Publication year: 2019-01 9 documents
Search documents matching “2019-01” →When a publisher first published each document. If a document is published multiple times, only the oldest one is used here.
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DoD 2011 Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace – Supply Chain Excerpts [pdf]
The classified 2011 Department of Defense strategy warns that U.S. reliance on foreign manufacturing—especially from countries like China—creates major cybersecurity risks, including the potential insertion of malicious hardware or software into critical systems. It outlines a government-wide plan to mitigate these supply chain vulnerabilities through coordinated policies, risk management strategies, and collaboration with industry.
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Intellipedia – Air Gapped Network Threats [pdf]
This document from an internal wiki for the U.S. intelligence community, surveys threats to so-called air-gapped systems, arguing that supply-chain compromises, physical implants (BIOS, KVMs, peripherals), infected removable media, and enabled wireless/emanations present realistic paths for adversaries to bridge isolated networks. It assesses likelihoods and attack vectors (including insider help and CDS/guard exploitation), highlights specific historic incidents (Agent.BTZ/MAKERSMARK), and recommends strict removable-media policies, TEMPEST countermeasures, and rigorous cross-domain guard protections to mitigate the risk.
People: Witte, Griff · Warren, Peter · Streeter, Michael · Watson, Paul · Louchard, Bjørn · Crawford, George · Rudge, David · Terrazas, Michael -
Intellipedia – BIOS Threats [pdf]
This from an internal wiki for the U.S. intelligence community, titled “BIOS Threats” details the use of malicious BIOS implants as a means of achieving persistent system compromise for cyber espionage and attack purposes. It discusses the history, technical challenges, detection limitations, and global development of BIOS-based malware by both state and non-state actors, including U.S. and Chinese cyber units.
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Intellipedia – Supply Chain Cyber Threats [pdf]
This document on Supply Chain Cyber Threats, from an internal wiki for the U.S. intelligence community, outlines vulnerabilities in hardware and firmware components such as power supplies, NICs, RAID controllers, GPUs, and peripheral devices that could be exploited by adversaries through the supply chain. It details assessments from U.S. intelligence agencies (CIA, DIA, FBI, CYBERCOM) highlighting risks from foreign companies, insider threats, and malicious modifications that could compromise critical U.S. government and military systems.
Programs: A-SPACE -
National Intelligence Estimate 2009 Global Cyber Threat – Supply Chain Excerpts [pdf]
These Supply Chain Excerpts from the 2009 National Intelligence Estimate, assesses that the U.S. faces a growing cyber threat from state actors, particularly Russia and China, who have the capability and strategic intent to exploit or disrupt U.S. and allied information systems. It emphasizes vulnerabilities from supply chains, insider threats, and technology trends that favor offensive operations, while noting the difficulty of detecting and fully defending against these sophisticated cyber threats.
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NSA Supply Chain Attack From PMR 4-24-13 [pdf]
This document is a top-secret NSA report detailing a SIGINT development operation in which a classified Voice-over-IP network shipment was intercepted and subjected to a supply-chain interdiction, allowing NSA and its intelligence community partners to gain access to the hardware and intelligence. It describes the operational process, including tracking the shipment through China, coordinating with Tailored Access Operations (TAO), and using tools like XKEYSCORE to identify targeting selectors, ultimately enabling detailed surveillance and future operational opportunities.
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PRC Information Warfare & Huawei [pdf]
This NSA intelligence briefing on Huawei analyzes Huawei’s global telecommunications presence and its potential links to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and Chinese government intelligence activities. It highlights concerns that Huawei’s international market expansion — including its subcontracted 2008 upgrade of the TAT-14 transatlantic cable carrying U.S. and defense communications — could be exploited by China for signals intelligence (SIGINT) purposes.
People: Chávez, Hugo -
Special Collection Service – Pacific SIGDEV Conference March 2011 – Supply Chain Excepts [pdf]
This top-secret 2011 NSA presentation outlines how the Special Collection Service—a joint NSA–CIA program operating from U.S. embassies—leverages its global network of “points of presence” to conduct human-enabled SIGINT and cyber operations directly inside “adversary space.” Framed as a “home field advantage,” it portrays U.S. diplomatic sites as launchpads for infiltration, surveillance, and even supply chain attacks, blurring the line between diplomacy and digital espionage.
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Tailored Access Operations 2007 [pdf]
This NSA document describes the Tailored Access Operations (TAO) division, which conducts sophisticated cyber operations to penetrate and maintain persistent access to target networks globally through both remote exploits and physical interdiction methods. The presentation outlines TAO's organizational structure, mission capabilities across telecommunications and data networks, development of hardware/software implants for devices ranging from servers to SCADA systems, collaboration with HUMINT partners for physical access operations, and specialized divisions focused on exploiting telephony systems, computer networks, and developing tools for computer network attack and exploitation.