Japan official NSA visit, HF briefing
Open PDFDocument date: 2013-01-02
Pages: 2
Genre: report
Banner: SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
Classification: SECRET COMINT
Dissemination: NOFORN
The document describes ongoing NSA efforts to renew high-frequency direction-finding (HFDF) collaboration with Japan’s Directorate for SIGINT (DFS) after Japan withdrew from the CROSSHAIR network in 2009. By 2012–2013, both sides were manually exchanging HFDF data, and the NSA sought to advance toward automated data sharing via its BORESIGHT system while reassuring Japan that it would not replace or override its existing technology.
CROSSHAIR, KLIEGLIGHT, BORESIGHT
People mentioned:
-
Countries:
Japan, China, Korea
Tags:
DFS, HFDF, military communications, intelligence modernization, data standards, training, intelligence equipment, operational planning, signal interception, electronic surveillance, intelligence sharing
Identifier:
PointPaperHFVisitFeb2013-v1-0
PDF SHA-256:
f543b34390021eb61339a4bb3fedd13cebb55702726c04757fab60bb3709fc9d
My notes
SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Topic: NSA High Frequency (HF) Collaboration efforts with Japan
(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Background: For many years, NSA collaborated with the DFS on the exchange of high frequency direction finding (HFDF) information via the CROSSHAIR direction finding network. Unfortunately, Japan's participation in CROSSHAIR effectively ended in 2009. Japan prefers to perform DF manually. Our perception is that Japan has interpreted CROSSHAIR participation as an inability to perform manual DF, which is not the case. Since 2009, the Terrestrial RF Division (S3511) has been working to re-engage this partner on the exchange of HFDF data. In response, the DFS recently agreed to a manual exchange of KLEIGLIGHT HFDF data with NSA. Starting in July 2012, the NSA Office of China and Korea, S2B, submitted 248 requests for HFDF lines of bearing (LOBS) to the DFS. The partner was very efficient in responding to these requests, responding on average within three hours, aiding S2B analysts in obtaining fixes on targets that could not be acquired using NSA's CROSSHAIR system. During the same period, DFS made nine HFDF requests of S2B, all of which were promptly serviced.
(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) In November 2012, S3511 personnel briefed [REDACTED] Director DFS, on NSA's new BORESIGHT HFDF system. In response, [REDACTED] invited NSA to visit Japan in 2013 for further discussions, emphasizing that cooperation on HFDF was desired. However, he also expressed his need for concurrence from Japan's Ministry of Defense before committing to an information exchange between BORESIGHT and Japan's system. He stated that he would like NSA to better understand Japan's HFDF system and programmatic constraints, which include the need to increase HFDF capabilities in the face of austere budgets.
(U) Potential Landmine:
- (S//NF) In the past, the Partner has mistakenly perceived that NSA was trying to force DFS to use U.S. technical solutions in place of their own. When this occurred, the Partner reacted in a strong, negative manner. NSA does not wish to replace the DFS HFDF network with BORESIGHT. Rather, NSA's goal with DFS is system interoperability through use of common data standards.
(U) Director's Talking Points:
- (S//REL TO USA, JPN, FVEY) Thank the Partner for their cooperation in the current effort to exchange HFDF data via KLEIGLIGHTS.
- (S//REL TO USA, JPN, FVEY) Reaffirm that NSA would like to send representatives to Japan this year to further discuss HFDF collaboration.
- (S//REL TO USA, JPN, FVEY) State that NSA's ultimate goal is an automated exchange of information via BORESIGHT. This automated exchange would be based on common data standards and would not require Japan to adopt NSA HFDF technology, nor change how DFS currently performs HFDF operations.
(U) Date of Material: 02 January 2013
(U//FOUO) Originator: [REDACTED] Chief, Terrestrial RF Division, S3511, [REDACTED]
SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
Dated: 20070108
Declassify On: 20380101
SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
(U//FOUO) Alt. POC: [REDACTED] Deputy Chief, Terrestrial RF Division, S3511, [REDACTED]
(U//FOUO) Classification Review By: [REDACTED] CAO, S3511, [REDACTED]
SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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