Tag: incidental collection 8 documents
Search documents matching “incidental collection” →Free-text subjects the curators added. Unlike the other axes these are not necessarily from the documents' own vocabulary, so they are the loosest thing to browse by (and the most forgiving).
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Bulk collection of webmail address books and emerging protocols [pdf]
TOP SECRET NSA document details the large-scale collection of email address books and contact lists from major webmail and social media providers, emphasizing their metadata value despite low attribution rates to known targets. It also highlights ongoing efforts to identify and analyze emerging communication protocols, such as those used by Hotmail Messenger.
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Content Acquisition Optimization PowerPoint Slides [pdf]
An NSA presentation on content acquisition optimisation — describing how incidental bulk collection from Yahoo Webmessenger, email address books, buddy lists and webmail inboxes was generating massive unintended collection volumes.
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Discovery SIGINT Targeting Scenarios and Compliance [pdf]
This document is a top-secret NSA guidance manual detailing SIGINT targeting scenarios, compliance procedures, and legal guidance for querying foreign actors, malware, and potentially U.S.-linked systems, including considerations for minimizing incidental collection of U.S. persons’ communications. It outlines specific rules, approvals, and exceptions for using SIGINT tools, foreign intelligence tasks, and cases involving ambiguous or dual-use selectors like WikiLeaks, The Pirate Bay, and foreign actors operating through U.S. infrastructure.
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FAA702 Glossary - Section 702 of the Fisa Amendments Act (FAA) [pdf]
This document outlines NSA rules under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act, which prohibit directly targeting U.S. persons or individuals inside the U.S., but quietly note a 2011 rule change allowing analysts to use U.S. person identifiers to query data already collected under 702—pending internal oversight. This effectively establishes a “backdoor search” capability enabling warrantless searches of Americans’ communications stored in NSA databases. Section 702 also gives the NSA authority to target without warrant the communications of foreign targets.
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Minimization Procedures Used By The National Security Agency In Connection With Acquisitions Of Foreign Intelligence, Information Pursuant To Section 702 Of The Foreign Intelligence Court Surveillance Act Of 1978 [pdf]
The NSA’s Section 702 minimization rules expose how the agency can collect, keep, and use Americans’ communications without warrants, despite claiming to target only foreigners. While the document sets out procedures for handling U.S. data, it includes broad loopholes—like keeping “inadvertently” collected domestic messages for years, sharing unfiltered data with the FBI, CIA, and even foreign governments, and giving NSA analysts wide discretion over who gets surveilled—all under secret FISA Court approval.
People: Holder, Eric H. Jr. -
NSA target package [pdf]
This 2011 target package focuses on Muhammad Tahir Shahzad (alias Abu Hamza), a Pakistan-based bomb builder and Al-Qaeda facilitator. The document was produced by the Counter IED Analysis Integration Cell (CAIC) at the NSA. Notably, the document credits the tracking of Shahzad’s 60+ digital selectors with the eventual capture of high-value targets, including himself and Bali bombing suspect Umar Patek. The accompanying Washington Post investigation uses this specific case to highlight the massive scale of "incidental collection." While Shahzad was a valid foreign target under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act (FAA), the investigation revealed that for every legitimate target like him, the NSA intercepted nine "non-targeted" users—many of whom were Americans—capturing deeply personal photos, medical records, and private correspondence.
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Procedures Used By The National Security Agency For Targeting Non-United States Persons Reasonably Believed To Be Located Outside The United States To Acquire Foreign Intelligence Court Information Pursuant To Section 702 Of The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Of 1978 [pdf]
The NSA’s 2009 Section 702 targeting procedures lay out how analysts decide who can be surveilled without a warrant, supposedly limiting spying to foreigners abroad. In reality, the rules give the agency wide latitude to presume people are foreign, rely on vague “totality of the circumstances” tests, and allow broad technical methods like IP filters and metadata checks. Oversight is mostly internal and after-the-fact, creating significant potential for U.S. communications to be swept up with little accountability.
People: Holder, Eric H. Jr. -
Tasking of SCALAWAG [pdf]
An NSA Special Source Operations memo describing bandwidth and latency problems caused by the SCALAWAG bulk voice collection program, and introducing the RETRO Tool — a capability allowing analysts to reach back up to 30 days into a buffer of recorded phone calls from an entire country to retrieve audio that was never individually targeted.
Programs: SCALAWAG · DOUBLEARROW · UTT · OCTAVE · NUCLEON · RETROSPECTIVE · RETROTOOL · RETRO · FASCIA · SSO