Tag: metadata 142 documents
Search documents matching “metadata” →Free-text subjects the curators added. Unlike the other axes these are not necessarily from the documents' own vocabulary, so they are the loosest thing to browse by (and the most forgiving).
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New Policy Affects SIGINT Development: The Unmasking of Canadian Phone Numbers SIDtoday [pdf]
The Communications Security Establishment — the NSA’s Canadian partner agency — has authorized the unmasking of Canadian phone numbers “incidentally” collected by the NSA. This allows for easier contact chaining and other forms of target development involving Canadian phone numbers.
Programs: FASCIAThe Intercept ↗ (2018-08-15) -
New Session Added: Brown Bag on 'Persona Session Collection' SIDtoday [pdf]
An additional session has been scheduled for a top-secret discussion of strategies and tools for discovery and collection of the communications of important targets.
Programs: CONDENSER · MAM · UTT · GLOBALVISION · TURBULANCE · TRAFFICTHIEF · WEALTHYCLUSTER · XKEYSCORE · UIS · PSC · WEALTHYCLUSTER2The Intercept ↗ (2018-03-01) -
NSA Intelligence Relationship with Norway [pdf]
This document details the long-standing SIGINT partnership between the NSA and Norway’s NIS, formalized under the NORUSA agreement in 1954, highlighting collaboration on intelligence collection, analysis, and technology modernization, particularly against Russian, counterterrorism, and counter-proliferation targets. It emphasizes mutual contributions, including SIGINT, geolocation data, FORNSAT metadata, and computer network exploitation, with Norway recognized as a top NSA partner and significant contributor to coalition intelligence efforts in Afghanistan.
“Norway Used NSA Technology for Potentially Illegal Spying” - The Intercept ↗ (2018-03-01) · “Norway´s secret surveillance of Russian politics for the NSA” - Dagbladet ↗ (2013-12-17) · “The antennas that collect data on Norwegian citizens” - NRK ↗ (2018-03-01) · Moltke, Henrik · Halvorsen, Arne · Blindheim, Anne Marte · Klungtveit, Harald S. · Sørenes, Kjetil Magne · Bergsaker, Tore · Hultgreen, Gunnar · Skille, Øyvind Bye · Hansen, Ståle Ellingsgard · Døvik, Olav · Lied, Henrik · Jansson, Harald K. -
NSA June 2012 SSO Weekly Brief Excerpt [pdf]
This NSA Special Source Operations (SSO) briefing from June 2012 describes SPINNERET, a surveillance program that became the second-largest source of phone calling records and "tips" feeding into SHELLTRUMPET, a system that obscures the origin of collected metadata before forwarding it to NSA's Real-Time Regional Gateway (RT-RG) in Texas. The document indicates SHELLTRUMPET "obfuscates the source designators" and filters metadata to only include call events within NSA-Texas's area of responsibility.
“Mission Creep: How the NSA’s Game-Changing Targeting System Built for Iraq and Afghanistan Ended Up on the Mexico Border” - The Intercept ↗ (2019-05-29) · “Norges hemmelige krig i Afghanistan” - NRK ↗ (2019-05-29) · Moltke, Henrik · Skille, Øyvind Bye · Døvik, Olav · Hansen, Ståle Ellingsgard · Fjørtoft, Martin -
NSA target package [pdf]
This 2011 target package focuses on Muhammad Tahir Shahzad (alias Abu Hamza), a Pakistan-based bomb builder and Al-Qaeda facilitator. The document was produced by the Counter IED Analysis Integration Cell (CAIC) at the NSA. Notably, the document credits the tracking of Shahzad’s 60+ digital selectors with the eventual capture of high-value targets, including himself and Bali bombing suspect Umar Patek. The accompanying Washington Post investigation uses this specific case to highlight the massive scale of "incidental collection." While Shahzad was a valid foreign target under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act (FAA), the investigation revealed that for every legitimate target like him, the NSA intercepted nine "non-targeted" users—many of whom were Americans—capturing deeply personal photos, medical records, and private correspondence.
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NSA's New Information Sharing Policy: How It Affects the Dissemination of SIGINT SIDtoday [pdf]
A new policy allows for more rapid sharing of signals intelligence with other branches of government and allies, as long as agents comply with the appropriate regulations. Open sharing represents a “major cultural shift” for the NSA, and as the agency drafts new policies, analysts must judge whether information they find is both eligible and appropriate for sharing.
The Intercept ↗ (2018-03-01) -
NSAers Make First-Ever Visit to FORNSAT Collection Site in Schöningen, Germany SIDtoday [pdf]
The BND (German Federal Intelligence Service) has a base at Schoningen, where they collect different types of mobile communications (satellite, fax, and GSM), many of which they share with their NSA counterparts. NSA visited to compare notes, and requested copies of some of the Germans' software tools--which had "features that surpass US SIGINT capabilities--for call chaining and metadata analysis.
“The NSA in Germany: Snowden's Documents Available for Download” - Der Spiegel ↗ (2014-06-18) · The Intercept ↗ (2019-05-29) -
O Where, O Where Has My Target Gone? SIDtoday [pdf]
The Metadata Analysis Center is trying to build technology to pinpoint the location of GSM cellphone users based on metadata. The author explains several terms related to GSM networks and describes how they fit together in the metadata that's collected, along with the challenges of laying it all out on a map. In order to solve this challenge, they requested that people submit geolocation data about GSM networks.
Marking: SECRETPrograms: PILOTHOUSE · ASSOCIATION · OCTSKYWARD · BELLVIEW · THORNYHOSTILE · DEEPSKY · GAMIRA · TAREX · GNDBThe Intercept ↗ (2017-09-13) -
One Login, Many Searches SIDtoday [pdf]
In June, the NSA launched the federated search tool GLOBALREACH, which allows analysts to search telephony metadata across a number of datasets and tools, rather than having to query each database individually. Soon, Digital Network Intelligence information will be searchable via this tool as well.
Programs: GLOBALREACH · FASCIA · ASSOCIATION · DISHFIRE · YACHTSHOP · SPOTBEAM · BROOMSTICK · MAINWAY · ENTANGLER · GNDB · LAMPSHADE · OCTAVE · CONTRAOCTAVE · DISTANTFISH · BANYAN · APATS · TRAILBLAZERThe Intercept ↗ (2017-04-24) -
One-Year Anniversary for SUSLAG SIDtoday [pdf]
The NSA’s Special U.S. Liaison Activity Germany opened a new facility in June 2004. This site serves as a hub for the NSA’s collaboration with German intelligence, the BND, on monitoring targets and sharing techniques.
The Intercept ↗ (2018-03-01) -
OPSEC Bulletin: Converting Sanitized Text from Word to PDF? -- Caution! SIDtoday [pdf]
A new report from the Information Assurance Directorate highlights a common operational security error: converting “sanitized” Microsoft Word documents to PDF without purging metadata or properly redacting images, text, or diagrams.
Programs: E-SpaceThe Intercept ↗ (2018-08-15) -
Pilot Effort Will Add 'Intelligence Source Descriptors' into NSA Reports SIDtoday [pdf]
The NSA will add four new metadata fields to each report they produce that indicate the access they had to the communication, the identity of one or both parties to the communication, the source's reliability, and an additional "amplifying comment."
The Intercept ↗ (2019-05-29) -
PINWALE: Transnational DNI Training [pdf]
This presentation is a classified NSA training guide on PINWALE, a SIGINT database used for the storage, retrieval, and analysis of intercepted digital network intelligence (DNI) communications. It outlines system capabilities, query creation, search tools, and interfaces such as NEXUS, UIS, and AGILITY, explaining how analysts search, retrieve, and analyze both content and metadata — including FISA-partitioned data — within the Five Eyes intelligence framework.
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PRESTON Study [pdf]
This GCHQ document details the PRESTON surveillance program, revealing that over a six-month period, 97% of intercepted communications—including calls, texts, and internet data—were not viewed by analysts despite being fully warranted, highlighting systemic challenges in processing and exploiting the vast volume of collected intelligence. It underscores the reliance on traditional PRESTON sources for events like the London G20, while noting gaps in data feeds from other repositories, reflecting both operational scale and limitations in effective oversight.
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PRISM/US-984XN Overview [pdf]
A 2013 NSA training presentation revealing that major U.S. tech companies — including Google, Facebook, Apple, Microsoft, and Skype — secretly gave the NSA direct access to their servers, allowing the agency to collect users' emails, chats, photos, and files in real time, with the FBI acting as intermediary.
Programs: PRISM · FAIRVIEW · STORMBREW · BLARNEY · OAKSTAR · UTT · PRINTAURA · PINWALE · NUCLEON · TRAFFICTHIEF · SCISSORS · MARINA · MAINWAY · FALLOUT · CONVEYANCE · REPRISMFISA · SSO“U.S., British intelligence mining data from nine U.S. Internet companies in broad secret program” - The Washington Post ↗ (2013-06-06) · “NSA Prism program taps in to user data of Apple, Google and others” - The Guardian ↗ (2013-06-07) · “L'ampleur de l'espionnage mondial par la NSA” - Le Monde ↗ (2013-10-21) · “NSA files decoded: Edward Snowden's surveillance revelations explained” - The Guardian ↗ (2013-11-01) · “No Place to Hide” - Metropolitan Books ↗ (2014-05-13) · “Dark Mirror: Edward Snowden and the American Surveillance State” - Penguin Press ↗ (2020-05-19) · Gellman, Barton · Poitras, Laura · Greenwald, Glenn · MacAskill, Ewen · Untersinger, Martin · Dance, Gabriel -
Profile: Analytic Services and Technology (S24) SIDtoday [pdf]
NSA's Analytic Services and Technology provides analysts with many of the products and services they use every day, including analytic tools and access to non-SIGINT and open source information.
The Intercept ↗ (2019-05-29) -
Puis-je vous aider? Highlights from a Third-Party-Training TDY SIDtoday [pdf]
An NSA team travelled to France to provide a crash course to French counterparts. To the team's surprise, it found the French are allowed to use “non-secure cell phones in their training facility, as long as they were turned off,” and that wine is served with every meal (instead of soda).
“Mission Creep: How the NSA’s Game-Changing Targeting System Built for Iraq and Afghanistan Ended Up on the Mexico Border” - The Intercept ↗ (2019-05-29) · “Norges hemmelige krig i Afghanistan” - NRK ↗ (2019-05-29) · The Intercept ↗ (2019-05-29) · Moltke, Henrik · Skille, Øyvind Bye · Døvik, Olav · Hansen, Ståle Ellingsgard · Fjørtoft, Martin -
Real Life Stats from GPRS work [pdf]
GCHQ’s TOP SECRET briefing touts real-time interception of diplomats’ smartphone traffic at the 2009 G20—especially BlackBerry—feeding live messages and newly discovered selectors to analysts and UK ministers to shape summit outcomes. It’s a snapshot of summit espionage turned into a policy tool: exploit the smartphone dependence of foreign delegations, deliver actionable SIGINT on demand.
“GCHQ intercepted foreign politicians' communications at G20 summits” - The Guardian ↗ (2013-06-16) · “For the NSA, espionage was a means to strengthen the US position in climate negotiations” - Dagbladet Information ↗ (2014-01-30) · MacAskill, Ewen · Davies, Nick · Hopkins, Nick · Borger, Julian · Ball, James · Gjerding, Sebastian · Geist, Anton · Moltke, Henrik · Poitras, Laura -
Recent Enhancements to the PLUS Database SIDtoday [pdf]
The "PLUS" system contains a database of information about signals intelligence reports and search tools. New categories of records have been added, including data from Canada and the U.K.
Programs: PLUS · SKYCAST · KLIEGLIGHT · EGRAM · SYBASE · NSRP · RUMCAY · SCORPIOFORE · KSP · RAINMAN · SODThe Intercept ↗ (2017-09-13) -
Register Now for A&P; Analysis Conference SIDtoday [pdf]
Announcement of the upcoming Analysis Conference.
The Intercept ↗ (2017-09-13)