SNIPs of SIGINT

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Creating agency: NSA National Security Agency (US)
Document date: 2012-06-27
Pages: 5
Genre: other
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Classification: TOP SECRET SI
Dissemination: REL TO USA, FVEY

A monthly notes entry from June 2012 by an NSA analyst on exchange at DSD Australia, describing two CNA/CNE tool development projects — PITIEDFOOL, a Windows file system destruction suite that kills the MFT and volume shadow copies and was successfully tested inside FUZZYEBOLA, and PANT SPARTY, an OpenSSH daemon backdoor granting covert root access while suppressing log entries — alongside a briefing to the US Ambassador to Australia on CNA/CNE work and TAO collaboration.

Long Description:
This is a TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY personal monthly notes entry dated 27 June 2012, published by T314 End User Solutions, authored by an NSA analyst completing an exchange tour at DSD Australia. The document describes two tool development projects completed during the tour alongside personal travel notes and awards received. PITIEDFOOL is described as a suite of CNA tools targeting Windows file systems. The core capability is destroying the Master File Table and volume shadow copies to render data irrecoverable. The development challenge documented was that Windows Volume Shadow Copy Service preserves large chunks of MFT data, allowing forensic recovery tools to reconstruct deleted files — PITIEDFOOL was updated to specifically overwrite shadow copy contents on each partition encountered. A 15-fold performance improvement was achieved by refactoring sector-by-sector writes into configurable block writes. The tool was tested inside FUZZYEBOLA — a separate implant framework — by inserting the PITIEDFOOL binary without recompilation and configuring it to execute at a specific time. The test result was confirmed successful: the system rebooted and failed to come back up, with nearly the entire drive irrecoverable. The author notes that with secure sector wiping added after MFT and VSS destruction, recovery would be impossible. PANT SPARTY is a backdoor implanted in the OpenSSH daemon for Unix/Linux systems, providing persistent covert root access independent of the authorized_keys file. The implementation embeds a public key directly in the sshd binary, granting root shell access to the holder of the corresponding private key regardless of SSH configuration, including configurations explicitly prohibiting root login. Several technical challenges are documented: bypassing SSH's username-switching protections mid-login, allowing arbitrary non-existent usernames while still obtaining root, and handling de-privileged child process constraints that required force-feeding a fake root authorization context. The stealth design suppresses logging — when an arbitrary username is used the logs show only "Invalid username" with no follow-on authentication success message; when a valid username is used the logs show only a failed public key check. The author notes this was completed in two days, breaking their previous personal record of three days for DIRTYDEEDS. Awards received include a Letter of Appreciation from the DSD Director, a Letter of Appreciation from the SUSLOC Chief, and a SUSLOC coin — confirming the author was stationed at SUSLOC (the US SIGINT element co-located at DSD). The author briefed the US Ambassador to Australia on CNA/CNE work and TAO collaboration during the tour.
Programs:
PITIEDFOOL, FUZZYEBOLA, PANTSPARTY, DIRTYDEEDS

People mentioned:
-

Countries:
New Zealand, Australia

Tags:
SUSLOC, Computer Network Attack, Computer Network Exploitation, Tailored Access Operations, Windows, MFT, volume shadow copy, file system destruction, OpenSSH, sshd, backdoors, root access, Unix, Linux, persistence, log suppression, exchange tour, US Ambassador

Identifier:
spiegel_-_media-35663

PDF SHA-256:
dca225fd88f9b1547e867f3949d675cb42bd43372137677dab78463a42bf8d2e

SNIPs of SIGINT :: (U) Monthly Notes for June 2012

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SNIPS of SIGINT
(U) Monthly Notes for June 2012

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SNIPS of SIGINT :: (U) Monthly Notes for June 2012
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
(U) Monthly Notes for June 2012

2012.06.27 - 03:58 pm
Entry tags: monthly notes

Technical accomplishments

(U//FOUO) PITIED FOOL

  • (TS//SI//REL) PITIEDFOOL is a suite of CNA tools I'm developing for
    use against file systems, initially focused on Windows. More information
    can be found on the DSD wiki, but it's a bit ugly at this point.
  • (TS//SI//REL) Determined that it was a combination of the volume
    shadow copy and deleted entries in the shadow copy that were causing
    my recovery woes. As a result of the shadow copy having large chunks of
    MFT data in it, and much of these records still being mostly correct,
    recovery programs were able to reconstruct most of the system drive. I
    added functionality to PITIEDFOOL to overwrite the contents of the
    shadow copy on each partition encountered.
  • (TS//SI//REL) Now that I was overwriting large chunks of data for
    every partition, I could no longer ignore the performance issues with
    writing to a disk one sector at a time. I refactored my code to overwrite in
    blocks configurable by a pre-processor definition and sped up execution
    about 15-fold, with the possiblity of it going even faster with increased
    memory usage.
  • (TS//SI//REL) After all this I tested PITIEDFOOL within FUZZYEBOLA
    and it worked flawlessly. I took a build of FUZZYEBOLA from last
    month, and without recompiling inserted the PITIEDFOOL binary with
    configuration details to execute it at a certain time. At that time I saw the
    process usage slightly increase (from 0% to around 2%) and a few minutes
    later the system rebooted and didn't come back up. Running a file
    recovery tool over the entire drive yielded some files (from scraping
    headers) but nearly the entire contents of the drive were irrecoverable,
    and if it had been configured to securely wipe every sector on the drive
    after killing the MFT and VSS it wouldn't have been able to recover
    anything at all. Success!
  • (U//FOUO) Documented my work.

(U//FOUO) PANT SPARTY

  • (TS//SI//REL) PANT SPARTY is a backdoor in the SSH daemon for
    *NIX, based on OpenSSH portable. It allows a public key to be embedded
    in the sshd binary and will then always grant a root login shell if
    presented with the proper key pair for that key. In other words, it behaves
    as if the given key is in ~/.ssh/authorized_keys.
  • (TS//SI//REL) Currently DSD uses authorized_keys as a quick-and-easy
    method of persistence against certain *NIX targets. In most cases this

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SNIPS of SIGINT :: (U) Monthly Notes for June 2012

works, but it obviously isn't very stealthy and can run into problems if
that file is deleted or the SSH configuration changes to not use it. The goal
for this project was to provide the same level of persistence but embedded
in the sshd binary itself (obviously, assuming root access, as before).

  • (TS//SI//REL) By adding my own check in several key places within the
    SSH code I was able to grant authorization to a key embedded in the
    binary without too much trouble. The hard part came in granting that
    user root privileges even if the configuration specifically banned root
    login. That was achieved by setting a flag in the authorization context
    within the server that essentially said "this is our backdoor, let it happen,
    oh and stop logging also."
  • (TS//SI//REL) Then I wanted to have it so if you provide a normal
    username as a login, it still grants you a root shell. SSH has a lot of checks
    to make sure you can't switch usernames in the middle of a login (go
    figure) so this was a bit tricky to bypass. Ultimately I was able to use the
    same flag as the previous step, and just had to put checks for it in other
    places.
  • (TS//SI//REL) More fun was to be had when I wanted to allow an
    arbitrary username to be provided (i.e. one that doesn't exist on the
    system) while still allowing for root login. This led to all sorts of problems
    where I didn't even get a valid authorization context at all, and I couldn't
    manually call the C function to get one for root because the connection is
    a de-privileged child process, so I had to force-feed it a fake one for root.
    Of course, the force-fed hash for root doesn't match the entry in passwd,
    so I had to throw in another check there to return true if it's the backdoor.
    And there's all sorts of fun happening with pre-auth where I had to revert
    the authorization context back to its original value to postpone its
    processing (a standard authorization step in some cases) and then
    properly update it to root during the actual authorization step later on.
    Once I got this working, however, a user is able to run "ssh
    abcdefg@target" and the target's logs only show "Invalid username
    abcdefg" without the follow-on message of "Accepted publickey for root
    from 10.0.0.1 port 55000 ssh2". Presenting a valid username leads to the
    only logged output being that the public key check failed.
  • (S//SI//REL) I set my new implant development PR on this project! My
    previous record was 3 days for DIRTYDEEDS, but I finished this in 2.
    Technically I had it working in a day, but it wasn't what I considered
    releasable, so I'll have to wait for some other opportunity to present itself
    so I can achieve the feat of an implant-in-a-day.

Awards/Recognition

(U//FOUO) Letter of Appreciation from [REDACTED] Director DSD

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(U//FOUO) Letter of Appreciation from [REDACTED] Chief SUSLOC

(U//FOUO) SUSLOC coin

Briefings and demonstrations given

(S//REL) Briefed the U.S. Ambassador to Australia on my work on CNA/CNE
and collaboration with TAO during my time at DSD.

Meetings and briefings attended

(U) NSTR

(U) Weekly SUSLOC meetings

Reports/papers/publications

(U) NSTR

Training

(U) NSTR

Miscellaneous

(U) New Zealand was incredible! I wish I'd had more time there, but I think I
did pretty well. I saw a handful of LOTR sights, Mount Cook, a number of
gorgeous lakes, snow-capped mountains everywhere, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] If you want pictures let me know and I'll shoot
you the link.

(U) Tasmania was similarly awesome, and not just because I can now say "Yea,
I've been to Tasmania," because, you know, it sounds cool.

(U) redacted at the U.S. Embassy Independence Day Party!

(U//FOUO) My time at DSD came to a close in June, as my flight back is on 30
June (26 hours in an airplane, WOO!). I absolutely loved my time in Australia,
both in terms of work and travel, but I'm also looking forward to returning to
the land of Chick-fil-A, college athletics, BBQ pork, and real bacon. Oh, and
good beer.

(U) THE BCS IS DEAD!!!!!!! YESSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS
SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS

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SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS
SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS!!!

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Page Publisher: T314 - End User Solutions

DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52
DATED: 08 JAN 2007
DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108
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