JORDAN-BELGIUM
Open PDF +1 other copyDocument date: 2008-12-01
Pages: 6
Genre: report
Banner: SECRET STRAP1 SPOKE
Classification: SECRET STRAP 1 SPOKE
Dissemination: -
2008 GCHQ report documenting the interception of a Jordan–Belgium satellite telecommunications link, through which British intelligence monitored call traffic and identified tasked surveillance targets including the Turkish foreign ministry, Palestinian Authority figures and Israeli MK Ahmad Tibi, along with other hits on Kurdish leadership, diplomats, and Jordanian government offices such as the Royal Protocol Office. The published copies redact different entries. Der Spiegel's and The Intercept's show the Turkish and Kurdish ones, Le Monde's (version 8BBAC) the Palestinian and Jordanian ones.
CORINTH, SOUNDER, DRUMKIT, DRUMROLL, DEPTHGAUGE
People mentioned:
Tibi, Ahmad
Countries:
Jordan, Belgium, Turkey, Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique, Greece, France, Spain, Cyprus, Belarus, Ukraine, Romania, Norway, Poland, Germany, Malaysia, Australia, Thailand, Japan, South Korea, China, Taiwan, India, Pakistan, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, UAE, Israel, Bahrain, Qatar, Bhutan, Kyrgyzstan, Mauritius, Finland, Bulgaria, Switzerland, Sweden, Syria, Iran, South Africa, Andorra, Singapore, Palestine
Tags:
8BBAC, C7, DNR, E1, DCME, Belgacom, OPA-BUDE, telecommunications, Palestinian Authority, PLO, satellite interception, diplomatic spying
Identifier:
media-34658
Also known as:
8BBAC
PDF SHA-256:
c6eb7cd254596bf76761fb6acee63e7970558bbbb0aba2f0719b2777a02886e6
My notes
SECRET STRAP1 SPOKE
8BBAC
JORDAN-BELGIUM
Report No: 44 Date: 01/12/2008
Case Notation: 8BBAC
Polarity/Freq: 8BL[REDACTED]Mhz
Summary:
This informal report has been issued to highlight a link of potential interest for tasking.
The physical gateways are JORDAN-BELGIUM, however BELGIUM is providing a logical
gateway to the ROW.
The link is a fairly standard E1 employing Timeslots 30 and 31 to relay C7, which in turn provides
the dialling for this link. Compression is achieved by utilising DTX-360B DCME equipment.
Traffic summaries indicate that both terminals are relaying transit data.
Results:
TS 30 (HOST)
OPC 4-032-5 (Jordan, FAST Link GSM) DPC 2-014-7 (Belgium, Brussels F Belgacom)
Link activity as follows:
4-032-5 to 2-012-2 CIC 0066-0097, 0155-0191
Transit calls to:
Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo,
Mozambique, Greece, Belgium, France, Spain, Cyprus, Belarus, Ukraine, Romania, Norway,
Poland, Germany, Malaysia, Australia, Thailand, Japan, South Korea, China, Taiwan, Turkey,
India, Pakistan, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, UAE, Israel, Bahrain, Qatar, Bhutan, Kyrgyzstan
4-032-5 to 2-012-1 CIC 0065-0096, 0145-0192
Transit calls in addition to above include:
Mauritius, Finland, Bulgaria, Switzerland, Sweden, Syria, Iran
TS 31 (HOST)
OPC 4-032-0 (Jordan, FAST Link) DPC 2-013-1 (Belgium, Brussels F Belgacom)
Link activity as follows:
4-032-0 to 2-012-2 CIC 0065-0096, 0145-0183
Transit calls to:
Morocco, Algeria, Libya, France, Spain, Cyprus, Finland, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Romania, Malaysia,
Australia, South Korea, China, Turkey, India, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, UAE, Israel, Bahrain, Bhutan
4-032-0 to 2-012-1 CIC 0066-0097, 0146-0183
Transit calls in addition to above include:
South Africa, Greece, Andorra, Switzerland, Singapore
Mapping:
8BBAC was input to Depthgauge for mapping.
Although the resultant map was not fully conclusive, it supports the previously listed mapping as
follows:
C7 in BS30 controls trunks 2,3,4,5
C7 in BS31 controls trunks 0,1,6,7
40320-20122 TR0 CIC'S 0065-0087 TS 01-23 LIN
40320-20122 TR1 CIC'S 0098-0126 TS 02-30 ALTE
40325-20122 TR2 CIC'S 0066-0085 TS 02-21 LIN
40325-20122 TR3 CIC'S 0098-0126 TS 02-30 ALTE
40325-20121 TR4 CIC'S 0065-0094 TS 01-30 LIN
40325-20121 TR5 CIC'S 0098-0126 TS 02-30 ALTE
40320-20121 TR6 CIC'S 0066-0093 TS 02-29 LIN
40320-20121 TR7 CIC'S 0098-0118 TS 02-22 ALTE
*** LAST MAP 02037 ***
Further signalling is being carried by these C7 channels, which has not yet been mapped.
Possibly controls voice on another bearer:
BS30 40325-20121 CIC 0151-0192 and 40325-20122 CIC 0155-0191
BS31 40320-20121 CIC 0146-0183 and 40320-20122 CIC 0145-0183
The RLE to this link is believed to be 8BBNH. Currently in view at Sounder.
ANALYSIS: -
8BBAC was sampled for DNR activity for approximately 94 hours over the period 26/11/2008-
01/12/2008 on Drumkit.
Originating Countries Calls Percentage Destination Countries Calls Percentage
Results – TS30
TS30: - Scored 607 hits, which include both tasked and de-tasked numbers listed in Corinth. Of the
607 hits, 86 were scored against 26 currently tasked numbers.
Results – TS31
TS31: - Scored 349 hits, which include both tasked and de-tasked numbers listed in Corinth. Of the
349 hits, 40 were scored against 14 currently tasked numbers.
Hits can be viewed in Drumroll under the following filenames:
TS 30 = 8BBAC0030
TS 31 = 8BBAC0031
TASKED HITS NOTED FOR TS30:
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] TURKISH MFA [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
SELECTION OF NON-TASKED HITS FOR TS30: (priority 1 hits highlighted in red)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] KURDISH LEADERSHIP [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
TASKED HITS NOTED FOR TS31:
[REDACTED]
SELECTION OF NON-TASKED HITS FOR TS31: (priority 1 hits highlighted in red)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] KURDISH LEADERSHIP [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] KURDISH LEADERSHIP [REDACTED]
Technical Details: Link = 8BBAC
Modulation – 8PSK.
Symbol rate = 780.19 Kbps
Data rate = 2048bps.
Fec rate = 7/8.
Fec Type = TPC.
Overhead = None.
Reed Solomon = None
Absolute encoding.
This link can be tasked on the system
Contact Details [REDACTED]
OPA-BUDE - [REDACTED]
1 of 7
This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be
subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on
01242 221491 x30306 (non-sec) or email infoleg@gchq
SECRET STRAP1 SPOKE
Published in the Same Report
(10 of 14 documents)
-
SINIO Summer 2003 Series of Strategic Intelligence Issue Seminars Begins with Tough Times for Turkey SIDtoday [pdf]
Announcement of a seminar on negative fallout from the Iraq War for Turkey and Turkey-U.S. relations.
Marking: CONFIDENTIAL“Turkey Is 'Partner and Target' for the NSA” - Der Spiegel ↗ (2014-08-31) · “How the NSA Helped Turkey Kill Kurdish Rebels” - The Intercept ↗ (2014-08-31) · The Intercept ↗ (2016-05-16) · Poitras, Laura · Rosenbach, Marcel · Sontheimer, Michael · Stark, Holger -
NSA's Oldest Third Party SIGINT Partnership SIDtoday [pdf]
The United States’s signals intelligence relationship with Turkey started with a 1949 verbal agreement between the CIA and Turkey’s intelligence organization. As of 2005, 40 NSA staffers in Ankara provide technical assistance, training, and support to Turkey’s military and civilian intelligence agencies. Although the NSA’s overt operations in Turkey ceased in 1993, covert SIGINT collection by NSA/CIA Special Collection Service continues from sites in Istanbul and Ankara.
Programs: SEA SENTRY“Turkey Is 'Partner and Target' for the NSA” - Der Spiegel ↗ (2014-08-31) · “How the NSA Helped Turkey Kill Kurdish Rebels” - The Intercept ↗ (2014-08-31) · The Intercept ↗ (2018-03-01) · Poitras, Laura · Rosenbach, Marcel · Sontheimer, Michael · Stark, Holger -
Turkey and the PKK SIDtoday [pdf]
The U.S. must strike a delicate balance in its support of Turkey: It aids Turkey’s internal struggle against the PKK, or the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, while trying to dissuade Turkey from attacking the PKK’s presence across the Turkish border in Iraq. NSA signals intelligence support to Turkey includes tracking PKK members’ handsets while in Turkey and helping to track PKK financiers.
Programs: FOLLOWTHEMONEY“Turkey Is 'Partner and Target' for the NSA” - Der Spiegel ↗ (2014-08-31) · “How the NSA Helped Turkey Kill Kurdish Rebels” - The Intercept ↗ (2014-08-31) · The Intercept ↗ (2018-03-01) · Poitras, Laura · Rosenbach, Marcel · Sontheimer, Michael · Stark, Holger -
SINIO Seminar: Turkey and the Kurds SIDtoday [pdf]
A strategic seminar titled “Turkish Cross-Border Operations and Kurdish Intifada: Rhetoric or Reality?” will be held.
Marking: CONFIDENTIAL“Turkey Is 'Partner and Target' for the NSA” - Der Spiegel ↗ (2014-08-31) · “How the NSA Helped Turkey Kill Kurdish Rebels” - The Intercept ↗ (2014-08-31) · The Intercept ↗ (2018-08-15) · Poitras, Laura · Rosenbach, Marcel · Sontheimer, Michael · Stark, Holger -
NCRs with Foreign Relations Missions Become 'SUSLAs' SIDtoday [pdf]
New titles have been created for four NSA/CSS Representatives (NCRs) to major Third Party partners. Special US Liaisons Advisors (SUSLA) to Italy and Germany were first named, now followed by Special US Liaison Advisors to Turkey (SUSLAT), Thailand (SUSLAB), Japan (SUSLAJ) and Korea (SUSLAK).
People: Schwemin, Sharon“Turkey Is 'Partner and Target' for the NSA” - Der Spiegel ↗ (2014-08-31) · “How the NSA Helped Turkey Kill Kurdish Rebels” - The Intercept ↗ (2014-08-31) · The Intercept ↗ (2019-05-29) · Poitras, Laura · Rosenbach, Marcel · Sontheimer, Michael · Stark, Holger -
Collaboration in Overdrive: A CNE Success SIDtoday [pdf]
A collaboration between several NSA departments achieved, for the first time, Computer Network Exploitation against "Turkish leadership."
Programs: CMAP“Turkey Is 'Partner and Target' for the NSA” - Der Spiegel ↗ (2014-08-31) · “How the NSA Helped Turkey Kill Kurdish Rebels” - The Intercept ↗ (2014-08-31) · The Intercept ↗ (2019-05-29) · Poitras, Laura · Rosenbach, Marcel · Sontheimer, Michael · Stark, Holger -
MHS/GCHQ Projects - Turkey Energy Company Development (GCHQ) [pdf]
This GCHQ project, classified TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT, details a focused effort to gain intelligence access to key Turkish energy organizations, including the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources (MENR) and major state and private corporations. The goal was to understand their communications traffic, improve collection access, and assess the balance of power within the MENR.
Programs: ROADBEDPeople: Güler, Hilmi -
NSA Intelligence Relationship with Turkey – Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT) and the Turkish SIGINT Intelligence Directorate (SIB) [pdf]
A 15 April 2013 NSA information paper on the SIGINT relationship with Turkey's civilian MIT and military SIB, covering what each side provides, including HFDF access and CROSSHAIR geolocation fixes, and describing Turkey as both a SIGINT partner and an intelligence target.
-
Agenda 14-15 May 2013: Turkish Signal Intelligence Chief [pdf]
A draft NSA visit agenda, as of 30 April 2013, for the Turkish Signal Intelligence Chief and delegation attending a Strategic Planning conference on 14-15 May 2013 and an ELINT demonstration at the Naval Research Laboratory on 16 May 2013.
See all 14 documents published with “Turkey Is 'Partner and Target' for the NSA” →
See all 14 documents published with “How the NSA Helped Turkey Kill Kurdish Rebels” →
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