DFS and NSA partnership
Open PDFDocument date: 2013-01-01
Pages: 1
Genre: report
Banner: SECRET//NOFORN
Classification: SECRET
Dissemination: NOFORN
DFS the NSA Sister Organization. This document outlines a high-level visit by Japan’s Directorate for Signals Intelligence (DFS), described as NSA’s “sister organization,” to the NSA/CSS headquarters in early 2013. The purpose was to strengthen their decades-long partnership, focusing on SIGINT-enabled cyber capabilities, training, and mutual understanding of each agency’s role in cyber defense.
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People mentioned:
Alexander, Keith B.
Countries:
Japan
Tags:
U.S.-Japan relations, training, NTOC, IAD, foreign affairs, intelligence cooperation, protocol visit, sister organization, NSA collaboration, DFS
Identifier:
DFS-the-NSA-Sister-Organization
PDF SHA-256:
dc043122a73b29c04e49303d4436464aa785f6ebe82a6224db90dc3a2e30b896
My notes
SECRET//NOFORN
CLEARANCES: (U) S//SI
ACCOMPANYING NSA/CSS (U//FOUO) [REDACTED]
SENIOR: Deputy Director Foreign Affairs (D/DIRFA)
PHOTOGRAPHER: (U) No.
MEMENTO PRESENTED: (U) No.
UNIFORM OF THE DAY: (U) GEN A: Class B; D/DIR and Guests: Business Attire
PURPOSE OF VISIT: (S//NF) [REDACTED] would like to visit NSA/CSS for discussions with IAD and NTOC on cyber, [REDACTED] on SIGINT-enabled cyber, and to obtain information from ADET on training related to SIGINT-enabled cyber.
JUSTIFICATION FOR DIRECTORATE INVOLVEMENT: (S//REL TO USA, JPN) The Japanese DFS is NSA/CSS's sister organization in Japan, and an important partner for NSA/CSS. NSA/CSS and DFS have partnered for more than 50 years, and enjoy an active exchange on many targets of mutual interest. This visit will provide an opportunity to follow up on any topics that surfaced during D/DIR's January 2013 visit to Japan.
EXPECTED OUTCOME: (S//NF) To have a greater understanding on the part of DFS of SIGINT contributions to cyber defense, and on how to start growing a SIGINT-enabled cyber capability at DFS.
(S//NF) To better NSA/CSS understanding of DFS capabilities and plans for SIGINT-enabled cyber.
(S//REL TO USA JPN) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
Chief of Protocol
and Corporate Events
NSA/CSS Protocol Office
SECRET//NOFORN
Published in the Same Report
(2 documents)
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Cyber Paper Japan NSA DFS [pdf]
This January 2013 NSA memo from SUSLAJ (Special U.S. Liaison Activity Japan) details Japan’s effort to rapidly launch a SIGINT-enabled cyber defense initiative and a new 100-person “Cybercom” by April 2013. It describes tensions between reformist elements like CIRO (Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office) and more conservative ones like the DFS (Directorate for SIGINT) and MOD Internal Bureau, with struggles in policy, information sharing, and workforce training. The memo shows Japan seeking NSA’s technical help — including at the MALLARD FORNSAT site — while rushing to deliver malware signatures and sign new information-sharing agreements. The NSA viewed Japan as responsive but too focused on short-term results rather than long-term cyber workforce development.
Programs: MALLARD“The Untold Story of Japan's Secret Spy Agency” - The Intercept ↗ (2018-05-19) · “日本の諜報 スクープ 最高機密ファイル” - NHK ↗ (2018-05-19) · Gallagher, Ryan -
DFS SIGINT-enabled Cyber [pdf]
This February 2013 top-secret DFS presentation outlines how Japan’s Directorate for Signals Intelligence (DFS) developed a SIGINT-enabled cyber program with U.S. NSA support, launching operations in late 2012 using the MALLARD system to collect and analyze satellite-based internet sessions. It details the project’s buildup, early challenges with massive data volumes, reliance on U.S. technical assistance, and plans for expanded antennas, infrastructure, and long-term system upgrades.
Marking: TOP SECRETPrograms: MALLARD“The Untold Story of Japan's Secret Spy Agency” - The Intercept ↗ (2018-05-19) · “日本の諜報 スクープ 最高機密ファイル” - NHK ↗ (2018-05-19) · Gallagher, Ryan
Related Documents
-
Cyber Paper Japan NSA DFS [pdf]
This January 2013 NSA memo from SUSLAJ (Special U.S. Liaison Activity Japan) details Japan’s effort to rapidly launch a SIGINT-enabled cyber defense initiative and a new 100-person “Cybercom” by April 2013. It describes tensions between reformist elements like CIRO (Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office) and more conservative ones like the DFS (Directorate for SIGINT) and MOD Internal Bureau, with struggles in policy, information sharing, and workforce training. The memo shows Japan seeking NSA’s technical help — including at the MALLARD FORNSAT site — while rushing to deliver malware signatures and sign new information-sharing agreements. The NSA viewed Japan as responsive but too focused on short-term results rather than long-term cyber workforce development.
Programs: MALLARD“The Untold Story of Japan's Secret Spy Agency” - The Intercept ↗ (2018-05-19) · “日本の諜報 スクープ 最高機密ファイル” - NHK ↗ (2018-05-19) · Gallagher, Ryan -
DFS SIGINT-enabled Cyber [pdf]
This February 2013 top-secret DFS presentation outlines how Japan’s Directorate for Signals Intelligence (DFS) developed a SIGINT-enabled cyber program with U.S. NSA support, launching operations in late 2012 using the MALLARD system to collect and analyze satellite-based internet sessions. It details the project’s buildup, early challenges with massive data volumes, reliance on U.S. technical assistance, and plans for expanded antennas, infrastructure, and long-term system upgrades.
Marking: TOP SECRETPrograms: MALLARD“The Untold Story of Japan's Secret Spy Agency” - The Intercept ↗ (2018-05-19) · “日本の諜報 スクープ 最高機密ファイル” - NHK ↗ (2018-05-19) · Gallagher, Ryan -
NSA Intelligence Relationship with Sweden [pdf]
A 2013 NSA information paper documenting the agency's long-standing intelligence partnership with Sweden's signals intelligence service FRA, covering joint collection on Russian targets, counterterrorism, cryptanalysis, and cyber defense — a relationship kept classified due to Sweden's official political neutrality.
“SVT avslöjar: USA hyllar FRA:s ryss-spionage” - SVT Nyheter ↗ (2013-12-05) · “Snowden files reveal Swedish-American surveillance of Russia” - SVT Nyheter ↗ (2013-12-05) · Struwe, Filip · Svensson, Anna H · Gallagher, Ryan · Greenwald, Glenn · Bergman, Sven · Dyfvermark, Joachim · Laurin, Fredrik -
Denmark DDIS partnership with NSA (2013) [pdf]
This document provides classified talking points and administrative guidance for the Director of the NSA (DIRNSA) regarding the DENUSA conference and the agency’s strategic partnership with the Danish Defence Intelligence Service (DDIS). It highlights the long-standing collaboration between the two nations on specialized cable access programs and reaffirms the NSA’s commitment to maintaining and expanding access to high-capacity international fiber-optic cables transiting Danish territory.
“How Secret Partners Expand NSA’s Surveillance Dragnet” - The Intercept ↗ (2014-06-18) · “NSA ‘third party’ partners tap the Internet backbone in global surveillance program” - Dagbladet Information ↗ (2014-06-19) · Gallagher, Ryan · Geist, Anton · Gjerding, Sebastian · Moltke, Henrik · Poitras, Laura -
Talking Point Topics Proposal - HR DIETMAR B - Director SIGINT Analysis and Production German Federal Intelligence Service, 30 April - 1 May 2013 [pdf]
The memo summarizes preparatory talking points for meetings between NSA/NTOC and German intelligence (BND), BSI, and BfV leadership, highlighting Germany’s T4 cyber unit staffing progress (~130/150 positions), interest in NSA guidance on CND, and German legal prohibitions on near‑real‑time cyber defense activities. It records German interest in NSA programs (TUTELAGE, DIB partnerships), requests for follow‑on technical information, and an internal “landmine” assessment that substantial analytic/operational investment may not be justified yet; recommended next steps emphasize monitoring progress, encouraging interagency German cooperation, and offering selective lessons‑learned briefings.