Classification: TOP SECRET 823 documents
Search documents matching “TOP SECRET” →Each document's classification level, as component values. If a document contains multiple classifications, the highest is used here.
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GCSB monitoring candidates for WTO director general via XKEYSCORE fingerprint [pdf]
GCSB used XKEYSCORE to intercept emails mentioning other candidates for WTO job and paid close attention to Indonesian contender.
Programs: XKEYSCORE -
GCSB SIGINT Development Quarterly Report [pdf]
This GCSB quarterly report from July 2009 provides a Top Secret review of major telecommunications developments in the South West Pacific, focusing on the intelligence challenges posed by competitive deregulation and new infrastructure projects, while also detailing GCSB's efforts to enhance its collection capabilities, including the fine-tuning of GSM collection in the Solomon Islands, supporting DSD analyses in Fiji, and preparing for full-take XKEYSCORE data sharing with allies.
“New Zealand Spies on Neighbors in Secret "Five Eyes" Global Surveillance” - The Intercept ↗ (2015-03-04) · “Snowden revelations / The price of the Five Eyes club: Mass spying on friendly nations” - The New Zealand Herald ↗ (2015-03-04) · “New Zealand Spy Data Shared With Bangladeshi Human Rights Abusers” - The Intercept ↗ (2015-04-15) · “Secret documents shine light on GCSB spying in Bangladesh” - The New Zealand Herald ↗ (2015-04-16) · Gallagher, Ryan · Hager, Nicky -
General Zahner's View from the Front SIDtoday [pdf]
Description of Brig. Gen. Zahner’s speech, which covered the role of intelligence in Operation Iraqi Freedom and the importance of taking risks.
People: Zahner, RichardThe Intercept ↗ (2016-05-16) -
Getting Close to the Adversary – Forward-based Defense with QFIRE (June 3, 2011) [pdf]
This document describes the QFIRE project which is designed to give the NSA a global, low-latency platform for “forward-based defense”, enabling real-time detection and manipulation of Internet traffic close to its source. By co-locating passive sensors (TURMOIL), decision logic (TURBINE), and injection capabilities, QFIRE can rapidly reset connections, redirect targets for exploitation, inject malicious payloads, and even seize control of botnets. It operates as part of the broader QUANTUMTHEORY architecture, leveraging both cooperative and non-cooperative infrastructure worldwide to enable CNE/CND/CNA effects with minimal delay.
Programs: QFIRE · QUANTUMTHEORY · TURBULENCE · TURMOIL · TURBINE · TUTELAGE · QUANTUM · QUANTUMSKY · QUANTUMINSERT · QUANTUMBOT · QUANTUMCOPPER · STRAIGHTBIZARRE · BLINDDATE · TUMULT · ISLANDTRANSPORT · SURPLUSHANGAR · MIDDLEMAN · SCSnet · WEALTHYCLUSTER · SSO -
Getting Leads: GEO Mining SIDtoday [pdf]
Description of an approach to sifting through large amounts of phone call metadata to find leads for new surveillance target called "GEO Mining." The author gives an example of searching for heroin-production labs in Afghanistan using GEO Mining, by filtering all phone calls in Afghanistan down to calls made near known heroin-processing labs. In this case, "The top 20 handsets were then tasked for collection, and at least one has produced reportable intelligence."
People: Brown, PaulThe Intercept ↗ (2017-04-24) -
Getting the 'Ungettable' Intelligence: An Interview with TAO's Teresa Shea SIDtoday [pdf]
An interview with Teresa Shea, then chief of Tailored Access Operations, NSA's offensive hacking unit. In 2006 TAO had "access to over 258 target sets in 89 countries."
The Intercept ↗ (2019-05-29) -
GHOSTHUNTER aerial image (2009) [pdf]
This imagery showcases a real-world application of the GHOSTHUNTER program operated out of Menwith Hill Station in the UK. The document features an aerial satellite photograph used to pinpoint the precise physical location of VSAT (Very Small Aperture Terminal) satellite dishes. By linking a target's digital footprint—specifically their MAC address and IP address—to a specific set of geographic coordinates, the NSA and GCHQ can identify the exact building or compound where a person is using the internet. This capability is a cornerstone of the "find, fix, finish" cycle used to support "covert operations" and targeted killing missions in conflict zones like Yemen, Somalia, and Afghanistan.
Programs: GHOSTHUNTER -
Ghosthunter and the geolocating of internet cafes [pdf]
This document announces an NSA “R Spotlight” webcast introducing GHOSTHUNTER, a multi-agency geolocation program designed to locate Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) VSAT Internet access points, particularly internet cafés across the Middle East and North Africa in support of U.S. military operations. By mid-2009, GHOSTHUNTER had successfully geolocated over 5,000 VSAT terminals across Middle East demonstrating its operational effectiveness and integration with broader intelligence efforts.
Programs: GHOSTHUNTER -
Ghosthunter future capabilities (2008) [pdf]
This document indicates that Menwith Hill Station (MHS) provides approximately 99% of the FORNSAT data used by GHOSTHUNTER for geolocating targets, while additional FORNSAT sites can be tapped as needed to cover other regions. Although GHOSTHUNTER offers near-global geolocation capabilities, certain areas remain blind spots where coverage is limited.
Programs: GHOSTHUNTER -
GHOSTHUNTER Tasking Process [pdf]
The document outlines the GHOSTHUNTER (GH) tasking process at Menwith Hill Station, describing how geolocation requests for VSAT terminals and internet-connected targets are managed through coordination with the NSA’s Network Analysis Centre (NAC) and other sites. It details priority levels, task submission procedures, use of locational data from MASTERSHAKE, integration with imagery, and how results are shared with GCHQ and other authorized parties.
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GHOSTMACHINE: Identifier Lead Triage with ECHOBASE [pdf]
This June 2012 presentation introduces ECHOBASE, an NSA analytic architecture designed to automate the triage of massive identifier lead lists (ranging from 50 to 10,000+ entries). By applying behavior-based analytics and "yes/no" behavioral queries against raw SIGINT, the system allows analysts to prioritize high-interest targets and discard irrelevant leads at scale.
Programs: GHOSTMACHINE · ECHOBASE · IDENTIFIERSCOREBOARD · FOREMAN · CONTRAOCTAVE · OCTAVE · UTT · WAVELEGAL · CASPORT · PSC -
Going on TDY to Help Protect a VIP SIDtoday [pdf]
During Dick Cheney's visit to Lithuania, an NSA team working out of the US embassy unsuccessfully tries to break local cell phone networks' encryption. They do, however, find 'relevant' airport and local police communications to exploit.
People: Cheney, DickThe Intercept ↗ (2019-05-29) -
Gold Nugget Award Bestowed SIDtoday [pdf]
A staffer was given an award for outstanding achievement in Traffic Analysis, including identifying and geolocating insurgents and terrorists.
Programs: VOICESAILPeople: Johnson, CarlThe Intercept ↗ (2017-09-13) -
Graph theory in the operational environment – GCHQ [pdf]
This document details GCHQ’s research on identifying “closed loops” of communication, where targets use a small set of phones to communicate exclusively among themselves, often with cheap, disposable handsets like the Nokia 1100. It explains the methodology for analyzing anonymized metadata, constructing contact graphs, and extracting non-giant, non-tree components to discover operationally relevant closed loops for intelligence and counterterrorism purposes.
Programs: VOICESAILPeople: Rumsfeld, Donald -
GRIMPLATE - First Steps Toward Identifying Adversarial Use of BitTorrent [pdf]
This document outlines the NSA's GRIMPLATE program, which was developed to monitor and analyze BitTorrent traffic on the Department of Defense's NIPRnet to identify potentially malicious activity. The program focuses on crawling the Distributed Hash Table (DHT) of BitTorrent networks to gather data on file-sharing nodes and peer connections, in order to detect and mitigate threats while building a case for halting unauthorized P2P usage on secure networks.
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GSM Temporary Selectors - Breakthroughs in Automated Identification SIDtoday [pdf]
It has always frustrated analysts when GSM cellular networks implement Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identities, which obscure a code, known as IMSI, that uniquely and persistently identifies the cellphone. The "ASSOCIATION" program has solved this problem by mapping TMSI to IMSI.
The Intercept ↗ (2018-03-01) -
GSM tower geolocation [pdf]
This TOP SECRET STRAP 1 note describes DYMO, a prototype GSM-tower geolocation system that combines RUFIS-bis (which demodulates co-channel GSM ARFCN streams per cell-ID) with WHAMI Fast Image (WFI) to remodulate and correlate signals to produce high-quality tower geolocation and matching metadata. The remodulated “synthetic geolocation” improves accuracy and is under development in the NMDC/Midas studies.
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GSM tower mapping made easier and more accurate with new tool SIDtoday [pdf]
This document details DYMO, a prototype developed at the NSA’s Menwith Hill Station—the agency’s large British base operated in close cooperation with GCHQ—for highly accurate GSM tower geolocation. It highlights DYMO’s superior performance in mapping accuracy and metadata integrity, its extensive operational use across regions such as Iraq, Iran, and Somalia, and its integration with tools like GOLDENEYE and the Integrated COMINT System (ICS) to streamline analysis and intelligence fusion.
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Guidelines for the classification of NSA SIGINT details (1945-1967) [pdf]
This document is an NSA classification guide that defines how and why historical SIGINT material from 1945–1967 remains classified, in many cases for 75 years. It systematically explains which intelligence activities, targets, partnerships, and technical methods must stay protected because they still reveal sensitive sources, methods, and diplomatic equities.
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Hackers are Humans too - Cyber leads to CI leads [pdf]
This document from Canada’s Communications Security Establishment (CSE) analyzes the Russian hacking team MAKERSMARK, highlighting how its operators misused technically sophisticated but poorly secured infrastructure, mixing personal and operational activity, which made them traceable despite their advanced tools. It details CSE’s methods for attributing cyber intrusions, monitoring malware-infected systems, and exploiting operational security lapses to gain intelligence on Russian cyber operations.