CSEC Surveillance of Travellers Through Airport Wi-Fi Tracking

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Creating agency: CSE Communications Security Establishment (Canada)
Document date: 2012-05-10
Pages: 27
Genre: slides
Banner:
Classification: TOP SECRET
Dissemination: -

The leaked 2012 top secret CSEC presentation details a trial program that used airport Wi-Fi metadata to identify and track travellers’ devices across Canada and internationally, developing advanced “IP profiling” techniques to map movements through hotels, airports, and public hotspots. The program, conducted with NSA support, aimed to build powerful analytic tools for surveillance and real-time alerts within the Five Eyes intelligence network.

Long Description:
No extended description available.
Programs:
SSO, QUOVA, ATLAS

People mentioned:
-

Countries:
Canada, India, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Egypt

Tags:
CSEC, NSA, airports, Wi-Fi geolocation, WiFi, metadata collection, Canadian, Five Eyes, mass surveillance, NSA collaboration, travel, IP profiling

Identifier:
EFF_-_01312014-cbc-csec_airport_wifi_tracking

PDF SHA-256:
249625365ba028b7e7462ec27c246b970e73f9c733e4a304c61b7a8d412b5485

TOP SECRET

Communications Security Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada

IP Profiling Analytics & Mission Impacts

[REDACTED]
Tradecraft Developer
CSEC - Network Analysis Centre
May 10, 2012

SIGINT
Canada


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Example IP Profile Problem

Target appears on IP address, wish to understand network context more fully

Example Quova look-up & response for [REDACTED]

  • Lat. 60.00 Long: -95.00 (in frozen tundra W. of Hudson Bay)
  • City: unknown
  • Country: Canada,
  • Operator: Bell Canada, Sympatico

Issues with IP look-up data:

  • is it actually revealing, or is it opaque
  • is the data even current, or is it out-of-date
  • was the data ever accurate in the first place

2


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Objectives

Develop new analytics to provide richer contextual
data about a network address

Apply analytics against Tipping & Cueing objectives

Build upon artefact of techniques to develop new
needle-in-a-haystack analytic – contact chaining
across air-gaps

3


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Analytic Concept – Start with Travel Node

Begin with single seed Wi-Fi IP address of intl. airport

Assemble set of user IDs seen on network address
over two weeks

4


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Profiling Travel Nodes – Next Step

Follow IDs backward and forward in recent time

Earlier IP clusters of:

  • local hotels
  • domestic airports
  • local transportation hubs
  • local internet cafes
  • etc.

Later IP clusters of:

  • other intl. airports
  • domestic airports
  • major intl. hotels
  • etc.

5


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IP Hopping Forward in Time

Follow IDs forward in time to next IP & note delta time

Next IP sorted
by most popular:
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
1 Hr.
2 Hr.
3 Hr.
4 Hr.
5 Hr.
Δ time

Many clusters will resolve to other Airports!

Can then take seeds from these airports and
repeat to cover whole world

Ditto for going backward in time, can uncover
roaming infrastructure of host city: hotels,
conference centers, Wi-Fi hotspots etc.

6


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Data Reality

The analytic produced excellent profiles, but was more
complex than initial concept suggests

Data had limited aperture – Canadian Special Source

  • major CDN ISPs team with US email majors, losing travel coverage

Behaviour at airports

  • little lingering on arrival; arrivals using phones, not WiFi
  • still, some Wi-Fi use when waiting for connecting flight/baggage
  • different terminals: domestic/international; also private lounges

Very many airports and hotels served by large Boingo
private network

  • not seen in aperture; traffic seems to return via local Akamai node

7


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Tradecraft Development Data Set

Have two weeks worth of ID-IP data from Canadian Special Source - [REDACTED]

Had program access to Quova dataset connecting into Atlas database

Had seed knowledge of a single Canadian Airport WiFi IP address

8


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Hop Geo Profile From CDN Airport Intl. Terminal

Long Longitude scale is non-linear
a
t
most far-flung sites are wireless gateways with many other wireless gateways in set

Profiled/seed IP location: square = geographic location
Hopped-to IP location: line height = numbers of unique hopped-to IPs at location

Plot of where else IDs seen at seed IP have been seen in two weeks
Plot shows most hopped to IPs are nearby - confirming reported seed geo data

9


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Effect of Invalid Geo Information

Long Longitude scale is non-linear
a
t

Geo incongruence: displacement of seed location from distribution center strongly suggests data error

Profiled/seed IP location: square = geographic location
Hopped-to IP location: line = numbers of unique hopped-to IPs at location

Effect of invalid seed geo information readily apparent

10


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Hop-Out Destinations Seen

Other domestic airports

Other terminals, lounges, transport hubs

Hotels in many cities

Mobile gateways in many cities

Etc.

11


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"Discovered" Other CDN Airport IP

Domestic terminal

Closeness of majority of hopped-to IPs confirms geo data

But, domestic airport can also look like a busy hotel ...

12


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IDs Presence Profile at "Discovered" Airport

Each horizontal line shows presence pattern of one ID, sorted by order of appearance

Time/days ->

Dominant pattern is each ID is seen briefly, just once - as expected

13


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Profiles of Discovered Hotel

Many IDs present over a few days

14

Time/days ->


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Profiles of Discovered Enterprise

Time/days ->

Regular temporal presence (M-F) with local geographic span
Contrasts well against travel/roaming nodes

15


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Discovered Coffee Shop, Library

Coffee shop

Time/days ->

Library

Similar patterns of mixed temporal & local geographic presence

16


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Discovered Wireless Gateway

Wireless gateway not unlike a hotel, except ...

Time/days ->

17


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Partial Range Profile of Wireless Gateway

Number of IDs seen on each IP
500
400
300
200
100
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Individual IP number in range of 8

ID Total on IP
Common IDs

For wireless gateway, range behaviour is revealing
Most IDs seen on an IP are also scattered across entire range
ID totals & traffic across full range is very high

18


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Mission Impact of IP Profiling

Tipping and Cueing Task Force (TCTF)

  • a 5-Eyes effort to enable the SIGINT system to provide real-time alerts of events of interest
  • alert to: target country location changes, webmail logins with time-limited cookies etc.

Targets/Enemies still target air travel and hotels

  • airlines: shoe/underwear/printer bombs ...
  • hotels: Mumbai, Kabul, Jakarta, Amman, Islamabad, Egyptian Sinai ...

Analytic can hop-sweep through IP address space to identify
set of IP addresses for hotels and airports

  • detecting target presence within set will trigger an urgent alert
  • aim to productize analytics to reliably produce set of IPs for alerting

19


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IP Profiling Summary

Different categories of IP ownership/use show distinct
characteristics

  • airports, hotels, coffee shops, enterprises, wireless gateways etc.
  • clear characteristics enable formal modeling developments
  • clear identification of hotels and airports enables critical Tipping & Cueing
    tradecraft

Geo-hop profile can confirm/refute IP geo look-up
information

  • later could fold-in time deltas for enhanced modeling

Can "sweep" a region/city for roaming access points to IP
networks

  • leads to a new needle-in-a-haystack analytic ...

20


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Tradecraft Problem Statement

A kidnapper based in a rural area travels to an urban area to
make ransom calls

  • can't risk bringing attention to low-population rural area
  • won't use phone for any other comms (or uses payphones ...)

Assumption: He has another device that accesses IP
networks from public access points

  • having a device isn't necessary, could use internet cafes, libraries etc.
  • he is also assumed to use IP access around the time of ransom calls

Question: Knowing the time of the ransom calls can we
discover the kidnapper's IP ID/device

  • "contact chain" across air-gap (not a correlation of selectors)

21


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Solution Outline

With earlier IP profiling analytics, we can “sweep” a
city/region to discover and determine public accesses

We can then select which IP network IDs are seen as active
in all times surrounding the known ransom calls

  • reduce set to a shortlist

Then we examine the reduced set of IP network IDs and
eliminate baseline heavy users in the area that fall into the
set intersection just because they are always active

  • that is, eliminate those that are highly active outside the times of the ransom calls
  • hopefully leaves only the one needle from the haystack

22


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First Proof-of-Concept

Swept a modest size city and discovered two high traffic
public access ranges with >300,000 active IDs over 2 weeks

  • used for initial expediency due to computational intensity

Presumed that there were 3 ransom calls, each 50 hours
apart during daytime, looked for IDs within 1 Hr of calls

  • reduce large set to a shortlist of just 19 IP network IDs

Examined activity level of 19 IP network IDs – how many
presences each had in 1 Hr slots over two weeks

  • main worry as the computation was running: there would be a lot of IDs that showed just a handful of appearances: e.g. 3, 4, 5 instances

23


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ID Presence of Shortlist

Postulated presence of kidnapper/target

Time/hour-slots ->

Happy result: least active ID had appearances in 40 hour-slots!
Thus could eliminate all, leaving just the kidnapper (if he was there)

24


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Big-Data Computational Challenge

All the previous analytics, while successful experimentally,
ran much too slowly to allow for practical productization

CARE: Collaborative Analytics Research Environment

  • a big-data system being trialed at CSEC (with NSA launch assist)
  • non-extraordinary hardware
  • minimal impedance between memory, storage and processors
  • highly optimized, in-memory database capabilities
  • columnar storage, high performance vector functional runtime
  • powerful but challenging programming language (derived from APL)

Result of first experiments with CARE: game-changing

  • run-time for hop-profiles reduced from 2+ Hrs to several seconds
  • allows for tradecraft to be profitably productized

25


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Overall Summary

IP profiling showing terrific value

  • significant analytic asset for IP networks and target mobility
  • enables critical capability within Tipping & Cueing Task force
  • working to productize on powerful new computational platform
  • broader SSO accesses/apertures coming online at CSEC
  • look to formalize models & fold-in timing deltas

A new needle-in-a-haystack analytic is viable: contact

  • chaining across air-gaps
  • enabled by sweep capability of IP profiling
  • should test further to understand robustness with respect to loosening
  • assumptions of target behaviour
  • beyond kidnapping, tradecraft could also be used for any target that makes occasional forays into other cities/regions

26


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[REDACTED] Tradecraft Studio Example

[REDACTED]

Possible route for productizing analytics

27