Publisher: The Intercept 72 documents
Search documents matching “The Intercept” →Who published each document. Mostly a news outlet, but sometimes a book. A partner outlet that reported the story without publishing the documents keeps its byline and its article, but is not a publisher here.
Showing the documents The Intercept itself published in 2016 - all years.
Graphs
By Banner
By Classification
Refine (combine with another filter, via search)
Sort: Title
Documents
-
SKIDROWE [pdf]
This document reveals the extensive surveillance capabilities of the NSA's SKIDROWE program at TITANPOINTE, specifically designed to intercept and analyze satellite communications and internet data. It highlights how intercepted data is processed and filtered through advanced systems like XKEYSCORE, which enables real-time intelligence gathering by sifting through massive amounts of digital content, including emails, calls, and internet activity.
Programs: SKIDROWE · WEALTHYCLUSTER2 · WEALTHYCLUSTER · TURNWEALTHY · VPCS · XKEYSCORE · GENESIS · CONTROLAND · ATM · FITBOY · DARKTHUNDER · FIP · METTLESOME · SKYFRAME · PVOICE · XXPY0012 · AGITATOR · STARPROC · SPELLBINDER · BLACKPEARL · BLACKALCHEMY · BLACKGOLD · BLACKFIRE · MONKEYMIND · BCD · EVVIPER · QUANTUM · MISTYPEAK · VALIANTSURF · GALLANTWAVE · SWINE · BLUESNORT · TOSSSWUNG · GNOMEVISION · GNOMEGOGGLES · HIDDENSALAMANDER · TURMOIL · PSC -
Special Source Operations - Corporate Partner Access [pdf]
A classified NSA Special Source Operations briefing detailing the four major corporate partner surveillance programs — BLARNEY, FAIRVIEW, STORMBREW, and OAKSTAR — their legal authorities, collection access points, target lists, and funding profiles totaling nearly $480 million in FY2010, revealing the infrastructure through which the NSA taps U.S. telecommunications companies to intercept international fiber optic communications on American soil.
Programs: BLARNEY · FAIRVIEW · STORMBREW · OAKSTAR · LITHIUM · ARTIFICE · ROCKSALT · SERENADE · PINECONE · BRECKENRIDGE · TAHOE · SUNVALLEY · WHISTLER · KILLINGTON · COPPERMOUNTAIN · MAVERICK · CONUS · TURMOIL · UTT · STEELKNIGHT · SSO“Snowden document reveals key role of companies in NSA data collection” - The Guardian ↗ (2013-11-01) · “NSA files decoded: Edward Snowden's surveillance revelations explained” - The Guardian ↗ (2013-11-01) · “No Place to Hide” - Metropolitan Books ↗ (2014-05-13) · “NSA Spying Relies on AT&T’s ‘Extreme Willingness to Help’” - ProPublica ↗ (2015-08-15) · “AT&T Helped U.S. Spy on Internet on a Vast Scale” - The New York Times ↗ (2015-08-15) · “Titanpointe: The NSA’s Spy Hub in New York, Hidden in Plain Sight” - The Intercept ↗ (2016-11-16) · MacAskill, Ewen · Rushe, Dominic · Dance, Gabriel · Greenwald, Glenn · Angwin, Julia · Larson, Jeff · Savage, Charlie · Moltke, Henrik · Poitras, Laura · Risen, James · Gallagher, Ryan -
-
SSO news excerpts [pdf]
These SSO news exceprts describe the successful deployment of QUANTUMTHEORY and QUANTUMINSERT capabilities by the NSA’s Tailored Access Operations (TAO) team, in collaboration with Special Source Operations (SSO), to exploit high-value targets, including key figures in the Haqqani network. Using a combination of signal case notations and real-time exploitation via QUANTUMHAND, TAO was able to implant malicious software on the target's computer, enabling further intelligence collection and exploitation.
Programs: QUANTUMTHEORY · QUANTUM · QUANTUMINSERT · FOXACID · DANCINGOASIS · FOXCONTACT · VALIDATOR · SARATOGA · TURMOIL · QUANTUMHAND · SSOPeople: Haqqani, Badruddin -
THIEVING MAGPIE: Using on-board GSM/GPRS services to track targets [pdf]
A GCHQ capability-development presentation on THIEVING MAGPIE, which uses the on-board GSM/GPRS services airlines offer to track targets in flight: comms backhauled over Inmarsat BGAN and collected via SOUTHWINDS, registration events tied to a flight number or callsign in near real time, events for BlackBerry handsets with their PINs and associated e-mail addresses, and content tasked into datastores with unselected traffic to XKEYSCORE.
“US and Britain refine their ability to tap into airline passenger’s mobile phones while they are in the air” - Le Monde ↗ (2016-12-07) · “American and British Spy Agencies Targeted In-Flight Mobile Phone Use” - The Intercept ↗ (2016-12-07) · “No Place to Hide” - Metropolitan Books ↗ (2014-05-13) · Follorou, Jacques · Greenwald, Glenn -
Tony Fullman NSA file [pdf]
This document, a series of TOP SECRET intelligence reports from 2012, details the extensive surveillance of Anthony Fullman, a Fiji-born New Zealand citizen and pro-democracy activist. This document shows how the NSA and the New Zealand Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) utilized the PRISM program (SIGAD: US-984XN) to intercept Fullman’s private communications under a FISA Amendments Act (FAA) certification. The gathered intelligence includes personal photographs with embedded metadata, detailed credit card transaction records, private emails regarding job opportunities, and Westpac bank statements. This document serves as a case study in how "Five Eyes" partners share intelligence derived from FAA collection to monitor individuals for political or security reasons.
Programs: PRISMPeople: Fullman, Anthony -
Tracking Targets Through Proxies & Anonymizers [pdf]
This NSA presentation details methods for tracking and de-anonymizing internet users who employ privacy tools like Tor, proxies, and VPN services such as AnchorFree's Hotspot Shield. The document explains how the agency reverse-engineers anonymization tools, creates "fingerprints" to identify their traffic in surveillance systems, and correlates encrypted connections to reveal users' real IP addresses and locations—acknowledging this work "makes for sad analysts" when targets successfully obscure their identities.
-
Traffic Series: Is Your Collection Surveyed or Sustained? SIDtoday [pdf]
This NSA internal newsletter article explains how analysts can determine whether their collected signals intelligence traffic comes from sustained, ongoing collection (tasked through formal requirements) or temporary "survey" activities where satellite collection sites scan for new targets. The article teaches analysts how to read "case notations" (CASNs) to identify whether traffic spikes are from permanent collection or just temporary surveys—warning that valuable intelligence can suddenly disappear when survey activities end unless analysts formally request sustained collection through the SURREY system.
-
UK special forces Reaper drone (Jan-Feb-2012) [pdf]
This NSA document from March 2012 describes how NSA and GCHQ geolocation efforts in Afghanistan pinpointed a previously unknown VSAT terminal in Helmand Province for UK Special Forces, who dispatched an MQ-9 Reaper drone to the location within an hour of receiving the intelligence.
-
Wireless LAN / CNE Tool Training Course and Evaluation [pdf]
This document is a slide deck introducing a "Close Access" NSA training course to "familiarize, educate, and certify students in the operational usage" of various computer network exploitation tools.
-
Work is progressing on Menwith Hill Station’s new operations building SIDtoday [pdf]
This NSA SIDtoday article from January 2010 describes construction progress on Project PHOENIX, a massive 95,000 square-foot state-of-the-art operations building at Menwith Hill Station in Yorkshire, England, featuring NSA's first "Tier III" equipment room with redundant power and cooling for critical mission systems, a 200-seat auditorium, and 10 new classrooms. The $40 million facility was expected to be completed by early 2011 with staff moving in by mid-2012, requiring 740 tons of steel, 4,200 cubic meters of concrete, and over 6,000 vehicle movements through the construction gate.
Programs: PHOENIX -
Yemen backhaul comms collected (Jan 2011) [pdf]
This brief GCHQ document from January 2011 describes intelligence collection operations against Yemen's microwave telecommunications infrastructure, where overhead (OH) tasking confirmed tower activity and analyzed GSM and CDMA backhaul communications using the ICS2 tool, yielding voice intercepts, SMS messages, and at least one dial number recognition (DNR) hit that significantly contributed to counterterrorism work.