TUTELAGE 411

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Creating agency: NSA National Security Agency (US)
Document date: 2011-01-01
Pages: 30
Genre: slides
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Classification: TOP SECRET COMINT
Dissemination: REL TO USA, FVEY

TUTELAGE is a SIGINT-driven cyber defense and counterintelligence platform that enables NSA to observe, intercept, redirect, block, and manipulate adversary network activity at DoD gateways, transforming intrusion response from post-incident reporting into real-time mitigation and intelligence generation.

Long Description:
This document contrasts pre‑TUTELAGE cyber defense—largely reactive, log-driven, and focused on post-intrusion reporting—with a new model in which SIGINT collection and cyber defense are tightly integrated. With TUTELAGE, adversary tools, tradecraft, and intentions are discovered early through SIGINT platforms such as XKEYSCORE, CYBERQUEST, and GNOMEVISION. This intelligence feeds a rapid cycle of signature and countermeasure development, which is then deployed directly to boundary sensors before or during an attack, disrupting adversary decision loops and mitigating intrusions in near real time. TUTELAGE operates as an inline packet-processing capability at DoD Internet Access Points, providing a menu of operational effects: alerting and tipping, interception, substitution, redirection, blocking, and latency manipulation. These capabilities allow malicious activity to be silently altered, delayed, or neutralized without alerting the adversary, while simultaneously collecting intelligence. The system supports both domestic defense and foreign intelligence missions, sharing signatures and countermeasures with partners and feeding new insights back into SIGINT tasking and analysis. Operational examples demonstrate TUTELAGE’s use against state-sponsored spearphishing, botnets, exploit kits, and DDoS tools such as LOIC. Case studies include defending senior U.S. military leadership from targeted phishing campaigns, rapid DNS interdiction against ZEUS malware, and interception of large-scale adversary email operations. Future capabilities outlined in the presentation extend TUTELAGE into deeper integration with QUANTUM operations, real-time cryptanalysis, listening posts, and host-based security systems, highlighting its role as both a defensive shield and an enabler of offensive and counterintelligence cyber operations.
Programs:
TUTELAGE, CYBERQUEST, XKEYSCORE, GNOMEVISION, POPQUIZ, BISHOPKNIGHT, BLACKENERGY, BLINDMARKSMEN, BYZANTINEFOOTHOLD, BYZANTINEVIKING, CARBONPEPTIDE, CONFICKER, DANCING PANDA, DISCOVERY, GNOMEFISHER, MAKERSMARK, MAVERICKCHURCH, NATIVEDANCER, WEASELWAGGLE, SUBTLESNOW, WIDOWKEY, ZEUS, GHOSTMACHINE, PANDORASMAYHEM, TURBINE, QUANTUM, BYZANTINEHADES, AMULETSTELLAR, TURNABOUT

People mentioned:
-

Countries:
Germany, Japan

Tags:
botnets, exploits, DDoS, phishing, malware, cryptanalysis, listening post, NTOC, network interdiction, packet processing, boundary sensors, intrusion mitigation, real-time intelligence, alerting, traffic interception, redirection, blocking, firewalls, latency manipulation, DNS interdiction, TCP, spearphishing defense, signature development, mission blending

Identifier:
media_35685_NSA_Program_TUTELAGE_to_instrumentalize_third_party_attack_tools

PDF SHA-256:
06b8ecd79df482ab8ee6dd3d26289cecee2929716172397876fc100ce1eac800

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

TUTELAGE

4 1 1

SPECIAL PROJECTS
NSA/CSS THREAT OPERATIONS CENTER

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Before TUTELAGE...

AFTER INTRUSION

Manual Analysis of Reporting Logs
Reporting Process

TIME

  • Intrusion by Adversary
  • Intrusion Event Logged
  • Event Log
  • Intrusion Report
  • Victim Notification (Response?)

BEFORE INTRUSION
MON TUE WED THU FRI

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Before TUTELAGE...

AFTER INTRUSION

Adversary Malware Design Process
Manual Analysis of Reporting Logs
Reporting Process

TIME

  • Intrusion by Adversary
  • Intrusion Event Logged
    • PLAN
    • DEPLOY
    • ATTACK
  • Event Log
  • Adversary Malware Decision
  • Intrusion Report
  • Victim Notification (Response?)

BEFORE INTRUSION
MON TUE WED THU FRI

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With TUTELAGE...

AFTER INTRUSION

Adversary Malware Design Process

  • Discovery of Adversary Tools & Tradecraft
  • Tailored Countermeasure Developed & Deployed
  • Discovery of Adversary Intentions
  • Adversary Malware Decision Loop
  • PLAN
  • DEPLOY
  • ATTACK
  • SIGINT-Enabled Countermeasure Mitigates Adversary Intrusion
    TIME

Countermeasure Development

BEFORE INTRUSION

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Application of Capabilities

Internet

DoD Gateways

  • Beale
  • Pentagon
  • Norfolk
  • Columbus
  • San Antonio
  • Hickam
  • San Diego
  • Vaihingen
  • Wiesbaden
  • Yokota

NIPRNet

BACK TO CAPABILITIES

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TUTELAGE Mission Flow

Discovery & Characterization of Cyber Adversary Tradecraft

  • CYBERQUEST
  • XKEYSCORE
  • GNOMEVISION
  • POPQUIZ
  • etc.
  1. SIGINT Collection
  2. Signature & Countermeasure Development
  3. Deploy New Signatures and Countermeasures to Boundary Sensors
  4. Share New Signatures, Countermeasures and reporting with Partners
  5. Deploy New Signatures and Countermeasures to Foreign Intelligence Sensors
  6. Foreign Adversary Launches Attack
  7. Detect & Mitigate Malicious Activity
  8. Tip & Cue SIGINT

Foreign Adversary
Alert!
DoD Networks
DoD Boundary Sensors
U.S. Foreign Intelligence Sensors
U.S. Boundary Sensors
.GOV

  1. Foreign Adversary Launches Foreign Adversary
  2. Detect & Mitigate Malicious Activity
  3. Foreign Adversary Launches Attack
  4. SIGINT Collection
  5. U.S. Foreign Intelligence Sensors
  6. Alert!
  7. Tips & New SIGINT
  8. Signature & Countermeasure Development
  9. Deploy New Signatures and Countermeasures to Boundary Sensors
  10. DoD Boundary Sensors
  11. DoD Networks
  12. U.S. Boundary Sensors
  13. Share New Signatures, measures and New Signatures and Countermeasures with Partners
  14. Deploy New Signatures and Countermeasures to U.S. Foreign Intelligence Sensors
  15. GOV reporting with Partners

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UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

Operational Landscape

Foreign Intel Service

Threat Observability

Script Kiddie

  • SIGINT
    • Discover & Warn
  • TUTELAGE
    • Understand & Mitigate
  • COMMERCIAL
    • Anti-Virus, Firewalls, Intrusion Detection, Intrusion Prevention

Email Phishing

Zero Day Exploit

Threat Sophistication

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

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TUTELAGE Capabilities

Alert/Tip

  • Passive Sensor Generates Alert
  • Storage

Redirect

  1. "What's My Destination?"
  2. Redirect to Safe Server
  3. Infected Host's Information

Intercept

  • Malicious Activity
  • "Activity Successful"

Block

  • Blocks Entry/Exit Activity

Substitute

  • "Attack"
  • "Sleep"

Latency

  • Speed Adjusted

SKIP TO APPLICATION

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TUTELAGE Capabilities

MENU

Alert/Tip

  • Passive Sensor Generates Alert
  • Sensor:
    • Generates Alerts
    • Collects Data for Analysis
    • Runs Applications
  • Data Request
  • Storage
  • Decision Logic
  • SIGINT Tasking
  • Decision Logic:
    • Requests Data
    • Establishes Correlations
    • Sends Out Tasks
    • Sends Alerts to SIGINT Tasking
  • DoD

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
Alert/Tip indicates the presence of malicious activity and communicates this information with the rest of the TUTELAGE enterprise and/or the SIGINT (passive/active) enterprise. Rule and Decision Logic determine whether data is stored.

SKIP TO APPLICATION

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TUTELAGE Capabilities

MENU

Intercept

  • DoD
  • "Successful"
  • In-Line Packet Processor:
    • Re-routes traffic dynamically
    • Modify inbound & outbound packets
    • Insert and/or delete packets

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
Intercept is the means by which the TUTELAGE in-line packet processor can transparently intervene in adversarial activities, permitting the activity to appear to complete without disclosing that it did not reach/affect the intended target.

SKIP TO APPLICATION

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TUTELAGE Capabilities

MENU

Substitute

  • "Attack"
  • "Sleep"
  • Unable to Decrypt
  • 00111010011101011101010110101001011010011011
  • DoD

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
Substitute is the TUTELAGE in-line packet processor's ability to perform bidirectional content detection and replacement.

SKIP TO APPLICATION

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TUTELAGE Capabilities

MENU

Redirect

Domain Name Servi
Connect Here Instead
Redirect to Safe Server
Received Destination IP
What's My Destination?
Infected Host's Information
Tip SIGINT if Foreign
Decision Logic
DoD

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
Redirect is the TUTELAGE in-line packet processor's ability to change the course or direction of an adversarial (or adversarial induced) activity.

SKIP TO APPLICATION

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TUTELAGE Capabilities

MENU

Block

  • Blocks Entry/Exit Activity
  • DoD

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
Block is the means by which the TUTELAGE in-line packet processor can deny entry/exit of network activity at the Internet Access Points (IAPs) based initially on source and/or destination Internet Protocol (IP) addresses and ports.

SKIP TO APPLICATION

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TUTELAGE Capabilities

MENU

Latency

  • Speed Adjusted
  • DoD

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
Latency is the means by which the TUTELAGE in-line packet processor can stealthily vary the in/outbound speed of an adversary's activities traversing the IAPs to provide a diminished quality of service. This creates more time for other TUTELAGE capabilities to be executed.

SKIP TO APPLICATION

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How Many, How Often

TUTELAGE currently operates against 28 major threat categories, using a total of 794 operational effects encompassed in seven capabilities (alerting/tipping, blocking, interception, sidelining, substitution, redirection and latency).

Cyber Activity Ops Alert/Tip Block Intercept Latency Redirect Substitute
SMTP HTTP HTTP DNS TCP
Adversarial Recon 3 3
Bishop Knight 10 10
Black Energy Bot 24 24
Blind Marksmen 77 77
Byzantine Foothold 96 1 12 83
Byzantine Viking 36 1 4 31
Carbon Peptide 6 6
Conficker 3 3
Cross-Domain Violations 77 77 77
Dancing Panda 2 2
Discovery 123 4 116 1 2
Eleonore Exploit Kit (TEC) 5 5
Email 8 8
GnomeFisher 4 4
GnomeVision 1 1
MakersMark 8 8
Maverick Church 12 4 8
Native Dancer 26 8 18
Non Attributed Malware 13 13
Other 3 3
Phoenix Exploit Kit 1 1
Technology 7 6 1
WeaselWaggle/SubtleSnow 58 1 57
Widowkey 26 1 25
Zeus 17 1 16
TOTAL 794 81 2 61 3 77 552 95

TUTELAGE posture against major threats as of 11 February 2011.

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FUTURE CAPABILITIES

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Upgrades & What They Mean

Upgrade to 10G Sensor provides additional capabilities and enables future upgrades:

  • Immediate Benefits:
    • Increased speed and capacity
    • TS//SI signatures
    • Full Snort (Current sensors use packet-based Snort. 10G sensors use session-based Snort.)
    • Multi-event Snort
  • Future Upgrades:
    • POPQUIZ: Real-time behavioral analytics
    • GNOMEVISION: De-obfuscation of malicious packages
    • Cryptanalytic Capabilities
    • Netflow: Traffic analysis with GHOSTMACHINE

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Latest ~Future~ TUTELAGE Capability

TCP Reset

  • TCP
  • The page cannot be found 404 - File not found
  • Reset Connection
  • DoD

(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)
TCP Reset prevents malicious activity by breaking the connection.

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Future TUTELAGE Capabilities

Sideline for Session Analysis

  • Internet
  • Sideline Infrastructure
  • Analysis
  • http://...
  • Continue On? or Quarantine?
  • Decision Logic
  • DoD

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
Sidelining is an intentional redirection of an activity to a secondary level of intervention where an intermediate host(s) (e.g. Listening Post, Quarantine, etc.) is staged to provide additional processing/manipulation to better engage and/or thwart adversarial activity.

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Future TUTELAGE Capabilities

Sideline for Listening Posts

  • Internet
  • Today: DNS Interdiction
  • Listening Post
  • Virtual Listening Posts
  • Physical Servers
  • DoD

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
Sidelining is an intentional redirection of an activity to a secondary level of intervention where an intermediate host(s) (e.g. Listening Post, Quarantine, etc.) is staged to provide additional processing/manipulation to better engage and/or thwart adversarial activity.

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Future TUTELAGE Capabilities

HBSS Integration

  • HBSS
  • Adversarial C2 Request
  • Remote Server
  • HBSS Enabled Endpoint
  • ePO Server
  • Substitution/Redirection to Deliver Payload
  • Detailed Alerts
  • DoD

(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)
Integrating with the DOD's Host-Based Security System allows malicious activity detected through classified signatures in TUTELAGE to be dealt with at the host level. Using HBSS, TUTELAGE can trigger less sensitive alerts to local network administrators.

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Future TUTELAGE Capabilities

Quantum Tip

  • Sensor
  • PANDORAS MAYHEM
  • Injector
  • Quantum Tip
  • TURBINE
  • DoD

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)
TUTELAGE can tip QUANTUM to enable offensive action in adversary space.

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Future TUTELAGE Capabilities

Quantum Shooter

  • Injector
  • Sensor
  • PANDORAS MAYHEM
  • Quantum Tip
  • TURBINE
  • DoD

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)
TUTELAGE can tip QUANTUM to enable offensive action in adversary space.

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Future TUTELAGE Capabilities

Real Time Cryptanalytics

  • Sensor
  • PANDORAS MAYHEM
  • Cryptanalytics
  • DoD

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)
Real-time cryptanalytics allows Quantum operations to take place at net-speed.

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OPS SUCCESS STORIES

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U.S. Military Leaders Defended

  • SIGINT
  • BYZANTINE HADES
  • Countermeasure Developed
  • RADM
  • CAPT
  • CJCS
  • CNO
  • Based on information from SIGINT collection, a TUTELAGE countermeasure was developed and deployed in 2009 for a particular BYZANTINE HADES attack.
  • On October 21st and 22nd 2010, the spear-phishing attack was launched. The attack targeted four users, including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, with a carefully disguised malicious PDF.
  • NTOC operated the countermeasure and the attack was thwarted.

SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY


SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

WAG Attempts to Deliver Holiday Present to DoD

23 December

  • NTOC-TX calls ops center advising of phishing campaign with “Merry Christmas” subject associated with WAG actors
  • WAG actors attempted to use ZEUS malware to exfiltrate documents
  • NTOC-TX did malware analysis and identified 2 new callback domains
  • In < 3 hours, received CyberCommand approval and placed domains on DNS interdiction

30 December

  • NTOC-TX notices new spike in WAG mail signature
  • NTOC-TX discovers new callback domain
  • In < 20 minutes, received approval and placed domain on DNS interdiction
  • NTOC-W confirmed same malware from Xmas themed event

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AMULETSTELLAR Spearphishing... Trying to Make New Friends

FRAUD
LinkedIn
This is a reminder that on December 25, George W. sent you an invitation to be her professional network at LinkedIn.
Follow this link to accept George W.'s invitation.
[REDACTED]
Signing up is free and takes less than a minute.
On December 25, [REDACTED] wrote:
> To[REDACTED]
> From[REDACTED]
> Subject:[REDACTED]
> I'd like to add you to my professional network on LinkedIn.
>
[REDACTED]

The only way to get access to George W.'s professional network on LinkedIn is through the following link:

[REDACTED]

You can remove yourself from George W.'s network at any time.
© 2010, LinkedIn Corporation
  • In SIGINT, NTOC observed AMULETSTELLAR use of [REDACTED]@yahoo.com email account
  • On Christmas Day, account was used to generated LinkedIn requests to 10 general and flag grade officers
  • NTOC leveraged TUTELAGE and SIGINT for further discovery of activity
  • In coordination with CyberCommand,
    • Published 10 advisories
    • Identified 2 additional LinkedIn accounts
    • Deployed 4 countermeasures
    • Intercepted over 2000 emails from AMULETSTELLAR actors

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SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

Combating the Low Orbit Ion Cannon (LOIC)

  • The open-source LOIC tool has been used by “Anonymous” and others in several DDoS attacks.
  • NTOC developed signatures to detect specific content strings generated by this tool.
  • For example, for packets containing the string “Sweet_dreams_from_AnonOPs” TUTELAGE will perform an ACL Block against the offending IP once a threshold is met.
  • Observed here is traffic from an ongoing DDoS against several DoD IPs. TUTELAGE is blocking the malicious IP from communicating with any DoD machines.
leostream - op-winxpv11-13.op.ntoc.nc - Remote Desktop

SECRET//REL TO USA, ACGU/NS

TUTELAGE CYBERWATCH: TEC:LOIC_DEFAULT_CONTENT2_UDP - Mozilla Firefox

SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY

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tutelage.ntoc[REDACTED]

Most Visited Getting Started Latest Headlines Windows Marketplace

Stolen PKI Certificates Log | Tutelage Signatures | TurQI - TURNABOUT Query Interface | TUTELAGE CYBERWATCH: TEC:LOI...

Row  View Event time stamp           SRC IP     SRC PORT    Dest IP   Dest Port Protocol SIGAD
1    View 2011/03/06 07:19 35.26376S [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 80        udp  USF-9940L
2    View 2011/03/06 07:19 35.26376S [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 80        udp  USF-9940L
3    View 2011/03/06 07:19 35.26376S [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 80        udp  USF-9940L
4    View 2011/03/06 07:19 35.26376S [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 80        udp  USF-9940L
5    View 2011/03/06 07:19 35.26376S [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 80        udp  USF-9940L
6    View 2011/03/06 07:19 35.26376S [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 80        udp  USF-9940L
7    View 2011/03/06 07:19 35.26376S [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 80        udp  USF-9940L
8    View 2011/03/06 07:19 35.26376S [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 80        udp  USF-9940L
9    View 2011/03/06 07:19 35.26376S [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 80        udp  USF-9940L
10   View 2011/03/06 07:19 35.26376S [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 80        udp  USF-9940L
11   View 2011/03/06 07:19 35.26375S [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 80        udp  USF-9940L
12   View 2011/03/06 07:19 35.26375S [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 80        udp  USF-9940L
13   View 2011/03/06 07:19 35.26375S [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 80        udp  USF-9940L
14   View 2011/03/06 07:19 35.26375S [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 80        udp  USF-9940L
15   View 2011/03/06 07:19 35.26375S [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 80        udp  USF-9940L
16   View 2011/03/06 07:19 35.26375S [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 80        udp  USF-9940L
17   View 2011/03/06 07:19 35.26375S [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 80        udp  USF-9940L
18   View 2011/03/06 07:19 35.26375S [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 80        udp  USF-9940L
19   View 2011/03/06 07:19 35.26375S [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 80        udp  USF-9940L
20   View 2011/03/06 07:19 35.26375S [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 80        udp  USF-9940L
21   View 2011/03/06 07:19 35.26375S [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 80        udp  USF-9940L

Find: scarlon Next Previous Highlight All Match Phrase not found
Done

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UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

QUESTIONS?

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

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