Journalist: Poitras, Laura 193 documents
Search documents matching “Poitras, Laura” →Journalists bylined on the stories that published these documents. Contributors credited without a byline are searchable but not listed here.
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MYSTIC [pdf]
These excerpts provide foundational details on the MYSTIC program, including its inception in 2009 and its structural organization. It defines MYSTIC as a program managed by the Special Source Operations (SSO) division, focusing on "embedded collection systems" within foreign wireless and mobile networks. The document confirms a deceptive operational model: the equipment is overtly installed to provide "commercial services" for telecommunications companies, while its secret purpose is to provide SIGINT (Signals Intelligence) to U.S. agencies.
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N.S.A. Memo Expands Access to FISA Information [pdf]
In 2006, the National Security Agency sought to expand access to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act information — previously limited to its headquarters in Fort Meade, Md. — to its code-breakers in Georgia, Texas and Hawaii. Part of the deliberations focused on a problem that raised the possibility that the agency had violated rules the surveillance court established for handling the information.
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N.S.A. Timeline of Surveillance Law Developments [pdf]
This chart, apparently from an internal N.S.A. presentation, lists milestones in surveillance rules over nearly four decades. The July 2002 “Raw Take” sharing order, whose existence has not previously been disclosed, is just one of three rulings by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to make the list. The other two were 2004 and 2006 rulings allowing bulk collection of data about emails and phone calls.
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NAC BUDE Partnership - SATELLITE TELEPORT KNOWLEDGE (GCHQ) [pdf]
A top secret GCHQ Network Analysis Centre document from GCHQ Bude detailing comprehensive intelligence profiles of three German satellite teleport operators — Stellar, Ce-Tel, and IABG — including their network infrastructure, router configurations, IP ranges, employee identities, satellite customers, and login credentials, compiled to identify access chokepoints for SIGINT collection against German IP transit infrastructure.
People: Steffen, Christian · Sommer, Christoph · Fares, Ali · Grave, Richard · Steffen, Simona · Skaletz, Oliver“Treasure Map: The NSA Breach of Telekom and Other German Firms” - Der Spiegel ↗ (2014-09-14) · “The NSA and GCHQ Campaign Against German Satellite Companies” - The Intercept ↗ (2014-09-14) · Müller-Maguhn, Andy · Poitras, Laura · Rosenbach, Marcel · Sontheimer, Michael · Grothoff, Christian -
NCRs with Foreign Relations Missions Become 'SUSLAs' SIDtoday [pdf]
New titles have been created for four NSA/CSS Representatives (NCRs) to major Third Party partners. Special US Liaisons Advisors (SUSLA) to Italy and Germany were first named, now followed by Special US Liaison Advisors to Turkey (SUSLAT), Thailand (SUSLAB), Japan (SUSLAJ) and Korea (SUSLAK).
People: Schwemin, Sharon“Turkey Is 'Partner and Target' for the NSA” - Der Spiegel ↗ (2014-08-31) · “How the NSA Helped Turkey Kill Kurdish Rebels” - The Intercept ↗ (2014-08-31) · The Intercept ↗ (2019-05-29) · Poitras, Laura · Rosenbach, Marcel · Sontheimer, Michael · Stark, Holger -
Net Defense from Encrypted Communications [pdf]
A NSA Technology Directorate briefing from February 2012 describing BLUESNORT — a capability that repurposes GALLANTWAVE's SSL/TLS decryption pipeline for network defence, re-injecting decrypted traffic into TURMOIL Stage 1 Prime where BLUESNORT detects malware and other malicious activity — representing description of NSA using its own bulk decryption infrastructure for cyber defence as well as intelligence collection.
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New Contact-Chaining Procedures to Allow Better, Faster Analysis SIDtoday [pdf]
The SIGINT Management Directive 424 briefing (Jan 2011) announces a major procedural shift at the NSA, allowing analysts to conduct contact chaining and large-scale metadata analysis from any selector, regardless of nationality or location. This change removes prior restrictions on U.S. data, enabling more powerful social network mapping for foreign intelligence purposes.
Programs: GATEKEEPER -
NIOC MARYLAND ADVANCED COMPUTER NETWORK OPERATIONS COURSE [pdf]
Programs: GENIE · HAWKEYE · EINSTEIN · TUTELAGE · NEPTUNETHUNDER · BLINDDATE · HAPPYHOUR · NITESTAND · WAITAUTO · MATCHCRIMP -
NSA BOUNDLESSINFORMANT Chart on Germany [pdf]
The Germany BOUNDLESSINFORMANT chart covering Dec 10, 2012 to Jan 8, 2013 shows that German intelligence collected and shared about 553 million cellphone metadata and internet records with the NSA, primarily through XKEYSCORE, LOPERS, and JUGGERNAUT systems.
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NSA Communications Hub in Europe Is Modernized SIDtoday [pdf]
This internal NSA report details the completion of "GODLIKELESION," a massive infrastructure modernization project at the European Technical Center (ETC) in Wiesbaden, Germany, which serves as the agency's primary communications and data-flow hub for Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. The project remediated critical failures in power and cooling systems while expanding capacity for 27 third-party partner data flows without interrupting mission operations.
Programs: GODLIKELESION -
NSA Espionage During the UN Climate Change Conference (COP15) in Copenhagen [pdf]
The leaked NSA document reveals that during the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Summit (COP15), the agency and its intelligence partners collected signals intelligence on other countries’ climate negotiation strategies, including advance details of China’s coordination with India and Denmark’s confidential “rescue plan,” to provide U.S. policymakers with a strategic advantage. It underscores how espionage was integrated into diplomatic efforts to influence the outcome of global climate talks.
People: Sarkozy, Nicolas -
NSA Intelligence Relationship with Turkey – Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT) and the Turkish SIGINT Intelligence Directorate (SIB) [pdf]
A 15 April 2013 NSA information paper on the SIGINT relationship with Turkey's civilian MIT and military SIB, covering what each side provides, including HFDF access and CROSSHAIR geolocation fixes, and describing Turkey as both a SIGINT partner and an intelligence target.
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NSA's Counterterrorism (CT) Relationship with the German Federal Intelligence Service (BND) and the German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) [pdf]
This April 2013 NSA talking points document prepares leadership for discussions with German intelligence services BND and BfV about counterterrorism cooperation, highlighting NSA's formal relationship with BfV approved March 20, 2013, planned provision of XKEYSCORE technology to enable German domestic surveillance, and warning that German requests for Skype interception capabilities and use of SIGINT in open court represent potential complications.
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NSA's Offensive and Defensive Missions: The Twain Have Met SIDtoday [pdf]
The document outlines a case where NSA’s defensive malware analysis enabled offensive SIGINT teams to gain sustained access to a Chinese command-and-control server, allowing NSA to intercept intelligence China had stolen from the United Nations through a method known as fourth-party collection.
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NSA's Oldest Third Party SIGINT Partnership SIDtoday [pdf]
The United States’s signals intelligence relationship with Turkey started with a 1949 verbal agreement between the CIA and Turkey’s intelligence organization. As of 2005, 40 NSA staffers in Ankara provide technical assistance, training, and support to Turkey’s military and civilian intelligence agencies. Although the NSA’s overt operations in Turkey ceased in 1993, covert SIGINT collection by NSA/CIA Special Collection Service continues from sites in Istanbul and Ankara.
Programs: SEA SENTRY“Turkey Is 'Partner and Target' for the NSA” - Der Spiegel ↗ (2014-08-31) · “How the NSA Helped Turkey Kill Kurdish Rebels” - The Intercept ↗ (2014-08-31) · The Intercept ↗ (2018-03-01) · Poitras, Laura · Rosenbach, Marcel · Sontheimer, Michael · Stark, Holger -
NSA/CSS EXCEPTIONALLY CONTROLLED INFORMATION (ECI) 2003 [pdf]
This document acts as the definitive "master list" of the NSA’s Exceptionally Controlled Information (ECI) compartments as of September 2003. While standard Top Secret information is shared among those with the appropriate clearance and a "need to know," ECIs are even more restricted—they are "silos" of information where access is granted only by the Director of the NSA (DIRNSA). This list provides a rare architectural view of the NSA's most sensitive secrets, ranging from illegal money laundering stings to the subversion of global encryption standards.
Programs: PAWLEYS · ABEYANT · APERIODIC · AUNTIE · AMBULANT · FIRSTDOWN · BOATMEN · BOXWOOD · BULLET · CHILLY · CLERIC · CONQUERER · KLAMATH · DECKSTOP · DICHOTOMY · DILEMMA · RAMPART-M · DOMINATE · FLEXURE · ENSIGN · STAIRWELL · ESCAPEE · STATEROOM · EVADEYIELD · FORBIDDEN · FORBORNE · GRAYSCALE · HELLFIRE · HISTORY · INVEIGH · INVENT · LYSERGIC · MISCHIEF · RAGTIME · BLARNEY · OPALESCE · TAREX · PENDLETON · PIEDMONT · PITCHFORD · REFRACTOR · RUBIOUS · STEREO · STRESSFUl · TAXONOMY · VISITOR · WASHBURN -
NSA: How Network Mapping is Helping to Target the Credit Card Authorization Networks [pdf]
This document outlines NSA efforts to map and exploit credit card authorization networks by collecting, parsing, and ingesting transactional data from key geographic regions. It focuses on locating large stores of cardholder data, overcoming technical barriers to collection, and turning this financial information into actionable intelligence — part of a broader, highly secretive global financial surveillance program.
Programs: FOLLOWTHEMONEY -
OTR encrypted messages can't be decrypted by the NSA [pdf]
Three intercepted chat sessions from 16 March 2012 collected under PRISM, showing a target switching mid-conversation from unencrypted to OTR-encrypted messaging — with NSA able to collect the session metadata and unencrypted portions but unable to decrypt the OTR messages, each annotated "No decrypt available for this OTR encrypted message."
Programs: PRISM -
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Partner Cables [pdf]
A classified table mapping which GCHQ cable interception programs had access to specific undersea fiber optic cables worldwide, revealing the codenames and access types — either Direct Cable Order or Indefeasible Right of Use/Landing Capacity — of seven surveillance programs across dozens of international cable systems, with Cable & Wireless (GERONTIC) providing access to the largest number.
“Vodafone – der lange Arm des britischen Geheimdienstes?” - WDR ↗ (2014-11-20) · “Spy cable revealed: how telecoms firm worked with GCHQ” - Channel 4 ↗ (2014-11-20) · “Der lange Arm des Geheimdienstes?” - NDR ↗ (2014-11-21) · “Snowden-Leaks: How Vodafone-Subsidiary Cable & Wireless Aided GCHQ’s Spying Efforts” - Süddeutsche Zeitung ↗ (2014-11-25) · Restle, Georg · White, Geoff · Strozyk, Jan · Moltke, Henrik · Poitras, Laura · Obermaier, Frederik