TPM Vulnerabilities to Power Analysis and An Exposed Exploit to Bitlocker

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Creating agency: NSA National Security Agency (US)
Document date: -
Pages: 1
Genre: wiki
Classification: SECRET
Dissemination: NOFORN,ORCON
Scahill, Jeremy · Begley, Josh · Fishman, Andrew · Brown, Alleen · Jones, Andrea · Gallagher, Ryan · Marquis-Boire, Morgan · Lee, Micah

A secret abstract from the Trusted Computing Base Jamboree describing research by Sandia National Laboratories into power analysis attacks against Trusted Platform Modules from five manufacturers — extracting RSA private keys non-invasively via wired power analysis and electromagnetic emissions, including a novel unpublished single-trace attack against a Chinese Remainder Theorem RSA implementation — and a case study demonstrating how the extracted TPM key enables circumvention of Microsoft BitLocker's root-of-trust system by modifying BIOS digest values without software-level detection.

Long Description:
This is a SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON presentation abstract from the Trusted Computing Base Jamboree, scheduled for Tuesday 16 March. The abstract describes two related research contributions: power analysis attacks against TPM hardware, and an exploitation of the resulting key access to defeat BitLocker disk encryption. The first contribution covers side channel attacks against TPMs from five different manufacturers using power analysis — a technique that infers cryptographic secrets by measuring the electrical power consumption or electromagnetic emissions of a device during cryptographic operations, without physically opening or damaging the chip. The researchers employed publicly known power analysis attacks against RSA implementations found in these TPMs. In addition to conventional wired power analysis, they present results for extracting keys by measuring electromagnetic signals emanating from the TPM while it remains soldered to the motherboard — a significantly more practical attack scenario requiring no physical modification of the target system. Most significantly, the abstract describes an entirely new unpublished attack against a Chinese Remainder Theorem implementation of RSA that yields private key information in a single power trace — meaning the attack requires only one observation rather than the statistical accumulation of many measurements typically required for differential power analysis. The second contribution is a BitLocker exploitation case study enabled by the TPM key extraction. Trusted Platform Modules underpin BitLocker's root-of-trust system by storing sealed measurements of the boot environment — if the BIOS or bootloader is modified, the expected digest values change and BitLocker detects the tampering. By obtaining the private TPM key, the researchers demonstrate the ability to modify these sealed digest values to match a modified BIOS, preventing software-level detection of the change. The practical implication is that an attacker with physical access sufficient to perform power analysis can subsequently modify the BIOS of a BitLocker-protected system and install persistent malware that survives disk decryption.
Programs:
-

People mentioned:
-

Countries:
China

Tags:
CIA, Sandia National Laboratories, TCB Jamboree, TPM, BitLocker, Microsoft, power analysis, side channel attack, RSA, Chinese Remainder Theorem, CRT, electromagnetic emissions, differential power analysis, single trace attack, root of trust, BIOS, firmware, disk encryption, cryptographic key, hardware attack

Identifier:
tpm-vulnerabilities-to-power-analysis-and-an

PDF SHA-256:
fbc1f0f432da204bb9bdbca382233be38fc9674c63bd52b2f160bbf181733570

[edit] Presentation Abstracts

[edit] (U) Times
(U) Each day will run from 9am to 5pm. In order to facilitate planning, the topics presented on each day are highlighted below. The abstracts for each topic are on the following pages.

[edit] Tuesday, 16 March

[edit] (S//NF/ORCON) TPM Vulnerabilities to Power Analysis and an Exposed Exploit to Bitlocker
(U) Presenter: [REDACTED]

(S//NF/ORCON) Power analysis, a side channel attack, can be used against secure devices to non-invasively extract protected cryptographic information such as implementation details or secret keys. We have employed a number of publically known attacks against the RSA cryptography found in TPMs from five different manufacturers. We will discuss the details of these attacks and provide insight into how private TPM key information can be obtained with power analysis. In addition to conventional wired power analysis, we will present results for extracting the key by measuring electromagnetic signals emanating from the TPM while it remains on the motherboard. We will also describe and present results for an entirely new unpublished attack against a Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) implementation of RSA that will yield private key information in a single trace.

(S//NF/ORCON) The ability to obtain a private TPM key not only provides access to TPM-encrypted data, but also enables us to circumvent the root-of-trust system by modifying expected digest values in sealed data. We will describe a case study in which modifications to Microsoft's Bitlocker encrypted metadata prevents software-level detection of changes to the BIOS.