Interview with a SID "Hacker" -- Part 1: How Does TAO Do Its Work?
Open PDF +1 other copyDocument date: 2012-07-12
Type: SIDtoday
Pages: 4
Genre: newsletter
Banner: DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
Classification: SECRET SI
Dissemination: REL
A SIDToday interview from July 2012 with a counterterrorism subject-matter expert in TAO's Requirements and Targeting organisation, explaining how TAO plans and executes computer network exploitation operations.
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People mentioned:
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Countries:
Pakistan
Tags:
Tailored Access Operations, Remote Operations Center, Computer Network Exploitation, endpoint access, Internet Service Providers, OPSEC, mission management
Identifier:
spiegel_-_media-35655
PDF SHA-256:
5972e63d9a1c434369aaf779293445fa210a5b17c9c637b20fd1288de48190ac
My notes
SIDToday - Interview with a SID "Hacker'' -- Part 1: How Does TAO Do Its Work?
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
(U//FOUO) Interview with a SID "Hacker" -- Part 1: How Does TAO Do Its Work?
FROM: [REDACTED] the SIDtoday Editor
Run Date: 07/12/2012
[REDACTED] (S//REL) One organization that has grown substantially in recent years is Tailored Access Operations (S32), the group that hacks our targets'
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SIDToday - Interview with a SID "Hacker'' -- Part 1: How Does TAO Do Its Work?
[REDACTED] computers. (pictured), a counterterrorism subject-matter expert in TAO's Requirements and Targeting organization, spoke with SIDtoday recently to explain how TAO carries out its work:
- (U//FOUO) What do TAO Requirements & Targeting analysts like you do? -- What's your role?
(U) Our role in R&T is to serve as a liaison with the TOPIs in S2. We work with the TOPIs to find out what they really want in terms of CNE [computer-network exploitation] collection and then work within TAO to figure out how to get it... To give you a quick overview, there are different elements in TAO:
- (U//FOUO) First there are are the developers who create the software and the hardware -- the tools that TAO uses to carry out our collection.
- (U//FOUO) Next are the operators in the ROC [Remote Operations Center] who actually use the tools. They do the actual collection of intelligence from the targets' systems, while showing good OPSEC [operations security] and making sure our tools themselves are protected.
- (U//FOUO) And then there is my element, Requirements and Targeting. We are the analysts and planners for operations. We find out what the TOPIs are looking for, do the network analysis, and draw up a plan for getting that collection.
- (U//FOUO) Supporting it all are the folks who provide the infrastructure. They provide the computers, networks, etc. and keep everything running.
(U//FOUO) Each group brings a different skill to the table. Regarding the tools we use, the developers know the coding for them, the operators know how to use them, and R&T just knows that they exist. R&T's focus is on where we can apply the tools to get the intelligence we want.
(U//FOUO) In TAO, we all have to work hand-in-glove. Often the analysts are eager to grab whatever intelligence we can, while the operators are more conscious of the risks involved, so we meet somewhere in between. Each side brings their own perspective and it creates checks and balances.
(U//FOUO) The ROC does after-action reviews of operations -- every action taken is automatically recorded -- to make sure things were done appropriately. Operators have to be certified -- and they can have their certifications pulled so they have a strong incentive to show good OPSEC.
- (U//FOUO) Do R&T analysts participate when operations are carried out in the ROC? If so, how does it play out?
(U//FOUO) Yes, the R&T analysts actually sit side-by-side with the ROC operators when an operation takes place. We're there to provide knowledge of the networks, and the operators, as I mentioned, know how to use the tools to extract the data.
(U//FOUO) Nowadays there are dedicated analysts and operators working on
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SIDToday - Interview with a SID ''Hacker'' -- Part 1: How Does TAO Do Its Work?
specific targets. So, for example, I work the CT [counterterrorism] target, and we have counterpart operators who focus on CT, too. (In the past, we analysts would have shown up for an operation and been assigned an operator randomly out of a pool.) The benefit of this new approach is that the analysts and operators can develop working relationships and collaborate ahead of time on an upcoming operation.
(U//FOUO) In terms of how an operation is scheduled, our analysts decide to work a project and start to do research on targets to go after. Next we get approvals through the ROC mission directors to pursue operations against those targets. The mission directors are a small group of people with lots of experience. They assess the risks involved in the operation and approve or deny it. Once we have the approval, the analysts plan an operation in coordination with an operator and, when they are ready, arrange a specific time to carry it out. We have the flexibility to conduct the operation at the optimal time.
(U//FOUO) In the early days TAO used to be just a bunch of hackers! We did things in a more ad hoc manner... one guy did it all. Now we're more systematic in how we do things.
(S//SI//REL) In the CT world, we usually go after the infrastructure (like an ISP [internet service provider]) or after the specific target in end-point collection extracting data from a specific "box" [computer or device]. Normally collection is automated for end-point, but sometimes it's an interactive, real-time event when the target is up on the net. The latter happens quite a bit in CT. The operations might take place at 2AM or 6AM, since that is when the target is active. Some CT targets use really slow dial-up connections from remote places in the Pakistani tribal areas, and we have to move quickly when the opportunity presents itself.
[REDACTED]
(U) ...Do you need linguists to participate in your operations, to translate the names of the files, etc?
(S//SI/REL) Not as much as you might think. We don't evaluate the content of the data, we just collect it. Usually we have an idea of what types of files and information the TOPIs are interested in -- like text files -- and we try to grab all of it for analysis later. We don't take the time during the operation to sort out the good from the bad.
(U) Stand by for the conclusion of this interview., appearing tomorrow. [Editor's note: click HERE.]
"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday
articles may not be
republished or
reposted outside
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SIDToday - Interview with a SID "Hacker'' -- Part 1: How Does TAO Do Its Work?
NSANet without the
consent of S0121
[REDACTED]
DYNAMIC PAGE --
HIGHEST POSSIBLE
CLASSIFICATION IS
TOP SECRET // SI / TK
// REL TO USA AUS
CAN GBR NZL
DERIVED FROM:
NSA/CSSM 1-52,
DATED 08 JAN 2007
DECLASSIFY ON:
20320108
4 of 4
Published in the Same Report
(10 of 34 documents)
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Expanding Endpoint Operations SIDtoday [pdf]
Tailored Access Operations, NSA's elite hackers, are expanding their endpoint operations -- hacking directly into computers to steal information -- and are establishing the new endpoint operations remote operations center, scheduled to come online in the summer of 2005, that "is capable of managing and conducting endpoint operations on a scale that will dramatically expand collection." The physical office space of this new center will allow TAO to "grow from the current average of 20-25 of these operations per day to over 100 per day," and will allow TAO to increase the number of "active implants," or actively monitored pieces of malware, from 100-150 to thousands.
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The ROC: NSA's Epicenter for Computer Network Operations SIDtoday [pdf]
The Remote Operations Center (ROC) conducts computer network operations against U.S. adversaries and foreign governments. Its motto is: "Your data is our data, your equipment is our equipment, anytime, any place, by any legal means."
The Intercept ↗ (2019-05-29) · “The Digital Arms Race: NSA Preps America for Future Battle” - Der Spiegel ↗ (2015-01-17) · Appelbaum, Jacob · Gibson, Aaron · Guarnieri, Claudio · Müller-Maguhn, Andy · Poitras, Laura · Rosenbach, Marcel · Ryge, Leif · Schmundt, Hilmar · Sontheimer, Michael -
CSEC SIGINT Cyber Discovery: Summary of the current effort [pdf]
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Programs: STARGATE · LOOKING GLASS · QUANTUM · GOLDENEYE · XKEYSCORE · MARINA · JTRIG · BROADOAK · UTT · GLOBALREACH · GLOBALSURGE · THUGGEE · EREPO · DANCINGBEAR · HAUSTORIUM · SHAREOWN · MUTANTBROTH · MOONRAKER · CARBONROD · RUFFLE · ROCKOPERA · QUINCEY · ECLIPSE · MUGSHOT · HIGHNOTE · UDAQ2 · EKB · TURBINE · ACNO · FLAMECARPET · FUMECUPBOARD · JACKPOT · SLIPSTREAM · B13B · PSC · QUINCY · DAREDEVIL · ROADBED -
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Programs: TURBULENCE · TURMOIL · HAMMERSTEIN · HAMMERCHANT · FASHIONCLEFT · TUTELAGE · TURBINE · TRAFFICTHIEF · XKEYSCORE · ANALYTICS · PRESSUREWAVE · TOYGRIPPE · POISONNUT · FLAXENPRECEPT · FOGYNULL · FUNNELAPS · SHELLGREY · METROTUBE · VINYLSEAT · OLYMPUS · UNITEDRAKE · FIGBUILD · SURPASSPIN · ROOTKNOT · OPTICPINCH · SEAGULFARO · TREBLECLEF · CONVEY · PINWALE · SWEEPFORWARD · QUANTUM · KEYCARD · ASDF · TUBE · PUZZLECUBE · WEALTHYCLUSTER2 · COALSHOVEL · HAMMERMILL · ISLANDTRANSPORT · FASCIA · TURBINIE · APEX · PPF · AEG · FIP · SSO · PICARESQUE · PSP · IVE · PSC · CHIMNEYPOOL · CORESSC · FLASHHANDLE · IBRIDGE · CORALREEF · VAO · NUCLEON · PIQBLADE“The Digital Arms Race: NSA Preps America for Future Battle” - Der Spiegel ↗ (2015-01-17) · “How the NSA Plans to Infect ‘Millions’ of Computers with Malware” - The Intercept ↗ (2014-03-12) · “How the NSA Plans to Infect ‘Millions’ of Computers with Malware” - The Intercept ↗ (2014-03-12) · Appelbaum, Jacob · Gibson, Aaron · Guarnieri, Claudio · Müller-Maguhn, Andy · Poitras, Laura · Rosenbach, Marcel · Ryge, Leif · Schmundt, Hilmar · Sontheimer, Michael · Gallagher, Ryan · Greenwald, Glenn -
Analytic Challenges from Active-Passive Integration [pdf]
This NSA presentation examines metadata attribution challenges arising when active TAO implants exfiltrate traffic through passive TURMOIL collection infrastructure, creating conflicts where intercepted data carries dual classification markings, case notations, and legal authorities from both collection systems. The briefing highlights how existing databases and analytic tools were not designed to handle traffic with two simultaneous sets of metadata parameters, requiring enterprise-wide solutions to consistently attribute and track actively-shaped intelligence collection.
Programs: BRAVENICKEL · HAMMERMILL · APEX · MARINA · TURMOIL · PRESSUREWAVE · METROTUBE · TOYGRIPPE · HAMMERSTEIN · HAMMERSTONE · METAWAVE · TURBULENCE · SSO -
The FASHIONCLEFT Protocol [pdf]
This October 2008 NSA technical specification details FASHIONCLEFT, the encryption and exfiltration protocol used by TAO implants to securely tunnel captured network packets from compromised devices back to the NSA's Common Data Receptor using layered RSA and RC6 encryption with authentication. The document addresses technical integration challenges of implementing FASHIONCLEFT packet reception within TURMOIL's passive collection infrastructure, particularly cache buffering requirements and metadata handling for exfiltrated traffic.
Programs: FASHIONCLEFT · FOGYNULL · FUNNELAPS · SHELLGREY · TURMOIL · SURPASSPIN · PUZZLECUBE · FLASHHANDLE · HAMMERCHANT · AEG · PPF · ISLANDTRANSPORT -
Moving Data Through Disconnected Networks - Delay-Tolerant Networking and the IC [pdf]
This June 2012 NSA Laboratory for Telecommunications Sciences presentation details Delay-Tolerant Networking (DTN) applications for surveillance operations, including covert communications in denied areas, data exfiltration from isolated networks, unwitting data mules, and integration with TAO's CHIMNEYPOOL implant framework. The document reveals R4 development of FUZZYLINT, an ultra-lightweight DTN implementation designed to enable multi-hop exfiltration from implants without requiring direct physical access.
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Related Documents
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BYZANTINE HADES: An Evolution of Collection [pdf]
A classified NSA SIGINT briefing from 2010 describes “BYZANTINE HADES,” a collection of Chinese computer network exploitation activities, with a focus on the BYZANTINE CANDOR actor set and U.S. efforts to analyze, attribute, and counter those intrusions. The document details targeting patterns, technical tradecraft, and a TAO-led counterintelligence operation that successfully penetrated the attackers’ infrastructure and personal systems.
Programs: BYZANTINEHADES · BYZANTINECANDOR · BYZANTINERAPTOR · BYZANTINEANCHOR · BISHOPKNIGHT · BYZANTINEVIKING · MAVERICKCHURCH · BISHOP · BYZANTINETRACE · DIESELRATTLE · BYZANTINEFOOTHOLD · BYZANTINEPRAIRIE · SEEDSPHERE · CARBONPEPTIDE · TITANRAIN · PINWALE · XKEYSCORE · CROSSBONES · TUNINGFORK · ARROWECLIPSE · CUTEBOY · POPROCKS · BYZANTINE -
COMPUTER NETWORK OPERATIONS - GENIE [pdf]
A TOP SECRET Congressional Budget Justification entry for the NSA/CSS GENIE project — the Tailored Access Operations programme underpinning all endpoint Computer Network Operations — requesting $651.7 million and 1,870 military and civilian positions for FY2013, with plans to maintain 85,000-96,000 implant points-of-presence worldwide and 9,000-10,000 active accesses, including $25.1 million for covert purchase of software vulnerabilities and a $3.4 million supply chain implant operation targeting al-Qaeda.
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SPINALTAP, Tracking Courier Use of Secure Digital Cards, and QUANTUMFALCON [pdf]
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Der Spiegel ↗ (2013-12-29) · “How the NSA Plans to Infect ‘Millions’ of Computers with Malware” - The Intercept ↗ (2014-03-12) · “The Digital Arms Race: NSA Preps America for Future Battle” - Der Spiegel ↗ (2015-01-17) · Appelbaum, Jacob · Poitras, Laura · Rosenbach, Marcel · Stöcker, Christian · Schindler, Jörg · Stark, Holger · Gallagher, Ryan · Greenwald, Glenn · Gibson, Aaron · Guarnieri, Claudio · Müller-Maguhn, Andy · Ryge, Leif · Schmundt, Hilmar · Sontheimer, Michael -
Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) Classification Guide / 2-59 [pdf]
A NSA/TAO classification guide establishing the precise classification level for 41 categories of information about computer network exploitation operations — covering remote and physical subversion methods, CNE tools and techniques, supply chain operations, hardware implants, off-net field operations, zero-day vulnerabilities, and cryptographic material acquired through CNE.
“Core Secrets: NSA Saboteurs in China and Germany” - The Intercept ↗ (2014-10-10) · “The Digital Arms Race: NSA Preps America for Future Battle” - Der Spiegel ↗ (2015-01-17) · Maass, Peter · Poitras, Laura · Appelbaum, Jacob · Gibson, Aaron · Guarnieri, Claudio · Müller-Maguhn, Andy · Rosenbach, Marcel · Ryge, Leif · Schmundt, Hilmar · Sontheimer, Michael -
The ROC: NSA's Epicenter for Computer Network Operations SIDtoday [pdf]
The Remote Operations Center (ROC) conducts computer network operations against U.S. adversaries and foreign governments. Its motto is: "Your data is our data, your equipment is our equipment, anytime, any place, by any legal means."
The Intercept ↗ (2019-05-29) · “The Digital Arms Race: NSA Preps America for Future Battle” - Der Spiegel ↗ (2015-01-17) · Appelbaum, Jacob · Gibson, Aaron · Guarnieri, Claudio · Müller-Maguhn, Andy · Poitras, Laura · Rosenbach, Marcel · Ryge, Leif · Schmundt, Hilmar · Sontheimer, Michael