Alert: Voice Masking Is Discovered in SIGINT
Open PDFDocument date: 2007-03-22
Type: SIDtoday
Pages: 1
Genre: newsletter
Banner: DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
Classification: TOP SECRET SI
Dissemination: REL
This March 2007 post from the internal NSA newsletter SIDToday draws attention to voice-masking technology used by subjects of surveillance to frustrate the agency’s voice-recognition efforts.
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People mentioned:
Cusmariu, Adolf, Ubaydah, Abu, Ghadiyah, Abu
Countries:
Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria
Tags:
voice masking, speaker identification, Human Language Technology, speech processing, audio analysis, language analysts, surveillance countermeasures, tradecraft, counterterrorism, Al-Qaeda, sunni extremism, levant, foreign fighters, terrorism financing, target identification
Identifier:
2007-03-22-Alert-Voice-Masking-Is-Discovered-in
PDF SHA-256:
d1c9b4fbb7300732f97fe094817de3d03952b13c875c77632c789f7889506d66
My notes
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
SIDtoday
(TS//SI//REL) Alert: Voice Masking Is Discovered in SIGINT
FROM: Adolf Cusmariu, HLT Operational Technologies (S24211), and
[REDACTED] Deputy Chief, Levant Sunni Extremism (S2I24)
Run Date: 03/22/2007
(TS//SI//REL) Use of voice-masking devices complicate efforts to "voice ID" SIGINT targets.
(TS//SI//REL) Earlier this month, Counterterrorism (S2I) Levant Sunni Extremism language
analysts noticed that the intercepts of two prominent Al-Qai'da associated extremists in the
Levant contained voice masking; the audio either sounded far too high, or too low in pitch.
(TS//SI//REL) In one instance Saudi-based senior extremist financier Abu-Ubaydah used the
voice-masking tool throughout his conversation dealing with his financing the travel of Yemeni
suicide bombers to both Lebanon and Iraq. In another instance, Syria-based senior foreign
fighter and facilitator Abu-Ghadiyah began in masked mode, went unrecognized by the
recipient, turned the masking device off, and both had a good laugh.
(TS//SI//REL) Of course, this is no laughing matter, since all efforts to identify any speaker -
both human and automated - will fail when voice alteration is used. But why would a caller do
this at all? Surely the recipient would also fail to recognize the speaker, so absence of this very
human method of sound identification would only induce suspicion and mistrust. Disturbingly,
could some terrorists be aware of efforts by SIGINT agencies to identify them by their voices and
thus have begun to resort to masking?
(TS//SI//REL) The devices used to alter voices in the few cases intercepted so far may not have
been all that sophisticated. Simple changes in sampling rates done in mathematical software
made the digital audiofiles sound more normal; in fact, two specific intercepts may have
contained the same speaker. Still, automated detection of such anomalies will be difficult.
(TS//SI//REL) A way to undo masking for an intended recipient would be to use the same device
and agree on settings prior to each transmission, so that unmasking could be done near-real
time. For example, if the sampling rates were increased by 25% to make the speaker's pitch
sound far too low, sampling rate reduction by the same amount at the other end would return a
normal voice. Even simpler, if only voice messaging is used, the masked recorded audio could
be undone after playback through an (un)masking device.
(TS//SI//REL) Because speaker identification services will continue to provide a key piece of the
puzzle in tracking and capturing terrorists, voice-masking techniques need to be understood
early. Tools developed for other intelligence applications are available and will be acquired to
study this emerging problem.
(U//FOUO) Do you have any comments on this topic? Post them on the SID today blog .
"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet
without the consent of S0121 (DL sid comms)."
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108
Published in the Same Report
(10 of 21 documents)
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RT10 Initiative Overview [pdf]
Overview document for RT10, "Real-time, distributed architecture for mobile (tactical) and fixed (national) operational environments"
Programs: RT10 · COBRA FOCUS · GREENDRAGON · GOLDMINER · JUGGERNAUT · MATTERHORN · OBELISK · SORTINGHAT · INFOVIS · SHARPFOCUS2 · TOGA · SORTINGLEAD · GLOBALREACH · VOICERT · QUADRASPECTRE · RENOIR · ANALYSTSNOTEBOOK · OCTAVE · HLT · DRT · GEOT · InnoVisions -
NSA Georgia Opens New Audio-Forensics Lab SIDtoday [pdf]
The document discusses the launch of a new audio-forensics lab at NSAG (National Security Agency Georgia) designed to enhance the processing and analysis of intercepted voice communications. The lab, funded through the Senior Language Technology Authority (SLTA), will focus on resolving language processing challenges for language analysts by improving the intelligibility and quality of foreign-language voice intercepts.
People: Mercer, Marti Hix -
Tips for a Successful Quick Reaction Capability SIDtoday [pdf]
In response to Iranian President Ahmadinejad’s 2007 visit to New York, the NSA’s Iran Government and Leadership branches launched a Quick Reaction Capability (QRC) to gather time-sensitive intelligence. The QRC focused on enhanced collection techniques, collaboration across departments, and efficient data management to analyze the extensive communications traffic during the event, resulting in valuable leads on Iranian leadership activities and diplomatic plans.
People: Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud -
New RT-RG Overview Video Available on NSANet SIDtoday [pdf]
The NSA's Meade Operations Center released a 10-minute video overview of the Real-Time Regional Gateway (RT-RG), a tool suite designed for forward-deployed analysts. The suite enables faster access to real-time metadata and reporting, improving tactical support for military operations, with new functionalities being developed for use in Afghanistan and beyond.
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Voice Biometrics Capability Proven During Recent Technology Demonstration SIDtoday [pdf]
The Coordinate Operational Resources for Voice Exploitation Technology (CORVET) project, managed by the Expeditionary SIGINT Services Office (ESSO), demonstrated a promising capability for voice biometrics that could be used in security operations to identify individuals based on voice characteristics. Similar to the long-established method of fingerprinting, CORVET aims to create a database of voice models that could be used for identification in various contexts, such as detention and force-protection scenarios.
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Alvin, Simon, and... Al Qaeda? Finding Modified Voice in SIGINT Traffic SIDtoday [pdf]
This SIDtoday article discusses the use of voice modification technology by Al-Qaeda and other extremist groups to evade identification in SIGINT traffic. It highlights the development of the HLT Lite software by R64, which can automatically detect modified voices in intercepted communications, enabling the identification of targets even when traditional voice recognition fails.
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Come to SID's Identity Intelligence (I2) Day Conference and See Your Target in a Whole New Light! SIDtoday [pdf]
This SIDtoday article promotes NSA's Identity Intelligence (I2) Day Conference, highlighting the importance of using SIGINT tools and techniques to track individuals across time and space. It emphasizes the growing role of biometrics, biographic data, and digital footprints in identifying and targeting foreign persons of interest, with insights from key speakers and case studies.
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SIGINTers Use Human Language Technology to Great Advantage, Isolate Conversation about Threat to US Official SIDtoday [pdf]
In 2010, the Special Collection Service in Mexico City began using Human Language Technology (HLT) to streamline voice collection and analysis, significantly improving efficiency. By rapidly filtering through large volumes of audio data, HLT helped isolate critical intelligence, such as identifying a conversation related to a bomb threat targeting a U.S. Embassy official, all within minutes instead of hours.
Programs: HLT -
Innov8 Voice Analytics Experiment Profile [pdf]
This document outlines Phase 1 of a Voice Analytics experiment conducted by GCHQ in partnership with the NSA, testing the ingestion and processing of voice data through the DISTILLERY platform on GHOSTMACHINE hardware. The experiments evaluate independent, parallel, and linked analytics (SAD, GID, LID), as well as dynamic resource management, to ensure accurate, scalable, and compliant voice processing in a Joint Collaboration Environment.
Marking: TOP SECRET -
Voice Fax User Group Minutes December 2010 [pdf]
This GCHQ document is a NSA/GCHQ meeting record from December 2010 detailing the deployment of voice analytics, including speech activity detection, speaker identification, and language identification, integrated with tools like Google Earth to map locations of target communications. It outlines ongoing and planned speaker ID operations against specific targets, including militant leaders and foreign officials, demonstrating the operational use of voice recognition for intelligence collection and geolocation.
Related Documents
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Voice Fax User Group Minutes December 2010 [pdf]
This GCHQ document is a NSA/GCHQ meeting record from December 2010 detailing the deployment of voice analytics, including speech activity detection, speaker identification, and language identification, integrated with tools like Google Earth to map locations of target communications. It outlines ongoing and planned speaker ID operations against specific targets, including militant leaders and foreign officials, demonstrating the operational use of voice recognition for intelligence collection and geolocation.
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Alvin, Simon, and... Al Qaeda? Finding Modified Voice in SIGINT Traffic SIDtoday [pdf]
This SIDtoday article discusses the use of voice modification technology by Al-Qaeda and other extremist groups to evade identification in SIGINT traffic. It highlights the development of the HLT Lite software by R64, which can automatically detect modified voices in intercepted communications, enabling the identification of targets even when traditional voice recognition fails.
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GCHQ Visit to NSA on Voice Analytics Systems [pdf]
This document is a GCHQ report detailing a late-November (2007?) visit to NSA’s R64 division focused on collaboration in language identification (LID) and speaker identification (SID) systems, including sharing models and research insights. It also describes NSA tools like Hotzone and Voice RT for real-time voice analysis, and mentions an upcoming visit from the CLEAR consortium to address challenges in speech intelligibility and audio recovery for intercepted communications.
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Open Source Signals Analysis: Not Your Grandfather's SIGINT! SIDtoday [pdf]
Using a combination of expert analysis and voice recognition tools that were developed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the NSA was able to confirm that a set of publicly released recordings, ostensibly made by Iraq-based Al Qaeda figure Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, were indeed in al-Zarqawi's voice.
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For Media Mining, the Future Is Now! SIDtoday [pdf]
A number of new "media mining" tools allow analysts to search intercepted content in near-real time, no matter if text, audio or visual. This includes retroactive word-search in intercepted communications.
People: Picone, Joseph“How the NSA Converts Spoken Words Into Searchable Text” - The Intercept ↗ (2015-05-05) · “Finding Your Voice: Forget About Siri and Alexa — When It Comes to Voice Identification, the “NSA Reigns Supreme”” - The Intercept ↗ (2018-01-19) · The Intercept ↗ (2019-05-29) · Froomkin, Dan · Kofman, Ava