Stealthy Techniques Can Crack Some of SIGINT's Hardest Targets

Open PDF +1 other copy
Creating agency: NSA National Security Agency (US)
Document date: 2010-06-01
Type: SIDtoday
Pages: 2
Genre: newsletter
Banner:
Classification: TOP SECRET COMINT
Dissemination: NOFORN

A SIDToday article from June 2010 describing TAO's supply chain interdiction operations — where shipments of network devices are covertly intercepted, implanted with beacon implants at a secret load station, and repackaged for delivery — illustrated by a specific operation against the Syrian Telecommunications Establishment whose implanted backbone devices unexpectedly provided access to Syria's previously unexploited GSM network, enabling automatic exfiltration of call detail records and voice content.

Long Description:
This is a TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN SIDToday article dated June 2010, authored by the Chief of Access and Target Development (S3261). The article provides explicit confirmation of TAO supply chain interdiction operations — the physical interception and implantation of network hardware before delivery to targets. The operational process is described directly. Shipments of computer network devices — servers, routers and similar equipment — destined for targets worldwide are intercepted in transit. They are redirected to a secret location where TAO Access Operations (AO, S326) employees, supported by the Remote Operations Center (S321) and IC partners, install beacon implants directly into the hardware. The devices are then repackaged and returned to the delivery stream. The article describes these operations as "some of the most productive operations in TAO" because they pre-position access inside hard target networks before those networks are aware of any compromise. The Syria case study is the document's most operationally significant content. Devices were intercepted that were bound for the Syrian Telecommunications Establishment to be used as part of Syria's internet backbone. After several months a beacon implanted during interdiction called back to NSA covert infrastructure. The callback provided access to further exploit the device and survey the network. The survey revealed an unexpected bonus: STE's GSM cellular network was also running over the same backbone infrastructure. Since STE's GSM network had never previously been exploited, this represented a new access of significant intelligence value. The resulting capabilities are described in concrete terms. TAO gained the ability to automatically exfiltrate call detail records from STE containing billing information showing subscribers' contacts and geographic locations. This access then cascaded to CDRs from other GSM networks in the region, GPRS data, and exploitation of a GSM switch providing target voice content exfiltration.
Programs:
-

People mentioned:
-

Countries:
Syria

Tags:
Tailored Access Operations, S326, S3261, S321, Access Operations, Remote Operations Center, supply chain interdiction, beacon implant, load station, Syrian Telecommunications Establishment, STE, GSM, GPRS, call detail records, internet backbone, voice communications, implants, physical access

Identifier:
spiegel_-_media-35669

PDF SHA-256:
94a4a5feb429262322315cd16b7967990ca43d139e57e44423fc2e3233d18d7b

TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN

June 2010

SIDtoday

(U) Stealthy Techniques Can Crack Some of SIGINT's Hardest Targets

By: (U//FOUO) [REDACTED], Chief, Access and Target Development (S3261)

(TS//SI//NF) Not all SIGINT tradecraft involves accessing signals and networks from thousands of miles away... In fact, sometimes it is very hands-on (literally!). Here's how it works: shipments of computer network devices (servers, routers, etc.) being delivered to our targets throughout the world are intercepted. Next, they are redirected to a secret location where Tailored Access Operations/Access Operations (AO – S326) employees, with the support of the Remote Operations Center (S321), enable the installation of beacon implants directly into our targets' electronic devices. These devices are then re-packaged and placed back into transit to the original destination. All of this happens with the support of Intelligence Community partners and the technical wizards in TAO.

(TS//SI//NF) Such operations involving supply-chain interdiction are some of the most productive operations in TAO, because they pre-position access points into hard target networks around the world.

(TS//SI//NF) Left: Intercepted packages are opened carefully; Right: A "load station" implants a beacon

(TS//SI//NF) In one recent case, after several months a beacon implanted through supply-chain interdiction called back to the NSA covert infrastructure. This call back provided us access to further exploit the device and survey the network. Upon initiating the survey, SIGINT analysts from TAO/Requirements & Targeting determined that the implanted device was providing even greater accesses than we had hoped: We knew the devices were bound for the Syrian Telecommunications Establishment (STE) to be used as part of their internet backbone, but what we did not know was that STE's GSM (cellular)

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
Dated: 20070108
Declassify On: 20350501

TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN

network was also using this backbone. Since the STE GSM network had never before been exploited, this new access represented a real coup.

(TS//SI//NF) TAO is now able to automatically exfiltrate call detail records (CDRs) containing billing information from STE, showing subscribers' interlocutors and their geographic locations. This access has, in turn, enabled access to CDRs from other GSM networks in the region, including GPRS data as well as the exploitation of a GSM switch that provides target voice content exfiltration. A very successful operation!

(U//FOUO) Want to know more about AO? Type "go AO" in your browser.

(U//FOUO) POC: [REDACTED]

TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN