially, constitu-
    tionally, and politically acceptable ways to handle
    exponentially more information no matter what
    future comes to pass. In many cases, meeting the
    challenge will come down to more effective data
    management. Automated analysis of "anonymized"
    data could detect threats much earlier without
    infringing upon privacy. Role-based access could
    help mitigate the risk of abuse.

(C//REL) The third key assumption about the operating
environment of 2025 is that IC customers and part-
ners will be "digital natives" and will have a signifi-
cantly different set of expectations of the IC. They will
tend to behave in two fundamentally different ways,
both of which contravene current orthodoxy.

  • (U) Having grown up with the likes of Wikipedia,
    Facebook, Flickr, and Google Earth, customers will
    be accustomed to building their own context, un-
    derstanding, and in many cases, technical details.
  • (U) Customers will be much less reliant on official
    intermediaries and much more comfortable reach-
    ing out directly to networks of experts and data
    (whether or not they are inside the IC).

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(U) CONCEPTS FOR INTELLIGENCE IN 2025

(U) To cope with the challenging missions emerging from the four scenarios summarized in the figure on page 2,
QICR developed six concepts (see figure below) that point to a need for further exploration and potential investment.
Some of these concepts will be critical across the full spectrum of possible futures and thus are termed "safe bets"
because they merit the most urgent attention for further development and investment. Other concepts will be highly
relevant in a narrower range of future operating environments, although aspects of the concept may have wider ap-
plication. These concepts are termed "strategic hedges," and merit further exploration for investment in the event
that future developments point toward their increasing importance. Together, these concepts and their associated
sample key capabilities highlight how the management, organization, and practice of intelligence must evolve to
cope with the range of alternative futures the IC may confront. The IC will need to develop innovative approaches,
potentially including some adaptation of the legal and/or policy framework under which the IC operates.

(U) Sentient Enterprise

(U) Segmented Customers, Differentiated Services

(U) Responsive Presence

(U) Technology Acquisition by All Means

(U) Human Terrain in the Virtual World

(U) Money Mastery

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(U) Safe Bet:
Sentient Enterprise

(U) In 2025, electronic data will have increased ex-
ponentially as massive amounts of stored data have
accumulated and access to mobile communications
and networked sensors have become ubiquitous.
The volume, velocity, and variability of data will pose
enormous search and knowledge-management chal-
lenges, driving the IC toward non-linear processing
and autonomous organization of critical information.
Virtual interactions will be integral to daily communica-
tions for millions of benign purposes, but hostile actors
will also use this medium as a means to build ideologi-
cal and financial support and for planning and execu-
tion of operations. In addition, signals of threats may
be few, weak, or conflicting because of the ability to
shelter activity from domains that require a signature.

(C//REL) The concept of Sentient Enterprise postures the
IC for this circumstance, creating a sensing and learn-
ing environment capable of identifying and respond-
ing to voluminous, simultaneous, and continuous
inputs. The Sentient Enterprise will track and manage
thousands of exabytes of data every day (1 exabyte is
the equivalent of 100,000 times the Library of Con-
gress, which holds 19 million books), enabling iterative
assessments in real time, not days or weeks. The data
it manages will be universally discoverable, accessible,
and usable by humans and machines equally. Indeed,
the human-machine interface will allow the individual
to interact directly with a unified information architec-
ture. The enterprise will be able to continuously and
autonomously process, evaluate, and act on new data
without regard to structure or format. The enterprise
will log expert users' interactions with the data, while
gleaning new insights from more generalist users. By
so doing, the entire enterprise will create, share, and
advance corporate knowledge in a rich and seamless
interplay where machines and humans learn together.

(U//FOUO) The Sentient Enterprise will have the ad-
ditional benefit of freeing intelligence professionals
from mundane tasks so that they can focus on activi-
ties reliant on human judgment. Analysts will be able
to allocate much more of their time to the front and
back ends of the intelligence cycle, focusing much
more energy on scoping problems with customers,
driving collection, and helping customers understand
the implications of different courses of action. More
seasoned officers will be able to more ably mentor
novices, collaborate with other experts, and influence
decision-makers.

(U) Sample Key Capabilities

  • (C//REL) Automation. The IC would emplace
    sensors and monitor applications that run autono-
    mous collection of the most relevant data, trigger
    pattern recognition sequences, and process raw
    feeds. This would require supercomputer-like
    capabilities at every "computational point-of-pres-
    ence," from computer terminal to digital handheld
    device. Automation (e.g., in language translation,
    gisting, relational analysis, and trend assessment)
    would allow verification and validation of the ac-
    curacy of information.
  • (U) Artificial Intelligence (AI). Application of
    advanced AI techniques would make it possible to
    continuously improve understanding of complex
    threat environments, discern the relative impor-
    tance of data, and adapt quickly to changes indi-
    cated by sensor data and automated analysis (thus
    providing indication and warning). This would
    allow the experts to focus on translating critical
    information to decision-makers in an effective and
    time-efficient manner.

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  • (S//REL) Self-Learning. The institutional knowl-
    edge of the Sentient Enterprise would increase the
    user's ability to recall events and significant facts
    to build relational awareness. Simultaneously, the
    human-machine interface would enable the user
    to continuously refine the "algorithms" that trans-
    late human judgments into machine language so
    that the system actively learns.
  • (U) Human Interface. The Sentient Enterprise
    would employ dashboards and similar interfaces
    to provide continuous, real-time visualization of
    the operational environment. Interfaces would in-
    clude interactive touch-screen mapping of a large
    variety of data types that enables zoom and pan
    capabilities to scan the physical, virtual, and social
    environments.
  • (U) Collaborative Features. The Sentient Enter-
    prise would employ social-networking tools and
    virtual models of the real world to monitor the
    threat environment, enable collaboration, and
    test alternative hypotheses. This would include
    social-networking tools that allow outside experts
    to be tapped quickly so they could make contribu-
    tions in a crisis and provide input into the analytic
    process.
  • (S//REL) Protection. The continuously updated,
    multilayered, and changing boundaries of Sentient
    Enterprise would be selectively permeable, requir-
    ing innovative system or data-specific protection
    capabilities for flow of data into and out of the
    data stream.

Illustrative Example
(U) Sentient Enterprise

  1. (S//REL) Through pervasive sensors, the
    Sentient Enterprise discovers an anomalous
    pattern of influenza in a remote Chinese
    province. Analysts' queries automatically
    trigger human collection in Hong Kong and
    Bangkok and remote technical collection in
    less permissive environments.
  2. (S//REL) The reporting, when combined with
    flight schedules, passenger manifests, and
    public health data, yields near-real-time under-
    standing of the likely transmission vectors to
    the United States. The sensitivity of environ-
    mental sensors at U.S. ports of entry adjusts
    accordingly, allowing the quarantine of infected
    travelers.
  3. (S//REL) Immunologists access the reporting and
    analysis to determine that the strain of influenza,
    while dangerous, is controllable. This informa-
    tion is broadcast to international public health
    organizations. Underlying models, algorithms,
    and collection strategies self-update to anticipate
    future outbreaks.

China
Hong Kong
Thailand
Bangkok

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(U) Safe Bet:
Segmented Customers, Differentiated Services

(U) The expectations of digitally native users and a
much more diverse set of partners will drive a differ-
ent conceptualization of the customer. First, the IC will
engage its customers with greater responsiveness,
employing highly iterative customer segmentation,
requirements, and satisfaction analyses to understand
their working styles and decision-making needs.
Second, the IC will focus its efforts on more tailored
services (e.g., visualization techniques and tabletop
role-play exercises), vice products, to meet the full
spectrum of customer needs. Third, the IC will provide
data and analyses anywhere (in U.S.-based offices or
in the field), in more dynamic ways (from interactive
streams available via wireless devices to immersive,
three-dimensional presentations), and at multiple clas-
sifications.

(U) The concept of Segmented Customers, Differentiated
Services synthesizes these conclusions with a construct
of three categories of customers. These categories are
not dissimilar to today, but their needs will be met with
different capabilities. At one end of the spectrum, "do-
it-yourself" customers will want data and analytic tools
from the IC so they can answer their own questions. In
the middle of the spectrum are users of analytic prod-
ucts who will expect to see-and work with-the un-
derlying data and models, frequently in collaboration
with the IC. At the other end of the customer spectrum
are users who will turn to analysts for tailored analy-
sis and products that they can apply without further
refinement or context.

(U) Sample Key Capabilities

  • (C//REL) Interactive Visualization. The IC would
    deploy dashboards, datastreams, and other
    interfaces that allow customers to continuously
    monitor the operational environment, rather than
    rely on static judgments.
  • (C//REL) Interactive Tools. Interactive decision-
    support tools would allow customers to conduct
    their own sensitivity analyses, test hypotheses, and
    discover new insights from underlying data, either
    with or without an intelligence officer assisting.
  • (C//REL) Customization. Customer interfaces
    would enable users to enter specific requirements,
    update them dynamically, and build tailored prod-
    ucts in various forms and for various media.

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Illustrative Example
(U) Segmented Customers, Differentiated Services

  1. (C//REL) With global tensions on the rise
    as a Middle Eastern state says it will "go
    nuclear" absent United Nations (UN)
    concessions, a senior weapons of mass
    destruction (WMD) intelligence analyst
    maintains robust and differentiated support to
    three key customers.
  2. (C//REL) The National Security Council director for
    counterproliferation (A) looks to the analyst to ensure
    the latest operational data goes directly to his secure
    laptop (a). The State Department's top arms-control
    negotiator (B) calls on the analyst to help her prepare
    for an upcoming session by walking her through an im-
    mersive simulation using the latest intelligence (b). The
    commander of a multi-national task force in the Indian
    Ocean (C) asks the analyst for a tailored, releaseable
    intelligence product (c).

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(U) Safe Bet:
Responsive Presence

(C//REL) In 2025, the United States will face much
greater difficulty penetrating key states that suddenly
emerge as areas of national security interest. It may
have neither an extensive forward military presence
nor much of a physical diplomatic and intelligence
presence, depriving it of an understanding of the
socio-cultural environment. Adding to the challenge,
despite the transformation in the information environ-
ment, nation-states in some scenarios may try to cor-
don off their information infrastructures into national
intranets. In such a world, the IC will need a way to
rapidly deploy suites of intelligence capability (collec-
tion, analysis, security, communications, etc.) over the
horizon to theaters of political-military competition
where U.S. Government presence and infrastructure
are minimal or have been withdrawn. In addition, the
IC will need to be prepared to deploy its resources in
cyberspace to meet quickly emerging challenges.

(C//REL) Responsive Presence addresses this challenge
by applying the expeditionary model developed in the
military context, bringing the capability of an overseas
station to bear when and where necessary. It builds on
today's deployable organizational models and rests on
several principles: development of small tactical teams
capable of rapid deployment and long, autonomous
operation in a variety of environments; a small logisti-
cal and communications footprint that is largely carry-
in/carry-out; and a robust, self-sufficient communica-
tions capability. Similarly, the intelligence enterprise
will need a cyber architecture that can rapidly move
into IT network "clouds" undetected and maintain that
presence with few additional resources.

(U) Sample Key Capabilities

  • (S//REL) Data Exfiltration and Covert Communi-
    cations. Exfiltrating intelligence from non-permis-
    sive environments will be crucial. A critical enabler
    would be covert communications with a negligible
    forward footprint. U.S. intelligence officers and
    sensitive sources will need to move data in an
    unattributable and undetected way, sometimes
    from within commercial entities possessing great
    technical prowess and robust cyber and electronic
    security protective procedures. Although the likely
    advent of transnational, high-bandwidth wireless
    communications services will offer an environ-
    ment with "lots to hide behind," it will also contain
    many highly competent, and potentially antago-
    nistic, actors.
  • (S//REL) Expanded Reachback. Deployed units
    would have ready reachback to a heterogeneous
    set of expert analysts from IC elements, other
    U.S. Government departments, academia, and
    non-governmental organizations. They would
    have trusted and secure means to communicate
    with these partners that would enable real-time
    exchange while protecting the most sensitive
    operational details.

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Illustrative Example
(U) Responsive Presence

  1. (S//REL) The Caucasus region be-
    comes a flashpoint after the discovery
    of vast new energy reserves under the
    Caspian Sea. As China, Russia, Iran,
    the European Union, and the United
    States jostle for political influence,
    ethnic hostilities draw them toward
    armed conflict.
  2. (S//REL) The United States quickly
    deploys multidisciplinary teams to the
    region, making heavy use of non-official
    cover. These teams carry in highly
    secure data exfiltration gear, erect a
    signals intelligence capability, and build
    a human collection network.
  3. (S//REL) Deployed teams access IC
    and non-U.S. Government experts who
    augment their cultural and linguistic
    expertise and provide real-time analysis
    to improve field operations and shape
    policy.

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(U) Strategic Hedge:
Technology Acquisition by All Means

(C//REL) QICR identified two scenarios in 2025 in which
the United States' technological and innovative edge
slips-despite our countervailing efforts and shifts
to denied areas. Under one scenario, a bloc of states
actively seeking to undermine U.S. geostrategic leader-
ship could deny access to key emerging technologies.
Another possibility is that the technological capacity
of foreign multinational corporations could outstrip
that of U.S. corporations. The IC would be challenged
to understand technological innovation outside its
traditional competencies (e.g., weapons systems) and
in domains where it traditionally has focused less effort
(e.g., commercial research and development (R&D)).
Because technological advancement tends to be ex-
ponential rather than linear, either development could
put the United States at a growing-and potentially
permanent-disadvantage in crucial areas such as
energy, nanotechnology, medicine, and information
technology.

(C//REL) To offset risk in these particular futures, the IC
would need to deploy a set of entrepreneurial tactics
to maintain a technological advantage. This concept
rests on a multi-pronged, systematic effort to gather
open source and proprietary information through
overt means, clandestine penetration (through physi-
cal and cyber means), and counterintelligence.

(U) Sample Key Capabilities

  • (S//REL) S&T Analysis. The IC would monitor sci-
    entific and trade journals, patent filings, and other
    "gray material" datastreams, enabled by technolo-
    gies associated with Sentient Enterprise, to discover
    latent patterns that precede technological innova-
    tion. Thus, the IC would be better able to manage
    the problem of "tens of analysts" sifting through
    "thousands of pages."
  • (S//REL) "Thousands of Conversations." The
    IC would need the ability to access proprietary
    sources of information in permissive environ-
    ments such as foreign universities, industry trade
    shows, and government conferences. This could
    include cooperating U.S. students, professors, and
    researchers reporting bits of non-public informa-
    tion that by themselves are not sensitive, but
    in aggregate could help the IC make inferences
    about breakthrough technological innovations.
    The key challenge would be working closely with
    the academic and scientific communities (which
    would include non-U.S. persons), gaining trust,
    and monitoring potential "threats" while continu-
    ing to advance U.S. scientific progress.
  • (S//REL) Direct Penetration. In denied or more
    restrictive environments such as state-supported
    R&D centers, the IC would continue to apply hu-
    man intelligence (HUMINT) tradecraft and employ
    HUMINT-enabled close access collection. This
    would include recruitment of sources and assets,
    and provision of appropriate technical means to
    acquire and exfiltrate sensitive information.

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  • (S//REL) Cyber Operations. The IC would sustain
    close-access collection, frequently by second and
    third parties, to non-public and/or covert centers
    of innovation by implanting applications (i.e., bots)
    that run automated tasks and sensors in software
    and hardware used by foreign researchers and
    manufacturers, and by conducting computer-
    network exploitation of foreign R&D intranets. In
    select instances, this could also involve develop-
    ment of long-term sources.
  • (C//REL) S&T Counterintelligence. Counterintel-
    ligence in both the public and private sectors
    would not rely solely upon defensive measures,
    but would also undertake proactive measures to
    detect, identify, and degrade or neutralize foreign
    efforts to illegally acquire U.S. technology in areas
    where we retain a leadership position. Counter-
    intelligence would actively seek out and engage
    foreign entities involved in illicit intelligence col-
    lection operations using offensive methods and
    become as effective in the cyber sphere as in the
    physical sphere.

Illustrative Example
(U) Technology Acquisition by All Means

  1. (S//REL) India and Russia are pursuing high-
    temperature superconductivity, which would
    yield a significant economic advantage to the
    first adopter. But four separate streams of
    intelligence, when put together, yield a new
    insight-the two countries are working together.
  2. (S//REL) Sustained reporting from open and
    clandestine sources enables a team of experts
    from the IC, academia, and industry to assess
    the likelihood-moderate-and impact-high-of
    a breakthrough by India and Russia. Counterin-
    telligence reporting suggests the two countries
    are not very interested in U.S. superconductivity
    efforts, which may indicate they believe they
    have a secure lead.
  3. (S//REL) The IC makes separate clandestine
    approaches to India and Russia to break up the
    partnership. It conducts cyber operations against
    research facilities in the two countries, as well as the
    intellectual "supply chain" supporting these facilities.
    Finally, it assesses whether and how its findings
    would be useful to U.S. industry.

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(U) Strategic Hedge:
Human Terrain in the Virtual World

(C//REL) In 2025, non-state identity and affinity groups
operating seamlessly across physical and virtual worlds
could be the key players in global politics. Some of
these groups could pose a grave challenge to U.S. po-
litical legitimacy and physical security. In virtual worlds,
individuals could tailor multiple personas for different
settings, and both individuals and groups could have
many overlapping or non-obvious relationships. There-
fore, understanding the different roles an individual or
group might play in multiple contexts would represent
the central challenge around which the IC would be
oriented.

(S//REL) In this circumstance, the IC would increasingly
need to employ a virtual presence to complement
its physical presence. That presence would include
maintaining a forward position inside unconventional
partner and target entities by routinely embedding
officers not only in foreign intelligence services, as it
does today, but also in cooperative non-state groups.
The IC would also routinely employ private citizens
as proxies for sensitive analytic and collection tasks.
Academics, business people, and others would form an
IC-led standing dialogue, participating in collaborative
analytic teams when and as their expertise warranted.

(U) Sample Key Capabilities

  • (S//REL) The Virtual IC. The IC would require
    collection approaches and counterintelligence
    capabilities such as online techniques for human
    collection. Developing and protecting online cover
    personas and authenticating the identity of online
    sources and data would continue to be critical
    elements of HUMINT and counterintelligence
    tradecraft.
  • (S//REL) Bridging Domains. An automated cross-
    cueing of collection platforms, including distrib-
    uted sensors, would maintain a seamless approach
    to monitoring and understanding individuals and
    groups as they move between and operate across
    the physical and virtual worlds.
  • (S//REL) Identity Assurance. As it builds a web of
    complex and shifting partnerships, the IC would
    need fail-safe means to authenticate its partners'
    identities, conduct counterintelligence, and con-
    trol access to its most sensitive intelligence, which
    will be more challenging in 2025 than today due
    to the proliferation of key technologies.
  • (S//REL) Counterintelligence. The IC would de-
    velop increasingly effective methods for detecting,
    deterring, and exploiting hidden foreign manipu-
    lation of IC activities, and recognizing the trusted
    insiders who are threats. Offensively, the counter-
    intelligence target of choice would shift to persons

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who have access to identity or affinity groups
assessed as a threat to U.S. national security. These
targets would be more likely to be located in com-
mercial or private establishments and might have
no discernible affiliation with a nation-state actor.

  • (C//REL) Trusted, Deployable, Diverse Work-
    force. Organizationally, the IC would need to more
    aggressively recruit and maintain a more diverse
    workforce capable of penetrating and analyzing
    affinity-based groups. In many cases, this would
    require hiring from such groups-and dealing
    creatively with the counterintelligence challenges
    presented by the multiple loyalties that such
    recruits would be likely to have.

Illustrative Example
(U) Human Terrain in the Virtual World

  1. (S//REL) Rapid but unevenly shared
    advances in human enhancement have
    spawned transnational interest groups
    focused on medical ethics. Some question
    limiting human enhancement to the wealthy
    few; others reject it altogether. These
    communities use virtual environments to
    form and proselytize, although some form
    physical communes to live "unenhanced"
    lifestyles.
  2. (S//REL) Although most groups focus
    on peaceful political change, U.S. law
    enforcement and the IC become aware
    of an extremist subcurrent, which they
    are concerned could lead to "medical
    terrorism."
  3. (S//REL) IC and law enforcement agencies
    conduct human intelligence in both physical
    and virtual environments. Automated software
    tools help concatenate commercial, sensor,
    and open-source data to verify targets using
    multiple online personas. Academic experts
    help IC analysts better understand how online
    interest groups self-organize, grow, and splin-
    ter into extremist elements.

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(U) Strategic Hedge:
Money Mastery

(C//REL) If corporations, megacities, and foreign
governments were to limit access to data critical to
the provision of global public goods such as macro-
economic stability, U.S. policymakers could come to
rely on the IC to assist in efforts to collect and analyze
this closely held financial and economic information
and create an "economic operating picture" similar to
the "common operating picture" the military strives for
today. Basic elements of today's financial intelligence
(e.g., international datasets maintained by the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund and others, government reports,
and industry analyses) would be unavailable, unreli-
able, or misleading.

(C//REL) In this case, the IC would need a concept of
Money Mastery to penetrate corporations, markets, for-
eign central banks, and foreign finance ministries and
organizations so that it could gather and analyze pro-
prietary data. The IC also would need to track critical
commodities markets in much greater detail as well as
the full range of illicit financial markets and economies.
This concept would far exceed today's approach to
financial and economic intelligence in scale and scope
and would require increasingly sophisticated targeting
expertise, even more aggressive HUMINT collection,
and processing tools.

(U) Sample Key Capabilities

  • (S//REL) "White/Grey/Black” Literature Exploita-
    tion. Overtly, the IC would monitor open markets
    in stocks, commodities, and currencies. To acquire
    non-public but unprotected data such as propri-
    etary business information, it would use two-way
    information sharing with trusted and cooperative
    corporations and foreign governments. Clan-
    destinely, the IC would use human and technical
    means, including sophisticated tracking soft-
    ware, to access closely held market, financial, and
    business data, be it inside corporations, foreign
    governments, or other institutions.
  • (C//REL) Geoeconomic Analysis. Intelligence pro-
    fessionals would monitor the stability of the global
    economic system (not just single nation-state
    economies) for early warning of disruptions and
    would help policymakers understand the implica-
    tions of different policy interventions.
  • (S//REL) Verify and Validate. The IC would assume
    an even greater validation function to discern the
    truth in official economic data issued by nation-
    states and multilateral organizations. To do this,
    the IC would employ a standing collaborative
    network of economic experts-drawn from many
    sectors of the economy, business, and governmen-
    tal bodies, foreign and domestic-while mitigat-
    ing the potential insider threat.

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Illustrative Example
(U) Money Mastery

  1. (S//REL) A handful of international
    city-states and mega-corporations have by-
    passed multilateral forums to establish their
    own carbon cap-and-trade regime. Most
    trading of carbon credits occurs through
    private channels that are opaque to financial
    regulators (U.S. or otherwise).
  2. (S//REL) Concerned that this burgeoning
    market could trigger a global financial crisis,
    a network of IC and non-IC government
    agencies overtly partners with U.S. energy
    and carbon-abatement corporations to
    acquire non-public information about the
    carbon-credit market.
  3. (S//REL) Covertly, IC agencies form
    front corporations to participate directly
    in the market and emplace spyware that
    detects speculative trading-a leading
    indicator of systemic risk in this market.
    The findings help the United States
    build international support for stronger
    oversight.

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(U) CONCLUSION

(U) QICR 2009's charge was to build on and distill the
implications of the NIC's Global Trends 2025 so that IC
leadership could begin to manage the risks associated
with plausible alternative future environments chal-
lenging to the nation and the IC. This Final Report high-
lights six concepts (three "safe bets" and three "strategic
hedges") and identifies a number of illustrative capa-
bilities that would enable these concepts. IC elements
are strongly encouraged to deepen and broaden the
discussion of safe bets and strategic hedges begun
here, and to begin to consider whether and how stron-
ger foundations for these concepts might be laid into
the next several planning and programming cycles.

(C//REL) Collectively, these findings imply four broader
implications for how to posture the IC to deal with the
range of uncertainty in 2025. First, the IC will have to
manage highly fluid relationships to deal with the
dynamism of a more competitive security environment
and the fluidity among partners, sources, and targets.
This will require the IC to accept more risk despite
increasingly complex counterintelligence and security
challenges.

  • (C//REL) Varying Patterns. The IC will need to
    maintain both enduring partnerships grounded in
    deep trust and shared interests as well as marriag-
    es of convenience that are ephemeral and ad hoc.
    Relationships with foreign partners, in particular,
    will have to be much more variegated and extend
    to unorthodox allies, be they states or non-state
    actors.
  • (C//REL) Range of Partners. The IC will need to
    more aggressively leverage outside expertise
    (foreign and domestic, governmental and non-
    governmental) across all facets of the intelligence
    enterprise (from collection to security to technol-
    ogy development). Reliance on outside expertise
    will require a commensurate level of vigilance
    in the form of effective counterintelligence to
    ensure the integrity of information and systems
    are protected. Equally important, the IC will have
    to recruit, train, educate, mentor, and retain a suf-
    ficiently sized cadre of intelligence professionals
    capable of sustaining a rigorous dialogue with ex-
    ternal experts. Finally, the IC will need to continue
    developing products and services for state, local,
    and tribal governments as well as the private sec-
    tor, recognizing that these customers have special-
    ized information needs and generally do not have
    access to classified information systems.
  • (C//REL) Changing Roles, Unknown Attributes.
    The IC will need ways to deal with partners whose
    roles vis-à-vis U.S. security interests change rapidly.
    Partners or sources in one dimension may very
    well be intelligence targets in another. Addition-
    ally, the IC will have to deal with actors who more
    actively conceal their physical locations, nationali-
    ties, true identities, and true purposes. The IC's
    operating and management model (to include
    tradecraft) will have to work across jurisdictions
    and domains to deal with these challenges, which
    probably will mandate a more robust collection
    and analytic posture inside the United States.

(S//REL) Recommendation: Appropriate elements of the
IC should conduct a policy, regulatory, and legal review to
ensure the IC can meet the challenges of highly fluid rela-
tionships in ways that respect the desire of the American
people for privacy and civil liberty.

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(S//REL) Second, the IC will need to manage a singular
operational architecture that allows for the discov-
ery and tracking of targets across domains, be they
physical or virtual, foreign or domestic, in order to deal
with the new ways that a greater volume of informa-
tion will flow. Continued access to, and effective use
of, space will likely serve as a critical enabler to provide
important collection and communication capability to
work across this divide, although it may be challenged
in scenarios where states or corporations compete for
primacy in space. Achieving such an architecture will
be more difficult if and when U.S. rivals attempt to mili-
tarize space and/or endeavor to increase significantly
the risk to U.S. space-based intelligence assets. At the
same time, the IC will need to maintain visibility into
"off-the-grid" activity that has no digital signature or
a very ambiguous physical signature but that can still
have disproportionately large effects.

  • (C//REL) Dynamic Interaction. The IC will need an
    architecture capable of adapting quickly as threats
    and issues emerge and readily cueing collection
    and operations, often across the physical and
    virtual domains.
  • (C//REL) Few, Conflicting, or Weak Signals. The IC
    will need to synthesize data from multiple, often
    novel, sources to identify threats or opportunities.
    In particular, the IC will need to anticipate, detect,
    understand, and place into context digital signals
    that have few, if any, physical manifestations.

(S//REL) Recommendation: Appropriate elements of the
IC should assess the organization and structure of the
intelligence enterprise to ensure it will support the kind
of operational architecture necessary to deal with the
transformed information environment of 2025.

(U) Third, the IC will need to change the role of the
intelligence officer to deal with a dynamic external
environment and adapt to new customer needs. The
IC will need officers trained in multiple fields, from
technology to methodology to all-source analysis,
with many filling multiple roles at the same time. The
workforce model will need profound reassessment in
at least two dimensions:

  • (C//REL) Building Well-Rounded Experts. IC
    personnel will still need specialized training, in-
    cluding in languages, but they will require deeper
    understanding of context to perform their jobs.
    Initiatives like joint duty will need to be greatly
    expanded and complemented with an array of de-
    velopmental, educational, and training activities.
  • (C//REL) Cross-Training. The IC will need to
    prepare intelligence professionals for careers in
    which the distinction between analyst and collec-
    tor is increasingly irrelevant, particularly in virtual
    worlds. At the same time, the IC will need to build
    teams to bring a range of skills to bear on complex
    problems, because some degree of individual
    specialization will persist.

(U) Recommendation: Appropriate elements of the IC
should review how to adapt the workforce management
model to promote flexibility, responsiveness, collabora-
tion, and appropriate incentives and rewards.

(S//REL) Fourth, the IC will need to maintain strong
information and identity assurance to address the
likely erosion in our technological advantage and
the new dynamics of the digital medium, which will
introduce new risks to our IT infrastructure and new
methods of denial, deception, and misdirection.

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  • (S//REL) Declining IT Security. The IC will have to
    operate in an environment where computing infra-
    structure is more difficult to secure, advanced en-
    cryption is far more pervasive, and our cryptologic
    advantages may persist only in niches where we
    have focused resources to achieve breakthroughs.
    Indeed, the IC may not be able to provide compre-
    hensive security for its entire IT infrastructure and
    may have to use such offsetting strategies as "hide
    in plain sight."
  • (S//REL) Digital Deception. The IC will need to op-
    erate in an increasingly virtual operational environ-
    ment where denial, deception, disinformation, and
    hostile collection will intensify the risks posed to
    collection systems and analytical methodologies.
    Recognizing the difference between clandestine
    adversaries and non-threatening interlocutors will
    require new sets of knowledge, skills, and abilities
    from our HUMINT, security, and counterintelli-
    gence cadres.
  • (S//REL) Identity Assurance. The IC will need ro-
    bust ways to discover, manage, and protect identi-
    ties as many more people use multiple online
    personas and leverage increasingly sophisticated
    anonymizing techniques. It will need approaches
    to mitigate this challenge by taking advantage of
    linked identities and entities providing a web of
    potentially identifying information to cue social-
    network analysis.

(C//REL) Recommendation: Appropriate elements of the
IC should assess the information and identity assurance
capabilities of the IC to ensure it will be able to meet the
digital challenges of 2025.

(U) In conclusion, QICR 2009 highlights the urgency to
begin developing new approaches to prepare for an
uncertain future. Elements of the National Intelligence
Program, foreign intelligence services, state, local,
and tribal governments, and industry are encouraged
to consider these insights in conducting their own
long-term planning efforts. The rigor with which QICR
2009 developed these ideas to mitigate strategic and
institutional risk must now be translated into meaning-
ful agenda items for the IC and its partners to carry
forward.

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(U) For additional reading:

  • (U) National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World, December 2008, available at
    http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_2025_project.html.
  • (U) Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Quadrennial Intelligence Community Review Scenarios:
    Alternative Futures the IC Could Face, January 2009.

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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Office of the Director of National Intelligence

09065903
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