Publication year: 2016 73 documents
Search documents matching “2016” →When a publisher first published each document. If a document is published multiple times, only the oldest one is used here.
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Significant TRF TROODOS stories over past 6 [pdf]
This 2012 top-secret document outlines intelligence gathered by the NSA and GCHQ from the Troodos Communications Facility in Cyprus, which includes regular surveillance of Israeli and Iranian drones over a six-month period, particularly focusing on drone operations and weapons systems. It also mentions significant collections of UAV signals, including the Heron TP drone and Iranian Ababil III, with presidential-level interest in video samples from these operations.
Programs: TROODOS -
SKIDROWE [pdf]
This document reveals the extensive surveillance capabilities of the NSA's SKIDROWE program at TITANPOINTE, specifically designed to intercept and analyze satellite communications and internet data. It highlights how intercepted data is processed and filtered through advanced systems like XKEYSCORE, which enables real-time intelligence gathering by sifting through massive amounts of digital content, including emails, calls, and internet activity.
Programs: SKIDROWE · WEALTHYCLUSTER2 · WEALTHYCLUSTER · TURNWEALTHY · VPCS · XKEYSCORE · GENESIS · CONTROLAND · ATM · FITBOY · DARKTHUNDER · FIP · METTLESOME · SKYFRAME · PVOICE · XXPY0012 · AGITATOR · STARPROC · SPELLBINDER · BLACKPEARL · BLACKALCHEMY · BLACKGOLD · BLACKFIRE · MONKEYMIND · BCD · EVVIPER · QUANTUM · MISTYPEAK · VALIANTSURF · GALLANTWAVE · SWINE · BLUESNORT · TOSSSWUNG · GNOMEVISION · GNOMEGOGGLES · HIDDENSALAMANDER · TURMOIL · PSC -
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SSO news excerpts [pdf]
These SSO news exceprts describe the successful deployment of QUANTUMTHEORY and QUANTUMINSERT capabilities by the NSA’s Tailored Access Operations (TAO) team, in collaboration with Special Source Operations (SSO), to exploit high-value targets, including key figures in the Haqqani network. Using a combination of signal case notations and real-time exploitation via QUANTUMHAND, TAO was able to implant malicious software on the target's computer, enabling further intelligence collection and exploitation.
Programs: QUANTUMTHEORY · QUANTUM · QUANTUMINSERT · FOXACID · DANCINGOASIS · FOXCONTACT · VALIDATOR · SARATOGA · TURMOIL · QUANTUMHAND · SSOPeople: Haqqani, Badruddin -
Tony Fullman NSA file [pdf]
This document, a series of TOP SECRET intelligence reports from 2012, details the extensive surveillance of Anthony Fullman, a Fiji-born New Zealand citizen and pro-democracy activist. This document shows how the NSA and the New Zealand Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) utilized the PRISM program (SIGAD: US-984XN) to intercept Fullman’s private communications under a FISA Amendments Act (FAA) certification. The gathered intelligence includes personal photographs with embedded metadata, detailed credit card transaction records, private emails regarding job opportunities, and Westpac bank statements. This document serves as a case study in how "Five Eyes" partners share intelligence derived from FAA collection to monitor individuals for political or security reasons.
Programs: PRISMPeople: Fullman, Anthony -
Tracking Targets Through Proxies & Anonymizers [pdf]
This NSA presentation details methods for tracking and de-anonymizing internet users who employ privacy tools like Tor, proxies, and VPN services such as AnchorFree's Hotspot Shield. The document explains how the agency reverse-engineers anonymization tools, creates "fingerprints" to identify their traffic in surveillance systems, and correlates encrypted connections to reveal users' real IP addresses and locations—acknowledging this work "makes for sad analysts" when targets successfully obscure their identities.
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Traffic Series: Is Your Collection Surveyed or Sustained? SIDtoday [pdf]
This NSA internal newsletter article explains how analysts can determine whether their collected signals intelligence traffic comes from sustained, ongoing collection (tasked through formal requirements) or temporary "survey" activities where satellite collection sites scan for new targets. The article teaches analysts how to read "case notations" (CASNs) to identify whether traffic spikes are from permanent collection or just temporary surveys—warning that valuable intelligence can suddenly disappear when survey activities end unless analysts formally request sustained collection through the SURREY system.
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UK special forces Reaper drone (Jan-Feb-2012) [pdf]
This NSA document from March 2012 describes how NSA and GCHQ geolocation efforts in Afghanistan pinpointed a previously unknown VSAT terminal in Helmand Province for UK Special Forces, who dispatched an MQ-9 Reaper drone to the location within an hour of receiving the intelligence.
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What’s the worst that could happen? [pdf]
This GCHQ document from March 2010 presents a checklist of factors analysts should consider before going ahead with an operation to infiltrate a communications network, by physical or other means.
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Wireless LAN / CNE Tool Training Course and Evaluation [pdf]
This document is a slide deck introducing a "Close Access" NSA training course to "familiarize, educate, and certify students in the operational usage" of various computer network exploitation tools.
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Work is progressing on Menwith Hill Station’s new operations building SIDtoday [pdf]
This NSA SIDtoday article from January 2010 describes construction progress on Project PHOENIX, a massive 95,000 square-foot state-of-the-art operations building at Menwith Hill Station in Yorkshire, England, featuring NSA's first "Tier III" equipment room with redundant power and cooling for critical mission systems, a 200-seat auditorium, and 10 new classrooms. The $40 million facility was expected to be completed by early 2011 with staff moving in by mid-2012, requiring 740 tons of steel, 4,200 cubic meters of concrete, and over 6,000 vehicle movements through the construction gate.
Programs: PHOENIX -
Yemen backhaul comms collected (Jan 2011) [pdf]
This brief GCHQ document from January 2011 describes intelligence collection operations against Yemen's microwave telecommunications infrastructure, where overhead (OH) tasking confirmed tower activity and analyzed GSM and CDMA backhaul communications using the ICS2 tool, yielding voice intercepts, SMS messages, and at least one dial number recognition (DNR) hit that significantly contributed to counterterrorism work.
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ZAIN INTRANET NETWORK ENGINEERING [pdf]
2009 GCHQ report documents the sampling and tasking of a satellite data carrier linking Gabon and Belgium that carried the internal corporate intranet of telecom operator Zain (formerly MTC Vodafone), through which engineers exchanged technical data via SMTP email. The intercept surfaced email selectors belonging to staff across multiple telecom operators — including Zain subsidiaries, Orange Mali, Saudi Telecom, MTC Touch (Lebanon), Tunisie Telecom, and Celtel entities in Niger and Nigeria — reflecting the agency’s systematic targeting of telecom employees as a potential entry point into operators’ internal networks.