Tag: NTOC 34 documents
Search documents matching “NTOC” →Free-text subjects the curators added. Unlike the other axes these are not necessarily from the documents' own vocabulary, so they are the loosest thing to browse by (and the most forgiving).
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Meet Us at the NTOC: 'Opportunities Day' SIDtoday [pdf]
The newly formed NSA/CSS Threat Operations Center will hold an “Opportunities Day” to inform about its mission and job opportunities.
The Intercept ↗ (2018-08-15) -
Bad guys are everywhere, good guys are somewhere! [pdf]
A classified NSA NTOC presentation describing TREASURE MAP — the agency's near real-time global internet mapping platform — which combines open source, commercial, covert, and SIGINT data to chart every device, router, and autonomous system on the internet, including through 13 covert servers secretly planted in unwitting data centers across 18 countries spanning Asia, Europe, Russia, Africa, and South America, with networks marked in red indicating active SIGINT collection access points across at least 20 major telecommunications providers on three continents including allied nations' state-owned carriers.
Programs: TREASUREMAP · PACKAGEDGOODS · SOCIALSTAMP · SEASIDEFERRY · ARK · CAIDA · RUSTICBAGGAGE · PACKAGEDGOODS-GTR · PACKAGEDGOODS-SERVER · BLACKPEARL · LEAKYFAUCET · HYDROCASTLE · MASTERSHAKE · S-TRICKLER · TOYGRIPPE · DISCOROUTE · VITALAIR2 · IPGEOTRAP · JOLLYROGER · TUTELAGE · BYZANTINEHADES · XKEYSCORE · RADIUS · TACACS“Treasure Map: The NSA Breach of Telekom and Other German Firms” - Der Spiegel ↗ (2014-09-14) · “The NSA and GCHQ Campaign Against German Satellite Companies” - The Intercept ↗ (2014-09-14) · Müller-Maguhn, Andy · Poitras, Laura · Rosenbach, Marcel · Sontheimer, Michael · Grothoff, Christian -
Brown Bag Session: Fusing Network Data to Achieve a Global Internet Mapping System SIDtoday [pdf]
A system used to map and visualize the global internet, fusing open source, commercial and SIGINT data, will be discussed to staffers interested in SIGINT Development (SIGDEV) topics.
The Intercept ↗ (2019-05-29) -
CNO Legal Authorities [pdf]
An NSA Office of General Counsel briefing on the legal authorities for computer network operations and the NTOC floor: constitutional and EO 12333 limits, NSCID 6 definitions, Wiretap Act exceptions, NSD 42, service-provider information-assurance rules (DoD 5240.1-R), and oversight and compliance.
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Cooperation between the NSA and BND [pdf]
Comprehensive internal summary of the history and current state of cooperation between the NSA and BND
Programs: RT-RGPeople: Schindler, Gerhard -
Culture Shock: NSA from the Perspective of Summer Interns SIDtoday [pdf]
Two interns in the 2007 NSA Intelligence Analysis Summer Program share their initial culture shock and misconceptions about the agency, from unrealistic expectations about high-tech tools to the reality of strict regulations and a supportive, collaborative environment.
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Cyber Paper Japan NSA DFS [pdf]
This January 2013 NSA memo from SUSLAJ (Special U.S. Liaison Activity Japan) details Japan’s effort to rapidly launch a SIGINT-enabled cyber defense initiative and a new 100-person “Cybercom” by April 2013. It describes tensions between reformist elements like CIRO (Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office) and more conservative ones like the DFS (Directorate for SIGINT) and MOD Internal Bureau, with struggles in policy, information sharing, and workforce training. The memo shows Japan seeking NSA’s technical help — including at the MALLARD FORNSAT site — while rushing to deliver malware signatures and sign new information-sharing agreements. The NSA viewed Japan as responsive but too focused on short-term results rather than long-term cyber workforce development.
Programs: MALLARD“The Untold Story of Japan's Secret Spy Agency” - The Intercept ↗ (2018-05-19) · “日本の諜報 スクープ 最高機密ファイル” - NHK ↗ (2018-05-19) · Gallagher, Ryan -
DFS and NSA partnership [pdf]
DFS the NSA Sister Organization. This document outlines a high-level visit by Japan’s Directorate for Signals Intelligence (DFS), described as NSA’s “sister organization,” to the NSA/CSS headquarters in early 2013. The purpose was to strengthen their decades-long partnership, focusing on SIGINT-enabled cyber capabilities, training, and mutual understanding of each agency’s role in cyber defense.
People: Alexander, Keith B.“The Untold Story of Japan's Secret Spy Agency” - The Intercept ↗ (2018-05-19) · “日本の諜報 スクープ 最高機密ファイル” - NHK ↗ (2018-05-19) · Gallagher, Ryan -
DGSE and ANSSI Delegation to NSA (April 2013), cyberattacks [pdf]
This Top Secret NSA visit précis details the April 12, 2013 meeting between senior French cyber officials Bernard Barbier (DGSE) and Patrick Pailloux (ANSSI) and NSA leadership to discuss and seek U.S. assistance in attributing May 2012 cyberattacks on the French Presidential network. The document outlines the visit agenda, background tensions over French media accusations of U.S. involvement, and NSA’s plan to emphasize cyber defense cooperation while carefully navigating potential diplomatic sensitivities.
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Discovery SIGINT Targeting Scenarios and Compliance [pdf]
This document is a top-secret NSA guidance manual detailing SIGINT targeting scenarios, compliance procedures, and legal guidance for querying foreign actors, malware, and potentially U.S.-linked systems, including considerations for minimizing incidental collection of U.S. persons’ communications. It outlines specific rules, approvals, and exceptions for using SIGINT tools, foreign intelligence tasks, and cases involving ambiguous or dual-use selectors like WikiLeaks, The Pirate Bay, and foreign actors operating through U.S. infrastructure.
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FINAL Agenda SWEDUSA [pdf]
Detailed list of points and participants in the summit meeting between the top brass of the FRA and the NSA in April 2013.
Programs: TURTLEPOWER · TURMOIL · XKEYSCORE · WINTERLIGHT · QUANTUM · PARTNERMALL · VIVIAN · NAPA-3 · GCE · SSO -
GRIMPLATE - First Steps Toward Identifying Adversarial Use of BitTorrent [pdf]
This document outlines the NSA's GRIMPLATE program, which was developed to monitor and analyze BitTorrent traffic on the Department of Defense's NIPRnet to identify potentially malicious activity. The program focuses on crawling the Distributed Hash Table (DHT) of BitTorrent networks to gather data on file-sharing nodes and peer connections, in order to detect and mitigate threats while building a case for halting unauthorized P2P usage on secure networks.
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Intellipedia – Air Gapped Network Threats [pdf]
This document from an internal wiki for the U.S. intelligence community, surveys threats to so-called air-gapped systems, arguing that supply-chain compromises, physical implants (BIOS, KVMs, peripherals), infected removable media, and enabled wireless/emanations present realistic paths for adversaries to bridge isolated networks. It assesses likelihoods and attack vectors (including insider help and CDS/guard exploitation), highlights specific historic incidents (Agent.BTZ/MAKERSMARK), and recommends strict removable-media policies, TEMPEST countermeasures, and rigorous cross-domain guard protections to mitigate the risk.
People: Witte, Griff · Warren, Peter · Streeter, Michael · Watson, Paul · Louchard, Bjørn · Crawford, George · Rudge, David · Terrazas, Michael -
Intellipedia – BIOS Threats [pdf]
This from an internal wiki for the U.S. intelligence community, titled “BIOS Threats” details the use of malicious BIOS implants as a means of achieving persistent system compromise for cyber espionage and attack purposes. It discusses the history, technical challenges, detection limitations, and global development of BIOS-based malware by both state and non-state actors, including U.S. and Chinese cyber units.
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INTOLERANT – Who Else Is Targeting Your Target? Collecting Data Stolen by Hackers – SIDtoday SIDtoday [pdf]
A TOP SECRET SIDToday article from Menwith Hill Station describing how NSA and CSEC discovered and began exploiting INTOLERANT — a sophisticated email-stealing hacking operation targeting Indian diplomats, Central Asian diplomats, Chinese human rights defenders, Tibetan pro-democracy activists, Uighur activists and European officials — by intercepting the stolen emails as they transited satellite links, a technique internally called "fourth party collection" or "outsourcing SIGINT."
Programs: INTOLERANT -
Is There a Sustainable Ops Tempo in S2? How Can Analysts Deal with the Flood of Collection? SIDtoday [pdf]
The NSA's Deputy Director for Analysis and Production discusses the unsustainable operational tempo caused by overwhelming data collection volumes, advocating for "Analytic Modernization" that would shift from treating SIGINT as "radioactive" NSA-only material to sharing raw intelligence with other agencies for collaborative exploitation.
Programs: A-SPACE -
Lobban NSA Visit Précis [pdf]
This document is a formal briefing for a April 2013 visit by GCHQ Director Sir Iain Lobban to the NSA. The visit aimed to reinforce the Five Eyes partnership by discussing sensitive topics including supervised access to FAA Section 702 data ("Triage 2.0"), coordinated cyber and SIGINT strategies for Syria and Iran, and the implementation of the Global Collaboration Environment (GCE).
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Mixing SIGINT and Information Assurance SIDtoday [pdf]
The signals intelligence director gives an update on some major changes to the Information Assurance Directorate. Two organizations within IAD have combined to create the new NSA Threat Operations Center for "detecting unauthorized activity, attacks, intrusions, and other threats to DoD's vital computer networks." A new position was created to liaison between IAD and SID.
The Intercept ↗ (2017-04-24) -
MORECOWBELL [pdf]
This document describes how NSA is covertly monitoring DNS resolutions and target websites in near real-time using covertly rented servers in Malaysia, Germany and Denmark.
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New FAA702 Certification in the Works - Cyber Threat [pdf]
A 23 March 2012 SSO article on a draft FAA 702 certification for cyber threats. It would let analysts task selectors tied to malicious cyber activity without attributing them to a foreign government or terrorist group, and would codify tasking of IP addresses and code strings through PRISM and the upstream accesses.